Biszantz v. Stephens Thoroughbreds, LLC
Filing
47
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Court GRANTS Dft's 21 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court will enter a separate Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robert E. Wier on February 11, 2015. (AWD) cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
LEXINGTON
GARY E. BISZANTZ, d/b/a GARY E.
BISZANTZ RACING,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEPHENS THOROUGHBREDS, LLC,
Defendant.
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No. 5:13-CV-348-REW
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
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Defendant, Stephens Thoroughbreds, LLC (“Stephens”), moved for summary
judgment on all claims made by Plaintiff, Gary E. Biszantz d/b/a Gary E. Biszantz
Racing (“Biszantz”). DE #21. Plaintiff responded, DE #38, and Defendant replied, DE
#39. The motion is ripe for consideration. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (DE #21). The case presents no genuine
dispute of any material fact, and each of Plaintiff’s claims fails as a matter of law. Mr.
Biszantz, an experienced horseman who voluntarily entered an arms’ length transaction
governed by the highly predictable and demanding Keeneland Conditions of Sale, seeks
to evade the effect of those conditions over dissatisfaction with the results of the bargain;
this he cannot do, on this record, under Kentucky contract (or tort) principles.
I.
BACKGROUND
Stephens purchased a yearling filly, later to be named SALINA, on September 12,
2012. See DE #36-6 (Notice of Sale). Prior to this transaction, Stephens employed Dr.
Greg BonenClark, an owner of Florida Equine Veterinary Associates (“FEVA”), to
1
review the filly’s records and radiographs in the Keeneland Repository. DE #36-3
(BonenClark Depo.), at 1, 3 (Depo. pp. 3, 10, 12). He performed this inspection on
September 11, 2012. Id. at 3 (Depo. pp. 10, 12). Also prior to Stephens’s purchase, Dr.
Robert J. Hunt wrote a letter regarding SALINA dated August 22, 2012, that states, in its
entirety, “On April 3, 2012, I performed arthroscopic surgery on the right hind fetlock.”
DE #36-12 (Hunt Letter). This letter was in the Repository, but John Stephens (“Mr.
Stephens,” to differentiate him from Defendant) claims he did not learn of it until this
litigation. DE #36-5 (Stephens Depo.), at 8 (Depo. p. 30). Dr. BonenClark saw the letter
in the Repository, DE #36-3, at 4 (Depo. p. 15), and gave principal Mr. Stephens a
general verbal summary of his report from the Repository review, id. (Depo. p. 16); see
also DE ##36-5, at 9 (Depo. pp. 34-35); 36-3, at 4 (Depo. p. 16) (“I would have told him
about it.”).
After Stephens’s purchase, Dr. BonenClark engaged in a series of direct
examinations of the filly and monitored her condition over several months. He examined
SALINA on September 21, 2012, concerning an abnormality with her left hind fetlock.
Id. at 4 (Depo. pp. 13-14). In his patient history report of that day, Dr. BonenClark noted
a “LEFT HIND MED SUSP[ENSORY] BRANCH GRAD[E] 2 LESION AT
ATTACHMENT.” Id. at 5 (Depo. pp. 17-18); DE #21-10, at 3.1 On December 8, 2012,
Dr. BonenClark observed “sesamoiditis of the medial left hind medial sesamoid,” and he
reported the sesamoiditis to either Mr. Stephens or Emily Dawson (“Dawson”). DE #36-
1
Dr. BonenClark noted that, in general, 80-90% of thoroughbreds with grade 2 lesions
would heal. DE #36-3, at 7 (Depo. pp. 25-26). He predicted SALINA would have “a
good chance, a reasonable chance to recover[,]” meaning over 75%. Id. (Depo. pp. 2627).
2
3, at 8 (Depo. pp. 29-30).2 Dr. BonenClark took another ultrasound on December 12,
2012, and again noted “LEFT HIND SUSP BRANCH”. DE #21-10, at 2. The size of the
branch had decreased since September 21, an improvement. DE #36-3, at 8 (Depo. pp.
31-32). Dr. BonenClark again scanned the horse on January 28, 2013. Id. at 9 (Depo. p.
35). While the branch appeared marginally bigger on the ultrasound of that date, Dr.
BonenClark advised that the “angle of the way you hold the probe can change the size
you measured” and that the size thus can be variable. Id. at 10 (Depo. pp. 38-39); see also
DE #36-15 (Bramlage Depo.), at 11 (Depo. p. 43) (agreeing). The treatment record
indicates “NO CHANGE” on January 28. DE #21-10, at 2. While Dr. BonenClark had
continued concern about the January 28 ultrasound, he only stressed patience—“take
your time”—to Mr. Stephens and Dawson. DE #36-3, at 12 (Depo. p. 47). The patient
history was never provided to Defendant, and the evidence is that Dr. BonenClark never
told Mr. Stephens or Dawson of the “lesion,” at least as to that term.3 Id. at 12-13 (Depo.
pp. 48-49).
Dawson is Mr. Stephens’s assistant trainer. She was with Dr. BonenClark when
he performed SALINA’s September 2012 ultrasound. DE #36-8, at 8 (Depo pp. 30-31).
Dr. BonenClark told her “the [suspensory] branch was enlarged[,]” but he did not tell her
2
This diagnosis (as well as the lesion) “certainly” does not concern the same procedure
as Dr. Hunt’s arthroscopic surgery; the sesamoiditis was on the left hind sesamoid, while
the surgery was on the right hind fetlock. DE #36-3, at 13 (Depo. pp. 51-52).
Additionally, Mr. Stephens testified that Dr. BonenClark did not explain his September
21 observations to him. DE #36-5, at 12 (Depo. p. 46-47). Mr. Stephens also did not
recall Dr. BonenClark giving him a report on the information in the Repository, except
for saying SALINA had sesamoiditis. Id. at 9 (Depo. p. 35). Mr. Stephens generally
described the degree of deference he gave Dr. BonenClark, or his veterinarian at the time,
to only bring issues to his attention when needed. He would trust the veterinarian to
properly perform his or her work. Id. at 10 (Depo. p. 37).
3
Although he “probably would have said this horse has a diffused hypoechoic area at the
attachment.” DE #36-3, at 20 (Depo. p. 78).
3
there was a lesion.4 Id. at 8-9 (Depo. pp. 31-33). He also told her that SALINA had
sesamoiditis, but not that the enlarged suspensory branch was at the point of attachment
to the bone. DE #36-22 (Dawson Re-Depo.), at 4 (Depo. p. 16). Between the September
21 and December 8 ultrasounds, SALINA was in a paddock and was on some type of
conservative exercise program, probably including being under saddle and jogging on the
track. DE #36-8, at 10 (Depo. p. 38). Like all horses, SALINA underwent a customized
training regimen. See DE #36-5, at 3 (Depo. p. 9) (indicating training is determined for
each horse individually; “There is no set program.”).5 BonenClark told Dawson the
December 8 ultrasound showed improvement and that the “branch was smaller in size.”
DE #36-8, at 10 (Depo. p. 39). He still did not mention a lesion. Id. Prior to January 28,
2013, Dawson did not remember having any issues with SALINA; “she was easy to take
care of and easy to train.” Id. (Depo. p. 42). Dawson remembered the January 28 scan to
be the same as the previous scan. Id. (Depo. p. 43). SALINA “was a very sound, athletic,
really very nice filly.” Id. at 12 (Depo. p. 48).6
The January 28 review communicated to Stephens that SALINA was status quo
from early December, not better and not worse. Stephens then had the horse in
continuous training leading up to the Keeneland sale in April 2013. Dr. BonenClark did
not see the filly again in advance of that sale.
4
However, in a post-suit review of the record, Dr. Michael A. Spirito averred that
“SALINA arrived at Stephens Farm in September 2012 with a Grade 2 lesion[.]” DE
#36-20 (Spirito Affidavit), at ¶ 5(a). He opined that this caused a delay in training and
disparate treatment of the filly. Id. at ¶ 5. This largely, though not precisely, corroborates
Dr. BonenClark’s handling of the filly.
5
SALINA’s training records reflect this reality, as well as Stephens’s efforts to respond
to her known conditions. DE #36-19. Per the vet’s advice, Stephens moved cautiously
with SALINA in the fall of 2012.
6
Further, Mr. Stephens testified that there were no health issues with SALINA between
January 28, 2013, and the time she was transported to Keeneland for sale; she “never
missed a day of training, never sick, nothing. She was wonderful.” Id. at 14 (Depo. p. 55).
4
Biszantz bought SALINA from Stephens on April 9, 2013, at the annual
Keeneland Two-Year-Olds In Training Sale, pursuant to a written agreement. DE #21-2
(Notice of Sale, Purchase and Security Agreement, and Conditions of Sale). SALINA did
not originally sell when she went through the auction ring because she was RNA. DE
#36-5 (Stephens Depo.), at 6 (Depo. pp. 21-22). After the auction, Mr. Stephens, on
behalf of Defendant, contacted Steve Young (“Young”), Biszantz’s agent, by phone to
offer to sell SALINA. Id. at 20 (Depo. pp. 77-79). Young had observed SALINA in
person, and Mr. Stephens allegedly had told Young, prior to the April sales, that he “liked
her a lot.” DE #36-13 (Young Depo.), at 3 (Depo. pp. 10-11).7 After consulting with
Biszantz, Young made a $175,000 offer; Mr. Stephens accepted. See DE #21-2. In the
contract, the parties agreed to be bound by Keeneland’s Conditions of Sale (“COS”), to
say the least a comprehensive document. Id. at 1 (“Both Consignor and Purchaser agree
and acknowledge that this sale shall be subject to and governed by the Conditions of Sale
and they agree to be bound thereby[.]”). Both sides concede COS application. DE ##1-1
(Complaint), at 3 (“[t]he applicable Conditions of Sale”), 3 (Answer), at 1, 3.
Prior to the sale, on April 4, 2013, Stephens hired Michael J. Chovanes, D.V.M.,
to take radiographs8 of SALINA at the Keeneland sales grounds to place in the
Repository. DE #36-9 (Chovanes Depo.), at 2 (Depo. p. 7). Dr. Chovanes described “a
moderate sesamoiditis in a left hind ankle” and “may have told” Mr. Stephens that “one
to two out of five veterinarians would be a little bit worried about th[e left] hind ankle.”
7
This timing observation rests on Young’s view of the remark. This meant, to Young,
“that [Mr. Stephens] thought she was going to bring quite a bit of money.” DE #36-13, at
3 (Depo. p. 11). Young had watched SALINA multiple times, id. at 3 (Depo. pp. 10-11),
and the remark plainly was a sale prediction to Young.
8
A radiograph is used to image bone; an ultrasound is used to image soft tissue. DE #369, at 10 (Depo. p. 38).
5
Id. at 4 (Depo. p. 14).9 Dr. Chovanes said he did not tell Mr. Stephens the possibilities
and risks of training, nor he did discuss with Mr. Stephens the option of doing an
ultrasound to gain further information. Id. at 5 (Depo. p. 17).10 He testified that which
procedures and investigation to undertake are strictly up to the owner or client because
each entails a cost. Id. at 16 (Depo. p. 61); see also DE #36-15 (Bramlage Depo.), at 4
(Depo. p. 14) (acknowledging that whether to take additional ultrasounds, due to the costs
involved, “depends on the client”). Dr. Chovanes acknowledged many things can affect
the physical condition of a horse in a material way, including training, putting it under
tack, galloping, shipping, and simply passage of time. Id. (Depo. pp. 61-63); see also DE
#36-11 (Hay Depo.), at 9 (Depo. pp. 33-34) (same).
On April 7, 2013, Biszantz retained Scott Hay, D.V.M., an equine veterinarian, to
examine SALINA’s radiographs in the Keeneland Repository. DE #36-11, at 2 (Depo. p.
7).11 Dr. Hay “didn’t have any significant concerns about the horse’s radiographs.” Id.
(Depo. p. 8). He did not see sesamoiditis. Id. at 3 (Depo. p. 10). He did not request to see
Dr. Chovanes’s radiological report, contained in the Repository (and he normally would
9
Looking at the radiographs, Dr. Chovanes said, “[T]he irregularity that I see way up at
the top of the sesamoid is within normal limits on that sesamoid.” DE #36-9, at 7 (Depo.
p. 27). He identified no abnormality on the right hind fetlock. Id. at 8 (Depo. p. 29).
10
Regarding Dr. Hunt’s statement about the arthroscopic surgery, see DE #36-12 (Hunt
Letter), Chovanes said, “That’s about as broad as you could get.” DE #36-9, at 12 (Depo.
pp. 45-46). Even if he had seen Hunt’s letter, he would not have recommended a buyer
contact Hunt about the surgery; he simply would have read the radiographs. Id. (Depo. p.
48). He acknowledged, though, that “[a]rthroscopic surgery is usually invasive joint
surgery. . . . [Y]ou are invading the joint[,]” but “it is strictly a cosmetic procedure.” Id. at
14-15 (Depo. pp. 56-57).
11
The testimony is clear and uncontradicted that the Repository radiographs were, in fact,
of SALINA. See, e.g., DE ##36-3, at 13 (Depo. p. 52); 36-5, at 18-19 (Depo. pp. 72-73);
36-9, at 2 (Depo. p. 7).
6
not do so). Id. at 4 (Depo. p. 13-14).12 Dr. Hay expressly confirmed that he could have
requested and viewed the Chovanes report. Id. at 10 (Depo. p. 37).
Biszantz did not hire a veterinarian to radiograph SALINA before she left
Keeneland (nor did he have an ultrasound done before buying her or before she left
Keeneland), but Young believed that if Biszantz had, the radiographs would have been
the same as Chovanes’s. DE #36-13, at 5 (Depo. pp. 18-20). Young advised that no one
disclosed, prior to the purchase, SALINA’s prior surgery or Dr. BonenClark’s report of a
lesion. Id. at 4 (Depo. p. 15).
After purchasing SALINA, Biszantz shipped her to Stonestreet in Ocala, Florida,
to train. DE #36-3, at 15 (Depo. p. 60). Ian Brennan was her trainer. Id. Brennan advised
Dr. BonenClark that “she was doing fine” in late May or early June 2013. Id. SALINA
“had no problems the entire time she was at Stonestreet.” Id. at 16 (Depo. p. 62). After
approximately three months, Biszantz sent her to Todd Pletcher in New York for further
training, where she manifested pain to the extent she was unable to enter a full training
regimen. See DE #36-13, at 6 (Depo. pp. 22-23). Biszantz then sent SALINA to Rood &
Riddle in Lexington, where she was treated by Lawrence Bramlage, D.V.M., who
concluded (in August 2013) that her left hind medial suspensory branch had a major
injury that appeared to start at the sesamoid bone. See DE #36-15 (Bramlage Depo.), at 9
(Depo. pp. 33-35). Dr. Bramlage opined that the Repository radiographs displayed no
12
Additionally, however, if Dr. Hay had known of Dr. BonenClark’s history, he would
have recommended that Young do a new ultrasound on the left hind fetlock before
purchasing. DE #36-11, at 10 (Depo. p. 37). Dr. BonenClark’s conclusions might indicate
possible future effect on the filly’s racing career. Id. at 5 (Depo. p. 17). Dr. Hay also
would have liked to have known about Dr. Hunt’s surgery because “there was definitely
an invasive joint surgery.” Id. at 6 (Depo. p. 21); see also DE #36-15 (Bramlage Depo.),
at 7 (Depo. pp. 26-27) (stating flatly that Hunt’s surgery, by definition, is invasive joint
surgery); but see DE #36-5 (Stephens Depo.), at 8 (Depo. p. 32) (indicating Hunt’s
surgery is not necessarily invasive joint surgery).
7
sign of injury,13 but he took his own radiographs and ultrasounds on August 27, 2013, on
which he observed a left hind ligament injury, and advised that the injury was old,
perhaps from 2012. Id. at 8 (Depo. p. 31). He noticed avulsion fractures, which were not
present in the radiographs at the time of sale. Id. at 10-11 (Depo. pp. 40-41). There was
no indication from the April radiographs that SALINA “was a likely candidate to have a
re-occurrence problem.” Id. at 12 (Depo. p. 45).
Around August 15, 2013, Biszantz received a billing statement from FEVA that
showed a previous balance due for December 2012 – January 2013 tendon work on
SALINA. This tipped Biszantz off to possible pre-sale health problems and was the
catalyst for the current suit. DE #36-18, at ¶ 11. Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Fayette
Circuit Court, making fraud and breach of contract/warranty claims. DE #1-1
(Complaint). Defendant removed the case to this Court. DE #1 (Notice of Removal).
Plaintiff generally alleged that (1) Defendant concealed a preexisting, known injury to
SALINA’s left hind suspensory ligament; (2) the Repository radiographs gave a false or
misleading impression of SALINA’s condition; and (3) Defendant administered
undisclosed medications to the filly. DE #1-1, at 6-8. Plaintiff alleged essentially the
same conduct as establishing violations of the COS, identifying four specific provisions
allegedly breached, while also challenging the enforceability of the COS’s time and
remedial limits. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff finally alleged Defendant’s creation and breach of a
warranty by placing radiographs in the Repository. Id. Defendant rejected each argument
and asserted a variety of affirmative defenses. DE #3 (Answer).
13
He reviewed the Repository radiographs and wrote, “They look fine to me as they did
to Dr. Hay.” DE #36-16, at 2.
8
On the parties’ request, Judge Hood ordered a period of limited discovery, see DE
#6 (Order), and later stayed commencement of full discovery, see DE #10 (Order). The
parties then consented to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge. DE #12. A period of
limited discovery followed, and Defendant moved for summary judgment. See DE #21.
The parties have fully briefed the issues raised. See DE ##21-1, 38, 39.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A reviewing court must construe the evidence and draw all
reasonable inferences from the underlying facts in favor of the nonmoving party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986);
Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407, 414 (6th Cir. 2009). Additionally, the court may not
“weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter” at the summary judgment
stage. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986).
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact
initially rests with the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553
(1986) (requiring the moving party to set forth “the basis for its motion, and identify[]
those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate an absence of a
genuine issue of material fact”); Lindsay, 578 at 414 (“The party moving for summary
judgment bears the initial burden of showing that there is no material issue in dispute.”).
If the moving party meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to
produce “specific facts” showing a “genuine issue” for trial. Celotex Corp., 106. S. Ct. at
9
2253; Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1044 (6th Cir. 1999). However, “Rule 56(c)
mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 106 S. Ct. at 2552;
see also id. at 2557 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“If the burden of persuasion at trial would
be on the non-moving party, the party moving for summary judgment may satisfy Rule
56’s burden of production in either of two ways. First, the moving party may submit
affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim.
Second, the moving party may demonstrate to the Court that the nonmoving party’s
evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim.”
(emphasis in original)).
A fact is “material” if the underlying substantive law identifies the fact as critical.
Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2510. Thus, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. A
“genuine” issue exists if “there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a
jury to return a verdict for that party.” Id. at 2511; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 106 S. Ct.
at 1356 (“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find
for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”) (citation omitted). Such
evidence must be suitable for admission into evidence at trial. Salt Lick Bancorp. v.
FDIC, 187 F. App’x 428, 444-45 (6th Cir. 2006).
10
III.
ANALYSIS
First, the Court must make a choice of law determination. The Court, in this
diversity case, applies Kentucky’s substantive law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 58 S.
Ct. 817, 822 (1938) (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.”); see also Legg v.
Chopra, 286 F.3d 286, 289 (6th Cir. 2002) (“In federal diversity actions, state law
governs substantive issues[.]”). Likewise, the COS and PSA contain choice-of-law
provisions directing application of Kentucky law, see DE #21-2, at 3, 29-30, and the
parties do not dispute that Kentucky law applies (and indeed they rely on it).
A.
Breach of Contract / Warranty
1.
The Parties’ Agreement
Plaintiff asserts Defendant breached several provisions of the COS. DE #1-1, at 8.
Defendant responds by generally asserting Plaintiff fatally failed to comply with the
COS’s notice, timing, and dispute resolution requirements.14 DE ##3; 21-1, at 8. The
parties’ 3-part agreement is filled with warranty disclaimer language and precise
provisions governing disputes (including time restrictions), often in pronounced, bolded,
capitalized lettering.15 Both sides unequivocally agreed “to be bound” by all COS terms.
14
Biszantz argues that Stephens cannot defend based on the text of the agreement
because the COS does not “condone or facilitate fraud.” DE #38, at 23. The Court will
consider Biszantz’s fraud arguments below.
15
For example, the PSA, on its front page, states, “OTHER THAN LIMITED
WARRANTIES EXPRESSLY STATED AND LIMITED BY NOTIFICATION
AND TIMING REQUIREMENTS AS FURTHER STATED IN THE
CONDITIONS OF SALE, THERE ARE NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, BY KEENELAND OR ANY SELLER, CONSIGNOR OR AGENT AT
ANY KEENELAND SALE AS TO MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR
ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF ANY ANIMAL SOLD AND THE HORSE
AND ANY INTEREST THEREIN IS SOLD ‘AS IS.’” DE #21-2, at 2 (emphasis in
original). These warnings are in the parties’ agreement from the first page, indicating the
11
DE #21-2, at 1. Application of the agreement, by its clear terms, plainly resolves
Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims in favor of Defendant.
a.
Terms of the Agreement
The COS—the “LEGALLY BINDING RULES” of the sale, id. at 5 (emphasis
in original)—begins, “All prospective Purchasers . . . are accepting any horse purchased
with all faults, including all conditions and defects except for applicable limited
warranties set out in Conditions NINTH through FOURTEENTH.” Id. (Condition
FIRST).16
In turn, condition NINTH provides, in relevant part, “The following conditions of
a horse must be must be so disclosed by placing a veterinary certificate in the
parties’ knowledge of and desire for them. Both sides agree that all participants in this
transaction were sophisticated parties with long histories in the horse industry, indicating
both were fully aware of and bargained for (or at least had full and free awareness and
assent to) the terms of their agreement.
16
The COS is clear: “WARRANTY DISCLAIMER: OTHER THAN THOSE
LIMITED WARRANTIES EXPRESSLY STATED IN THESE CONDITIONS OF
SALE (in Conditions NINTH through FOURTEENTH) . . . THERE IS NO
WARRANTY OR GUARANTEE OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, BY
KEENELAND, SELLER, AND/OR OR [sic] CONSIGNOR AS TO THE
SOUNDNESS, CONDITION, WIND OR OTHER QUALITY OF ANY HORSE
SOLD IN THIS SALE. THERE IS NO WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
BY KEENELAND, SELLER AND/OR CONSIGNOR, EXCEPT AS
SPECIFICALLY SET FORTH HEREIN, AS TO THE MERCHANTABILITY OR
FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF ANY HORSE OFFERED IN
THIS SALE. SUBJECT TO THE LIMITED WARRANTIES STATED HEREIN,
ALL SALES ARE MADE ON AN ‘AS IS’ BASIS, WITH ALL FAULTS AND
DEFECTS. OTHER THAN FAILURE TO SATISFY THE EXPRESSLY LIMITED
WARRANTED CONDITIONS LISTED BELOW, NO OTHER DEFECTS SHALL
CONSTITUTE A NONCONFORMITY, SUBSTANTIAL OR OTHERWISE,
WITH THE TERMS OF THE CONDITIONS OF SALE/CONTRACT.” DE #21-2,
at 10 (Condition EIGHTH) (emphases in original).
12
Repository . . .: all horses that . . . are two years of age or less and have undergone (a)
invasive joint surgery[.]” Id. at 11 (emphasis in original).17
Condition THIRTEENTH provides, “Any [two-year-old in training] which has an
injury to or disease of the bone structure which, in the opinion of a veterinarian, would
more likely than not materially and adversely affect its suitability for training and racing,
must be so announced at the time of sale OR in lieu of announcement at the time of sale,
must be so disclosed by placing radiographs and/or a veterinary certificate in the
Repository . . . reasonably disclosing that one or more of the conditions are applicable.”
Id. at 15. It also provides a specific notice procedure before the Purchaser may elect
Rejection. Id. Condition TWELFTH, as incorporated in Condition THIRTEENTH,
provides for a particular 3-veterinarian dispute resolution procedure for alleged
violations. Id. at 14-16.
Condition THIRTEENTH further states, “Consignor agrees to place in the
Repository contemporaneously with the arrival of the horse on Keeneland sales grounds a
disclosure statement, which shall be updated daily, signed by a duly licensed veterinarian
which provides a listing of all medications, including dosage, administered to [the horse]
within fourteen (14) days of sale.” Id. “Purchaser shall have the same rights and duties
regarding Rejection as provided in the Rejection section found in Condition Ninth[.]” Id.
at 17.
17
“Consignor shall have the sole responsibility concerning the accuracy of the
disclosure/announcement of the condition of any horse as aforesaid and required above.”
DE #21-2, at 11. Additionally, Condition ELEVENTH—mentioned in the Complaint but
no longer at issue per the briefing—states, “Consignor warrants that any . . . two-year-old
entered in this sale shall not have been administered any exogenous or androgenous
anabolic steroids (“AS”) within 45 days of the date of sale.” Id. at 13. However, “[i]n
order for Purchaser to avail himself of this limited warranty he must check the
appropriate box on the [PSA] at the time of sale.” Id. Biszantz did not check the box. Id.
at 2.
13
Critically, condition FIFTEENTH reminds the parties “that only the conditions set
forth in these Conditions of Sale will allow Rejection and that Rejection hereunder shall
be Purchaser’s sole and exclusive remedy. In all other respects, the AS IS nature of this
sale remains in full force and effect.” Id. at 20 (emphases in original).
Condition TWENTY-FIRST again alerts the parties that “[p]urchasers are
accepting any horse purchased with all defects except those conditions and defects
specifically warranted by Keeneland’s Conditions of Sale.” Id. at 23. An inspection of the
horse is an affirmative buyer duty and must include a review of all Repository
information for the horse. Id. at 23-24. “Purchasers will be charged with knowledge of
any defect that is or should be revealed by a reasonable inspection, including any defect
that is or should be revealed by a review of the Repository information, [with limited
exceptions not here implicated.]” Id. at 24.
The Consignor “warrants the accuracy, validity and authenticity in all
material respects of the Repository information placed by Consignor in the
Repository.” Id. at 24-25 (emphasis in original). The COS establishes a specific
Rejection process if Consignor violates this provision. Id. However, this “limited right of
Rejection . . . shall terminate . . . immediately upon the removal of the horse from
Keeneland sales grounds[.]” Id. at 26.
b.
Although there are factual questions about contract
compliance, the buyer undoubtedly did not pursue the
exclusive COS remedies, and the Court enforces the
COS remedial limitations and mechanics.
There certainly would be factual questions over Stephens’s compliance with the
COS on several fronts. The Court perceives the claims contested as (a) prior invasive
14
joint surgery disclosure; (b) disclosure of a qualifying bone structure condition; and (c)
disclosure of medications.
SALINA had a prior arthroscopic surgery on a different ankle, and there is
evidence of record that would place that type of surgery within the disclosure ambit of
Condition NINTH. DE #36-15 (Bramlage Depo.), at 7 (Depo. pp. 25-26). Mr. Stephens
denies learning about the surgery from Dr. BonenClark, but the veterinarian certainly
testified in a manner that would support a finding that Mr. Stephens learned of that
surgery (though both may have thought it inconsequential) at the time of the 2012
purchase. DE #36-3 (BonenClark Depo.), at 4 (Depo. p. 16) (“I would have told him
about it.”). In any event, it is the Consignor’s duty to make an accurate disclosure, DE
#21-2, at 24-25, so the Court views Stephens as obligated to present a clear picture of
qualifying surgical history. There was no disclosure in the 2013 sale Repository, a likely
violation of the COS.
Similarly, factual questions attend the disclosure as to the suspensory branch. The
duty hinges on diseased/injured bone structure and treats as compliant adequate
disclosure of radiographs or a certificate. Id. at 15. Indeed, even to contest disclosure
adequacy, a purchaser must present counter radiographic proof in a timely manner. Id.
Here, the radiographs were in the Repository, and Dr. Chovanes unquestionably indicated
sesamoiditis in his report. This may have been enough, if indeed SALINA’s condition
triggered a disclosure duty, but that would likely be a fact question. Again, cutting in
Stephens’s favor is the language of the COS qualifier—the condition must be one
sufficiently likely to impact the horse’s racing or training. Id. (“Any [two-year-old in
training] . . . which has an injury to or disease of the bone structure which, in the opinion
15
of a veterinarian, would more likely than not materially and adversely affect its suitability
for training and racing . . . must be so disclosed by placing radiographs and/or a
veterinary certificate in the Repository . . . reasonably disclosing that one or more of the
conditions are applicable.”). Here, Dr. BonenClark estimated 75% of horses would
perform athletically despite the lesion diagnosis. DE #36-3 (BonenClark Depo.), at 7
(Depo. pp. 26-27). Even Dr. Bramlage (post the second injury) put the full recovery
hopes at 50/50, DE #36-15 (Bramlage Depo.), at 4 (Depo. pp. 13-14), and SALINA did
significantly improve during the August to November 2013 period. The point is this: If
Dr. BonenClark held such a favorable prognosis, and if SALINA had continuously
trained leading up to the sale, showing no problems, was the suspensory at a point that
would trigger a disclosure duty? Was SALINA, in April 2013, under a bone structure
condition that “would more likely than not materially and adversely affect [her]
suitability for training and racing”? She evidently had trained continuously since at least
the end of January, was apparently showing no outward signs of injury, and had
radiographs that created only marginal concern among the veterinarians. [Further, the
filly trained without any problems until Biszantz shipped her to New York in the summer
of 2013.] It is far from clear that SALINA’s suspensory branch was problematic in April
of 2013. Still, the combination of Dr. BonenClark’s January posture and the persistent
sesamoiditis, along with the opinions of Drs. Bramlage, Spirito, and Hay, suggest a fact
question over Condition THIRTEENTH and any disclosure duty as it relates to bone
structure.
The medication disclosure issue also features competing evidence. The obligation
begins at pre-sale arrival with a 14-day look back period. DE #21-2, at 16 (“Consignor
16
agrees to place in the Repository contemporaneously with the arrival of the horse on
Keeneland sales grounds a disclosure statement, which shall be updated daily, signed by
a duly licensed veterinarian which provides a listing of all medications, including dosage,
administered to [the horse] within fourteen (14) days of sale.”). The parties have not
pointed to when SALINA arrived, but she breezed and Dr. Chovanes radiographed her on
April 4. Thus, the duty applied for at least 14 days before April 4 (i.e., March 21). The
duty of daily currency then applies. If SALINA received an undisclosed Bute injection or
Adequan or another medication during the 14 days pre-arrival and pre-sale—and there is
evidence she did—then Stephens failed in this duty. See, e.g., DE #36-7 (Ocala Equine
Hospital records). There also is little question that the disclosures in the record are not
compliant to the extent they do not reflect veterinary involvement or objectively
meaningful dosages. See DE #21-7.
The Court, for all of these reasons, would not grant summary judgment on the
existence of breach. That does not end the analysis, however. The contract could not be
clearer on its rigid mechanics, time limits, and remedial limitations. These are
enforceable and resolve any breach of contract claims. Whatever rights Biszantz had as to
SALINA’s condition at the time of sale lapsed by failure to abide by the COS as written.
The COS sensibly treats horseflesh as volatile and subject to sharp and sudden
changes in condition. Thus, the COS puts a heavy inspection expectation on buyers,
limits warranties to those set forth in the COS, and imposes a rigorous post-sale set of
mechanics for warranty enforcement. Those mechanics look harsh, in a vacuum, but
reflect the experience and market savvy of Keeneland as a keystone thoroughbred
17
marketplace, with the assent of participating horsemen. Biszantz and Stephens joined into
the deal, via the Keeneland terms, knowingly, competently, and voluntarily.
Without question, Biszantz did not pursue any of the intra-COS remedies. He had
14 days to raise an issue over prior surgery disclosure. He had 24 hours (amid other
conditions) to raise an issue over the qualifying bone-structure disclosure and/or
medications. Again, the COS warranties are exclusive, yield rejection as the remedy, and
treat rejection as the sole relief for a warranty breach. Failure to comply with the
mechanics removes rejection as an option. See DE 21-2, at 20 (Rejection is “Purchaser’s
sole and exclusive remedy.” (emphasis in original)); id. at 15 (setting out notice
requirements to elect rejection); id. at 25 (same).
This leaves Biszantz only with his effort to invalidate the COS terms, by arguing
that the remedial limitations transgress the UCC. The Court rejects the arguments in this
scenario. The Kentucky UCC governs application of remedial limitations and claims of
unconscionability. First, “[r]emedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance
with the provisions of this article on . . . contractual modification of remedy[.]” KRS
355.2-316(4). “[R]esort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is
expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.” KRS 355.2719(1)(b).
The COS represents an arms-length transaction between sophisticated horsemen;
indeed, both appear as and likely are merchants under the UCC. See KRS 355.2-104(1)
(defining merchant as “a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or
goods involved in the transaction[.]”). The COS expressly reflects that a horse’s
18
condition can change immediately, even as soon as put under tack or moved from the
sales grounds. Thus, the buyer knows he must rigorously inspect pre-sale and then must
immediately post-sale confirm the horse’s condition to invoke his bargained-for
protections.
Regarding the surgery, Biszantz would have had 14 days to inquire about prior
treatment (e.g., through prior owners, veterinary records, and/or more intrusive
inspection). He did not do this. On the medications and bone structure, the available time
window is very small, but it is the limit the parties—both experienced and sophisticated
horsemen—agreed to. Biszantz knew substantively about the disclosed medications given
on site and knew there was no veterinarian signature. He, again, could have made a direct
inquiry of Stephens, but the record reflects nothing of the sort. Further, there is no
evidence indicating the medication history would have been material to the horse’s
condition at the time of sale.18 On the matter of bone structure, Biszantz could have spent
$195 and known more than Stephens could have disclosed—the suspensory status at the
very time of sale.
Thus, there was no failure of remedial purpose. Biszantz entered a bargain
painstakingly defined by the COS terms—indeed, terms to which he assented and by
which agreed to be bound. Operation of the remedial limitations does not unfairly deny
him the benefit of the bargain. Instead, it imposes the very bargain reached.
Unconscionability is an additional avenue by which the Court “may refuse to
enforce the contract, . . . may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
18
Biszantz also asserts that Stephens gave SALINA Clenbuterol on March 25, but does
not cite to proof. DE #38, at 15. The training chart shows a general “Clen” notation for
the month of March, see DE #36-19, at 20, which Dawson testified meant that SALINA
was given liquid Clenbuterol without giving a more specific timeframe for or frequency
of its administration, see DE #36-22, at 11 (Depo. pp. 42-44).
19
unconscionable clause, or . . . may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause
as to avoid any unconscionable result.” KRS 355.2-302. “An unconscionable contract is a
contract which no man in his senses, not under delusion, would make, on the one hand,
and which no fair and honest man would accept, on the other.” Forsythe v. BancBoston
Mortg. Corp., 135 F.3d 1069, 1074 (6th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The doctrine forbids only one-sided, oppressive, and unfairly surprising contracts, and
not mere bad bargains.” Id. (applying Kentucky law and noting the doctrine “is only used
in rare instances”). Unconscionability is largely situational. Id. (noting the “fact-sensitive
nature of unconscionability determinations”). For many of the same reasons as above,
there is no unconscionability here.
In support of his argument, Biszantz cites a Fayette Circuit Court summary
judgment order in Solitary Oak Farm, Inc. v. Murphy. See DE #36-21. There, the agent of
the buyer (Pate) specifically inquired if the colt had undergone any surgeries, and the
agent of the seller (Reece) affirmatively denied prior surgeries. However, in fact, the colt
had undergone invasive joint surgery. Thus, the seller made an intentional, affirmative
misrepresentation to the buyer, and it was difficult, if not impossible, for the Plaintiff to
discover the defect within 14 days of the sale. “[B]ased on the facts o[f] the case,” the
Fayette Circuit Court declared this warranty period to be unconscionable “[g]iven the
intentional misrepresentation[.]” Id. at 5. The court tied its decision to that case’s specific
facts, and the situation here differs in critical respects. Chiefly, in this case, the Court
finds no intentional misrepresentation from Stephens to Biszantz similar to Reece
affirmatively lying in response to Pate’s specific, factual inquiry. Further, unlike in
Solitary Oak, where an intentional misrepresentation caused the warranty’s time
20
limitation to be inconsistent with the warranty’s purpose, the Court has no such concern
on these facts. See Middletown Eng’g Co. v. Climate Conditioning Co., Inc., 810 S.W.2d
57, 59-60 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (enforcing a contract’s exclusive remedy provision
because it did not fail of its essential purpose).
Here, the COS’s timing and/or remedy limitations did not fail of their essential
purposes.19 See KRS 355.2-719(2) (providing remedy if an exclusive or limited remedy
fails of its essential purpose). “A limitation of remedy provision fails of its essential
purpose when it deprives a party of the substantial value of its bargain. . . . As there are
relatively few situations where a remedy can fail of its essential purpose, section 2-719(2)
has been invoked most often in cases in which the exclusive remedy involves
replacement or repair of defective parts, and the seller because of his negligence in repair
or because the goods are beyond repair, is unable to put the goods in warranted
condition.” U.S. Achievement Acad., LLC v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 2d 389, 404
(E.D. Ky. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As in U.S. Achievement
Academy, Plaintiff did not take advantage of the offered warranties; he “should have
invoked [his] sole remedy of [Rejection] within the [applicable] period.” Id.; see also
Moore v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 40 S.W.3d 888, 892 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001); Middletown
19
The COS is clear that its time requirements are essential to contract operation: “The
physical condition of horses is subject to material change on a daily basis. Time is of the
essence. Failure to strictly comply with the notice requirements hereafter set out
shall operate to disallow the protection of the applicable warranty in favor of
Purchasers.” DE #21-2, at 12 (emphasis in original). “The time requirements for
Rejection . . . are: . . . (B) 14 days from the day of sale in the case of [applicable]
surgeries[.]” Id. The condition then sets out a specific, sequential process for providing
notice of Rejection. Id. (under Notice Requirements for Rejection). These time
limitations are not arbitrarily imposed; rather, they are included in the COS for reasons
central to horse sales: that a horse’s material condition can change rapidly, that the
provided dispute resolution protocol must occur promptly to evaluate an alleged
condition while still on the sales grounds, to provide finality to the largely “as is”
transaction, and to fairly evaluate parties’ rights under the provided limited warranties.
21
Eng’g, 810 S.W.2d at 59 (rejecting the essential purpose argument when, “[i]f the seller
were held responsible[,] . . . then this term of the contract between the parties would be
rendered meaningless.”). The COS, by its terms—bargained-for between two
sophisticated, experienced parties—addresses and provides remedies for the problems
Biszantz identifies; he simply failed to utilize them. See Moore v. Landes, No. 2005-CA002237-MR, 2006 WL 2919064, at *6 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2006). An exacting
contract, between equal parties on this subject matter, is not thereby unfair.
Counter to Biszantz’s citation to one Circuit Court summary judgment order, this
Court does enforce Keeneland’s COS (including time limits and other remedial
limitations). See, e.g., Keeneland Ass’n, Inc. v. Hollendorfer, 986 F. Supp. 1070, 1073
(E.D. Ky. 1997); Keeneland Ass’n, Inc. v. Eamer, 830 F. Supp. 974, 985-87 (E.D. Ky.
1993). The horse-racing industry is doubtlessly vitally important in and to the
Commonwealth. See Mizan Arabians v. Pyramid Soc’y, 821 F.2d 357, 360 (6th Cir.
1987). Enforcing the Keeneland COS’s limitations is consistent with precedent, vital to
the COS’s operation, and strengthens future parties’ reliance in contract enforceability; it
does not, as Biszantz argues, make the COS “illusory.” See DE #38, at 28.
Here, the prior surgery related to a different ankle, and no evidence shows the
surgery (which Dr. Chovanes called “cosmetic”, DE #36-9, at 15 (Depo. p. 57)) as
material in any way to SALINA’s fate. The medications also were substantially
disclosed, and there is no evidence a more complete record would have been material.
Regarding the bone structure, it is simply not unfair—and certainly not unconscionable—
to hold an experienced party to its deal in this context, where (a) Stephens put the
radiographs in the Repository along with an alerting report on sesamoiditis, and (b)
22
Biszantz had a veterinarian on site with equipment that could have scanned the filly and
timely raised an immediate issue. Biszantz contracted into an environment requiring great
vigilance. It is not unfair to hold him to this standard. See Forsythe, 135 F.3d at 1074
(“The terms of the release, though harshly applied . . ., were not unconscionable.”)
(noting Mrs. Forsythe was represented by counsel and negotiated the terms). There could
be a scenario where intentional deception could lead to sparing a party from a remedial
limit or requisite warranty enforcement steps, but this is not that case. The question is
whether the parties’ bargain was unconscionable at the time they entered it, per § 355.2302, and there is simply no indication of that here.
In sum, although fact questions remain regarding COS compliance, Biszantz is
not entitled to relief due to his similar failure to properly invoke his “sole and exclusive”
remedy under the contract. See DE #21-2, at 20. Biszantz goes to great length to shift the
blame onto Stephens, but as to the asserted breach of agreement claims, the record and
testimony conclusively show that, viewed in the light most favorable to Biszantz—even
if Stephens did breach each of the provisions—Biszantz fails to warrant relief.
2.
Creation of an Express Warranty
Because the agreement itself does not favor Biszantz’s claims,20 he next asserts
that Stephens created, and then breached, an express warranty through Mr. Stephens’s
alleged pre-sale statement to Young that Mr. Stephens “liked [SALINA] a lot.”21 “[A]
20
Likewise, the Complaint’s allegation that Stephens created and breached a warranty by
placing radiographs in the Repository that inaccurately reflected SALINA’s condition at
the time of sale—even if true—fails based on the text of the parties’ agreement. DE #212, at 24-26 (If Repository information is inaccurate, Purchaser must elect Rejection
within certain time restraints and following specific procedures.); see also id. at 20
(Under the COS, Rejection is Purchaser’s sole and exclusive remedy.).
21
Biszantz argues that the COS is not a complete integration of all terms of sale (and
therefore, consideration of extrinsic statements is not barred). DE #38, at 29. Condition
23
positive affirmation of fact by a seller relating to the subject matter, may constitute an
express warranty if it induced the sale and the buyer relies upon it.” King v. Ohio Valley
Terminix Co., 214 S.W.2d 993, 996 (Ky. Ct. App. 1948); see also KRS 355.2-313(1)(a)
(“Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the
goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty[.]”). Of
course, the Kentucky UCC governs.
Biszantz cites to Travis v. Wash. Horse Breeders Ass’n, Inc., 759 P.2d 418 (Wash.
1987) for his contention that Mr. Stephens’s statement has factual meaning. DE #38, at
27. The advertisements in Travis described horses as “truly outstanding,” and the agent
described a horse as “a fine athlete” and “in very good condition.” 759 P.2d at 419. Mr.
Stephens’s statement is qualitatively different. He expressed nothing objective or
measurable; rather, he simply stated his own, subjective feeling about SALINA. Indeed,
Young only understood the statement to mean that Mr. Stephens thought SALINA would
“bring quite a bit of money.” DE #36-13, at 3 (Depo. p. 11). The statement—averring
nothing more than a personal view and representing to the recipient nothing more than a
speculative possibility of future profit—is much more like “sales talk or expressions of
opinion[,]” see King, 214 S.W.2d at 996, than a positive affirmation of fact. See also
TWENTY-THIRD contains a merger clause that permits the parties to “enter into an
agreement which modifies the limited warranties as provided herein[.]” DE #21-2, at 29.
As Biszantz argues, this provision, at least in some respects, permits side deals and
additional terms. DE #38, at 29. (The Court doubts, however, that a unilateral statement
can amount to the parties “enter[ing] into an agreement” to modify the terms of the COS.)
Nevertheless, the condition also expressly provides that a party’s “oral statements . . .
concerning the physical condition or the racing abilities of the horse[] . . . do not
constitute warranties, shall not be relied upon by the Purchasers and are not part of the
contract for sale.” DE #21-2, at 29. Again, even assuming Biszantz’s argument is not
barred by the twenty-third condition, he fails to establish a basis for relief as to creation
and breach of a warranty through Mr. Stephens’s statement.
24
Middletown Eng’g, 810 S.W.2d at 59; Morris Aviation, LLC v. Diamond Aircraft Indus.,
Inc., 536 F. App’x 558, 562-63 (6th Cir. 2013).
The Court also notes that the record does not place the remark at a point in time,
though the only reasonable inference is that it occurred pre-sale, since Young treated the
remark as a prediction of what price SALINA would fetch at Keeneland. Thus, the
statement obviously predated the formal contract. Plaintiff asks to stretch Kentucky law
too far in this scenario. A value prediction of the type Mr. Stephens made would hardly,
in this context, become part of the basis of the parties’ bargain. Moreover, Mr. Stephens,
by the statement, only subjectively commended the value of his own horse. Such talk is
not warranty material in the Commonwealth. The Kentucky UCC could not be clearer:
“[A]n affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely
the seller’s opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.” KRS
355.2-313(2). The COS bars Biszantz’s side-warranty contention, DE #21-2, at 29, and
regardless, even if it did not, Mr. Stephens’s statement did not create a warranty.
B.
Fraud
Plaintiff next asserts fraud claims against Defendant, premised on essentially the
same conduct as the breach of contract/warranty claims. DE #1-1, at 6-8. The general
elements of fraud are as follows: “a) material representation b) which is false c) known to
be false or made recklessly d) made with inducement to be acted upon e) acted in reliance
thereon and f) causing injury.” United Parcel Serv. v. Rickert, 996 S.W.2d 464, 468 (Ky.
1999). To prevail at any trial, Plaintiff must prove each element by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. To survive the summary judgment stage, faced with a heightened proof
requirement, Plaintiff must produce evidence that would support a rational trier’s finding
25
under the clear and convincing proof standard. Local Union 2-2000 United Steel v. CocaCola Refreshments USA, Inc., 547 F. App’x 707, 719 (6th Cir. 2013); Street v. J.C.
Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989).
1.
The economic loss doctrine applies to bar the contractually based fraud
claim.
Defendant first argues that the economic loss doctrine bars Plaintiff’s fraud
claims. DE #21-1, at 10. This rule “prevents the commercial purchaser of a product from
suing in tort to recover for economic losses arising from the malfunction of the product
itself, recognizing that such damages must be recovered, if at all, pursuant to contract
law.” Giddings & Lewis, Inc. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 348 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Ky. 2011).
The Kentucky Supreme Court applied the rule to negligence, strict liability, and negligent
misrepresentation claims, but it refrained, on the facts before it, from applying the rule to
an asserted fraud by omission claim. Id. at 733, 738, 746. Plaintiff argues against the
doctrine’s applicability on these facts. DE #38, at 30-33.
The “rule recognizes that economic losses, in essence, deprive the purchaser of
the benefit of his bargain and that such losses are best addressed by the parties’ contract
and relevant provisions of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.” Giddings, 348
S.W.3d at 738. “Three policies support applying the economic loss doctrine to
commercial transactions: (1) it maintains the historical distinction between tort and
contract law; (2) it protects parties’ freedom to allocate economic risk by contract; and
(3) it encourages the party best situated to assess the risk of economic loss, usually the
purchaser, to assume, allocate, or insure against that risk.” Id. at 739 (quoting Mt.
Lebanon Pers. Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir.
2002)).
26
As this District has forecasted, “The Kentucky Supreme Court may not have
decided whether the economic loss doctrine applies to fraud claims, but it has indicated a
preference for broader application of the doctrine.” Ashland Hosp. Corp. v. ProVation
Med., Inc., No. 14-CV-44-DLB-EBA, 2014 WL 5486217, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 29, 2014).
“A finding that fraud claims are exempt from the economic loss doctrine would not only
represent a departure from the general trend of treating negligent misrepresentation and
fraud claims similarly, it would create patently inconsistencies with the [Kentucky
Supreme Court’s] prior reasoning. Given the Kentucky Supreme Court’s rather broad
application of the economic loss doctrine, as well as the close relationship between fraud
and negligent misrepresentation claims, this Court is now confident in predicting that the
Kentucky Supreme Court would extend the economic loss rule to fraud claims.” Id.; see
also Derby City Capital, LLC v. Trinity HR Servs., 949 F. Supp. 2d 712, 727-28 (W.D.
Ky. 2013) (stating that because fraudulent inducement claim is inextricably intertwined
with breach of contract claim, “it appears that the economic loss rule would preclude
recovery” but ultimately not predicting or holding this because the fraud claim did not
satisfy applicable pleading standards).
Here, Plaintiff’s fraud claims are fundamentally interwoven with his breach of
contract claims. All of Plaintiff’s claims emanate from the same set of facts and are
essentially restatements of each other, either as violations of the COS or under various
theories of fraud. The Court agrees with Ashland Hospital’s prediction that the Kentucky
Supreme Court would extend the economic loss rule to fraud claims, at least in these
circumstances. See Giddings, 348 S.W.3d at 746 (“[N]egligent misrepresentation requires
an affirmative false statement.”); cf. Hodell-Natco Indus., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., No. 1:08-
27
CV-02755, 2010 WL 6765522, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 2, 2010) (“It would be inherently
inconsistent to find that negligent misrepresentation claims survive the economic loss
doctrine while fraud or fraud in the inducement claims do not.”).
Looking to the recognized Kentucky rationales, first, the parties’ interactions here
are exclusively contractual; but for the negotiated sale of SALINA, the parties would
have no relationship. Because Biszantz alleges, essentially, a defective good resulting
only in loss of his bargain, the rule dictates that damages must be recovered, if at all,
pursuant to the contract. Second, the COS is a classic example of sophisticated,
experienced parties precisely allocating risk via mutual agreement; it contains exacting
grievance and resolution procedures and a variety of protections, warranties, and
disclaimers specific to the unique circumstances presented in a horse sale. Applying the
economic loss rule protects the parties’ granular agreement. Likewise, third, application
of the rule encourages the purchaser to evaluate and take appropriate action regarding any
risk. Thus, Biszantz entered a contract that accounted particularly for all of the risks of
the deal. He now seeks to avoid that risk allocation, and thus preserve his side of the deal
alone, by resorting to tort principles, an effort the economic loss doctrine prevents.
Seeking to avoid application of the rule, Plaintiff cites to Harley-Davidson Motor
Co., Inc. v. PowerSports, Inc., 319 F.3d 973, 981 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that
“Wisconsin would not apply the economic loss doctrine to bar” an action “for the
rescission of a contract”). Here, Plaintiff’s relevant “cause[] of action” is “[f]raud[.]” DE
#1-1, at 6 (emphases removed). Biszantz seeks “to recover damages reflecting the
difference in the fair market value of the filly . . . or to void the sale with a return . . . of
all costs[.]” Id. at 7-8. He reiterates that he “demands damages[,]” as well as “an Order
28
that the sale be voided and restitution-based damages[.]” Id. at 9. The word rescission
does not appear. See Bryant v. Troutman, 287 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Ky. 1956) (“[I]f the
purchaser was induced to enter into the contract in reliance upon the false representations,
he may maintain an action for re[s]cission, or he may accept the contract and sue for
damages suffered on account of the fraud[.]”). Biszantz chose fraud and sued in tort. The
complaint affirms that Biszantz seeks fraud-based money damages, including punitive
damages, even if he also seeks “void[ing] the sale.” See Gargotto v. Sherman, 180
S.W.2d 565, 566 (Ky. 1944) (“If a rescission is sought, it is incumbent upon [the buyer] .
. . to plead a tender or a return of the property.”). As the Seventh Circuit noted, “[i]n tort,
the remedies are damages[.]” Harley-Davidson, 319 F.3d at 986. The scope of the rule
also differs between Wisconsin and Kentucky; Wisconsin’s economic loss rule is
comparatively limited. See Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842,
852 (Wis. 1998) (applying economic loss doctrine to strict liability and negligence).22
22
Indeed, the Wisconsin Supreme Court later adopted a “very narrow” “fraud in the
inducement exception to the economic loss doctrine.” Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp.,
662 N.W.2d 652, 662-63 (Wis. 2003); accord Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co.,
699 N.W.2d 205, 219 (Wis. 2005). This exception, though, “does not apply when the
fraud pertains to the character and quality of the goods that are the subject matter of the
contract.” Cerabio LLC v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 410 F.3d 981, 989 (7th Cir. 2005);
see also Irwin Seating Co. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 306 F. App’x 239, 243-44 (6th Cir.
2009) (recognizing same exception under Michigan law). This honors the rule’s intent to
bar the parties from using “tort principles to circumvent the terms of an agreement.”
Cerabio, 410 F.3d at 988. The exception “does not address the situation where the only
misrepresentation by the dishonest party concerns the quality or character of the goods
sold, as the other party is still free to negotiate warranty and other terms to account for
possible defects in the goods.” Id. at 989-90 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and
citation omitted). Similarly, to invoke Wisconsin’s exception, the fraud must be
“extraneous to, rather than interwoven with, the contract.” Kaloti Enters., 699 N.W.2d at
219 (quoting Digicorp, 662 N.W.2d at 662). Plaintiff attempts a similar exception here,
which the Court rejects. Biszantz hardly was tricked into entering a contract that
addresses so comprehensively and encyclopedically the full course of conduct.
29
The Kentucky Supreme Court determined that, unlike in Wisconsin, the rule does
apply to negligent misrepresentation claims. Harley-Davidson’s holding rested on
premises fundamentally different from those the Court now faces. The Kentucky
Supreme Court in Giddings outlined a broad vision of the rule. Federal district courts in
both the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky have either held or strongly indicated
that the logical underpinnings of the doctrine, as expressed by the Kentucky Supreme
Court, would equally apply to allegations of fraud (at least those that are inextricably
intertwined with breach of contract claims). This Court agrees. Plaintiff’s fraud theory
centers on performance of the duties and obligations enumerated in the lengthy COS. No
duty independent of or not addressed by the COS exists, demonstrating the fraud claim’s
interdependence on the contract. The economic loss rule is an independent reason to deny
Plaintiff’s contractually derived fraud claims under Kentucky law.23
2.
Alternatively, because the record reveals no actionable duty or
misrepresentation, Biszantz’s fraud claims fail.
Under Kentucky law, to prevail on fraud by omission claims, Biszantz must prove
that “(1) the defendant had a duty to disclose the material fact at issue; (2) the defendant
failed to disclose the fact; (3) the defendant’s failure to disclose the material fact induced
the plaintiff to act; and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual damages as a consequence.”
Giddings, 348 S.W.3d at 747; see also Smith v. Gen. Motors Corp., 979 S.W.2d 127, 129
(Ky. Ct. App. 1998). “The existence of a duty to disclose is a matter of law for the court.”
Giddings, 348 S.W.3d at 747. “[M]ere silence is not fraudulent absent a duty to disclose.”
23
Paragraph 27 of the Complaint perhaps best shows this interconnectedness. In that
paragraph, which is within the fraud count, Plaintiff directly relies on asserted fraudulent
conduct as voiding the COS limitations. See DE #1-1, at 8. The problem is that the
conduct characterized as fraudulent is simply Stephens’s performance (or not) under the
requirements of the COS, a matter of contract.
30
Smith, 979 S.W.2d at 129.24 Kentucky recognizes a duty to disclose in four
circumstances: “arising from a confidential or fiduciary relationship[,] . . . a duty
provided by statute[,] . . . when a defendant has partially disclosed material facts to the
plaintiff but created the impression of full disclosure[,] . . . or where one party to a
contract has superior knowledge and is relied upon to disclose same[.]” Giddings, 348
S.W.3d at 747-48 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“Fraud by omission is not the same, at law, as fraud by misrepresentation, and has
substantially different elements.” Giddings, 348 S.W.3d at 747 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). A fraudulent misrepresentation claim requires proof, by clear and
convincing evidence,25 of the following elements: “(1) that the declarant made a material
representation to the plaintiff, (2) that this representation was false, (3) that the declarant
knew the representation was false or made it recklessly, (4) that the declarant induced the
plaintiff to act upon the misrepresentation, (5) that the plaintiff relied upon the
misrepresentation, and (6) that the misrepresentation caused injury to the plaintiff.”
Flegles, Inc. v. TruServ Corp., 289 S.W.3d 544, 549 (Ky. 2009) (citing Rickert, 996
S.W.2d 464). Plaintiff’s reliance must be reasonable or justifiable. Id. “The
misrepresentation, moreover, must relate to a past or present material fact. A mere
statement of opinion or prediction [of future performance] may not be the basis of an
action.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. at 552. “[M]ere
optimism, even excessive optimism, is not actionable.” Id. at 550.
24
See also Hall v. Carter, 324 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Ky. 1959) (Silence may be fraud “when
the circumstances surrounding a transaction impose a duty or obligation upon one of the
parties to disclose all the material facts known to him and not known to the other party.”).
25
Either variety of fraud invokes the clear and convincing proof standard. See, e.g.,
Arnsperger v. Becker, No. 2012-CA-486-MR, 2015 WL 301262, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan.
23, 2015) (applying the clear and convincing proof standard to a fraud by omission
claim).
31
The only affirmative representations are Mr. Stephens’s alleged “like her a lot”
remark and, perhaps, the Repository radiographs. The Court finds neither an actionable
misrepresentation. There is no evidence that the radiographs were inaccurate or
incomplete. They, paired with the Chovanes report, affirmatively disclosed the bone
condition—sesamoiditis. The “like her a lot” remark is not a factual misrepresentation,
especially given how Young treated the remark. Mr. Stephens’s statement merely
expressed his opinion on SALINA, and Young understood it to only reflect a prediction
of sales potential. As in the warranty analysis, the representation must be one of fact, not
opinion. See McHargue v. Fayette Coal & Feed Co., 283 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Ky. 1955)
(“Actionable misrepresentation must relate to a past or present material fact which is
likely to affect the conduct of a reasonable man and be an inducement of the contract. A
mere statement of opinion or prediction may not be the basis of an action.”).
On fraud by omission, the first two duty circumstances (fiduciary relationship and
statutory duty) obviously are inapplicable here. See Giddings, 348 S.W.3d at 747-48. The
critical questions relate to circumstances three and four. Biszantz fails to establish, for
summary judgment purposes, that Stephens partially disclosed material facts while
creating the impression of full disclosure, and he fails to introduce sufficient evidence
that Stephens had superior, but undisclosed, knowledge on which Biszantz reasonably
relied.
As to failure to disclose (regarding the prior surgery, the suspensory branch, and
the medications), the prior surgery and medications led to no harm as a matter of law.
Biszantz does not here contend, with any competent evidence fitting the rigorous fraud
32
standard, that the prior surgery, on a different leg, or the medicine particulars had any
impact on SALINA’s value or performance.
Regarding the suspensory branch issue, the Court emphasizes several things:
First, Stephens disclosed accurately the radiographs and the sesamoiditis.
Stephens placed current radiographs and a report describing the filly’s observed condition
in the Repository.26 Second, Biszantz, by the COS terms, had an inarguable duty to make
a full inspection of the horse. Third, Young saw the horse many times and had no
impediment to full assessment. Fourth, SALINA had continuously trained since before
the January 2013 ultrasound, without missing a day (per Stephens and the sole proof) and
the radiographs showed a condition, per Dr. BonenClark, about which only 1 or 2 out of
5 veterinarians would be concerned in April 2013. The evidence shows that Mr. Stephens
(and Dawson) knew the horse had an enlarged branch in September, handled the horse
conservatively, knew the branch had improved by December, and knew the horse, though
training, was stable as of late January. Sixty days of training later, SALINA was at
Keeneland for all to see, and there is no evidence of physical limitation(s) at that time or
treatment in the interim.
Fifth, no testimony suggests SALINA exhibited soreness or swelling at the time
of the sale. Indeed, post-sale, she trained in Florida for several months without apparent
incident or limitation. Dr. BonenClark happened to see her as he helped prepare horses
for transport to New York. He testified that Biszantz’s farm had reported no problems
with the horse and reported her as performing well. This strongly supports the view that
SALINA’s condition in April 2013 was sound, or at least that Stephens had no current
26
To the extent Biszantz alleges the radiographs failed to show avulsion fractures, presale radiographs could not reflect post-sale injuries. See DE #36-15, at 11 (Depo. p. 41).
33
reason or duty to make a contrary report. See also Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Ky., Inc., 703
S.W.2d 885, 888-89 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding damage award only when seller
“deliberately and consciously suppressed” a mare’s “profound defect” of which the seller
was “aware many months before the sale, during the sale and following the sale”). Sixth,
Biszantz dealt with Stephens knowing the COS defined the parties’ duties and
expectations. Thus, he could not rely reasonably on anything except the listed and wellcabined disclosure warranties, and the COS limitations should have reasonably tempered
his reliance even on such warranties. Seventh, Biszantz, himself an experienced market
participant, had a qualified veterinarian and expert agent on the scene. They both had full
access to SALINA. Dr. Hay could (and a COS compliant buyer would) have learned of
the sesamoiditis. He could have chosen to do an ultrasound for $195 that would have
given a full and up-to-date view of the suspensory branch at the time of or just after the
sale. Dr. Hay did not view the report, and Biszantz did not otherwise assay the issue.
Further, “mere silence does not constitute fraud by omission where it relates to
facts open to common observation or discoverable by the exercise of ordinary diligence,
or where means of information are as accessible to one party as to the other.” Giddings,
348 S.W.3d at 749 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). Biszantz
makes a specific argument that Stephens was required to disclose SALINA’s particular
training regimen and Dr. BonenClark’s training recommendations. DE #38, at 37.
Plaintiff cites no authority for this proposition, and the Court declines to create such an
obligation. Instead, the COS states the information that must be included in the
Repository, and training regimen information and recommendations are not included.
Stephens thought SALINA was a “very sound, athletic, really very nice filly.” DE #36-5,
34
at 12 (Depo. p. 48). Stephens sensed no reason to be alarmed at SALINA’s training
progress—indeed, Dr. BonenClark told Stephens that the sesamoiditis improved in the
second ultrasound and that there was no change in the third, see DE ##36-3, at 8-9
(Depo. pp. 31-35); 36-8, at 11 (Depo. p. 43); 21-10, at 2—and the mere fact that she
underwent a tailored exercise program (as all horses do) does not ripen an additional
disclosure duty.27 By all appearances and proof, the horse was, in early 2013, fulfilling
the optimistic projections Dr. BonenClark gave in terms of recovering from the lesion.
Although the Court applies the economic loss doctrine, the fraud claims would
not survive summary judgment even without that decision.28 Not all of the cited factors
are necessarily dispositive, but the Court finds no tort-based disclosure duty or actionable
misrepresentation in this context. The combination of contract-based requirements,
SALINA’s particular history, the radiographs and sesamoiditis disclosure, and Biszantz’s
inspection right coalesces to convince the Court that there is no triable fraud issue.
27
Additionally, Plaintiff asserts Stephens fraudulently failed to reveal all administered
medications, but Biszantz makes no showing that this omission induced him to act.
Biszantz certainly knew of the April 2 Bute administration, DE #21-7, at 1, and it did not
change his purchase decision.
28
Biszantz’s final arguments—concerning Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 529
and 550—similarly cannot survive review. First, “Kentucky has not adopted [§ 550], and
there is no indication that Kentucky courts would do so.” Hall v. MLS Nat’l Med.
Evaluations, Inc., No. 05-185-JBC, 2006 WL 2367139, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 15, 2006).
Biszantz makes the additional argument that “the rules create the impression that no
defects exist as to certain matters (or else they would be disclosed). As such, there is no
need to inspect further as to those issues.” DE #38, at 42. This argument ignores the plain
text of the agreement, which reminds buyers that they “will be charged with knowledge
of any defect that is or should be revealed by a reasonable inspection, including any
defect that is or should be revealed by a review of the Repository information[.]” DE
#21-2, at 24.
On § 529, the Court reiterates that the record indicates no instance of Stephens
making a representation that it knew or believed to be materially misleading. The
radiographs were accurate, and Mr. Stephens’s subjective statement was not “a
representation stating the truth,” but rather expressed his subjective opinion about the
filly.
35
Stephens did not make an incomplete or misleading disclosure, and his buyer could not
reasonably have relied on a disclosure any broader or of more substance than what the
detailed COS dictated. There is no sufficient basis to support a non-contractual duty.
Biszantz knew or plainly should have known the strict limitations and boundaries of
Stephens’s disclosure, and the COS unequivocally barred Biszantz from relying on
anything outside of those boundaries. Thus, Stephens owed only the disclosure the COS
required, and Biszantz knew otherwise to rely only on himself.
There also is insufficient evidence to support that Stephens intentionally and
materially misled Young, by omission or representation, as to the suspensory branch
condition in April 2013. The scenario, imbued with contract, is exactly why the economic
loss doctrine exists. Biszantz dislikes operation of the contract he entered and now seeks
to exceed the realm of contract and improve his lot via tort. His economic losses, if any,
result from the bargain, and the negotiated parameters of that contract must and should
array the parties’ rights.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment (DE #21). The Court will enter a separate Judgment.
This the 11th day of February, 2015.
36
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