Teal v. Quintana
Filing
6
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER 1.Daniel William Teal's petition for a writ of habeas corpus 1 is DENIED; 2. the Court will enter appropriate Judgment; 3. this proceeding is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court's docket; 4. no certificate of appealability will issue. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 09/09/2014.(lc)cc: COR, Pet by US mail
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION AT LEXINGTON
DANIEL WILLIAM TEAL,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Petitioner,
v.
FRANCISCO QUINTANA, WARDEN,
Respondent.
****
****
Civil Action No.
5: 14-230-JMH
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
****
****
Daniel William Teal is an inmate confined in the Federal
Medical
Center
located
in
Lexington,
Kentucky.
Proceeding
without counsel, Teal has filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his federal
drug and firearm convictions.
filing fee.
The
Teal has paid the $5.00
[R. 4].
Court
petitions.
[R. 1].
conducts
an
initial
review
of
habeas
corpus
28 U.S.C. § 2243; Alexander v. Northern Bureau of
Prisons, 419 F. App’x 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011).
The Court must
deny the petition “if it plainly appears from the petition and
any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief.”
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the
United States District Courts (applicable to § 2241 petitions
under Rule 1(b)).
more
lenient
The Court evaluates Teal’s petition under a
standard
because
he
is
not
represented
by
an
attorney, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Burton v.
Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir. 2003), accepts his factual
allegations as true, and construes Teals’ legal claims in his
favor.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56
(2007).
Having reviewed the habeas petition, the Court must deny it
because Teal cannot pursue his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
BACKGROUND
On
March
13,
federal
court
to
methamphetamine
in
2008,
Teal
pleaded
guilty
in
conspiracy
to
distribute
500
violation
of
21
§§
U.S.C.
a
Missouri
grams
of
841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A), and 846, and to carrying a firearm in furtherance of
a
drug
trafficking
924(c)(1)(A)(i).
crime,
in
violation
of
18
U.S.C.
§
United States v. Daniel William Teal, No. 07-
275-CR-W-NKL (W. D. Mo. 2007) [R. 42, therein; see also R. 44,
therein (April 1, 2008, Order accepting Teal’s guilty plea and
adjudicating him guilty)].
On October 23, 2008, the district
court sentenced Teal to a 120-month prison term on the drug
offense and to a consecutive 60-month prison term on the firearm
offense.
[R. 61, therein].
Teal did not appeal his sentence.
On November 25, 2009, Teal filed a motion to vacate his
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Daniel W. Teal v. United
States of America, No. 09-1014-CV-NKL-P (W.D. Mo., 2009) [R. 1,
2
therein]1
On January 20, 2010, the district court dismissed
Teal’s § 2255 motion, finding that Teal had until November 6,
2009, in which to file a timely §2255 motion; that Teal’s § 2255
motion was time-barred by nineteen days, and that Teal had not
shown any extraordinary circumstances to excuse his late filing.
[R. 8, therein]
Teal appealed, but the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals denied him a certificate of appealability.
[R. 16,
therein; see also Teal v. United States of America, No. 10-1797
(8th Cir. Jul. 7, 2010)]
September 1, 2010.
The Eight Circuit’s mandate issued on
[R. 17, therein]
CLAIMS ASSERTED IN THE § 2241 PETITION
In his § 2241 petition, Teal contends that after his trial,
he discovered evidence that “…cast very serious doubt on the
credibility of the Government’s testifying witness, Brad Smith,”
[R. 1, p. 2], and further claims his conviction was based “…on
fabricated
evidence,
that
if
viewed
in
light
of
the
new
evidence, old and new, ‘it is more than likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found the Petitioner guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.’”
[Id.].
cites
Perkins,
McQuiggin
McQuiggin,
the
v.
Supreme
In support of this claim, Teal
Court
133
S.Ct.
recognized
1924
that
(2013).
the
In
actual
innocence gateway to federal habeas review developed in Schlup
1
Teal’s §2255 motion was not docketed in the district court’s record until
December 3, 2009.
3
v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518
(2006), extends to cases where the petition would otherwise be
barred by the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations
prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1998 (“AEDPA”).
Teal provides no specific information identifying the new
and/or fabricated evidence pertaining to Brad Smith, nor does he
identify
how
much
time
passed
after
his
trial
before
he
discovered the new evidence pertaining to Smith.
Teal alleges
that
violated
the
“Government’s
suppression
of
evidence”
his
right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution, [R. 1, p. 4], but again, Teal does not
identify
what
specific
evidence
the
government,
and/or
the
Missouri district court, allegedly suppressed.
On page eight of his § 2241 petition, Teal states that the
indictment
charging
him
with
conspiracy
was
fundamentally
defective because it was based only on information obtained from
Brad Smith, a confidential informant for the government.
p. 8]
Teal argues that based on long standing case law, a
conspiracy
obtained
[Id.,
conviction
from
a
cannot
be
confidential
based
solely
informant,
and
on
information
that
a
lone
defendant cannot criminally conspire with an agent or informant
engaged by the government.
[Id.].
4
Teal therefore contends that he is actually innocent of
the drug and firearm offenses of which he was convicted, and
that he is entitled to relief from his sentence under § 2241.
He seeks an order vacating his conviction and sentence.
DISCUSSION
As a general rule, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides the correct
avenue to challenge a federal conviction or sentence, whereas a
federal prisoner may file a § 2241 petition if he is challenging
the execution of his sentence (i.e., the BOP’s calculation of
sentence credits or other issues affecting the length of his
sentence).
See United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461
(6th Cir. 2001); Charles Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 755–56 (6th
Cir.
1999).
The
Sixth
Circuit
has
explained
the
difference
between the two statutes as follows:
[C]ourts have uniformly held that claims asserted
by federal prisoners that seek to challenge their
convictions or imposition of their sentence shall
be filed in the [jurisdiction of the] sentencing
court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and that claims
seeking to challenge the execution or manner in
which the sentence is served shall be filed in the
court having jurisdiction over the prisoner's
custodian under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Terrell v. United States, 564 F.3d 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In short, 28 U.S.C. § 2255
provides the primary avenue for federal prisoners seeking relief
5
from
an
unlawful
conviction
or
sentence,
not
§
2241.
See
Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 2003).
A
federal
prisoner
may
challenge
the
legality
of
his
detention under § 2241 only if his remedy under § 2255(e) is
found to be inadequate or ineffective.
Wooten v. Cauley, 677
F.3d 303, 306-07 (6th Cir. 2012); Charles, 180 F.3d at 756.
This exception does not apply where a prisoner fails to seize an
earlier opportunity to correct a fundamental defect in his or
her convictions under pre-existing law, or actually asserted a
claim in a prior post-conviction motion under § 2255 but was
denied
relief.
Prevatte,
300
Charles,
F.3d
792,
180
800
F.3d
at
756;
(7th
Cir.
United
2002).
States
“It
is
v.
the
petitioner's burden to establish that his remedy under § 2255 is
inadequate or ineffective.”
Charles, 180 F.3d at 756.
Teal is not challenging the execution of his sentence, such
as the computation of sentence credits or parole eligibility,
issues which fall under the ambit of § 2241.
Jalili,
925
challenges
F.2d
the
889,
894
(6th
constitutionality
Cir.
of
1999).
his
United States v.
Instead,
underlying
Teal
federal
conviction on Fifth Amendment grounds under § 2241 by way of the
“savings clause” of § 2255(e).
However, § 2241 is not the
proper mechanism for making this claim because Teal has not
demonstrated that his remedy under § 2255 in the district court
6
was
an
inadequate
or
ineffective
means
of
challenging
his
federal detention.
Teal
claims
that
the
indictment
charging
him
with
drug
conspiracy was fundamentally defective because it was based only
on
information
informant,
and
obtained
that
from
unidentified
a
confidential
evidence
was
government
“suppressed.”
Teal either was, or should have been, aware of the factual bases
giving
rise
proceeding.
to
both
of
these
claims
during
his
criminal
Teal claims that on the advice of his attorney he
did not file a direct appeal of his sentence, but even accepting
that claim as true, Teal could have, and should have, asserted a
claim
challenging
the
sufficiency
of
his
indictment
and
alleged suppression of evidence in a timely § 2255 motion.
did not, however, file a timely § 2255 motion.
the
Teal
And as Charles
counsels, a prisoner may obtain collateral under § 2241, through
the savings clause of § 2255, when he had prior opportunity to
assert a claim under § 2255, but failed to do so.
F.3d 756-58.
Charles, 180
Section 2241 is not an additional, alternative, or
supplemental remedy to the one provided in § 2255.
Id., at 758.
Further, a prisoner proceeding under § 2241 can implicate
the savings clause of § 2255 if he alleges “actual innocence,”
Bannerman v. Snyder, 325 F.3d 722, 724 (6th Cir. 2003).
To make
a showing of actual innocence, the movant must allege a new rule
7
of law made retroactive by a Supreme Court case, such as the
claim raised in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
Townsend v. Davis, 83 F. App’x 728 (6th Cir. 2003); Barnes v.
United
States,
102
F.
App’x
441,
443
(6th
Cir.
2004)
(“A
prisoner who can show that an intervening change in the law
establishes his actual innocence can invoke the savings clause
of § 2255 and proceed under § 2241.”); Lott v. Davis, 105 F.
App’x 13, 14-15 (6th Cir. 2004).
Actual innocence requires
factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.
Bousley v.
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-24 (1998); Wooten v. Cauley,
677 F.3d at 307; Hilliard v. United States, 157 F.3d 444, 450
(6th Cir. 1998).
Teal contends that McQuiggin is a new rule of law which
applies
retroactively
sentence.
and
which
affords
him
relief
from
his
The Supreme Court, however, gave no indication in
McQuiggin that its holding applies retroactively to cases on
collateral review.
that
McQuiggin
Therefore, the Court is unable to conclude
affords
Teal
any
retroactive
relief.
Even
assuming that McQuiggin applies retroactively, the case does not
support Teal’s argument on the merits.
In
McQuiggin, the Supreme Court held that, in order to
avoid a miscarriage of justice, a federal court may entertain a
§ 2254 petition (i.e., a habeas application filed by a state
8
prisoner) if the petition states facts that could amount to a
convincing claim of actual innocence even if the AEDPA’s statute
of limitations for such a petition has expired.
133 S. Ct. at 1934–35.
See McOuiggin,
That equitable exception applies only to
a “severely confined category” of cases, namely, those matters
where the petitioner produces new evidence sufficient to show
that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would
have convicted [the petitioner].”
Id. at 1933 (quoting Schlup,
513 U.S. at 327)).
The Supreme Court cautioned that “tenable actual-innocence
gateway pleas are rare.”
“[t]he
gateway
‘evidence
of
should
innocence
McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1928, and that
open
so
only
when
a
strong
that
a
petition
court
presents
cannot
have
confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also
satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional
error.’”
also
Id. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316); see
Eberle
v.
Warden,
Mansfield
Correctional
Inst.,
532
F.
App’x 605, 612-13 (6th Cir. 2013) (discussing strict standards
for invoking relief under McQuiggin ).
Teal
is
not
a
state
prisoner
seeking
to
overcome
the
statute of limitations set forth in the AEDPA, but even assuming
that
McQuiggin
applies
to
federal
prisoners,
Teal’s
§
2241
petition is devoid of specific factual allegations identifying
9
what
new
and
evidence
he
allegedly
discovered
and
when
he
allegedly discovered that new evidence, which he claims warrants
granting him relief from his conviction and sentence.
For a petitioner to avail himself of the to the “actual
innocence gateway” rule set forth in McQuiggin, his claims “must
be both ‘credible’ and ‘compelling.’”
Qadar v. United States,
No. 1:13-CV-2967, 2014 WL 3921360, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 11,
2014)
(citing
Rivas
v.
Fischer,
687
F.3d
2012), and House, 547 U.S. at 521, 538).
‘credible,’
it
whether
be
it
must
be
supported
exculpatory
by
scientific
514,
541
(2d
Cir.
“For the claim to be
new
reliable
evidence,
evidence—
trustworthy
eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence---that was
not presented at trial.”
and citation omitted).
Qadar, at *6 (internal quotation marks
“For the claim to be ‘compelling,’ the
petitioner must demonstrate that ‘more likely than not, in light
of the new evidence, no reasonable juror would find him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt---or to remove the double negative,
that
more
likely
than
reasonable doubt.’”
In
his
§
2241
not
any
reasonable
juror
would
have
Id. (quoting House, 547 U.S. at 538).
petition,
Teal
provides
no
credible
and
compelling evidence of the type described in Qadar which would
demonstrate that he is actually innocent of the drug and firearm
offenses of which he was convicted.
10
The only claim which Teal
articulated in any detail is his allegation that the indictment
was defective as to the drug conspiracy charge, but as noted,
Teal could have, and should have, challenged the sufficiency the
drug conspiracy indictment during his criminal proceeding, on
direct appeal, or at the latest, in a timely § 2255 motion.
Numerous
prisoners
federal
to
invoke
substantiating
Longley,
548
courts
have
been
unwilling
McQuiggin
absent
innocence.
a
claim
of
actual
F.
App’x
146,
147
(5th
to
compelling
Cir.
See
2013)
allow
grounds
Grifin
v.
(affirming
dismissal of § 2241 petition under the “savings clause” because
McQuiggin “do[es] not support a holding that [the petitioner's]
claim
is
opinion
based
on
indicating
a
retroactively
that
he
was
applicable
convicted
Supreme
[in
1999]
Court
of
a
nonexistent offense and that his claim was foreclosed when it
otherwise
should
have
been
raised.”);
Tawalebeh
v.
Hollingsworth, No. 1:14-CV-04759, 2014 WL 4053962, at *2 (D.N.J.
Aug. 15, 2014) (rejecting a McQuiggin claim where “Petitioner
does not dispute his participation in the events underlying his
conviction,
he
is
merely
challenging
a
purely
legal
aspect.
Nothing in McQuiggin provides a basis for relief when such claim
is asserted: McQuiggin did not even have a reason to address
this
issue.”);
Johnson
v.
Mejia,
No.
3:14-CV-0909,
2014
WL
2938081 (N. D. Tex. Jun. 27, 2014) (denying § 2241, because
11
“…nothing
in
McQuiggin
decriminalizes
Petitioner was convicted.”);
the
conduct
for
which
Perry v. Walton, No. 3:13-CV-0-
CPJ, 2014 WL 1088410, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2014) (rejecting
§ 2241 petitioner’s McQuiggin claim alleging that “unspecified
fabricated
finding
testimony
that
such
was
an
given
by
allegation
law
enforcement
“…does
not
officers,”
make
out
a
constitutional violation.”)
Even more compelling is that Teal knowingly and voluntarily
pleaded guilty to the drug conspiracy and firearm offenses; in
fact, the district court entered an Order adopting a Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation that Teal’s guilty plea was intelligent
and voluntary.
Teal’s guilty plea dispels any notion that he is
eligible to assert a viable claim of actual innocence under the
McQuiggin rationale.
See Williams v. Holland, No. 13-CV-239-
GFVT, 2014 WL 1385192, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 9, 2014) (rejecting
§ 2241 petitioner’s actual innocence claims based on McQuiggin
where
he
had
pleaded
guilty
to
drug
and
firearm
offenses);
Sidener v. United States, No. 3:11-CV-03085, 2013 WL 4041375, at
*3 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2013) (rejecting McQuiggin claim because
“Petitioner’s admission to the factual basis demonstrates that
Petitioner
cannot
Therefore,
the
make
actual
a
showing
innocence
of
actual
“gateway”
for
innocence.
allowing
consideration of otherwise time-barred claims is not available
12
in Petitioner's case.”); United States v. Cunningham, No. H-123147, 2013 WL 3899335, at *4 n. 3 (S. D. Tex. July 27, 2013)
(same,
citing
simply
has
McQuiggin).
not
alleged
Given
facts
these
supporting
considerations,
a
claim
of
Teal
actual
innocence based on the rigorous and exacting standards set forth
in either McQuiggin, or in its predecessor case, Schlup.
In summary, because Teal has not established a claim of
actual
proceed
innocence
under
§
based
on
McQuiggin,
2241.
The
Court
will
he
is
deny
not
his
entitled
petition
to
and
dismiss this proceeding.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
1.
Daniel William Teal’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for a
writ of habeas corpus [R. 1] is DENIED;
2.
The Court will enter an appropriate judgment; and
3.
This habeas proceeding is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from
the Court’s docket.
4.
That no certificate of appealability will issue.
This September 9, 2014.
13
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