Meads v. Lexington-Fayette County Urban Government

Filing 49

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: (1) Dft LFUCG's 44 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. (2) Pla Meads' 42 Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. (3) All claims having been resolved, this action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court's docket. (4) A final and appealable Judgment shall be entered this date. Signed by Judge Danny C. Reeves on March 9, 2015. (AWD) cc: COR,Pla via US Mail

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
(at Lexington)
WILLIE R. MEADS,
Plaintiff,

V.
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN
COUNTY GOVERNMENT,

Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 5: 13-228-DCR

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

*** *** *** ***
This matter is pending for consideration of pro se Plaintiff Willie R. Meads’ and
Defendant Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government’s (“LFUCG”) motions for
summary judgment. [Record Nos. 42, 44] Meads alleges various claims resulting from his
time as an employee and eventual termination from the LFUCG’s Division of Waste
Management. For the reasons outlined below, the Court will deny the plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment and grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant regarding all
claims.
I.
Meads is African-American and was 58 years old at the time of filing his motion for
summary judgment on October 9, 2014.1 [Record No. 42, p. 9] He was employed by
LFUCG from May 2012 through July 2012. During this employment, Meads worked as an

1
Meads does not state how old he was at the time of his employment with the defendant. The
Court surmises that he was either 55 or 56 during that time.

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Equipment Operator Senior in the Division of Waste Management. One of his primary
duties was operating a rear loader truck and other equipment. At all times during his
employment he was a probationary employee and employed on an at-will basis.2
Steve Feese, the Director of the Division of Waste Management, decided to terminate
Meads on June 19, 2012. [Record No. 44-8] Thereafter, on June 21, 2012, Meads filed a
dual discrimination charge with the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights
Commission (“LFUCHRC”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). Meads alleged discrimination based on age, sex, and disability due to disparate
treatment of terms and conditions of employment in training and evaluation. [Record No.
44-2] He was made aware of his impending employment termination on June 26, 2012.
[Record No. 42-2, p. 16] Meads also filed a harassment complaint with the LFUCG’s
Division of Human Resources on June 28, 2012. [Id., p. 9–14] The harassment complaint
was denied the same day because it was determined that his allegations did not meet the
definition of harassment. [Id., p. 15]
Meads’ final day of work was July 3, 2012. At that time, his charge of discrimination
was still under investigation. Subsequently, on October 8, 2012, the LFUCHRC determined
that it was unable to conclude that a violation of the statutes had occurred relating to Meads’
allegations of discrimination. [Record No. 47-1] On May 29, 2013, the EEOC mailed Meads

2
Under Section 21-14 of the LFUCG Code of Ordinances, employees must serve a six-month
probationary period before appointment to classified civil service. The probationary period is used for the
adjustment of new employees through supervision, counseling, and evaluation, as well as for the
“elimination of any probationary employees who do not meet the required standards of work. The
appointing authority may terminate a probationary employee at any time during the probationary period
without the right of a hearing before the commission.” [Record No. 44-7, p. 1]

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a notice of right-to-sue as well as notification that it had adopted the LFUCHRC’s
determination. [Record No. 44-3] Meads originally filed suit against the LFUCG in the
Fayette County Circuit Court on June 27, 2013, asserting claims of race discrimination,
hostile work environment, retaliation, wrongful termination, and illegal conspiracy. [Record
No. 1-1, pp. 1, 3] Meads’ claims are based upon allegations of disparate treatment during
training for his employment, verbal abuse, and improper reasons for his termination. The
case was removed to this Court on July 18, 2013.
On November 12, 2013, Meads amended his Complaint to add additional defendants
and claims of age and sex discrimination. [Record No. 14, p. 3] On December 6, 2013, and
December 12, 2013, the newly-added defendants moved to dismiss the claims against them
for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [Record
Nos. 18, 20] On December 31, 2013, the Court granted the motions to dismiss. [Record No.
23] Meads appealed this Court’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit on January 9, 2014; however, his appeal was denied for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
[Record Nos. 24, 31] On June 11, 2014, the Court re-opened discovery for a period of ninety
days. [Record No. 37] Thereafter, the parties moved for summary judgment. [Record Nos.
42, 44]
II.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine disputes regarding any
material facts and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23; Chao v. Hall Holding Co., 285
F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). A dispute over a material fact is not “genuine” unless a
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reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. That is, the determination
must be “whether the evidence presents sufficient disagreement to require submission to a
jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986); see Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 516
(6th Cir. 2008). In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the Court views all the
facts and inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).3
III.
Meads alleges multiple claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
including race discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and sex discrimination.
He further alleges age discrimination and claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Finally, he
alleges state law claims of wrongful termination, illegal conspiracy, and claims arising under
the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.4 [Record No. 14]
A.

Title VII
Title VII is “an elaborate administrative procedure, implemented through the EEOC,

that is designed to assist in the investigation of claims of . . . discrimination in the workplace,
and to work towards the resolution of these claims through conciliation rather than

3
Meads has attached numerous affidavits to his motion. However, these affidavits do not indicate
that they are made with personal knowledge, fail to show that the declarants are competent to testify on
the matters stated, are filled with conclusory and speculatory statements, and assert facts that would be
inadmissible as hearsay. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3). Thus, they will not be considered in resolving the
pending motions.
4
Meads also alleges a claim of “sabotage.” [Record No. 14, p. 3] However, the Court is unaware
of a such a claim under federal or state law and the plaintiff fails to identify any support for such a claim.

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litigation.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180–81 (1989) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). To bring a claim in federal court under Title VII, a plaintiff must
satisfy two prerequisites: (1) timely file a charge of employment discrimination with the
EEOC; and (2) act upon the EEOC’s statutory notice of the right-to-sue. Puckett v. Tenn.
Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1486 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). The
Sixth Circuit has determined that “if a plaintiff did not first present a claim to the [EEOC],
that claim may not be brought before the federal courts on appeal.” Haithcock v. Frank, 958
F.2d 671, 675 (6th Cir. 1992); see Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d 359, 361 (6th
Cir. 2010). However, because the Complaint in this case was filed by a pro se plaintiff, it is
construed liberally so that the Court may consider claims that reasonably relate to or grow
out of the allegations contained in the EEOC charge. See Randolph v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth
Servs., 453 F.3d 724, 732 (6th Cir. 2006). Thus, “where facts related with respect to the
charged claim would have prompted the EEOC to investigate a different, uncharged claim,
the plaintiff is not precluded from bringing suit on that claim.” Davis v. Sodexho, 157 F.3d
460, 463 (6th Cir. 1998).
1.

Race Discrimination

LFUCG asserts that the Meads’ race discrimination claim is barred because he failed
to exhaust administrative remedies. [Record No. 44-1, p. 4] As stated previously, on June
21, 2012, Meads filed a dual discrimination charge with the LFUCHRC and the EEOC in
which he asserted discrimination on the basis of age, sex, and disability due to disparate
treatment of terms and conditions of employment in training and evaluation. [Record No.
44-2] At the time of Meads’ dismissal (i.e., July 3, 2012), his charge of discrimination was
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still being investigated. The LFUCHRC denied Meads’ claims on October 8, 2012, and the
EEOC adopted that decision on May 29, 2013. [Record Nos. 44-3; 47-1] Meads contends
that his claim of race discrimination grows out of the allegations in his EEOC charge. He
further contends that he amended his claim to include a charge of racial discrimination in a
document that he allegedly filed with the Kentucky Division of Unemployment Insurance as
part of an unemployment compensation proceeding. [Record Nos. 42-8, pp. 16–19; 46, pp.
2–3]
In this case, Meads did not allege a claim of race discrimination in his EEOC charge.
The EEOC form checked the boxes only for discrimination based on age, sex, and disability
and left blank the box for race. It also cited no related facts which would have prompted the
EEOC to consider or investigate possible race discrimination.

[Record No. 44-2]

Additionally, there is no evidence that the document allegedly filed with the Kentucky
Division of Unemployment Insurance was ever received by either the LFUCHRC or EEOC
or that it constituted an amendment to Meads’ EEOC charge. This is supported by the
August 31, 2012, report of the LFUCHRC’s investigator in which it was determined that
there was insufficient evidence to support Meads’ allegations of “disparate treatment on the
basis of age, sex, and/or perceived disability.” [Record No. 12-17, p. 4] Additionally, the
Commission’s October 8, 2012, dismal found no basis for statutory violations based on “age,
sex, and disability in regards to Meads’ employment,” without any mention of Meads’ race.
[Record No. 47-1]

Therefore, viewing the claim brought before the EEOC and the

LFUCHRC’s investigation as a whole, Meads did not adequately allege a claim of race

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discrimination. Thus, he failed to exhaust the administrative remedies under Title VII and
summary judgment is proper regarding that claim.
However, even if Meads had exhausted his administrative remedies, summary
judgment would nevertheless be appropriate because the plaintiff has not demonstrated a
prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII. To demonstrate a prima facie case, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for
the position and performed it satisfactorily; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action;
and (4) he was replaced by a member outside the protected class or was treated differently
than similarly situated non-protected employees. Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 567
(6th Cir. 2001). If the plaintiff is able to demonstrate a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the defendant to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the actions. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d
587, 603 (6th Cir. 2008). Once the defendant has met its burden, the plaintiff must prove
that the stated explanation was a pretext for discrimination.5 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 804. Meads satisfies the first and third prongs. However, Meads has failed to demonstrate
the second prong of the analysis.
To establish that a Title VII plaintiff is qualified for a position, he must demonstrate
that he satisfies an employer’s objective qualifications. Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576 F.3d
576, 585 (6th Cir. 2009). The proper inquiry is whether the plaintiff is qualified for the

5
A plaintiff may demonstrate pretext in three ways: “(1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in
fact; (2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate the employer’s action; or (3) that they were
insufficient to motivate the employer’s action.” Chen v. Dow Chemical Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir.
2009).

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position independent of the non-discriminatory justification produced by the defense. Cline
v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 660–61 (6th Cir. 2000). Under Section 21-14
of the LFUCG Code of Ordinances, an employee must serve a six-month probationary period
to demonstrate that he or she can meet the required standards of work prior to being
appointed to permanent status.

[Record No. 44-7]

The objective qualifications for

Equipment Operator Seniors at the Division of Waste Management include the ability to
safely and responsibly operate LFUCG equipment and vehicles and successfully complete
safety training. [Record No. 44-3, p. 2] Meads was never appointed to permanent status.
Instead, the record demonstrates that during training Meads frequently collided with barrels
and was unable to adequately complete the training course. [Record Nos. 44-5, p. 4; 44-6, p.
2, 44-8] Further, he was unable to progress past the first stage of safety training. [Record
No. 44-4, p. 3] As a result, Meads never satisfied the objective criteria to be qualified as a
permanent Equipment Operator Senior.
Additionally, Meads cannot satisfied the fourth prong in that he cannot show that he
was replaced by a member outside the protected class or was treated differently than
similarly situated non-protected employees. Meads alleges that he was replaced by white
employee John Burton. [Record No. 42, p. 9] However, he has provided the Court with no
admissible evidence regarding when John Burton was hired by the LFUCG or whether
Burton took Meads’ previous job. Meads further asserts that he was treated differently than
similarly situated, non-protected employees Rocky Daliron, John Burton, and Mellissa
Bowman. [Id., p. 10] He states that they too “had garbage truck accidents while on
probation and during training . . . and went back to driving.” [Id.] To demonstrate different
-8 

treatment than similarly situated employees, a plaintiff must demonstrate that they are
similarly situated in “all relevant respects.” Bobo v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 741,
751 (6th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit has previously stated that “the individuals with whom
the plaintiff seeks to compare his treatment must have dealt with the same supervisor, have
been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such
differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the
employer’s treatment of them for it.” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir.
1992). In this case, Meads has not alleged that Daliron, Burton, or Bowman dealt with the
same supervisor. Further, he has not demonstrated that they were subject to the same
standards, continually failed to abide by training instructions, or were unable to move past
the first stage of training.
Even assuming that Meads could meet his initial burden, he has offered no evidence
to rebut the LFUCG’s non-discriminatory justification for his termination. Steve Feese, the
Director of the Division of Waste Management, indicated that Meads was terminated
because of his unwillingness to follow directions during training and the inability to safely
operate LFUCG vehicles and equipment. [Record No. 44-4, p. 3] Further, Emma Turley, a
Safety Coordinator with the Division of Waste Management and Meads’ supervisor during
training, stated that Meads repeatedly collided with barrels and trash carts during training,
failed to follow instructions, and made wrong turns on the training course. In one instance,
Meads backed into a 55-gallon barrel on the training course and, despite Turley’s instructions
to stop, continued to back into the barrel pushing it out of position. [Record Nos. 44-5, p. 3;
44-6, p. 2] These actions resulted in Turley being concerned that the safety of the general
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public would be endangered if Meads performed in a similar fashion while operating
LFUCG vehicles.

[Record No. 44-5, pp. 3–4]

Turley also states that Meads was

disrespectful towards her on multiple occasions and was uncooperative throughout training.
[Id.]

Meads has provided no admissible evidence establishing that these reasons were

pretext. Instead, he makes numerous allegations of name-calling and disparate treatment
based on race which are devoid of any evidentiary support. Thus, summary judgment in
favor of the LFUCG on Meads’ claim of race discrimination is proper.
2.

Retaliation

LFUCG argues that Meads’ retaliation claim is also barred based on his failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. The same administrative remedies described above apply
to this claim. Similar to his race discrimination claim, Meads did not assert a claim of
retaliation in his charged filed with the EEOC. [Record No. 44-2] Meads alleges that his
retaliation claim arises out of his claims of age and sex discrimination which he reported to
LFUCG administrators between June 8, 2012 and July 2, 2012. [Record No. 14, pp. 4–5]
He further states that his retaliation claim was correctly asserted in a subpoena request to the
Kentucky Division of Unemployment Insurance. [Record Nos. 42-8, pp. 8–10; 46, pp. 2–5]
Like his claim of race discrimination, Meads failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies regarding his retaliation claim. He did not mark the box asserting a claim of
retaliation on his EEOC charge or relate facts that would lead to an investigation of such a
claim. [Record No. 44-2] Further, the Court rejects Meads’ contention that he amended his
filing in front of the EEOC to include a claim of retaliation. Meads points to a subpoena
request filed with the Appeals Branch of the Kentucky Division of Unemployment Insurance
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as proof of an amendment. [Record No. 42-8, pp. 8–10] However, there is no proof that this
was ever received by the LFUCHRC or the EEOC. As stated earlier, the LFUCHRC
investigation letter and order of dismissal only referred to Meads’ allegations of age, sex, and
disability discrimination. [Record Nos. 12-17, p. 4; 47-1] There is no indication that Meads’
claim of retaliation was ever part of the EEOC charge. As a result, Meads has failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies regarding this claim.
In addition to Meads’ failure to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding this
claim, it also fails on the merits. Claims of retaliation are subject to the McDonnell Douglas
burden shifting analysis described above. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the
defendant was aware of this activity; (3) the defendant thereafter took employment action
adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 730–31 (6th
Cir. 2014); Jones v. Johanns, 264 F. App’x 463, 466 (6th Cir. 2007). Specifically, “but for”
causation between the protected activity and the adverse employment action must be
demonstrated. Laster, 746 F.3d at 731. It is not contested that Meads satisfies the first and
third prongs.
Meads asserts that his claim of retaliation stems from protected activity occurring
between June 8, 2012 and July 2, 2012, when he reported numerous discriminatory acts by
supervisor Emma Turley. He contends that he first reported acts of discrimination to Kelvin

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Jackson during his two-week discussion on June 8, 2012,6 and that allegations were brought
to human resources officer Steve Feese and supervisor Darryl Clay from June 11 through
June 13. [Record No. 42, pp.13–14] As stated earlier, on June 21, 2012, Meads filed the
dual discrimination charge with the LFUCHRC and the EEOC and a harassment claim on
June 28, 2012, with the LFUCG’s Division of Human Resources. [Record No. 42-2, pp. 7–
14]
Meads has not demonstrated that the defendant was aware of the activity. Meads
contends that he made numerous allegations of discrimination prior to filing his dual charge
of discrimination on June 21, 2012. He first asserts that he reported discriminatory acts to
Kelvin Jackson during his two-week examination. However, a review of the form resulting
from the discussion does not include any evidence showing that a claim of discrimination
was asserted, nor has Meads provided any evidence to prove that an allegation was made.
[Record No. 47-2] Further, Meads has provided no evidence suggesting that other alleged
reports of discrimination made prior to June 21, 2012, occurred. The decision to terminate
Meads was made by Director Steve Feese on June 19, 2012, two days prior to the first
protected act. [Record No. 44-8] Thus, Meads has failed to demonstrate that a protected act
occurred of which the defendant was aware prior to the decision to terminate his
employment.
Further, Meads has failed to prove that there was a causal connection between the
activity and his employment termination. Retaliation claims must be proven according to

6
Meads alleges that this meeting took place with Kevin Bennett. However, a review of the
discussion form indicates that Kelvin Jackson was the supervisor who met with Meads at this time.
[Record No. 42-2, pp. 2–5]

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traditional principles of but-for causation. As stated earlier, Meads has supplied no evidence
of his alleged reports of discrimination before the filing of his dual discrimination charge on
June 21, 2012. Instead, he has provided the Court with hearsay statements alleging that
Turley was aware of these reports and unsupported claims that someone in human resources
was in Turley’s corner allowing her to retaliate against him.

[Record No. 42, p. 15]

Conversely, LFUCG has submitted evidence demonstrating that Steve Fees made the
decision to terminate Meads on June 19, 2012, two days prior to the filing of his dual
discrimination claim.

[Record No. 44-8]

Because Meads has provided no evidence

supporting that he had taken any protective activity prior to the decision to terminate him, he
is unable to demonstrate a causal connection between the protective activity and his
employment termination.
Finally, even if Meads could demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation, LFUCG
has articulated legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for his dismissal. As outlined above,
Meads was terminated for failing to follow instructions during training, being disrespectful
towards supervisors, being uncooperative during training, and concerns for public safety.
Meads has failed to provide any evidence that the reasons for his termination were pretext for
retaliation. He instead has submitted unsupported allegations that Turley “caught wind” of
his filings of discrimination and started a campaign to get him fired, and that acts of perjury
and forgery occurred. [Record No. 42, p. 15] There is no genuine issue of material fact
regarding Meads’ retaliation claim and that summary judgment is proper for the defendant.

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3.

Hostile Work Environment

LFUCG again contends that Meads failed to exhaust administrative remedies
regarding his hostile work environment claim under Title VII. Meads’ discrimination charge
filed with the EEOC did not assert such a claim. [See Record No. 44-2] Further, Meads
does not assert that he amended this charge to include a hostile work environment claim. He
also filed a harassment claim with the LFUCG’s Division of Human Resources on June 28,
2012, which did not include such a claim or evidence suggesting a hostile work environment
under Title VII. [Record No. 42-2, p. 9] And a broad reading of both claims demonstrates
that the facts asserted would not have prompted the EEOC to investigate a claim of hostile
work environment.

Thus, Meads is precluded from bringing a claim of hostile work

environment based on his failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Further, even if Meads had exhausted his administrative remedies, summary judgment
would be appropriate because Meads has not demonstrated a case of hostile work
environment. To establish such a claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a
member of a protected class; (2) he was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the
harassment complained of was based on race or sex; (4) the harassment created a hostile
work environment; and (5) the employer is liable. Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 512
(6th Cir. 1999). The alleged actions must “meet both an objective and a subjective test, in
other words, the conduct must be so severe or pervasive as to constitute a hostile or abusive
working environment both to the reasonable person and the actual victim.”
USCAR, 521 F.3d 655, 678 (6th Cir. 2008).

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Grace v.

Meads asserts that he was “pushed, spit on while being yelled at, finger in his face,
attacked and embarrassed in front of his classmates” by Emma Turley on the first day of
training. [Record No. 42, pp. 13–14] He contends that similar harassment continued to
occur through his last day of employment, including being called numerous racially
insensitive names.

Further, he stated that “thirty times a year dark complexed black

employees” brought similar charges against Turley. [Id., p. 13] Although Meads contends
that name calling and harassment were pervasive throughout his employment, he has alleged
only one specific instance of such an occurrence on the first day of training. Meads’ other
allegations provide no indication of the time, place, or context of the remarks, and fail to
demonstrate that the alleged comments were so frequent to qualify as severe or pervasive.7
See Fuelling v. New Vision Med. Labs LLC, 284 F. App’x 247, 259–60 (6th Cir. 2008).
Meads also failed to identify evidence that any other employees brought similar charges, let
alone “thirty times a year.” In summary, Meads has failed to create a genuine issue of
material fact of hostile work environment.
4.

Reverse Sex Discrimination

LFUCG asserts that Meads’ claim of reverse sex discrimination is time-barred.
[Record No. 44-1, p. 5] To bring a claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must timely file charges
of employment discrimination with the EEOC and file suit within ninety (90) days following
receipt of the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), (f). There is a rebuttable

7
Meads requests that the Court read all sworn affidavits and hearing transcripts which cover “all
subject and requirement in the laws that govern [his] hostile work environment situation.” [Record No.
48, p. 7] It is not this Court’s duty to search the record or affidavits to find support for Meads’ claim. See
Jones v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 466 F. App’x 449, 453 (6th Cir. 2012); InterRoyal Corp. v.
Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989).

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presumption that an individual receives a right-to-sue letter “on the fifth day following the
EEOC’s mailing.” Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d
552, 557 (6th Cir. 2000). Meads included a claim of sex discrimination in his June 21, 2012,
charge filed with the EEOC. [Record No. 44-2] The EEOC denied his claim by adopting the
findings of the LFUCHRC and mailed a right-to-sue letter to Meads on May 29, 2013.
[Record No. 44-3] As a result, the right-to-sue letter is presumed to have been received on
June 3, 2013. Meads’ original Complaint was filed in the Fayette County Circuit Court on
June 27, 2013. [Record No. 1-1, p. 1] He alleged claims of race discrimination, hostile work
environment, retaliation, wrongful termination, and illegal conspiracy. [Id., p. 3] It was not
until November 1, 2013 (approximately 150 days after receiving the right-to-sue letter), that
Meads sought leave to amend his Complaint to add a claim of sex discrimination. [Record
No. 14] Thus, Meads’ reverse sex discrimination charge is time-barred.
But even if this claim was not time-barred, summary judgment would still be proper
because Meads has not demonstrate a prima facie case of reverse sex discrimination. This
claim is also subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis described above.
Arendale, 519 F.3d at 603. To demonstrate a prima facie case of reverse sex discrimination,
a plaintiff must show that: (1) background circumstances support the suspicion that the
defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority; (2) he was
qualified for the job; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) he was replaced
by someone outside of the protected class or was treated differently than other similarly
situated employees. Johnson v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 502 F.
App’x 523, 536 (6th Cir. 2012); Arendale, 519 F.3d at 603–04.
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Meads has failed to satisfy the first element. The background requirement may be
demonstrated by “statistical evidence, employment policies demonstrating a history of
unlawful . . . considerations; evidence that the person responsible for the employment
decision was a minority [i.e., a woman]; or general evidence of ongoing tension in the
workplace.” Johnson, 502 F. App’x at 536. Meads has provided no statistical evidence or
employment policies demonstrating a history of unlawful sex considerations, or general
evidence of ongoing tension in the workplace. Further, the supervisor who recommended his
dismal was the Director of the Division of Waste Management (Steve Feese), who is a male.
[Record No. 44-4, p. 3] Thus, Meads cannot establish a prima facie case of reverse sex
discrimination.
Meads has also failed to demonstrate that he was qualified for the position. As stated
earlier, he did not satisfy the objective qualifications of the job because he was unable to
safely operate LFUCG vehicles or complete training to become a permanent employee. See
Part I., section A. Additionally, Meads cannot demonstrate that he was replaced by someone
outside of the protected class or was treated differently than other similarly situated
employees. Because Meads contends that he was replaced by John Burton, he has not
proven that he was replaced by a female. Further, Meads has not alleged or provided any
evidence that similarly-situated female employees were treated differently.

Instead, he

seems to assert that he was treated differently from other male employees because he was not
as sexually attractive or sexually permissive. [Record No. 14, p. 4] These allegations do not
satisfy the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.

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Finally, even if Meads could demonstrate a prima facie case of reverse sex
discrimination, LFUCG has asserted legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for his
termination and Meads has failed to provide evidence of pretext. As stated earlier, Meads
was terminated for reasons including failing to follow instructions during training, being
disrespectful towards his supervisors, and for concern for the public. Meads has failed to
provide any evidence that the reasons for his termination were pretext for discrimination.
Thus, summary judgment in favor of the LFUCG is proper regarding this claim.
B.

Kentucky Civil Rights Act
Meads’ Amended Complaint references the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (“KCRA”),

KY. REV. STAT. § 344.010 et seq. [Record No. 14, p. 1] However, the Amended Complaint
makes no effort to establish the nature of the claims asserted under the KCRA or to connect
the factual allegations to claims cognizable under the KCRA.

Because “the KCRA is

‘similar to Title VII of the 1964 federal Civil Rights Act [it] should be interpreted
consistently with federal law.’” Spees v. James Marine, Inc., 617 F.3d 380, 389 (6th Cir.
2010) (quoting Ammerman v. Bd. of Ed. of Nicholas Cnty., 30 S.W.3d 793, 797–98 (Ky.
2000)). To the extent Meads asserts claims of race discrimination, retaliation, hostile work
environment, and reverse sex discrimination under the KCRA, those claims are analyzed
under the same framework as Title VII claims. Because LFUCG is entitled to summary
judgment on those claims, it is likewise entitled to summary judgment on Meads’ KCRA
claims.

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C.

Other Claims
1.

Age Discrimination

Meads asserts a claim of age discrimination in his Amended Complaint. [Record No.
14] However, he has not identified a federal vehicle under which the claim can be brought.
The Amended Complaint only references Title VII; however, age is not a protected status
under Title VII. See Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 n.4 (1982). Thus,
summary judgment is proper regarding Meads’ claim of federal age discrimination.
Further, to the extent that Meads alleges a claim of age discrimination under the
KCRA, summary judgment would nonetheless be proper. Age discrimination claims arising
under the KCRA are subject to the same standard as those brought under the American
Discrimination and Employment Act. See Allen v. Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545 F.3d 387,
393–94 (6th Cir. 2008). Such claims are subject to the McDonell Douglas burden shifting
analysis. To set out a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must establish that:
(1) he was a member of a protected class (over 40 years of age); (2) he was discharged; (3)
he was qualified for the position held; and (4) he was replaced by someone outside of the
protected class or was treated differently than similarly situated non-protected employees.
Tuttle v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 474 F.3d 307, 317 (6th Cir. 2007).
Meads satisfies the first two prongs of the analysis. However, as explained above, he
has failed to demonstrate that he was qualified for the position of Equipment Operator Senior
because he did not satisfy the objective qualifications for permanent employment. Again, as
previously explained, Meads was unable to safely operate LFUCG vehicles or complete
training to become a permanent employee. See Part I., section A.
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Additionally, Meads is unable to satisfy the fourth prong.

Similar to his race

discrimination claim, Meads asserts that he was replaced by John Burton. [Record No. 42, p.
9] However, he has provided no evidence regarding John Burton’s age. Further, he has
failed to provide admissible evidence regarding the date John Burton was hired or whether he
took Meads’ previous position. Meads further asserts that he was treated differently than
similarly situated, non-protected employees Rocky Daliron, John Burton, and Mellissa
Bowman because they were given a second chance to establish that they could perform
assigned job duties but he was not. [Id.] However, Meads has failed to establish that
Daliron, Burton, or Bowman dealt with the same supervisor. Additionally, he has not
provided any admissible evidence demonstrating that the other probationary employees were
subject to the same standards, continually failed to abide by training instructions, or were
unable to move past the first stage of training. See Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 583.
Finally, even if Meads could demonstrate a prima facie case of age discrimination,
the LFUCG has asserted legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for his termination. As
outlined above, Meads was terminated for failing to follow instructions during training, being
disrespectful towards his supervisors, and for concerns relating to public safety. Meads has
failed to provide any evidence that the reasons for his termination were pretext for age
discrimination. Instead, he simply alleges without any supporting evidence that his age was
the reason for his termination. Thus, summary judgment in favor of the LFUCG on Meads’
claim of age discrimination is proper.

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2.

42 U.S.C. § 1981

Meads’ Amended Complaint references 42 U.S.C § 1981. [Record No. 14, p. 1]
However, to the extent that he alleges claims under § 1981, those claims fail because 42
U.S.C. § 1983 establishes the lone mechanism for bringing suits against state actors for
alleded violation of rights protected by § 1981. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S.
701, 733 (1981) (“[T]he express cause of action for damages created by § 1983 constitutes
the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in § 1981 by state
governmental units.”); Arendale, 519 F.3d at 594–99. Accordingly, summary judgment is
proper for claims asserted under § 1981.
D.

Remaining State Law Claims
1.

Wrongful Discharge

Meads also seems to assert a wrongful discharge claim under state law. Under
Kentucky law, an employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge where the discharge
is contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy as evidenced by a constitutional
or statutory provision.

Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 1985).

However,

preemption occurs in wrongful discharge cases “when the statutes that establish the ‘welldefined public policy’ violation which supports the wrongful discharge pleading are the same
statutes that establish a statutory cause of action for, and structure the remedy for, violations
of that public policy.” Hill v. Ky. Lottery Corp., 327 S.W.3d 412, 421 (Ky. 2010).
Meads’ KCRA claims preempt his claim of wrongful discharge. Other than the
KCRA, Meads fails to identify specific constitutional or statutory provisions supporting his
claim. Thus, because the KCRA contains its own causes of action and remedies, Meads’
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wrongful discharge claim will be dismissed. Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d at 401; Temple v. Pflunger,
866 F. Supp. 2d 735, 744 (E.D. Ky. 2011).
2.

Civil Conspiracy

A claim of civil conspiracy under Kentucky law is defined as “a corrupt or unlawful
combination or agreement between two or more persons to do by concert of action an
unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means.” Smith v. Bd. of Educ. of Ludlow, 94
S.W.2d 321, 325 (Ky. 1936). “Civil conspiracy is not a free-standing claim; rather, it merely
provides a theory under which a plaintiff may recover from multiple defendants for an
underlying tort.” Stonestreet Farm, LLC v. Buckram Oak Holdings, N.V., Nos. 2008-CA002389, 2009-CA-000026, 2010 WL 2696278, at *13 (Ky. Ct. App. July 9, 2010). The
plaintiff does not identify the underlying tort which forms the basis for this claim. However,
because the plaintiff’s stated claims fail, his claim for civil conspiracy also fails. See Walker
v. Carter Cnty., Ky., No. 0: 09-CV-25-DLB, 2011 WL 845780, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 15,
2011). 
IV.  
Meads has not presented evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding
any of his alleged claims resulting from his employment termination. As a result, summary
judgment is appropriate. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
1.

Defendant Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government’s motion for

summary judgment [Record No. 44] is GRANTED.

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2.

Plaintiff Willie R. Meads’ motion for summary judgment [Record No. 42] is

DENIED.
3.

All claims having been resolved, this action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN

from the Court’s docket.
4.

A final and appealable Judgment shall be entered this date.

This 9th day of March, 2015.

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