Hazelrigg v. State of Kentucky et al
Filing
16
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: It is ORDERED that Jon Michael Hazelrigg's 15 Letter/Construed Motion for Relief under Rule 59(e) is DENIED. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on July 11, 2013. (AWD) cc: Pla via US Mail
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON
JON MICHAEL HAZELRIGG,
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Plaintiff
v.
STATE OF KENTUCKY, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No.
5:13-cv-148-JMH
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
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Plaintiff Jon Michael Hazelrigg has submitted a letter which
the Court construes as a
motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) [R. 15] to alter or amend the July 3, 2013,
Memorandum Opinion and Order and Judgment [R. 13, 14] dismissing
Hazelrigg’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint.
[R. 1].
As
does
not
explained below, Hazelrigg’s motion will be denied.
In
his
letter/construed
motion,
Hazelrigg
specifically refer to the recent dismissal of his complaint, but he
states that he is not an attorney, asserts that he has required and
continues to require certain pain medications, and asks the Court
to “. . . help undue the injustice that was done to me by my
brother[,] Dr. Scott Peirce and Eastern & Western State Mental
Hospitals.”
[R. 15 at 1].
A Rule 59(e) motion may be granted only if there is a clear
error of law, newly discovered evidence, an intervening change in
controlling
law,
or
a
need
to
prevent
manifest
injustice.
Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Sch., 469 F.3d 479, 496 (6th Cir.
2006). In his current motion, Hazelrigg essentially re-asserts the
same claims and asks for the same relief (monetary damages and
access to pain medications) which he sought in his complaint.
A
party may not use a Rule 59(e) motion as a vehicle either to
re-hash old arguments or to advance positions that he or she could
have argued earlier, but did not.
Howard v. United States, 533
F.3d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 2008).
As the Court explained in the July 3, 2013, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, the Eleventh Amendment absolutely precludes Hazelrigg’s
§ 1983 claim for damages against the Commonwealth of Kentucky. [R.
13 at 3-4].
Further, the Court correctly dismissed Hazelrigg’s §
1983 claim against the other named defendant, James Ockerman
Hazelrigg, because James Ockerman Hazelrigg does not qualify as a
“state actor” under § 1983, and, lacking such status, he could not
be liable for damages under § 1983.
[R. 13 at 4-6].
Therefore,
under the first criterion for granting relief under Rule 59(e),
Hazelrigg
has
not
demonstrated
that
the
Court
improperly
interpreted or applied the law in dismissing his complaint.
As for the second and third criteria under Rule 59(e),
Hazelrigg has likewise failed to point to any newly discovered
evidence or to an intervening change in controlling law which would
warrant altering or amending the July 3, 2013, Memorandum Opinion
and Order.
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The fourth criterion under Rule 59(e) requires the movant to
show that the adverse ruling has caused him to suffer manifest
injustice.
One district court in this circuit has aptly described
the concept of “manifest justice” as follows:
As applied to Rule 59(e), no general
definition of manifest injustice has ever been
developed; courts instead look at the matter
on a case-by-case basis. Torre v. Federated
Mutual Ins. Co., 906 F.Supp. 616, 619 (D. Kan.
1995) (unsubstantiated assertion could not
lead to a finding of manifest injustice);
Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Com. of
Supreme Court v. Betts, 157 B.R. 631 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1993) (mere disagreement with
court's findings does not rise to level of
manifest injustice). What is clear from case
law, and from a natural reading of the term
itself, is that a showing of manifest
injustice
requires
that
there
exist
a
fundamental flaw in the court’s decision that
without correction would lead to a result that
is both inequitable and not in line with
applicable policy.
McDaniel v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 04-2667B, 2007 WL
2084277, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. July 17, 2007).
Under
the
above
analysis,
the
dismissal
of
Hazelrigg’s
complaint did not subject Hazelrigg to manifest injustice.
While
the outcome was obviously adverse to Hazelrigg, it was not based
either legally or factually on a “fundamental flaw . . . that
without correction would lead to a result that is both inequitable
and not in line with applicable policy.”
Id. at *2.
Further,
Hazelrigg may have had other remedies available to him in the state
courts.
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For these reasons, Hazelrigg’s letter, construed as Rule 59(e)
motion seeking relief from the July 3, 2013, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, will be denied.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT
IS
ORDERED
that
Jon
Michael
Hazelrigg’s
letter/ construed motion seeking relief under Rule 59(e) [R. 15] is
DENIED.
This the 11th day of July, 2013.
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