Salyers et al v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that Pla's 9 MOTION Not to Dismiss is DENIED. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on August 11, 2014. (MWZ) cc: COR (Plas via U.S. Mail)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON
MICHAEL AND CATHY SALYERS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
CO.,
Defendant.

This

matter

is

before

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Civil Case No. 14-cv-143-JMH

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

***
the Court

upon

Plaintiff

Michael

Salyers’ “Motion Not to Dismiss” [DE 9] asking the Court to
“continue

this

case”

because

Plaintiff

still

believes

that

Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. (“State Farm”) owes
him for 10 months of rent and said “that they would pay up to 24
months

for

rent

if

my

home

wasn’t

finish[ed].”

He

further

explains that he “can’t afford a [l]awyer so [he’s] trying to
represent himself” and requests that the undersigned “hear this
case in Court.”

Defendant State Farm has filed a Response.

The

Court being adequately advised and having considered the Motion,
the Court will deny it for the reasons set forth below.
The Court granted State Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment
on July 22, 2014 [DE 7] and entered a Judgment in favor of State
Farm

[DE

8].

The

basis

for

that

decision

was

that

the

contractual limitations clause contained in the subject policy
provided that actions for recovery under the policy “must be

started

within

one

year

after

the

date

of

loss

or

damage.”

Plaintiff Salyers filed no response nor provided any opposition
to the motion for summary judgment in the twenty-one day period
provided by Local Rule 7.1(c).

In his “Motion Not to Dismiss,”

Plaintiff does not criticize the decision reached asking only
that the Court permit his case to be heard.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 and 60 provide, in rare circumstances,
the means by which an aggrieved party may ask the Court to
vacate or alter a judgment that has been rendered.

Fed. R. Civ.

P. 59(e) provides that a party may seek to have a prior order
altered or amended when there has been (1) an intervening change
of the controlling law; (2) discovery of evidence not previously
available which has since become available; or (3) a clear error
of law or to prevent manifest injustice. GenCorp., Inc. v. Am.,
Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted).

Salyers has identified neither a change in the law

nor newly discovered evidence, nor does he suggest that the
Court’s

decision

involves

manifest injustice.

a

clear

error

of

law

or

works

a

This is a very high bar to overcome, and

the Court can find no reason to grant relief as Plaintiff has
not identified any factual or legal basis for the Court to reach
any decision other than what it reached.

See Sault Ste. Marie

Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir.
1998).

Nor has Salyers identified how any of the six grounds for
reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 would permit the Court
to reconsider its decision.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 provides for

reconsideration of a judgment where 1) there has been mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; 2) there is newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b); 3) there has been fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct
by an opposing party; 4) the judgment is void; 5) the judgment
has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying
it prospectively is no longer equitable or 6) any other reason
that justifies relief.

See GenCorp., Inc. v. Olin Corp., 477

F.3d 368, 372 (6th Cir. 2007). It is not enough to argue, as
Salyers does, that Plaintiffs would be able to prevail on the
merits of the coverage action if the contractual limitations
clause did not time bar their claim.

As adjudged by this Court,

the claim is time barred, and whether Plaintiffs are correct
about the coverage issue is irrelevant.
Finally, this Court may apply “the more ‘liberal’ pleading
standard applicable to pro se litigants[, but it] does not help
[Salyers’]

cause.

While

courts

must

apply

‘less

stringent

standards’ in determining whether pro se pleadings state a claim

for which relief can be granted, . . . pro se plaintiffs are not
automatically entitled to take every case to trial.”

Pilgrim v.

Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

Salyers has raised no

argument, artfully or inartfully, which would permit this Court
to grant him the relief he requests.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion Not to
Dismiss [DE 9] is DENIED.
This the 11th day of August, 2014.