Mallott v. SSA
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: (1) Plt's 9 Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED; (2) Dft's 10 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; (3) administrative decision will be AFFIRMED by separate Judgment. Signed by Judge Danny C. Reeves on 6/9/2014. (STC)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
JOHN RAYMON MALLOTT,
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Civil Action No. 5: 13-305-DCR
*** *** *** ***
This matter is pending for consideration of cross-motions for summary judgment filed
by Plaintiff John Raymon Mallott (“Mallott” or “the Claimant”) and Defendant Carolyn W.
Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”). [Record Nos. 9, 10]
Mallott argues that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) incorrectly found that he could
effectively ambulate, failed to identify the evidence supported the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) determination, did not accurately describe his limitations when posing a hypothetical
question to the vocational expert (“VE”), and inappropriately assessed his credibility. As a
result, Mallott seeks reversal of the ALJ’s decision and an award of benefits. Alternatively, he
asks for remand for further consideration of his claims. The Commissioner contends that the
ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. For the reasons
discussed below, the Court will grant the Commissioner’s motion and deny the relief sought by
On February 7, 2011, Mallott applied for a period of disability and disability insurance
benefits, alleging a disability beginning August 31, 2010. [See Administrative Transcript, pp.
162-63; hereafter, “Tr.”] His applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. [Id.,
pp. 56-87] On June 25, 2012, an administrative hearing was held before ALJ Roger J. Reynolds
in Lexington, Kentucky. [Id., p. 27] Mallott appeared and testified, represented by attorney
William Grover Arnett. [Id.] VE Joyce Forrest also testified during the hearing. [Id.] Mallott
was thirty-eight years old at the time of the ALJ’s decision. [Id., p. 20] He has a tenth grade
education and past work as a cabinet maker and pallet builder. [Id., p. 14] At the time he
applied for benefits, Mallott claimed to be disabled due to a deterioration of the spine, lower
back pain, and nerve damage “on skin.” [Id., p. 185]
After reviewing the record and testimony presented during the administrative hearing,
ALJ Reynolds concluded that Mallott suffered from the severe impairments of borderline
intellectual functioning, mild obesity, degenerative disc disease with mind congenital canal
stenosis and disc protrusion, right shoulder rotator cuff stenosis, and a learning disorder in
reading. [Id., p. 14] Notwithstanding these impairments, the ALJ determined that Mallott
maintained the RFC to perform light and sedentary work, subject to the following limitations:
no climbing of ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; occasional climbing of stairs or ramps;
occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching or crawling; occasional use of the right
upper extremity for pushing, pulling or overhead work. [Mallott] requires entry
level work with simple repetitive 1-2-3 step procedures, no frequent changes in
work routines, no requirement for detailed or complex problem solving,
independent planning or the setting of goals.
[Id., p. 19]
Based on the testimony of VE Forrest, ALJ Reynolds determined that Mallott could not
perform past relevant work. [Id., p. 20] However, after considering his age, education, work
experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that he could perform other work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy, such as inspector, tester, sorter, grader, labor or hand packer,
and light commercial cleaner. [Id., p. 21] As a result, the ALJ concluded that Mallott was not
disabled under the Social Security Act.
Under the Act, a “disability” is defined as “the inability to engage in ‘substantial gainful
activity’ because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment of at least one
year’s expected duration.” Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2007).
A claimant’s Social Security disability determination is made by an ALJ in accordance with “a
five-step ‘sequential evaluation process.’” Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 642
(6th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)). If the claimant satisfies the first
four steps of the process, the burden shifts to the Commissioner with respect to the fifth step.
See Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003).
First, the claimant must demonstrate that he is not engaged in substantial gainful
employment at the time of the disability application. 20 C.F.R.§ 404.1520(b). Second, the
claimant must show that he suffers from a severe impairment or combination of impairments.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Third, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful employment
and has a severe impairment which is expected to last for at least twelve months and which meets
or equals a listed impairment, he will be considered disabled without regard to age, education,
and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Fourth, if the Commissioner cannot make a
determination of disability based on medical evaluations and current work activity and the
claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner will then review the claimant’s RFC and
relevant past work to determine whether he can perform his past work. If he can, he is not
disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
Under the fifth step of the analysis, if the claimant’s impairment prevents him from doing
past work, the Commissioner will consider his RFC, age, education, and past work experience
to determine whether he can perform other work. If he cannot perform other work, the
Commissioner will find the claimant disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). The Commissioner has
the burden of proof only on “the fifth step, proving that there is work available in the economy
that the claimant can perform.” White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 312 F. App’x 779, 785 (6th Cir.
2009) (quoting Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 391 (6th Cir. 1999)).
Judicial review of the denial of a claim for Social Security benefits is limited to
determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the
correct legal standards were applied. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir.
2007). The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which
decision makers can go either way, without interference from the court. McClanahan v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support the conclusion. Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007).
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed even
if the Court would decide the case differently and even if the claimant’s position is also
supported by substantial evidence. Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 876 (6th Cir.
2007); Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007); Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005); Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d
1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993). Thus, the Commissioner’s findings are conclusive so long as they
are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Ability to Walk
Mallott first contends that the ALJ erred in determining that he could effectively
ambulate. [Record No. 9-1, p. 9] He argues that the ALJ did not consider evidence
demonstrating that he exhibited an antalgic gait during several examinations. [Id.] Thus, he
claims that the ALJ should have found that he meets the criteria under Listing 1.00(B)(2)(b) of
the Listing of Impairments. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, table 1, § 1.00(B)(2)(b). The
Commissioner maintains that the ALJ’s determination that Mallott does not meet the listing is
supported by substantial evidence. [Record No. 10, pp. 4-5]
Listing 1.00(B)(2)(b) describes effective ambulation as the ability to maintain “a
reasonable walking pace over a sufficient distance to be able to carry out activities of daily
living.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, table 1, § 1.00(B)(2)(b). Examples of ineffective
[T]he inability to walk without the use of a walker, two crutches or two canes, the
inability to walk a block at a reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces, the
inability to use standard public transportation, the inability to carry out routine
ambulatory activities, such as shopping and banking, and the inability to climb a
few steps at a reasonable pace with the use of a single hand rail.
Dr. Terry Troutt treated Mallott from September 2010, to April 2011. According to
Troutt, Mallott exhibited an antalgic gait on three occasions (September 24, 2010, December 17,
2010, and January 5, 2011). [Tr., pp. 277, 388, 401] Additionally, Dr. Jack Reed, a nonexamining physician, noted that Mallott exhibited an antalgic gait. [Id., p. 81] However, Dr.
Troutt also noted that Mallott’s strength was normal (“5/5”). [Id., pp. 278, 382, 383, 389]
During Mallott’s consultative psychological examination, Mary Allen Genthner, M.S., noted that
his posture and gait were normal and did not report the use of any assistive device. [Id., p. 375]
In September 2010, Mallott reported that he did not use any assistive device [Id., p. 401]
Further, on February 23, 2012, Dr. Anthony J. McEldowney stated that Mallott could ambulate
without an assistive device, did not exhibit an antalgic gait, and could walk on his toes and heels.
[Id., pp. 422-24] Although Mallott later reported that he used a cane, it was never prescribed by
a doctor. Further, there is no evidence of the use of two canes or any other device as required
by the listing. [Id., p. 202] Less than a month after reporting using a cane, Mallott stated that
he was moving furniture and lifting boxes. [Id., pp. 15, 410] Dr. Lauren Larson examined
Mallott on August 12, 2011, and indicated that she had a “long discussion regarding [the] need
to return to a job,” recommended that Mallott return to work, and did not mention any problems
with ambulation. [Id., p. 455]
ALJ Reynolds did not err in conclude that Mallott could effectively ambulate. Ineffective
ambulation is generally shown by lower extremity functioning so poorly that both upper
extremities are needed to aide in moving. Jackson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 07-14184, 2009
WL 612343, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 2009). While Mallott did exhibit an antalgic gait on
occasions, he was never found to be so limited that the use of an assistive device was
recommended by any physician. Mallott’s antalgic gait was not consistently mentioned in the
record and his daily activities demonstrate that he was not severely limited in his functioning by
his gait, as required by the regulations.
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, table 1,
§ 1.00(B)(2)(b). The ALJ noted that Mallott can feed, bathe, and dress himself, as well as
monitor his medication without assistance, do some chores, and help care for a child. [Tr., p. 17]
Substantial evidence supported ALJ Reynolds’ conclusion that Mallott could effectively
ambulate and did not meet the requirements for Listing 1.00(B)(2)(b).
Mallott argues that the ALJ improperly failed to consider medical evidence and his
treatment history and made the credibility determination solely based on Mallott’s demeanor at
the administrative hearing. The ALJ is required to evaluate the credibility of a claimant’s
statements concerning his symptoms by comparing them to other evidence in the record. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(a), (c). Further, an ALJ’s credibility assessment is entitled to deference
because the ALJ is in a unique position to “observe the claimant and judge [his] subjective
complaints.” Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001); Walters v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). However, if the ALJ “rejects a claimant’s testimony as
incredible, he must clearly state his reasons for doing so.” Felisky v. Brown, 35 F.3d 1027, 1036
(6th Cir. 1994). The ALJ’s credibility determination must not be based only on “intangible or
intuitive notion[s] about the individual’s credibility.” SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *4.
Rather, credibility determinations must be supported by the record. Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247.
Here, the ALJ stated that he considered the objective evidence along with subjective
factors and found that Mallott’s allegations were not fully credibile. [Tr., p. 20] Along with
these considerations, ALJ Reynolds noted Mallott’s appearance and demeanor at the hearing,
his history of treatment, and his daily activities. [Id.] The ALJ also properly considered the
objective medical evidence when making his credibility determination.
20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(c)(2). For example, he noted that while Mallott complained of severe leg and back
pain, x-rays performed on September 28, 2010, did not show any lumbar spine abnormalities.
[Tr., pp. 15, 332] The ALJ also mentioned that an MRI performed in March 2012, showed only
mild spinal issues. [Id., pp. 16, 333-34] This type of objective medical evidence is appropriate
to consider when determining a claimant’s credibility. Oliver v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 415 F.
App’x 681, 686 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that x-rays demonstrating no abnormalities and an MRI
only revealing mild bulges supported the ALJ’s finding that the claimant’s alleged back pain was
not disabling). In short, the ALJ properly weighed the objective medical evidence when making
his credibility determination.
The ALJ also properly considered statements from medical sources when making his
credibility finding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). As discussed above, Dr. Troutt noted several
times over the course of his treatment that Mallott’s strength was normal. [Tr., pp. 278, 382,
383, 389] Further, Dr. Larson opined that she had a “long discussion regarding [Mallott’s] need
to return to a job” and stated that Mallott should return to work. [Id., p. 455] The ALJ properly
considered these statements in rendering his decision. [Id., pp. 15-16]
ALJ Reynolds also determined that Mallott’s complaints of pain and the severity of his
symptoms were not consistent with his activities of daily living. [Id., p. 20] Indeed, Mallott
complained of having constant pain that prevented him from working and going to church. [Id.,
pp. 226, 228] However, at the time of the administrative hearing, Mallott testified that he was
currently attending church three times a week. [Id., p. 34] Further, the Claimant testified that
he had been moving boxes and furniture and did a lot of pushing, pulling, and lifting. [Id., pp.
15, 410] The ALJ also took note of the fact that Mallott can feed, bathe, dress himself, and
monitor his medication as well as perform some household chores and help provide childcare.
[Id., p. 17]
Mallott argues that ALJ Reynolds failed to consider his course of treatment for his alleged
disability. [Record No. 9-1, p. 10] He claims that he has attempted to use injections, physical
therapy, medication, and heating pads to alleviate his symptoms. [Id.] The ALJ did note
Mallott’s treatment but found that it was conservative and, therefore, undermined his credibility.
[Tr., p. 20] Consistent with the ALJ’s consideration of Mallott’s treatment history, Dr. Larson
did not recommend surgery and stated that he needed to return to a job. [Id., p. 455] The
contradictory evidence of treatment will not render the ALJ’s credibility determination
erroneous, especially considering the ALJ’s analysis of the entire record rather than just
Mallott’s treatment history.
Mallott’s assertion that ALJ Reynolds improperly relied on his demeanor at the hearing
is similarly unavailing. Mallott is correct that an ALJ may not rely solely on a claimant’s
demeanor when making a credibility determination. [Record No. 9-1, p. 10 (citing Martin v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 735 F.2d 1008, 1010 (6th Cir. 1984))] However, while the
ALJ considered this evidence, it was not the only factor the ALJ used to make his credibility
determination. [Tr., p. 20] Because Mallott’s demeanor was not the sole factor the ALJ utilized
in determining his credibility, the ALJ’s consideration of this factor was proper in rendering his
credibility determination. After considering the objective medical evidence, statements of
physicians, Mallott’s daily activities, treatment history, and demeanor, the ALJ found that
Mallott’s allegations were not fully credible. His decision is supported by substantial evidence
and is not erroneous.
Next, Mallott argues that ALJ erred in determining his RFC. [Record No. 9-1, p. 11]
Mallott claims that the ALJ failed to cite any medical evidence in determining that he could lift
twenty-five pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently. [Id.] The RFC determination is to
be made by the ALJ.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c). In fact, “the ALJ is charged with the
responsibility of evaluating the medical evidence and the claimant’s testimony to form an
assessment of the claimant’s residual functional capacity.” Coldiron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391
F. App’x 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
While the ALJ did not explicitly cite any medical sources during his analysis of Mallott’s
RFC, he did analyze the medical opinions earlier in his decision. [Tr., pp. 15-16] In that
analysis, ALJ Reynolds found that Dr. Troutt stated that Mallott had normal strength. [Id.] The
ALJ also noted that x-rays and an MRI made no more than mild or minimal findings and he
considered Mallott’s relatively conservative treatment history. [Id.] Further, as discussed above,
the ALJ found that Mallott’s allegations were not fully credible after considering the objective
evidence and several subjective factors. [Id., p. 20] This determination included Mallott’s
ability to move furniture and boxes and Dr. Larson’s statement that Mallott needed to return to
work. [Id.] Additionally, Dr. Reed found that Mallott could lift up to fifty pounds occasionally
and twenty-five pounds frequently. [Id., p. 79] The ALJ’s RFC determination was even more
limited, allowing Mallott to only lift twenty-five pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently.
[Id., p. 19] ALJ Reynolds gave the disabling opinion of Dr. McEldowney minimal weight as it
was inconsistent with the entire medical record. [Id., p. 20] Such inconsistency is a proper
consideration when determining the weight to give a physician’s opinion.
Analyzing the ALJ’s decision as a whole, substantial evidence supported his RFC
determination. Gribbins v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 37 F. App’x 777, 779 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding that the findings and conclusions of the Commissioner are reviewed in the context of
the record as a whole); see also Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 370 n. 5 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[I]t
is proper to read the ALJ’s decision as a whole, and . . . it would be a needless formality to have
the ALJ repeat substantially similar factual analyses at both steps three and five.”). The ALJ is
not required to discuss all of the evidence as long as the factual findings show that he implicitly
considered the record as a whole. See Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App’x 496,
507-08 (6th Cir. 2006). As discussed above, the ALJ properly reviewed the medical and nonmedical evidence and rendered his RFC finding. As this determination is supported by
substantial evidence as discussed above, ALJ Reynold’s RFC determination was not in error.
Moreover, even if the ALJ did err in not explicitly mentioning all of the evidence
considered in determining Mallott’s RFC, it would not require remand. See Rabbers v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 582 F.2d 647, 654 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding if an agency has failed to adhere to its
own procedures, remand for further administrative proceedings is not necessary unless “the
claimant has been prejudiced on the merits or deprived of substantial rights because of the
agency’s procedural lapses.”) (citations omitted); see also NLRB v. Wyman–Gordon Co., 394
U.S. 759, 766 (1969) (noting that courts are not required to “convert judicial review of agency
action into a ping-pong game” where “remand would be an idle and useless formality”).
Hypothetical Question to the VE
Finally, Mallott argues that the ALJ failed to include his moderately limited ability in
maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace in his hypothetical to the VE. [Record No. 9-1,
pp. 12-15] Mallott further asserts that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to include
the limitation that he can only focus for two hour increments in a workday in his hypothetical.
The VE’s testimony relies on the ALJ’s assessment of what the claimant “can or cannot
do.” Webb v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 368 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 2004). Additionally, the ALJ
is permitted to rely on the VE’s answer to a hypothetical question only to the extent the
assumptions included in the hypothetical are supported by substantial evidence. Varley v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1987). The VE’s answers to these
questions constitute substantial evidence “only if the question accurately portrays [the
claimant’s] individual physical and mental impairments.” Id. However, the ALJ is only required
to incorporate limitations in his hypothetical that he finds credible. Griffeth v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 217 F. App’x 425, 429 (6th Cir. 2007).
The ALJ asked the VE if work exists for:
a person of Mr. Mallott’s age, education, and experience with the capability to lift
and carry up to 10 pounds frequently, 20 pounds occasionally but with no
climbing of ropes, ladders or scaffolds, occasional climbing of stairs or ramps,
occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching or crawling, occasional use of the right
upper extremity for pushing or pulling, no overhead work with the right upper
extremity, further requires entry level work with simple repetitive, one, two, three
step procedures, no frequent changes in work routines, no requirement for
detailed or complex problem solving, independent planning or the setting of
[Tr., pp. 51-52]
The VE testified that such a person would not be able to perform Mallott’s past work but
would be able to find work as an inspector, tester, sorter, grader, labor or hand packer, and light
commercial cleaner. [Id., pp. 52-53] Mallott specifically objects to the fact that the ALJ did not
include restrictions concerning his alleged moderate limitations in concentration, persistence,
or pace. [Record No. 9-1, p. 13]
Dr. Christi Bruening indicated that Mallott had moderate difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence, and pace. [Tr., p. 62] She also found that Mallott has the ability to
sustain concentration for two hour increments during an eight hour workday. [Id., p. 68] Dr.
Douglas Robbins also made similar findings. [Id., pp. 77, 83] Mallott argues that the ALJ’s
omission of these limitations was erroneous under Ealy v. Commissioner, 594 F.3d 504 (6th Cir.
2010). In Ealy, the ALJ asked the VE to “assume this person [is] limited to simple repetitive
tasks and instructions in a non-public work settings.” Id. at 516. However, the ALJ in Ealy
expressly noted that he was adopting the opinion of a state agency psychologist who concluded
that Ealy only had the ability to “sustain attention to complete simple repetitive tasks for
two-hour segments over an eight-hour day where speed was not critical.” Id. The Sixth Circuit
held that the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE did not accurately describe the claimant’s functional
Mallott argues that the holding in Ealy means that limiting a claimant to “simple
repetitive tasks” does not adequately account for his moderate difficulties in concentration, pace,
and persistence as well as his ability to maintain concentration for two hour segments during an
eight hour workday. [Record No. 9-1, p. 14] However, Ealy does not mean that finding a
claimant limited to “simple repetitive task” is improper. Ealy simply reinforced the principle that
if the ALJ utilizes a response to a hypothetical, it must describe a claimant accurately. Indeed,
numerous courts have refused to apply Ealy in the manner Mallott advocates. See Hunt v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:13-CV-145, 2014 WL 345660, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2014)
(collecting cases); Oliver v. Colvin, No. 2:12-CV-480, 2014 WL 710101, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Feb.
21, 2014); Shaffer v. Colvin, No. 2:12-CV-432, 2014 WL 1207534, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 24,
In Ealy, the ALJ expressly adopted a specific limitation which he then failed to include
in his hypothetical to the VE. Here, there is no such issue because ALJ Reynolds did not
expressly adopt the limitations espoused by either Dr. Bruening or Dr. Robbins. Further, the
improper hypothetical in Ealy failed to account for speed-based restrictions. Ealy, 594 F.3d at
516. Under these facts, no special speed-based restriction was noted by any medical source. The
hypothetical question which the ALJ posed to the VE simply asked whether there were jobs
which an individual could perform consistent with Mallott’s RFC, to which the VE indicated that
there were a significant amount of such jobs. As discussed above, the ALJ’s RFC determination
is supported by substantial evidence and there was nothing improper about the hypothetical
question the ALJ posed to the VE.
Mallott also argues that the ALJ committed reversible error by not including his need to
take a break every two hours during an eight hour workday. [Record No. 9-1, p. 13] However,
this alleged failure does not constitute reversible error. Rather, breaks every two hours are to
be expected in most jobs. Rudd v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 531 F. App’x 719, 730 (6th Cir. 2013)
(citing SSR 96-9p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34478 (July 12, 1996)). Because the breaks that were
recommended by Dr. Bruening and Dr. Robbins are assumed in most jobs, any omission on the
part of the ALJ in fashioning his hypothetical is harmless. Id. (citing Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 654).
The hypothetical properly included the limitations found in his RFC determination which, as
discussed above, was supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ properly found that Mallott could effectively ambulate, did not err in assessing
Mallott’s credibility, appropriately determined his RFC, and found work that he could perform
in reliance on a proper hypothetical posed to the VE. Contrary to Mallott’s arguments, the ALJ’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
Plaintiff John Raymon Mallott’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Record No. 9]
Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Record No. 10]
The administrative decision will be AFFIRMED by separate Judgment entered
This 9th day of June, 2014.
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