Vaughn v. Konecranes, Inc.

Filing 147

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: It is ordered that Pla's 142 MOTION for Reconsideration is DENIED. Signed by Judge Danny C. Reeves on 5/26/2015.(SCD)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
(at Lexington)
GEORGE VINCENT VAUGHN,

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Plaintiff,
V.
KONECRANES, INC.,
Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff,
V.
DEMAG CRANES AND COMPONENTS
CORP.; HETRONIC USA, INC.; and
CENTRAL MOTOR WHEEL OF
AMERICA, INC.,
Third Party Defendants.

Civil Action No. 5: 14-136-DCR

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

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This action is pending for consideration of Plaintiff George Vincent Vaughn’s motion
for reconsideration. [Record No. 142] On April 13, 2015, the Court excluded the testimony
of the plaintiff’s expert witness, Frederick Heath. [Record No. 137] Without Heath’s
testimony, the plaintiff lacked evidence of causation necessary to support his negligence
claim, and the Court awarded summary judgment to Defendant Konecranes, Inc.
(“Konecranes”). [Record No. 138] Vaughn now moves for reconsideration of those two
decisions. For the reasons discussed below, the plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
Motions to reconsider under Rule 60(b) give an “opportunity for the court to correct
manifest errors of law or fact and to review newly discovered evidence or to review a prior
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decision when there has been a change in the law.” United States v. Davis, 939 F. Supp. 810,
812 (D. Kan. 1996). Under Rule 60, the Court may grant relief from a final judgment due to:
(1) mistake; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied
judgment; and (6) for any other reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b)
motions fall within the sound discretion of the district court. FHC Equities, L.L.C. v. MBL
Life Assurance Corp., 188 F.3d 678, 683 (6th Cir. 1999). Such motions seek extraordinary
judicial relief and should only be granted upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.
McAlpin v. Lexington 76 Auto Truck Stop, Inc., 229 F.3d 491, 502–03 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing
Dickerson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ford Heights, 32 F.3d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1994)).
The plaintiff argues that he is entitled to reconsideration because “it appears the Court
overlooked evidence submitted with the final report and because the Court has denied the
Plaintiff’s request for a hearing.” [Record No. 142, p. 2] But the undersigned finds no
reason to disturb the earlier ruling that the record was sufficient to perform the Court’s role
under Daubert without a hearing. The plaintiff was given every opportunity to produce a
sound expert report. After the plaintiff filed Heath’s initial expert report [Record No. 90-3],
the Court allowed him additional time to supplement it beyond the original deadline [Record
No. 120-1] and accepted Vaughn’s supplemental briefing in response to the defendant’s
challenges to Heath’s testimony. [Record Nos. 129, 133] Although the plaintiff now argues
that these allowances were not enough to fully address the admissibility of Heath’s
testimony, Vaughn may not use his motion to reconsider as another chance to sway the
Court. See Dana Corp. v. United States, 764 F. Supp. 482, 488-89 (N.D. Ohio 1991).

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Vaughn assumes that the Court did not consider “Mr. Heath’s c.v. and the crane
safety standard CMMA 4.4.4 which mandates frequent inspections for controller contactors.”
[Record No. 142, p. 3] To the contrary, this Court previously reviewed these documents and
found them unavailing. Neither Heath’s curriculum vitae nor the CMMA standard bridges
the analytical gap in Heath’s report. Insofar as the plaintiff suggests that a review of these
documents will “assuage the Court’s concerns,” [Record No. 142, p. 5] he misunderstands
the prior ruling. As explained in the April 13, 2015 Memorandum Opinion and Order,
Heath’s testimony was excluded because he failed to explain his reasoning, verify his
methods, or point to others who had done so. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion that the “only issue for the court is did Mr. Heath
use a proper method in his analysis of the likely causes,” [Record No. 142, p. 8] the plaintiff
bears the burden of showing that Heath’s conclusions meet all the threshold requirements
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Among these requirements is that the expert “reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. In assessing
the relevance and reliability of an expert opinion, the district court engages in a “preliminary
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to
the facts in issue.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. Heath’s March 2015 report states his
qualifications and his conclusions and identifies certain documents that he reviewed.
[Record No. 120] However, Heath fails to explain how, given the facts and data he relied
upon, he reached the conclusions outlined in his report. A list of conclusions without
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discernible reasoning does not meet the minimum threshold requirements for the admission
of expert testimony. See, i.e., Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158 (1999)
(In determining whether a particular methodology is reliable, the court is not required to
“admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert.”)
Now, under the guise of a motion to reconsider, the plaintiff attempts to bolster his
expert’s report. However, he offers no viable basis for altering the Court’s prior conclusion
in this regard. Instead, he provides the same arguments and evidence previously considered
and rejected. A motion for reconsideration is not the forum for a party to simply reargue its
position in the hope that the Court will change its mind. See Al-Sadoon v. FISI Madison Fin.
Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 899, 902 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). Simply put, Heath’s testimony is
inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
Finally, as the Court explained in its April 15, 2015 Memorandum Opinion and
Order, [Record No. 138] the plaintiff’s claims against Konecranes required a causal
connection between Konecranes’ actions (or omissions) and Vaughn’s injury. Here, the
plaintiff offered no evidence establishing causation other than Heath’s testimony, which the
Court excluded, and a request for a missing evidence instruction, which is insufficient to
survive summary judgment. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff George Vaughn’s motion for reconsideration [Record No.
142] is DENIED.

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This 26th day of May, 2015.

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