Luster v. SSA
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) DENYING pla's 16 MOTION for Summary Judgment; (2) GRANTING Commissioner's 15 MOTION for Summary Judgment; (3) the Commissioner's decision in this matter is AFFIRMED. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 6/24/15.(KJR)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON
TRACY RANEE LUSTER,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
***
This
summary
Civil Action No.
5:14-CV-116-JMH
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
***
matter
is
before
the
judgment
on
Plaintiff’s
***
Court
upon
appeal
of
cross-motions
the
for
Commissioner’s
denial of her application for disability income benefits (DIB)
and
supplemental
security
income
(SSI).1
The
Court,
having
reviewed the record and considered the parties’ arguments, finds
that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is supported
by
substantial
evidence
and,
thus,
the
Court
will
grant
Defendant’s motion and deny Plaintiff’s motion.
I. Overview of the Process and the Instant Matter
The
Administrative
Law
Judge
(ALJ),
in
determining
disability, must conduct a five-step analysis:
1.
An individual who is working and engaging in
substantial
gainful
activity
is
not
disabled,
regardless of the claimant's medical condition.
1
These are not traditional Rule 56 motions for summary judgment. Rather, it
is a procedural device by which the parties bring the administrative record
before the Court.
2.
An individual who is working but does not have a
"severe" impairment which significantly limits his
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities
is not disabled.
3.
If an individual is not working and has a severe
impairment which "meets the duration requirement and
is listed in appendix 1 or is equal to a listed
impairment(s)", then he is disabled regardless of
other factors.
4.
If a decision cannot be reached based on current
work activity and medical facts alone, and the
claimant has a severe impairment, then the Secretary
reviews the claimant's residual functional capacity
and the physical and mental demands of the claimant's
previous work. If the claimant is able to continue to
do this previous work, then he is not disabled.
5.
If the claimant cannot do any work he did in the
past because of a severe impairment, then the
Secretary considers his residual functional capacity,
age, education, and past work experience to see if he
can do other work.
If he cannot, the claimant is
disabled.
Preslar v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110
(6th Cir. 1994) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1982)).
“The
burden of proof is on the claimant throughout the first four
steps of this process to prove that he is disabled.”
Id.
“If
the analysis reaches the fifth step without a finding that the
claimant
is
Secretary.”
The
not
disabled,
the
burden
transfers
to
the
The
ALJ
Id.
Plaintiff
has
not
worked
since
2008.
determined that she had severe impairments including: chronic
neck pain following cervical vertebra fractures; degenerative
2
disc
disease
of
hyperglycemia;
disorder;
the
borderline
mathematics
disorder;
lumbar
panic
spine;
hypertension;
intellectual
learning
disorder
functioning;
disorder;
without
obesity;
reading
posttraumatic
agoraphobia;
stress
depressive
disorder; and marijuana abuse, which was allegedly in remission.
The ALJ determined, however, that none of the impairments met or
medically
equaled
Appendix 1.
the
severity
of
an
impairment
listed
in
After considering the medical evidence, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant
work, but retains the residual functional capacity to perform
light
work
as
416.967(b).
balancing
defined
in
20
C.F.R.
§§
404.1567(b)
and
The ALJ added, however, that Plaintiff could do no
or
climbing;
no
more
than
occasional
climbing
of
stairs or ramps, pushing, pulling, or overhead work with the
upper extremities; no more than frequent turning of the head
from side to side; and no exposure to concentrated vibration or
industrial
Plaintiff
hazards.
requires
Additionally,
entry-level
work
the
with
ALJ
concluded
simple,
that
repetitive
procedures; no frequent changes in work routines; no requirement
for detailed or complex problem solving, independent planning or
setting of goals; and no fast-paced assembly lines or rigid
production quotas.
should
work
in
Finally, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
an
object-oriented
3
environment
with
only
occasional and casual contact with coworkers, supervisors, or
the general public.
Based on the testimony of a vocational
expert (VE), the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was capable of
making a successful transition to other work that exists in
significant numbers in the national economy and, therefore, was
not disabled.
II. Standard of Review
In
reviewing
the
ALJ's
decision
to
deny
disability
benefits, the Court may “not try the case de novo, nor resolve
conflicts in the evidence, nor decide questions of credibility.”
Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th
Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
Instead, judicial review of the
ALJ's decision is limited to an inquiry into whether the ALJ's
findings were supported by substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C. §
405(g); Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2001)
(citations omitted), and whether the ALJ employed the proper
legal standards in reaching his conclusion.
See Landsaw v.
Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir.
1986).
"Substantial
evidence
is
more
than
a
scintilla
of
evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant
evidence
support
as
a
a
reasonable
conclusion."
mind
Cutlip,
omitted).
4
might
25
accept
F.3d
at
as
adequate
286
to
(citations
III. Discussion
At the time of the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff was forty-twoyears old and had completed two years of technical college.
Her
previous work experience includes employment as a sales clerk, a
nursing assistant, and as an assistant manager at McDonald’s.
Plaintiff claims that she became unable to work in April 2007
because of a “mental breakdown.”
for
the
breakdown
experienced
is
not
complications
known,
from
Although the precise trigger
Plaintiff
abdominal
reports
that
she
and
the
surgery,
psychological symptoms began around that time.
She does not
claim to have had any disabling physical conditions until May 8,
2009, when her trailer home was overturned during a tornado.
From that time on, Plaintiff claims, she has suffered neck and
arm pain and paresthesia, as well as low back and hip pain.
record
reveals
that
Plaintiff
sustained
bilateral
fractures at the C6 level at the time of the tornado.
The
lamina
Plaintiff
claims that her depression and anxiety worsened significantly
after
the
tornado,
as
well.
She
admitted
significant,
longstanding marijuana use up until May 2009.
Plaintiff’s primary care provider is Jessica Pennington,
M.D.
The record indicates that Plaintiff saw Dr. Pennington on
a regular basis beginning in December 2006.
During that time,
Dr. Pennington treated Plaintiff for anxiety, depression, back
5
pain,
and
other
general
referred
Plaintiff
for
provided
by
counselor.
sessions
Miller
Joan
It
with
worked
health
mental
Miller,
appears
Miller
with
a
health
Plaintiff
management techniques.
Pennington
which
professional
Plaintiff
October
Dr.
counseling,
licensed
that
from
problems.
2008
regarding
attended
through
stress
was
clinical
counseling
June
and
2009.
anxiety
Notably, one of the goals that Miller
set for Plaintiff was to “continue looking for a job and doing
what it takes to interview and submit applications.”
At Dr. Pennington’s order, Plaintiff underwent an MRI of
the lumbar spine in April 2010, which revealed mild spondylosis
and disc bulging without any evidence of disc herniation or
stenosis.
Plaintiff underwent an MRI of the cervical spine in
December 2009.
That study revealed disc bulging at C6-7, with
no evidence of disc herniation or stenosis.
Dr.
Pennington
performed
an
evaluation
for
Plaintiff’s disability claim in January 2010.
listed
cervical
Plaintiff’s
spine
problems
fractures,
as:
insomnia,
of
Dr. Pennington
hypertension,
depression,
purposes
history
and
of
anxiety.
She opined that Plaintiff could lift only five pounds and that
she could stand or walk only two hours out of an eight-hour
workday.
She opined that Plaintiff could sit only four hours
out of an eight-hour workday.
Additionally, she stated that
6
Plaintiff’s ability to focus on tasks and to concentrate was
affected
by
her
impairments.
Finally,
she
opined
that
Plaintiff’s ability to deal with stresses at work was poor.
Geraldo Lima, PhD performed a psychological examination of
Plaintiff for the state.
Lima found that Plaintiff was able to
understand simple instructions and had no difficulty recalling
the information.
He found that she was able to concentrate well
and would likely be able to complete tasks in a normal amount of
time.
He determined, however, that she was socially withdrawn
and unlikely to do well in social contexts and that her ability
to cope with work stress was reduced.
performed
a
psychological
Christi Bruening, PhD
consultation
for
the
state
and
determined that Plaintiff could understand, remember, and carry
out instructions; that she could concentrate for two hours at a
time; that she could tolerate occasional contact with co-workers
and supervisors in a non-public setting; and that she could
adapt as needed in work settings involving routine adjustments.
P.
Saranga,
M.D.
evaluation for the state.
performed
a
physical
consultative
Dr. Saranga determined that Plaintiff
could occasionally lift fifty pounds and frequently lift twentyfive pounds.
He found that she could stand, walk, or sit about
six hours in an eight-hour workday.
Finally, he found that
Plaintiff’s ability to push and pull was unlimited.
7
Harwell Smith, PhD performed a psychological examination
at the request of the state agency in January 2011.
estimated
Plaintiff’s
global
functioning
score
to
Dr. Smith
be
50
and
concluded that Plaintiff’s ability to perform daily activities
is good.
He determined that her concentration is fair, and that
her ability to interact socially with people at work and to
adapt
to
Hundley,
the
pressures
of
day-to-day
PhD
performed
another
ability
to
is
psychological
behalf of the state in July 2011.
Plaintiff’s
work
poor.
Cristi
examination
on
Dr. Hundley determined that
understand
and
remember
simple
instructions is fair to good and that her ability to maintain
attention is fair to guarded.
Hundley found that Plaintiff’s
ability to interact appropriately in a work setting is guarded
to poor “given her description.”
A.
The ALJ did not err by failing to give sufficient
reasons for rejecting Dr. Pennington’s opinion
regarding Plaintiff’s physical limitations.
An ALJ must give the opinion of a treating source
controlling
medically
weight
if
acceptable
the
opinion
clinical
and
is
“well-supported
laboratory
by
diagnostic
techniques” and is “not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence” in the record.
Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378
F.3d
2004).
541,
544
(6th
Cir.
Regardless
of
the
weight
assigned to a treating source opinion, an ALJ is required to
8
give
good
reasons
404.1527(d)(2).
opinion
stated
findings.”
the
weight
given.
20
C.F.R.
§
In giving little weight to Dr. Pennington’s
regarding
that
for
the
Plaintiff’s
opinion
physical
“is
not
limitations,
supported
by
the
ALJ
objective
Dr. Pennington’s treatment notes were not consistent
with the severity of the impairments given in the disability
evaluation.
treatment
The ALJ noted that, despite Dr. Pennington’s long
relationship
with
“lumbago” in March 2012.
Plaintiff,
she
diagnosed
only
The ALJ went on to point out that
Plaintiff’s nondisplaced cervical fractures had healed within a
few months of the 2009 tornado.
Further, the MRI studies of
Plaintiff’s neck and low back revealed only mild degenerative
changes of the spine.
To be sure, the ALJ could have provided a more thorough
analysis using all the factors listed in the Social Security
Regulations, see Wilson, 378 F.3d 541 at 544 (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2)). The Court is satisfied, however, that the ALJ
explained
why
physical
limitations
was
clinical
and
acceptable
“inconsistent
record.
Dr.
with
Pennington’s
the
not
regarding
“well-supported
laboratory
other
See id.
Plaintiff’s
by
techniques”
substantial
9
opinion
evidence”
medically
and
in
was
the
B.
The hypothetical presented to the VE was consistent
with Dr. Pennington’s opinion of Plaintiff’s
psychological impairments and was supported by
substantial evidence.
With respect to Plaintiff’s psychological impairments,
Dr. Pennington opined that, due to Plaintiff’s depression and
anxiety, her ability to deal with work stress was poor.
Having
considered Dr. Pennington’s opinion, along with those of the
state examining and consulting sources, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff could perform entry-level work with simple, repetitive
procedures, with no frequent changes in work routines and no
requirement for detailed or complex problem solving, independent
planning or setting of goals, and no fast-paced assembly lines
or rigid production quotas.
Additionally, the ALJ determined
that the Plaintiff could work in an object-oriented environment
with
only
occasional
and
casual
contact
with
coworkers,
supervisors, or the general public.
Like Dr. Pennington, the state’s examining and consulting
physicians determined that Plaintiff had a reduced ability to
cope with work-related stress.
The ALJ determined, however,
that Plaintiff’s claim of a complete inability to deal with
stress
pointed
was
exaggerated.
out
reportedly
In
Plaintiff’s
past
looking
for
“holiday road trips.”
work
support
work,
in
the
his
conclusion,
fact
2008,
and
that
was
she
he
was
planning
Further, he noted, Plaintiff’s anger10
late
of
management issues appeared to be related to her relationship
with
an
alcoholic
boyfriend.
And
though
Plaintiff
reported
being socially withdrawn, she reported having numerous friends
with whom she talked and visited.
The ALJ stated that the
“opinions and treating and examining sources as to ‘poor ability
to deal with work stresses’ ha[ve] been considered and [are]
reflected in the limitation to entry level work with infrequent
contact
with
routines.”
coworkers
and
no
frequent
changes
in
work
While Plaintiff requested a hypothetical defining
“poor” as “unacceptable” and “work stresses” as stress at even
simple jobs, the ALJ declined, finding that these definitions
were “extreme” and “not in accordance with the evidence.”
Based
on
the
Plaintiff’s
described
above,
the
ALJ’s
requested
hypothetical.
level
did
While
not
of
social
err
Plaintiff’s
by
function,
rejecting
ability
to
as
the
handle
stress is undoubtedly compromised, the ALJ’s conclusion that she
can tolerate some stress is supported by substantial evidence.
The record supports that the hypothetical presented to the VE
sufficiently captured Plaintiff’s reduced ability to deal with
stress and is, therefore, is not grounds for remand.
v.
Barnhart,
effectively
30
F.
limited
App’x
431,
hypothetical
437
to
(6th
“low
Cir.
See Renfro
2002)
stress”
jobs
(ALJ
by
stipulating that available jobs involve only simple tasks that
11
are not fast-paced and do not require public contact or high
levels of interaction with others.).
IV.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED:
(1)
that the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, [DE
15], is DENIED;
(2)
that the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
[DE 16], is GRANTED;
(3)
and
the
Commissioner’s
decision
AFFIRMED.
This the 24th day of June, 2015.
12
in
this
matter
is
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