Meads v. Lexington-Fayette County Urban Government

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) The 18 MOTION to Dismiss for failure to state a claim is GRANTED. (2) The 20 MOTION to Dismiss for failure to state a claim is GRANTED. (3) The claims asserted by Pla against Dfts Kentucky Education and Workforc e Development Cabinet, Steve Wilborn, Ray Crider, Jon Ackerson, and "unnamed individuals responsible for their training" and Dfts Richard Maloney, Ashley Case, Nicole Rodriguez, Steve Feese, Kevin Bennett, Emma Turley, Kelvin Jackson and Mike Conner are DISMISSED with prejudice. These Dfts are DISMISSED as parties to this action. Signed by Judge Danny C. Reeves on December 31, 2013. (AWD) cc: COR,Willie Meads via US Mail

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
(at Lexington)
WILLIE MEADS,
Plaintiff,
V.
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN
COUNTY GOVERNMENT, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 5: 13-228-DCR

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

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Plaintiff Willie Meads, a self-described middle-aged black man, was previously
employed by the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (“LFUCG”). He filed this
action after being terminated from his employment in July of 2012. After an Amended
Complaint was filed, several of the newly-joined defendants moved the Court to dismiss the
plaintiff’s claims against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. [Record Nos. 18 and 20] The first motion to dismiss was filed by Defendants
Education and Workforce Development Cabinet; Steve Wilborn, in his official capacity; Ray
Crider, in his official capacity; Jon Ackerson, in his official capacity; and “unnamed
individuals responsible for their training” (hereafter, “the Cabinet Defendants”). [Record No.
18]1 The second motion to dismiss was filed by eight current or former employees of

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It does not appear that the plaintiff has asserted claims against the Cabinet Defendants in their
individual capacities. The Amended Complaint does not contain any factual allegations that would support
such claims.

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LFUCG. [Record No. 20] The moving defendants include: Richard Maloney, Ashley Case,
Nicole Rodriguez, Steve Feese, Kevin Bennett, Emma Turley, Kelvin Jackson, and Mike
Conners (hereafter, “the LFUCG Defendants”). The motion to dismiss involves the claims
asserted against these defendants in their individual and official capacities.

Having

considered the defendants’ motions and the plaintiff’s response, the Court will dismiss with
prejudice all claims asserted against them.
I.
Meads filed this action in the Fayette Circuit Court on June 27, 2013. LFUCG was
the only defendant named in the original Complaint which contains the following allegations:
1. This action arises under the law of the United States, particularly Title 7 of
the civil rights act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as the law of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.
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5. The plaintiff has filed a claim with the Lexington County Human Rights
Commission and the U.S.E.E.O.C. and has received a right to sue.
The Parties
6. The plaintiff Willie Meads, where at all times mentioned herein, is a middle
age black man, citizen of the United States, resident of Fayette County
Kentucky and a former employee of the defendant, Lexington-Fayette County
Urban Government.
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Factual Allegations
First Cause of Action
8. The plaintiff Meads makes the claim of: racial discrimination, hostile work
environment, retaliation, wrongful termination and an illegal conspiracy.

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9. In July of 2012 the black plaintiff Meads was terminated from his position
with the Lexington-Fayette County Urban Government for reasons that have
changed and number of times since Meads actual termination date.
10. Between July 3, 2012 and October 20, 2012, the defendant brought fourth
4 different reason at 4 different times for terminating the plaintiff Meads. Said
defendant brought these reasons before the Lexington-Fayette County Human
Rights commission, the U.S. E.E.O.C. and the Kentucky Cabinet Of
Unemployment insurance. The Kentucky Cabinet of Unemployment event
went as fast as to help the defendant with his last reason and claim, and in an
act of conspiracy entered it into the record on the defendant’s behalf.
11. Yet, the above listed statement is only the tip of the iceberg, during the
court’s period of discovery the plaintiff Meads will amend his civil action, add
an additional defendant agency and 9 individual defendants, said plaintiff at
that point will take the court step by step through each and every illegal event
in his termination, U.S.E.E.O.C. filing and his filing for state unemployment
benefits.
12. Said plaintiff makes the claim that his termination was race based and had
he been a white employee working in a pordomitly [sic] white department,
such as police or fire department, the defendants would have applied the laws
that govern U.S.E.E.O.C. filing and investigated the plaintiff’s claim as the
law requires. The black plaintiff Meads worked for the prodimitly [sic] black
solid waste department. Wherefore, the white defendant saw no need for an
investigation and questioned no one with no regard to Meads claims. While at
the same time, white employee with the same U.S.E.E.O.C. filings received
the benefit of the law and was not subject to said discrimination like the black
plaintiff.
13. The plaintiff Meads makes the claim of retaliation. Between June 9, 2012
and July 2, 2012 the plaintiff Meads brought forth his charge of age and sex
discrimination. First to upper management in his solid waste department.
Meads then took his claims before L.F.U.C.G. lawyers on the 6th floor of 200
East Main Street Lexington, Ky. Meads then filed his claims with the
Lexington Human Rights Commission and U.S.E.E.O.C. and lastly, Meads
filed his claims with L.F.C.U.G. department of human resources. Five days
after his last civil rights filing, and for reason connected to retaliation, the
defendant then terminated his employment.
14. The plaintiff Meads makes the claim of a hostile work environment, and
claims that members of management in L.F.U.C.G. solid waste planned the
plaintiff termination his first day of training and boldly announced it to
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everyone in the solid waste bay area. Said plaintiff work environment was
hostile to the point it effected his work and training.
15. And lastly, the plaintiff makes the claim of wrongful termination, illegal
conspiracy. Said plaintiff claims are built on the defendant’s disregard for the
law, perjury, document tampering, forgery, witness tampering and conspiring
with other agency to hid evidence, fraud, financial gains and fabucating [sic]
evidence. Said plaintiff will go into great detail on the above list in his coming
amended complaint, his goal now is to stop the clock.
[Record No. 1-1; Complaint] Thus, as specifically noted in paragraph 11, Meads believed
that he had a basis to assert additional claims against at least nine individual defendants at the
time his original Complaint was filed. However, notwithstanding that belief, he chose to
name LFUCG as the only defendant.
Following removal to this Court, a scheduling conference was held on September 25,
2013. [Record No. 7] During the conference, the plaintiff indicated that he would be
retaining counsel in the near future. Additionally, and as outlined in his original Complaint,
Meads stated that he intended to amend his original pleading to add additional defendants.
Some of those prospective defendants were identified by Meads during the scheduling
conference with the Court. The Scheduling Order which was subsequently entered by the
Court gave the parties until February 3, 2014, to file any motions to join additional parties or
amend the pleadings. [Record No. 8; Scheduling Order, ¶ (7)]
Although he did not retain counsel, Plaintiff Meads moved the Court for leave to
amend his Complaint within the time set out in the Scheduling Order. [Record No. 12] The
motion was subsequently granted and the Amended Complaint was filed in the record on

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November 8, 2013. [Record No. 14]2 Contrary to Meads’ present assertions, the fact that
the Court allowed the amendment is no indication that his claims have merit. As specifically
indicated in the Court’s Order, while the amendment was allowed, “the Court [did] not
address the merit of the claims outlined in the Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint.”
[Record No. 13]
The Amended Complaint adds eight individual defendants who Meads asserts are
“managers, trainers and management employees” employed by the LFUCG and responsible
for “investigations, company policy, training guideline, equal treatment[,] hiring and
terminations.” [Record No. 14; Amended Complaint, ¶ 11] In addition, Meads’ Amended
Complaint adds Kentucky’s Education and Workforce Development Cabinet and three
individual defendants who he identifies as being “management employees, employed by the
defendant the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission[.]”

He also includes

“unnamed individuals” within the Cabinet who he claims are responsible for their training.
[Id. at ¶ 13]
Following service, separate motions to dismiss were filed on behalf of the LFUCG
Defendants [Record No. 18] and the Cabinet Defendants [Record No. 20]. Meads responded
to both motions on December 16, 2013. [Record No. 21]
II.
When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must determine
whether the complaint alleges “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

2

The plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint has 29 exhibits attached, together with
a proposed amended complaint.

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relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The plausibility standard is met “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Although the complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to
dismiss, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted). Further, while pro se pleadings must be construed liberally, such construction is
not without limits.
III.
B.

The Cabinet Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

The Cabinet Defendants contend that, with the exception of paragraph 23, Meads’
Amended Complaint does not contain any specific allegations against the Education and
Workforce Development Cabinet. As noted by the Cabinet Defendants, Meads’ claim for
unemployment benefits was denied by the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission.
Thus, to the extent he is unhappy with that determination, KRS 341.450 provided Meads
with a limited right of judicial review. The documents attached to Meads’ motion to amend
his Complaint indicate that he filed an action in the Fayette Circuit Court challenging that
decision but was unsuccessful. Thereafter, he did not seek further review by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals. As a result, he may not seek to re-litigate the issue in this forum by adding
the Cabinet Defendants to this action.
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Further, the allegations contained in paragraph 23 of the Amended Complaint are
insufficient to overcome the Cabinet Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Meads asserts in this
paragraph that the defendants: (i) hid evidence; (ii) committed fraud; (iii) and fabricated
transcripts and documents for financial gain. However, he totally fails to provide any
specific factual support for these claims. It is not enough to simply allege that an entity “hid
evidence” or “fabricated transcripts or documents”. A party making such claims must at least
identify the evidence, transcripts, and documents and explain how it is relevant to his or her
claims. Likewise, general allegations of “fraud” are insufficient to overcome a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. Fraud must be pled with particularity and Meads’ Amended Complaint is wholly
deficient in this regard.
A.

The LFUCG Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

As noted in their supporting memorandum, it is difficult to identify the alleged
wrongful actions of the LFUCG Defendants because the Amended Complaint merely adds
them as parties without linking them to any particular claims. Thus, Meads has failed to
comply with Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which requires that a
plaintiff offer a short and plain statement showing that he is entitled to relief against the
defendants. However, even if the Court construes the Amended Complaint as containing
claims based on Title VII, those claims would fail against this group of defendants. See
Wathen v. General Electric Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997) (“an individual
employee/supervisor, who does not otherwise qualify as an employer may not be held
personally liable under Title VII”); Colston v. Cleveland Public Library, 522 Fed.Appx. 332,
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336 (6th Cir. 2013); and Westermeyer v. Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21629, *13 (E.D.Ky. Mar. 3, 2011).
Likewise, the plaintiffs claims based on the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KRS Chapter
344) also fail. The LFUCG Defendants do not qualify as the plaintiff’s “employer” as that
term is defined in the Kentucky statute. Wathen, supra. And the LFUCG Defendants are
correct in noting that the official capacity claims asserted against them are construed as
claims asserted against the entity that they represent (i.e., the LFUCG). Effinger v. Philip
Moris, Inc., 984 F.Supp. 1043 (W.D.Ky. 1997) (“The purpose of the Act is properly fulfilled
by holding employers ultimately responsible for the discriminatory acts of their employees
and agents.” Citing Winston v. Hardee’s Food Systems, Inc. 903 F.Supp. 1151, 1155
(W.D.Ky 1993)).
Meads also cites 42 U.S.C. § 19833 as a basis for his claims, although he fails to
provide any relevant details. However, even if properly identified, any such claims would be
barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261
(1985); Hornback v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS
20720 (6th Cir. Oct. 8, 2013) (State law determines the appropriate statute of limitations for
claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Kentucky, the limitations period is one year.);
Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990) (section 1983 actions in
Kentucky are limited by the one-year statute of limitations found in KRS 413.140(1)(a)). As

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The Amended Complaint fails to state any basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, supra at 678. The defendants are also correct that the plaintiff cannot overcome a motion to dismiss
by simply pointing to the exhibits he has attached to his motion to amend without some explanation of how
they are responsive to the issues presented.

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outlined in the defendant’s memorandum, the plaintiff has reason to know of his alleged
injury no later than the date of his termination (July 3, 2012). However, Meads did not seek
to add the LFUCG Defendants until November 1, 2013, and he does assert that the claims
contained in his Amended Complaint should relate back to the filing date of his original
Complaint under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This one-year time
limitation would apply with equal force with regard to any conspiracy claims even if factual
support for such claims had been asserted.
With respect to any remaining state law claims, the LFUCG Defendants also properly
note that wrongful discharge claims cannot be asserted against individual employees or
supervisors. Temple v. Pflugner, 866 F.Supp.2d 735, 744 (E.D.Ky. 2011); Lorson v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 47969, *5 (W.D.Ky. May 31, 2005). Finally, any
state law negligence claims asserted against the LFUCG Defendants would be barred by
sovereign immunity based on the absence of specific factual allegations against them.
Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 2001); Estate of Clark v. Daviess County, 105
S.W.3d 841, 844 (Ky.App. 2003).4
In conclusion, the Court notes that Plaintiff Meads has failed to offer any substantive
response either motion to dismiss. Instead, he argues that the two motions were prepared “in
an act of conspiracy” and claim that the motions are “ridiculous”. As a result, he contends
that the defendants should be held in contempt because he as been required to stop a
“Christmas toy assembly line” for his grandchildren to respond to the motions. [Record No.

4

Having resolved the defendants’ motions on the merits, the Court declines to address the plaintiffs’
apparent failure to perfect service of process over the moving parties.

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21] According to Meads, because the Court previously allowed him to file an Amended
Complaint, that pleading is not subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. In making this assertion, however, Meads improperly assumes his claims
are not subject to challenge and that the defendants have acted improperly in pointing the
fundamental defects in his allegations.

Simply put, Meads’ sarcasm is insufficient to

overcome the defendants’ motions to dismiss which are well-grounded in legal authority.
IV.
The defendants’ motions to dismiss are well-taken. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
1.

The motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Education and Workforce

Development Cabinet, Defendants Steve Wilborn, Ray Crider and Jon Ackerson in their
official capacities, and “unnamed individuals responsible for their training” [Record No. 18]
is GRANTED.
2.

The motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Richard Maloney, Ashley Case,

Nicole Rodriguez, Steve Feese, Kevin Bennett, Emma Turley, Kelvin Jackson, and Mike
Conner, in their individual and official capacities, [Record No. 20] is GRANTED.
3.

The claims asserted by Plaintiff Willie Meads against Defendants Kentucky

Education and Workforce Development Cabinet, Steve Wilborn, Ray Crider, Jon Ackerson,
and “unnamed individuals responsible for their training” and Defendants Richard Maloney,
Ashley Case, Nicole Rodriguez, Steve Feese, Kevin Bennett, Emma Turley, Kelvin Jackson,
and Mike Conner are DISMISSED, with prejudice. These defendants are DISMISSED as
parties to this action.
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This 31st day of December, 2013.

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