Smith v. Ballard

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1) 1 and 5 Original and supplemental petitions are DENIED. 2) Court will enter judgment. 3) Matter is STRICKEN from the docket. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 2/27/2015.(SCD)cc: Pro Se Petitioner(via US Mail)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON
MICHAEL LLOYD SMITH,

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Petitioner,
V.
RODNEY BALLARD,
Respondent.
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Civil No. 5: 14-441-JMH

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

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***

Michael Lloyd Smith is an inmate at the Fayette County
Detention Center (“FCDC”) in Lexington, Kentucky.

Proceeding

without an attorney, Smith has filed original and supplemental
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.1
The

[R. 1, 5]
Court

petitions.

conducts

an

initial

review

of

habeas

corpus

28 U.S.C. § 2243; Alexander v. Northern Bureau of

Prisons, 419 F. App’x 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011).

The Court must

deny the petition “if it plainly appears from the petition and
any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief.”

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the

United States District Courts (applicable to § 2241 petitions

1

Smith’s petition also suggests that he seeks mandamus relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, but that provision confers jurisdiction
upon this Court to grant mandamus relief against federal, not
state, officials, and therefore affords him no additional basis
for relief.
1

pursuant to Rule 1(b)).

The Court evaluates Smith’s petition

under a more lenient standard because he is not represented by
an attorney.

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Burton

v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir. 2003).

At this stage, the

Court accepts the petitioner’s factual allegations as true, and
his legal claims are liberally construed in his favor.

Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
In his original petition, Smith explained that on November
12, 2014, he was granted parole from the sentence imposed in
Case No. 09-CR-1056 by the Circuit Court of Fayette County,
Kentucky.
remained

[R. 1, p. 4]
in

custody

at

However, instead of being released, he
FCDC

pursuant

to

a

parole

violator

warrant, lodged by the State of Michigan as a detainer with the
jail.

Id. at pg. 1.

Smith alleged that FCDC Director Ballard

refused to “file a ‘Interstate Agreement on Detainer’ to the
State of Michigan on my behalf.”
not

attempted

to

seek

relief

Smith indicates that he has
from

the

courts

of

Kentucky

regarding his present claims, and that there is no grievance
procedure available at the jail for him to invoke.

[R. 5, pp.

3-5]

Smith seeks his immediate release from custody and an

order

requiring

Ballard

to

file

an

Interstate

Agreement

on

Detainers (“IAD”) request on his behalf, backdated to September
10, 2014.

[R. 1, pp. 2, 6]

2

There are a number of reasons why Smith’s petition must be
denied.
proper

Most fundamentally, a writ of habeas corpus is not the
mechanism

to

enforce

rights

Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”).

under

the

Interstate

Curtis v. United States, 123 F.

App’x 179, 184–85 (6th Cir. 2005) (“alleged violations of the
Interstate

Agreement

on

Detainers

are

not

cognizable

under

either Section 2254, relating to state proceedings, and Section
2255, relating to federal proceeding … the same logic applies to
claims under § 2241 regarding alleged violations of the compact
on detainers.”)
Smith’s

petition

is

also

not

entirely

clear

that

properly followed the procedures set forth in the IAD.
the

warden

is

required,

upon

request,

to

supply

him

he

While
with

a

certificate providing information regarding his current term of
incarceration,

the

request

for

a

final

disposition

of

the

charges set forth in the detainer must itself originate from the
prisoner, which is then merely forwarded by the warden to the
prosecuting officer and court on his behalf.

Ky. Rev. Stat.

440.450 Art. III §(1), (2).
But even if Smith did follow these procedures, the IAD does
not apply here, where the detainer is not based upon an original
criminal charge, but for Smith’s alleged violation of the terms
of his parole in Michigan.

Carchman v. Nash, 472 U.S. 716, 726

(1985) (“The language of the [IAD] therefore makes clear that
3

the

phrase

‘untried

indictment,

information

or

complaint’

in

Art. III refers to criminal charges pending against a prisoner.
A

probation-violation

charge,

which

does

not

accuse

an

individual with having committed a criminal offense in the sense
of initiating a prosecution, thus does not come within the terms
of Art. III.”).

This conclusion applies with equal force to

detainers predicated upon a claimed violation of the terms of
parole.

White v. United States, No. 96-1298, 1997 WL 205615, at

*2 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Romero, 511 F. 3d 1281,
1284 (10th Cir. 2008) (“the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
Act, which requires immediate transfer of a prisoner to another
jurisdiction when there are detainers lodged on untried criminal
charges,

is

inapplicable

to

probation

or

parole

revocation

detainers.”).
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
1.

Smith’s original and supplemental petitions for a writ

of habeas corpus [R. 1, 5] are DENIED.
2.

The Court will enter a judgment contemporaneously with

this order.
3.

This matter is STRICKEN from the docket.

This 27th day of February, 2015.

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