Sefa v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for Health & Family Services
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) GRANTING dft's 5 Motion to Dismiss; (2) DENYING pla's 7 Motion for Summary Declaratory Jdg & 13 Dispositive Motion. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 4/5/12.(KJR)cc: COR, Sefa (US Mail)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON
ISAAC SEFA,
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Plaintiff,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 5:12-32-JMH
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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This matter is before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment [Record No.
5], Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Declaratory Judgment [Record No.
7], as well as Plaintiff’s “Dispositive Motion” [Record No. 13].
Defendant filed a Response [Record No. 9] to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Declaratory Judgment, and Plaintiff filed a Reply [Record
No. 17] regarding the same Motion.
The time for further responses
on these motions having passed, these matters are now ripe for the
Court’s review.
As the Court understands the Plaintiff’s Complaint and the
Defendant’s summary of facts, Plaintiff alleges that the Cabinet
for Health and Human Services (“Cabinet”) “kidnapped” his niece and
nephew in connection with state court actions for neglect against
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Plaintiff’s sister, Naomi Kandu, the mother of Plaintiff’s nephew,
as well as Plaintiff’s sister Ruth Pokua, the mother of Plaintiff’s
niece.
Both children are now wards of the state, and the Cabinet
has moved to terminate parental rights so the children may be
adopted.1
While the majority of Plaintiff’s complaints center
around the Cabinet’s procedure for taking custody and requesting
the termination of parental rights for Plaintiff’s niece and
nephew, the relief requested of this Court would require this Court
to review the state court’s decisions relating to the custody and
parental rights of Naomi Kandu and Ruth Pokua.
Plaintiff alleges
that the Cabinet (1) kidnapped the children by taking them from
school; (2) impermissibly interfered with Plaintiff’s rights by
asking for medical releases and requiring him to comply with the
Cabinet’s policies and procedures, such as attending a family
planning meeting; (3) that an agent from the Cabinet unlawfully
entered
his
home;
(4)
that
the
Cabinet
wrongfully
sent
the
plaintiff’s family to state court on the wrong date; (5) that the
Cabinet used “political power to separate and scatter the Plaintiff
and his family”; and (6) that the Cabinet set up networks of third
parties, using mind-blinding spirits, to threaten, intimidate and
launch spiritual attacks against Plaintiff’s family.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests
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It is unclear from the materials before this Court
whether the state court proceedings are final.
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the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint.
complaint
in
the
light
most
favorable
The Court views the
to
the
plaintiff
and
"[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level... on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true."
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,
“Although typically courts are limited
to the pleadings when faced with a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a
court may take judicial notice of other court proceedings without
converting the motion into one for summary judgment.”
Thomas
M.
Cooley
Law
School,
597
F.3d
812,
816
Buck v.
(6th
Cir.
2010)(citing Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d 565,
576 (6th Cir. 2008)).
The Court accepts Plaintiff's averments as true for the
purposes of evaluating Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. "A complaint
must contain either direct or inferential allegations with respect
to all material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some
viable legal theory."
Cir. 1997).
Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th
If it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff’s
complaint does not state facts sufficient to "state a claim that is
plausible on its face," then the claims must be dismissed.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d
538, 541-42 (6th Cir. 2007); Our Lady of Bellefonte Hospital, Inc.
v. Tri-State Physicians Network, Inc., 2007 WL 2903231, *2 (E.D.
Ky. Sept. 27, 2007). The factual allegations in the complaint need
3
to be sufficient to give notice to the defendant as to what claims
are alleged, and the plaintiff must plead "sufficient factual
matter" to render the legal claim plausible, i.e., more than merely
possible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50
(2009).
First, the Court notes that Plaintiff failed to properly serve
the Defendant, who is making a special appearance in the case to
challenge jurisdiction, sufficiency of process, and to argue that
Plaintiff fails to state a claim.
Plaintiff sent a copy of the
complaint and summons to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services
location in Lexington, Kentucky.
The certified mail was received
by a local worker who was not a proper agent of the Cabinet.
While
that alone would be sufficient grounds to dismiss the lawsuit, See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(5); Ross v. Voncannon, 2010 WL 2103440, *8
(E.D.Tenn. May 21, 2010), the Court relies on the following
substantive grounds for dismissal of the Plaintiff’s claims.
"A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a
pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation and
quotations omitted).
Reading Plaintiff’s Complaint liberally, he
claims that the Cabinet violated his right to due process, First
Amendment “right to privacy of belief,” his Fourth Amendment rights
to “privacy of person and possession,” Fourteenth Amendment right
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to be free of search and seizure and right of his family to the
“enjoyment of life, liberty, property, and protection” in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
whether
the
Plaintiff
articulates
The Court need not reach
facts
demonstrating
valid
constitutional violations in his Complaint because the Cabinet is
immune from monetary claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and §
1983 based on the Eleventh Amendment and, therefore, these claims
shall be dismissed.
Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561,
570-71 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506,
512 (6th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that claim against a state under
§ 1981 are barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332, 350 (1979) (holding that claims brought against a state
under § 1983 are barred by the Eleventh Amendment)).
Plaintiff also asks for injunctive relief pursuant to § 1983.
Specifically, he asks that this Court enter an order directing the
“release” of the minor children based on the alleged constitutional
violations.
Plaintiff’s request for the minor children’s release
would require this Court to review and overturn decisions regarding
custody and parental rights made by the state court.
“Under the
principles of comity and deference to state expertise in the field
of domestic relations, it has been [the Sixth Circuit’s] consistent
policy to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over claims which seek to
collaterally attack a state court judgment terminating parental
rights.” See Stephens v. Hayes, 374 F.App'x 620, 623 (6th Cir.
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2010) (unpublished opinion) (declining to exercise jurisdiction
over claims “where the tort action is a mere pretense and the suit
is actually concerned with child custody issues”).
Additionally,
as Plaintiff does not appear to have ever had any custodial,
guardianship or parental rights with respect to either his niece or
nephew, Plaintiff lacks standing to request an order for their
"release" on their behalf.
See Stephens, 374 F.App'x at 622
(noting that after parental rights have been terminated, parents
may not bring claims on behalf of their children).
Moreover,
assuming that Plaintiff has standing, two abstention doctrines
would act to prevent this Court’s consideration of the state
court’s decision.
To the extent the state court proceedings are
final, the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine prohibits an appeal
from a state court decision and, to the extent the proceedings are
not yet final, Younger abstention prevents this Court “from ruling
because the proceeding implicates important state interests” and
the
parties
to
the
state
court
proceeding
have
an
adequate
opportunity to raise their concerns in that setting. See Bodell v.
McDonald, 4 F.App'x 276, 278 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion)
(dismissing plaintiff’s request for injunctive and declaratory
relief regarding state court termination and adoption proceedings).
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff articulates claims on
behalf of the mothers of the minor children, those claims must also
fail because Plaintiff lacks standing to sue on their behalf.
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Generally, Plaintiff may not rest a claim for relief on the legal
rights or interests of third parties. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 410-11 (1991); Idemudia v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 36 F.App’x
558 (6th Cir. 2002). Further, only licensed attorneys may practice
law on behalf of others. Coleman Advertising, Inc. v. Visionmedia,
2003 WL 345368 at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2003) (citing Palazzo v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 764 F.2d 1381, 1385-86 (11th Cir. 1985); Doherty v.
American Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 334, 340 (6th Cir. 1984)).
As
noted above, to the extent that the parties to the state court
action wish to challenge the state court’s decisions, they have
methods of appeal available in state court proceedings and should
proceed on their own behalf.
Plaintiff also requests that this Court enter a declaratory
judgment, but fails to identify the specific relief he requests in
this respect.
Nonetheless, the factors delineated in Grand Trunk,
specifically,
(1) whether the declaratory action would settle the
controversy; (2) whether the declaratory action would
serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations
in issue; (3) whether the declaratory remedy is being
used merely for the purpose of “procedural fencing” or
“to provide an arena for a race for res judicata”; (4)
whether the use of a declaratory action would increase
friction between our federal and state courts and
improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction; and (5)
whether there is an alternative remedy which is better or
more effective,
all
weigh
against
the
Court
exercising
entertain a declaratory judgment action.
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its
jurisdiction
to
Grand Trunk Western
Railroad Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 746 F.2d 323, 326 (6th
Cir. 1984).
Any declaratory relief in this Court would not settle
Plaintiff’s alleged controversy, or clarify any legal relations at
issue.
As described above, Plaintiff has no standing to contest
the custody and parental rights state court action here, thus there
is no controversy to be settled in this respect.
Moreover, any
interference by this Court in the child custody arena would
unnecessarily encroach on state court and the res judicata effect
of the state cout’s decisions.
To the extent that Plaintiff
contends he was harmed by the Cabinet’s actions, it is unclear
what, if any, relief a declaratory judgment would provide.
Plaintiff
also
argues
that
this
Court
should
issue
an
injunction for the Defendant to halt all spiritual attacks and/or
stop the conspiracy to use "mind blinding spirits against the
Plaintiff's
family."
The
allegation
that
the
Cabinet
is
coordinating attacks with third parties against the Plaintiff by
using
mind
blinding
evil
spirits
is
wholly
implausible,
unsubstantiated, and devoid of merit. See Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d
477 (6th Cir. 1999); Dekovan v. Bell, 22 F.App'x 496 (6th Cir.
2001)(unpublished opinion); Belle v. F.B.I., 46 F.App'x 326 (6th
Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion).
Thus, Plaintiff's request that
this Court to issue an order against the use of mind blinding
spirits is denied as frivolous.
Plaintiff also attempts to articulate claims under several
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other statutes in his Complaint, which also fail.
Plaintiff does
not have standing to pursue a private right of action under any of
the federal criminal statutes on which he bases claims for relief
in the Complaint, specifically 18 U.S.C 1203(a) (“Federal Hostage
Taking Act”), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, which govern the criminal
offenses of conspiring against civil rights and deprivation of
rights under color of law.
See U.S. v. Oguaji, 76 F.App’x 579, 581
(6th Cir. 2003) (noting that there is no private right of action
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242).
“[A] private citizen lacks a
judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution
of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
This Court does not have the authority to initiate or direct
another party to initiate a criminal action as Plaintiff requests.
“[A]uthority to initiate a criminal complaint rests exclusively
with state and federal prosecutors.”
Mercer v. Lexington Fayette
Urban Co. Gov’t, 52 F.3d 325 at *1 (6th Cir. 1995) (unpublished
table opinion). Because Plaintiff lacks standing, these claims will
be dismissed.
Similarly, the plaintiff purports to make a claim under 15
U.S.C. § 57b, which applies to civil actions by the Federal Trade
Commission for violations of rules and cease and desist orders
respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices. As he also lacks
standing to initiate this type of action, this claim shall also be
dismissed.
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Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that:
(1) the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative,
for Summary Judgment [Record No. 5] is GRANTED; and
(2)
Plaintiff’s
Motion
for
Summary
Declaratory
Judgment
[Record No. 7], as well as Plaintiff’s “Dispositive Motion” [Record
No. 13] are DENIED.
On this the 5th day of April, 2012.
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