Davis v. Bishop et al
Filing
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OPINION & ORDER: (a) GRANTING IN PART & DENYING IN PART Bishop's 18 MOTION to Dismiss for failure to state a claim; (a) GRANTED as to pla's federal due-process claims under 42:1983 & those claims are DISMISSED; (b) DENIED as to pla's state-law claims & those claims are REMANDED to the Fayette Circuit Court. Signed by Judge Karen K. Caldwell on 6/2/14.(KJR)cc: COR, Fayette Circuit Court
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
AT LEXINGTON
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:12-CV-272-KKC
JANET A. DAVIS, Administratrix for the
Estate of Anthony Dwayne Davis, Deceased
v.
PLAINTIFF
OPINION AND ORDER
RONALD L. BISHOP and
UNKNOWN EMPLOYEES of the
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government
Department of Corrections,
DEFENDANTS
** ** ** ** **
This matter is before the Court on the motion to dismiss (DE 10) filed by the
Defendant, Ronald L. Bishop.
I.
Facts.
The Plaintiff in this matter is Janet A. Davis, acting as the administratrix for the
estate of her son, Anthony Dwayne Davis, who died while in custody at the Fayette
County Detention Center. Davis alleges that Anthony died because various employees of
the detention center failed to give him medication required for a congenital heart
condition.
With her initial complaint, Davis asserted claims against Bishop and certain
“unknown employees’ of the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government. In ruling on
Bishop’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court construed the complaint to
assert claims against the defendants in their individual capacities only. The Court further
determined that the initial complaint failed to sufficiently plead a § 1983 claim against
Bishop but granted Davis 14 days to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies in
her original complaint. The Court also directed Davis to clarify the claim she asserted in
Count I of the amended complaint.
Davis has filed an amended complaint. With this complaint, she asserts claims
against Bishop and 13 additional named defendants. Davis asserts the claims against the
14 defendants in both their individual and official capacities.
With Count I of the complaint, Davis asserts that the defendant deprived Anthony
of his life without due process of law in violation of section 1 of the Kentucky
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S Constitution. With
Count II of the complaint, Davis asserts a state-law negligence claim against the
defendants. With count III of the complaint, Davis asserts that the defendants violated
state statutes at chapter 441 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes and a Kentucky
administrative regulation at 501 KAR 3:090 by failing to provide medical care to
Anthony. With Count IV, Davis asserts a state-law wrongful death claim against the
defendants. With Count V of the complaint, Davis asserts a claim for punitive damages.
Bishop moves to dismiss all the claims, asserting that Davis has failed to
sufficiently plead any claim against him.
II.
Analysis
In Count I of the complaint, Davis asserts a claim that the defendants violated his
right to due process under the U.S. Constitution. The Court construes the complaint to
assert a substantive due-process claim against the defendants. This is because Davis has
not alleged that the process Anthony was afforded failed to comply with constitutional
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standards. See Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 557-58 (6th Cir. 2000) (explaining that
“While procedural due process principles protect persons from deficient procedures that
lead to the deprivation of cognizable liberty interests . . . substantive due process provides
that, irrespective of the constitutional sufficiency of the processes afforded, government
may not deprive individuals of fundamental rights unless the action is necessary and
animated by a compelling purpose.”)
Davis asserts her substantive due-process claim against the defendants in their
official and individual capacities. Official-capacity suits “generally represent only
another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978). “[A]n
official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the
entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). A county can be liable under
§ 1983 only “where a custom, policy, or practice attributable to the municipality was the
‘moving force’ behind the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Heyerman v.
County of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 2012).
In her amended complaint, the plaintiff makes no allegations from which it could
be inferred that a county custom or policy was the moving force behind the alleged
failure to provide medication to Anthony. Nor does Davis make any such allegations in
response to the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Section 1983 claims against the
defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed.
Further, in the amended complaint, the plaintiff asserts that the defendants
deprived Anthony of his life by “negligently failing to provide [Anthony] with his
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required medication.” (DE 16, Amended Complaint ¶ 29) (emphasis added.) A
government official cannot violate substantive due-process rights with negligent conduct.
Historically, this guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate
decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty or
property. No decision of this Court before Parratt [ v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527, (1981) ] supported the view that negligent conduct by a state official,
even though causing injury, constitutes a deprivation under the Due
Process Clause.
Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
In Daniels, the Supreme Court explicitly “overrule[d] Parratt to the extent that it
state[d] that mere lack of due care by a state official may ‘deprive’ an individual of life,
liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330–31.
Even after being given the opportunity to amend her complaint to sufficiently
plead a constitutional claim, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated Anthony’s
due-process rights with only negligent acts. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s due-process
claims against the defendants in their individual capacities must be dismissed.
The due-process claim is the sole federal claim in this action. Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Davis’s state-law
claims. “When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations
usually will point to dismissing the state law claims, or remanding them to state court if
the action was removed.” Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 89 F.3d 1244,
1254–1255 (6th Cir. 1996). Discovery has not yet begun in this action and motions for
summary judgment have not yet been filed. The federal claims have not been dismissed
as a result of forum manipulation by the plaintiff. Accordingly, the state-law claims will
be remanded to Fayette Circuit Court.
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III.
Conclusion.
For all these reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS that Bishop’s motion to dismiss
(DE 18) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
a)
the motion is GRANTED as to the plaintiff’s federal due-process claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and those claims are DISMISSED; and
b)
the motion is DENIED as to the plaintiff’s state-law claims and those
claims are REMANDED to Fayette Circuit Court.
Dated this 2nd day of June, 2014.
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