Adkins v. Shelter General Insurance Company

Filing 282

OPINION & ORDER: (1) DENYING AS MOOT Shelter's 216 Motion in Limine to exclude bad faith expert testimony; (2) DENYING Adkins' 222 224 Motions in Limine regarding "surprise" witnesses & exhibits; (3) DENYING Adkins' 226 Motion in Limine to prohibit attacks on counsel; (4) GRANTING Adkins' 229 Motion in Limine regarding prior offenses; (5) GRANTING Adkins' 231 Motion in Limine regarding roles performed by any government entity. Signed by Judge Karen K. Caldwell on 7/29/15. (KJR)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
AT LEXINGTON
KAYLA ADKINS,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:12-173-KKC

Plaintiff,
V.

OPINION AND ORDER

SHELTER MUTUAL INS. CO.,
Defendant.

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This matter is before the Court on various motions filed by the parties in anticipation of
the trial of this matter. The plaintiff Kayla Adkins asserts a statutory bad faith claim against
defendant Shelter Mutual Ins. Co. The matter is set for trial on August 17, 2015.
I.

Background

On October 25, 2008, Adkins, was in an automobile accident. She was 17 years old at
the time. The accident was caused by another driver, Anthony Mason, who was insured by
defendant Shelter.
Adkins’ mother, Jessica Collins, filed a claim with Shelter for property damage to her
car and that claim was settled on November 17, 2008. (DE 116-50, Notes.) Shelter adjuster
Linda Yates noted on that same date that she was waiting on Adkins to return medical
authorizations. (DE 116-50, Notes.) On December 11, 2008, Yates noted that Adkins still had
not returned medical authorizations and she phoned Collins. (DE 116-3, Notes.)
Yates’ notes reflect that Collins informed Yates that Adkins was “fine.” Collins stated
that Adkins had experienced only “bruising and soreness” and that she had not gone for any
follow-up medical care. Yates informed Collins that Kayla Roe, the passenger in Adkins’ car,

had retained an attorney. Collins stated that Adkins was “only bruised and she is not
pursuing any claim.” (DE 116-3, Notes.)
About a week later, Yates phoned Collins again and explained that Adkins was entitled
to a bodily injury settlement from Shelter even though she was not pursuing a claim and
offered her $500. (DE 116-4, Notes.) Collins accepted and, in return, she signed a document
provided by Shelter called “Indemnifying Release (Minors).” The release can be reasonably
interpreted to release Shelter and Mason from all claims, including any claims Adkins herself
may have, stating:
[W]e, individually and as a parents, release [Mason and Shelter] from any and
all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action, or suits of whatever
kind or nature, including bodily injuries sustained by Kayla Adkins, a minor. .
.or arising out of damages or direct or indirect loss we sustained from an
accident on the 25th day of October, 2008. . . [W]e agree to hold [Mason and
Shelter] harmless for any claim for the minor or any other party resulting from
the minor’s injury in this accident, and to reimburse any loss, damage, or costs
that [Mason or Shelter] pays if any litigation arises from these injuries. This
release fully settles and discharges all claims against [Mason and Shelter]. . .
I/We have fully read, understand, and voluntarily accept this agreement to fully
and finally compromise all claims, disputed or not, based on the injuries and
damages from this accident.
(DE 82-4, Release) (emphasis added.)
Collins testified that, at the time she signed the release, Adkins “was not showing any
health problems.” (DE 116-5, Collins Dep. at 17.)
While the release can reasonably be interpreted to settle all claims against Shelter and
Mason, Shelter’s Casualty Claims Adjusting Guidelines state that it “releases the parent or
guardians’ claim but not the minor’s claim.” The guidelines continue, however, that if the
minor “should later pursue his or her injury claim, any amount paid in addition to the amount
paid for this release could be claimed from the party signing this release.” (DE 121-1,
Guidelines at CM-ECF p. 14.) In other words, if the minor should assert her rights as an adult,
the parent would ultimately have to pay what the minor is due.

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No party sought court approval of the settlement. A Kentucky statute, KRS § 387.280,
mandates court approval for certain settlements with minors but does not state which party
must obtain it. Lawson v. Dawson, No. 2003-CA-00448-MR, 2004 WL 1909357 at *5 (Ky. App.
2004) (“Neither in the statutes or the case law is it stated on whom the burden rests to ensure
that a settlement on behalf of a minor is correctly executed.”)
Adkins agrees that the statute does not make clear which party should obtain court
approval. (DE 118, Response at 13.) Shelter’s position is that Collins, as Adkins’ custodian,
was the party who was required to obtain approval. (DE 116-1, Mem. at 20.) Regardless, “[t]he
case law makes clear that any settlement on behalf of a minor without the approval of the
court and appointment of a guardian is subject to collateral attack.” Lawson, 2004 WL
1909357 at *5 (discussing KRS §§ 387.280 and 387.125(6)).
Adkins turned 18 in April 2009. On October 26, 2009, she filed suit against Mason –
Shelter’s insured – seeking additional compensation for her alleged injuries. Adkins and
Mason eventually settled that claim in January 2012 for $12,000. Adkins testified that the
settlement adequately compensated her for her injuries. (DE 39, Adkins Dep. at 24-25.)
In April 2012, Adkins filed this action against Shelter. The sole remaining claim in this
action is Adkins’ claim that, in settling her claim, Shelter violated the Kentucky’s Unfair
Claims Settlement Practices Act (“UCSPA”), KRS § 304.12-230.
II. Motions
The Court hereby ORDERS as follows with regard to the following motions:
1) Shelter’s motion to exclude bad faith expert testimony (DE 216)
Shelter’s motion to exclude expert testimony that it acted in bad faith when
handling Adkin’s claim (DE 216) is DENIED as moot. Shelter has filed a notice
that it is withdrawing the motion.

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2) Adkins’ motions regarding “surprise” witnesses and exhibits (DE 222 and
224)
Adkins moves the Court to prohibit “surprise” exhibits (DE 222) and witnesses (DE
224). Adkins does not identify any particular exhibits or witnesses but instead
refers only to “surprise” witnesses and exhibits generally. These motions are denied
as premature. Adkins may reassert objections with regard to any particular exhibit
or witness at the appropriate time at trial.
3) Adkins’ motion to prohibit attacks on counsel (DE 226)
Adkins moves the Court to prohibit ad hominem attacks against her counsel and
specifically any references to her counsel as “TV Lawyers” or “Advertising
Lawyers.” The Court grants the motion to the extent Adkins requests that Shelter
be prohibited from referring to her counsel as “TV Lawyers” or “Advertising
Lawyers.” To the extent that the motion is directed at any other possible comments
that could arise at trial, the motion is denied with leave for Adkins to reassert
objections to any specific comments or testimony at the appropriate time at trial.
4) Adkins’ motion regarding prior offenses (DE 229)
Adkins moves the Court to preclude any reference to her prior marijuana
conviction, pending marijuana charge, and prior traffic offenses. Shelter states it
does not intend to introduce such evidence. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED.
5) Adkins’ motion regarding roles performed by any government entity (DE
231)
Adkins moves the Court to preclude any references to the fact that no governmental
entity has ever investigated Shelter’s minor settlement practices. Shelter does not
object to this portion of the motion. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED to the
extent that Adkins asks the Court to preclude references to the fact that no
governmental entity has investigated Shelter’s minor settlement practices. To the
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extent that Adkins requests that any other references to governmental entities be
precluded, the motion is DENIED as premature. Adkins may reassert objections to
any particular comments or testimony at the appropriate time at trial.
Dated July 29, 2015.

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