Berera v. Mesa Medical Group, PLLC

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) DENYING plas' 10 MOTION to Remand; (2) plas have 21 days to Show Cause why their complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 12/6/13.(KJR)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON
TAMMY BERERA, individually
and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MESA MEDICAL GROUP, PLLC,
Defendant.

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Civil Case No.
5:13-cv-294-JMH
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

***
This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Remand. [D.E. 10].1

This matter being fully briefed, and the

Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is now ripe for
review.
I. Procedural Background
Plaintiff Tammy Berera filed this suit in Fayette Circuit
Court on June 25, 2013, asserting her claims “on behalf of all
current and former employees of MESA and any predecessor company
of MESA.”

[D.E. 1-1 at 5].

Berera asserted a violation of KRS

337.385, claiming Defendant did not pay the full amount of wages
and overtime compensation earned, and a claim of negligence.
[D.E. 1-1 at 6-7].

1

Berera then filed an amended complaint,

The Defendant has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [D.E. 2],
which remains pending. The Court will rule on the Motion for
Summary Judgment after Plaintiffs have responded to the Court’s
show cause order, if necessary.

incorporating the original complaint in full, and adding claims
for

conversion

and

punitive

damages.

[D.E.

1-1

at

35-36].

Berera filed a second amended complaint to add Katisha Kabalen
as a member of the class.

[D.E. 1-2 at 67].

Based on the Motions and other materials submitted to this
Court, there has been much contention as to whether the claims
asserted

on

the

face

Plaintiffs’ claims.
Hunter

Hughes,

conversation

of

the

complaint

accurately

encompass

A letter filed with the Court from Mr.

outside
with

counsel

for

Plaintiffs’

Defendant,

counsel,

memorializes

where

Defendants

attempted to discern the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims.
3].

a

[D.E. 1-

Subsequently, the Fayette Circuit Court granted Defendant’s

Motion

for

a

More

Definite

Statement.

[D.E.

1-7

at

7].

Defendants contend that the federal nature of Plaintiffs’ claims
became apparent only after the parties’ counsel met on August
26, 2013.

[D.E. 1 at 4-5].

Defendant claims it was further

evident that Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes
were in issue when it received Plaintiffs’ Notice for Designated
Representatives to Give Video Taped Deposition on August 29,
2013.

[D.E. 13 at 8].

September 11, 2013.

Defendant filed a Notice of Removal on

[D.E. 1].

II. Standard of Review
“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction,
2

may

be

district

removed

by

the

defendant

court

of

the

United

or

States

the

defendants,

for

the

to

the

district

and

division embracing the place where such action is pending.”
U.S.C. § 1441.

28

“The notice of removal of a civil action or

proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by
the defendant through service or otherwise.”

Id. § 1446(b)(1).

“If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a
notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by
the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an
amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may
first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become
removable.”

Id. § 1446(b)(3).

“Only state-court actions that originally could have been
filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the
defendant. . . . The presence or absence of federal-question
jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’
which

provides

that

federal

jurisdiction

exists

only

when

a

federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s
properly pleaded complaint.”

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482

U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (citing Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S.
109, 112-13 (1936)).

“[A] case may not be removed to federal

court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense
of pre-emption.”

Id. at 393.

However, “[o]n occasion, the

Court has concluded that the pre-emptive force of a statute is
3

so ‘extraordinary’ that it ‘converts an ordinary state commonlaw
complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the
well-pleaded complaint rule.’”

Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins.

Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)).

“Once an area of state

law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based
on

that

pre-empted

state

law

claim

is

considered,

from

its

inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal
law.”

Id. (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers

Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
“The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing
its right thereto.”

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the

Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 339 (6th
Cir. 1989) (citing Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S.
92, 97-98 (1921)).

“The removal petition is to be strictly

construed, with all doubts resolved against removal.”

Id.

III. Analysis
Plaintiffs’ claims amount to a tax refund suit, giving the
Court

federal

preemption.
that

question

jurisdiction

based

on

complete

Defendant relies on 26 U.S.C. § 7422 in arguing

Plaintiffs’

claims

are

preempted.

That

section

states

that:
[n]o suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any
court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax
alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed
or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to
4

have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully
collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been
duly filed with the Secretary, according to the
provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations
of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.
26 U.S.C. § 7422.
Financial

Defendant further relies on Umland v. PLANCO

Services,

Inc.,

from

the

Third

Circuit,

proposition that § 7422 preempts Plaintiffs’ claims.

for

the

In holding

that complete preemption applied, the Umland court reasoned:
[Plaintiff] alleges that the amount withheld from her
paycheck was excessive, and that the 7.65 percent at
issue was wrongfully collected from her. These
allegations track the language of § 7422.
That
statute required [plaintiff] to seek a refund from the
IRS, which would in turn seek to collect the employer
FICA tax due from [defendant].
Moreover, even if we
did not hold that the language of § 7422 expressly
preempted [plaintiff’s] claim, the broad sweep of §
7422 – especially as described by the Supreme Court –
suggests that Congress intended the IRS to occupy the
field of tax refunds, preempting claims such as
[plaintiff’s].

Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 69 (3d Cir.
2008).

Our sister court was called upon to decide a similar

issue and also found § 7422 completely preempted plaintiff’s
claims.

See Crouch v. Guardian Angel Nursing, Inc., No. 3:07-

cv-541, 2009 WL 3738095, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2009) (“This
Court concurs with the reasoning of the Third Circuit and the
Western District of Michigan.
appropriate

avenue

of

As a matter of common sense, the

redress

for

overpayment

or

payment of taxes is to appeal directly to the IRS.”).

5

erroneous

The Sixth Circuit has not been called upon to address
this issue. Those few courts that have done so with
any degree of depth have overwhelmingly come down on
the side of preemption, regardless of whether the
claims at issue are asserted directly under FICA or
are framed as state-law claims to recover moneys owed
directly to the plaintiffs by the defendant-employers
as a result of their failure to pay their share of
FICA taxes.
Id. at *5.

Thus, the issue becomes whether Plaintiffs’ claims

are an attempt to recover FICA taxes that were wrongly withheld,
but veiled in state law causes of action.

See Caterpillar, Inc.

v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (“Once an area of state
law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based
on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception,
a

federal

claim,

and

therefore

arises

under

federal

law.”);

Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir.
2007) (quoting Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S.
394,

397

n.2

(1981))

(“[P]laintiffs

may

not

‘avoid

removal

jurisdiction by artfully casting their essentially federal law
claims as state-law claims.’”).
The record clearly shows that Plaintiffs are attempting to
recover taxes excessively withheld from their paychecks.

First,

and most detrimental to Plaintiffs’ arguments for remand, the
Complaint

expressly

provides

that

the

class

consists

of

“employees who have been forced to pay the employer’s share of
payroll taxes and other taxes and withholdings.”
5].

[D.E. 1-1 at

Thus, Plaintiffs’ right to recover is based on federal law.
6

This is not a situation in which the taxes at issue are solely
state

taxes.

See

Gully

v.

First

Nat’l

Bank,

299

U.S.

109

(1936). The amount alleged to be withheld is a federal tax and
is preempted by operation of 26 U.S.C. § 7422.
Furthermore,

at

a

hearing

in

Fayette

Circuit

Court,

Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed that the excessive withholding was
equal to Defendant’s obligation under FICA.
THE COURT: Okay. And that more likely than not at this
point in time, it appears that it’s going to relate back to
FICA and – and the half, the employer’s half.
MR.
PETERSON:
The
–
if
you’re
talking
about
the
calculation?
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. PETERSON: Yes, the calculation, yes.
[D.E. 1-7 at 5]. Then later:
MR. DANFORD: So the employees have been forced to paid
[sic] the employer’s share of FICA. I mean, that’s what Mr.
Golden said the claim – the claim, as he knows it, not the
other claims –
THE COURT: That’s not to say –
MR. PETERSON: That’s agreed. That’s agreed. I mean, that’s
what the calculation comes to. That’s what we’re agreeing
on.
[D.E. 1-7 at 6].
Plaintiffs
asserting

that

attempt

to

Plaintiffs

skirt
do

not

federal

was

withheld, and it could have been withheld for any reason.2

See

Plaintiffs also claim that Defendant
removal.
However, none of the case
actually found that a party had waived
the case law does not support a finding
precluded from removing this matter to
7

why

the

by

money

2

know

jurisdiction

has waived its right to
law cited by Plaintiffs
its right to removal and
that Defendant should be
federal court.
Wrapped

[D.E.

9

at

3].

The

Court

has

no

evidence

with

which

to

determine how Defendant spent the money, however, Plaintiffs own
complaint belies the assertion that Plaintiffs do not know where
the money went.

The complaint clearly states that the purported

class was “forced to pay the employer’s share of payroll taxes
and

other

taxes

and

withholdings.”

[D.E.

1-1

at

5].

Furthermore, § 7422 “means that if someone wrongfully collects
money as a tax, then a suit to recover the sum constitutes a tax
refund suit, even if the sum did not literally constitute an
‘internal revenue tax.’”

Brennan v. Sw. Airlines Co., 134 F.3d

1405, 1410 (9th Cir. 1998), amended by Brennan v. Sw. Airlines,
140 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Flora v. United States, 362
U.S. 145, 149 (1960)).

Therefore, if the monies wrongfully

withheld from Plaintiffs’ paychecks were not really a tax, but
were collected as a tax, § 7422 makes this a tax refund suit.
See id. (“Here, the airlines may not have collected an internal
revenue tax, but they nevertheless collected a ‘sum’ as a tax.
up in Plaintiffs’ argument is the assertion that Defendant’s
actions in this case should be considered “stonewalling” because
they have not responded to written discovery requests filed in
the Fayette Circuit Court.
[D.E. 10 at 8].
The Court notes
that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s response to an invitation to attend
an informal settlement conference included the following
transmission.
“If you want to meet, withdraw the requests for
admission.
If that is a problem, then obviously you were not
serious about the meeting and it would probably not be fruitful.
If you will withdraw discovery, I am willing to meet Monday at
10:00 a.m.
Otherwise, we can discuss settlement later as
discovery proceeds if you decide to get serious about the case
later.” [D.E. 1-2 at 11].
8

Therefore, Plaintiffs have filed a tax refund suit within the
meaning of the IRC.”); see also Kaucky v. Sw. Airlines Co., 109
F.3d 349, 351 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[Twenty-six] U.S.C. § 6401(c) .
.

.

provides

that

an

overpayment

of

tax

does

not

lose

its

character as a tax for which the taxpayer is entitled to a
credit or refund merely because he was not liable for any part
of the tax that was assessed against him.”).
Plaintiffs attempt to rely on Mikulski v. Centerior Energy
Corporation to show that this is not a tax refund suit.

In

Mikulski, the defendant misinterpreted the internal revenue code
in

such

a

increased,

way

that

the

was

then

which

corporation’s
passed

on

tax

to

liability

its

was

shareholders.

Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555, 558 (6th Cir.
2007).

The Sixth Circuit simply found that Congress did not

intend the “tax refund procedure [of § 7422] to be a security
holder’s

exclusive

dividends.”
at bar.
were

Id. at 564.

for

a

company’s

misreporting

of

This is wholly inapposite to the case

In this case, Plaintiffs are employees who allege taxes

withheld

factual

remedy

from

allegations

shareholder

their

paychecks

alleged

derivative

suit

are

by

not

based

at

upon

their

employer.

all

analogous

an

alleged

The
to

a

incorrect

dividend distribution.
Plaintiffs also rely on a decision from our sister court in
the District of Minnesota.

See In re Air Transp. Excise Tax
9

Litig., 37 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (D. Minn. 1999).

The case was cited

favorably by the Sixth Circuit, however, not for the proposition
Plaintiffs

would

like

the

Court

to

rely

upon.

The

Sixth

Circuit, in Mikulski, only relied on In re Air Transportation
Excise Tax Litigation for the proposition that § 7422 did not
apply because the corporation was not acting as a collection
agent.

See Mikulski, 501 F.3d at 565.

However, in this case,

Defendant, in excessively withholding payroll taxes, was acting
as a collection agent.

See 26 U.S.C. § 3102 (“The tax imposed

by section 3101 [FICA] shall be collected by the employer of the
taxpayer, by deducting the amount of the tax from the wages as
and when paid.”);

Eastman Kodak Co. v. United States, No. 517-

71, 1975 WL 3591, at *6 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div. Apr. 1, 1975)
(“[T]he employer functions only as a statutory collection agent
for purpose of the employee portion of FICA, denominated an
income tax imposed on the employee, whereas it is the taxpayer
as to its matching portion of FICA.”).
Furthermore, there are many more distinctions between the
facts in the case before the District of Minnesota and the case
at

hand.

The

District

of

Minnesota

did

not

find

tax

code

preemption because the defendant had never paid any amounts to
the

IRS

and

that

ascertainable.
2d at 1136.

the

amount

of

the

refund

was

not

readily

In re Air Transp. Excise Tax Litig., 37 F. Supp.

The court went on to hold that § 7422 only applies
10

to taxes “actually ‘assessed’ or ‘collected’ on behalf of the
government and that was actually paid to the government.”

Id.

at 1137 (emphasis in original).
Here the amount of the refund was readily ascertainable.
Plaintiffs’ counsel has already indicated that they agree with
the exact amount of the withholding.

See [D.E. 2-9 at 5-6].

While Plaintiffs repeatedly point out that they do not yet know
where the money went or if it was actually paid to the IRS, this
requirement imposed by the District of Minnesota, which is not
binding on this Court, has been criticized.

See Buck v. Am.

Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 36 n.8 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding
that In re Air Transportation, in holding that preemption did
not apply, was “mistaken”);

Matthew v. RCN Corp., No. 12 Civ.

0185 (JMF), 2012 WL 5834917, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012)
(“[T]he

rationale

and

holding

of

Air

Transportation

are

in

conflict with the expansive language of Section 7422 and the
great

weight

particular,

of
the

authority
Air

construing

Transportation

the

Court

statute.
relied

on

.

.
a

.

In

narrow

reading of the term ‘any sum’ in Section 7422 a reading that has
been soundly rejected by other courts.”);

Strategic Hous. Fin.

Corp. v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 518, 536 (Fed. Cl. 2009)
(refusing to limit the reach of § 7422, based on In re Air
Transportation,

because

of

the

that the statute was expansive);
11

Supreme

Court’s

determination

see also In re Motor Fuel

Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 534 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1238
(D. Kan. 2008) (limiting In re Air Transportation to its facts
by

finding

that

Transportation,
collected).

the

had

defendant,

specified

unlike

the

amount

in
of

In

the

re

Air

excise

tax

The Court finds the reasoning of Umland to be more

persuasive.

Moreover,

the

Court

believes

the

Sixth

Circuit

would agree with the Umland decision because in Mikulski the
Sixth Circuit recognized that § 7422 has been broadened when
defendants are acting as tax collectors.

Mikulski, 501 F.3d at

564-65 (citations omitted) (“Although the federal courts have
broadened
airlines

§

7422

that

in

the

effectively

collecting

excise

application

does

taxes
not

‘airline
act

as

from

extend

cases’

and

agents

for

passengers,

to

the

applied

that

present

to

IRS

the

it

by

expansive

case

because

Centerior did not collect or withhold any taxes.”).
Plaintiffs claim that the cause of action solely arises
under Kentucky’s wage and hour statute because that is what
Plaintiffs rely on in stating the cause of action, and because
Defendant

paid

compensation
[D.E.

1-1

Plaintiffs
according

“an

to
at

which
6].

were
to

amount

the

the
This

not

paid

less

than

the

wages

employees

were

argument

ignores

the

allegations

amount
in

and

entitled
that

they

Plaintiffs’

were

.

.

the

.

.”

reason

entitled,

complaint,

because Defendant was excessively withholding taxes.
12

overtime

is

Plaintiffs

argue that the claims do “not turn on the reason Defendants’
[sic] may have made deductions from pay, but turn on whether
Plaintiffs’ [sic] were entitled to receive the deducted pay.”
[D.E. 10 at 12].

This is simply incorrect.

If Plaintiffs were

not paid what they were entitled to receive because Defendant
was wrongfully withholding taxes, Plaintiffs’ claims, no matter
which Kentucky statute Plaintiffs choose to rely on, assert a
claim under federal law.

See Brennan, 134 F.3d at 1409 (“It is

well established that the IRC provides the exclusive remedy in
tax refund suits and thus preempts state-law claims that seek
tax refunds.”).
Plaintiffs

also

argue

that

“it

is

clear

pertains to suits against the United States.”

§

7422

only

[D.E. 14 at 7].

For this proposition, Plaintiffs rely on subsection (f), which
provides that “[a] suit or proceeding referred to in subsection
(a)

may

be

maintained

U.S.C. § 7422(f).
flawed.

only

against

the

United

States.”

26

Plaintiffs’ reading of this subsection is

This subsection simply means that in a tax refund suit,

as contemplated by subsection (a), the party must sue the United
States, not a private party or individual, such as Mesa Medical.
As is discussed further below, this statute supports a finding
that there is no private right of action for a tax refund suit,
and that Plaintiffs’ claims can only be pursued before the IRS
and then the United States.

See United States v. Clintwood
13

Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 4 (2008) (“[The tax refund]
scheme provides that a claim for a refund must be filed with the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) before suit [in either the United
States district court or in the United States Court of Federal
Claims] can be brought.”);

Umland, 542 F.3d at 69 (“[Section

7422] required Umland to seek a refund from the IRS, which would
in

turn

seek

to

collect

the

employer

FICA

tax

due

from

PLANCO.”).
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims are an attempt to
recover
suit.

wrongfully

withheld

taxes,

making

this

a

tax

refund

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted and this suit

was properly removed3 based on federal question jurisdiction.4

3

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s Notice of Removal was
untimely filed because Defendant knew from the time of the
filing of the initial complaint, June 25, 2013, that the claims
arose under FICA. [D.E. 10 at 22]. On August 9, 2013, Hunter
Hughes wrote a letter to Plaintiffs’ counsel stating “Absent
your advising me by August 13 both that we have not accurately
identified the factual predicate for the complaint as now pled,
and what in fact is your factual predicate if not FICA
withholdings, then we will proceed on the basis that at least
one of the matters alleged in your complaint . . . is that Mesa
improperly caused its employees’ wages to have deducted
therefrom the employer’s share of FICA.”
[D.E. 1-3 at 3].
Plaintiffs’ response to this letter was “We disagree with your
characterizations and assumptions contained within the letter.”
[D.E. 1-4 at 2].
The Court cannot find that Defendant had
“solid and unambiguous information that the case was removable”
at the time of the filing of the original complaint when
Plaintiffs’ counsel flatly denied that FICA taxes were involved.
Lindon v. Kakavand, No. 5:13-cv-26-DCR, 2013 WL 5441981, at *3
(E.D. Ky. Sept. 27, 2013) (quoting Walker v. Phillip Morris USA,
Inc., 443 F. App’x 946, 950 (6th Cir. 2011)). Thus, the Notice
of Removal was timely filed.
14

It is well settled that FICA does not create a private
right of action.

Umland, 542 F.3d at 67 (“FICA does not create

a private right of action.”); McDonald v. S. Farm Bureau Life
Ins. Co., 291 F.3d 718, 726 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e hold that no
private right of action may be implied under FICA.”);

Salazar

v. Brown, 940 F. Supp. 160, 166 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (“I conclude
that the Sixth Circuit would likewise refuse to imply a cause of
action under FICA.”).

The Court has already found that this is

a tax refund suit based upon an alleged overpayment of FICA
taxes.

Because FICA does not create a private right of action,

this suit must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff asserts three different claims, all of which are
based

upon

the

same

conduct;

withholding of FICA taxes.

namely,

an

alleged

excessive

The first claim, a violation of KRS

337.385, is based upon an allegation that Defendant paid its
employees

“an

amount

less

than

the

wages

and

compensation to which the employees were entitled.”
at 4].

overtime
[D.E. 2-3

The negligence claim alleges that Defendant “negligently

withheld wages from former and current employees and paid to
them an amount less than the wages and overtime compensation to

4

Based upon its finding that federal question jurisdiction
exists, the Court will not address Defendant’s argument that
jurisdiction exists under the Class Action Fairness Act. See 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d).
15

which the current and former employees were entitled.”
3 at 4].

[D.E. 2-

Finally, the amended complaint sets forth a claim for

conversion based upon Defendant “interfer[ing] with Plaintiff’s
lawful right to her [wages].”

[D.E. 2-4 at 2].

All of the

claims arise out of the same conduct which gives rise to the
class

allegations.

Specifically,

that

the

employees

were

“forced to pay the employer’s share of payroll taxes and other
taxes and withholdings.”

[D.E. 1-1 at 5].

Thus, all of the

claims are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim
because they all allege that Defendant excessively withheld FICA
taxes, which is an action that must be pursued in front of the
IRS.
In accordance with Sixth Circuit precedent, Plaintiffs will
be given twenty-one days to respond to the Court’s finding that
Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed.

Morrison v. Tomano, 755

F.2d 515, 517 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We therefore conclude that the
district

court

should

not

have

dismissed

the

case

without

affording plaintiffs some opportunity to address the perceived
shortcomings in the complaint.”).
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED:
(1)

that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Remand [D.E. 10] be, and

the same hereby is, DENIED;

16

(2)
the

date

that Plaintiffs shall have twenty-one (21) days from
of

entry

of

this

Order

to

SHOW

CAUSE

why

their

complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
This the 6th day of December, 2013.

17