Mock v. SSA
Filing
20
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1) 16 Motion for Extension of Time is GRANTED and tendered Motion for Summary Judgment is recognized for the purpose of this Order. 2) 16-2 Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 3) 19 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 4) Judgment in favor of SSA will be entered herewith. Signed by Judge Gregory F. VanTatenhove on 9/2/2016. (SCD)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
LEXINGTON
TINA LOUISE MOCK,
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)
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)
)
)
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Plaintiff,
V.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
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Civ. No: 15-CV-02-GFVT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
&
ORDER
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***
Plaintiff Tina Louise Mock seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s
decision to deny her application for Supplemental Security Income. For the reasons explained
below, the Court will DENY Mock’s Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 16-2] and GRANT the
Commissioner’s [R. 19].
I
A
At the outset, the Court notes that Mock filed her summary judgment motion approximately
nine months late. [R. 14 at 1.] The Court probably could have dismissed this case sua sponte for
failure to prosecute. But dismissal under Rule 41(b) is a harsh sanction, and courts are “reluctant
to uphold the dismissal of a case . . . merely to discipline an errant attorney because such a sanction
deprives the client of his day in court.” Knoll v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 176 F.3d 359, 363 (6th Cir.
1999). In deciding whether to impose this unusual sanction, courts ask “1) whether the party’s
failure [was] due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault; (2) whether the adversary was prejudiced by
[counsel’s] conduct; (3) whether [counsel] was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to
dismissal; and (4) whether less drastic sanctions [could be] imposed or considered before dismissal
[is] ordered.” Id.
Here, Mock’s counsel attributes his tardiness to “exhaustion” and “depression” resulting
from “the addition of two . . . special needs infants in [his] home.” [R. 16 at 1.] Although these
facts certainly do not absolve Mock of all fault for his untimely filings and disregard for court
orders, they do indicate that these violations were not necessarily a result of bad faith. The Court
also notes that it did not warn Mock about the risk of dismissal until March 2016, when it ordered
counsel to “show cause why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.” [R. 14 at
1.] Counsel responded to that order within the time allotted and tendered the present motion for
summary judgment. [R. 15.] And as for “less drastic sanctions,” Mock has already been “barred
from filing any future cases” in this District, although he has been permitted to “finish his pending
cases.” [R. 18 at 2.]
The Government also appears to have suffered little or no prejudice from this delay. They
have waived any right to seek dismissal on these grounds, and have filed their own motion for
summary judgment without commenting on the untimeliness of Mock’s filing. [R. 19.] Given (1)
counsel’s stated reason for his tardiness, (2) the lack of prior warning about the risk of dismissal,
(3) the absence of prejudice to the Government, and (4) the strong interest in giving Mock her day
in court, the Court will recognize Mock’s late filing and resolve this dispute on the merits.1
B
Tina Mock filed an application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) with the Social
Security Administration (“SSA”) in July 2011. [Tr. 261-270, 18.] The SSA denied her application
1
Relying on the same facts and conclusions noted above, the Court also finds that granting permission to
file this untimely motion is proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). In particular, counsel likely did not act
in bad faith, the delay had only a marginal impact on these judicial proceedings, and the Government
suffered little or no prejudice.
2
both initially and upon reconsideration. [Id.] Mock then requested an administrative hearing with
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Karen R. Jackson, which the parties held in July 2013. [Tr.
38-80.] On September 27, 2013, the ALJ held that that Mock was not disabled because she could
perform a “reduced range of medium work” that “exist[s] in significant numbers in the national
economy.” [Tr. 22, 29.]
In evaluating Mock’s disability claim, the ALJ conducted the standard sequential analysis
required under 20 C.F.R. § 416.9202. This evaluation includes five steps. First, if a claimant is
performing a substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, if
a claimant does not have any impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limit
his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, then he does not have a severe impairment
and is not “disabled” as defined by the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Third, if a claimant’s
impairments meet or equal one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1, he is “disabled.” 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(d). Before moving to the fourth step, the ALJ
must use all the relevant evidence in the record to determine the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (RFC), which is an assessment of one’s ability to perform certain physical and mental
work activities on a sustained basis despite any impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); 20
The Sixth Circuit summarized this process in Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469 (6th Cir.
2003):
2
To determine if a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act, the ALJ employs a
five-step inquiry defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Through step four, the claimant bears
the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments
and the fact that she is precluded from performing her past relevant work, but at step five
of the inquiry, which is the focus of this case, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to
identify a significant number of jobs in the economy that accommodate the claimant’s
residual functional capacity (determined at step four) and vocational profile.
Id. at 474 (internal citations omitted).
3
C.F.R. § 404.1545. Fourth, the ALJ must determine whether the clamant has the RFC to perform
the requirements of his past relevant work; if a claimant’s impairments do not prevent him from
doing past relevant work, he is not “disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). Fifth, if a claimant’s
impairments—considering his RFC, age, education, and past work—prevent him from doing other
work that exists in the national economy, then he is “disabled.” § 404.1520(f).
In this case, at Step 1, the ALJ found that Mock had “not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since June 30, 2011.” [Tr. 20.] At Step 2, she determined that Mock suffers from the
following
severe
impairments:
“neck
and
left
shoulder
pain
secondary
to
mild
spurring/osteoarthritis, cervical spine; low back pain secondary to mild degenerative disc disease
and levoscoliosis; mild degenerative disc disease, thoracic spine; history of left shoulder pain;
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease with tobacco abuse; migraine headaches; major depressive
disorder/bereavement; anxiety disorder, not otherwise specified/post traumatic disorder; and
obsessive compulsive disorder.” [Id.] At Step 3, she held that Mock “does not have an impairment
or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” [Tr. 21.] After considering the entire
record, the ALJ then determined that “the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform
a reduced range of medium work,” subject to the following conditions:
“She can lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently. She can stand
and/or walk six hours in an eight-hour workday. She can sit six hours in an eight-hour workday.
She can frequently climb ramps or stairs, and she can occasionally climb ladders, ropes or
scaffolds. The claimant can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. She can perform
frequent overhead reaching with the bilateral upper extremities. She should avoid vibration and
fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation. She is limited to an object-focused work environment
in which contact with coworkers and supervisors is casual and occasional, in a non-public work
setting. Her work should not require extended conversation, coordinated activities, dispute
resolution, or similar activities. She is limited to simple routine work tasks. She can maintain
attention and concentration for two-hour segments during an eight-hour workday. The claimant
can adapt to gradual changes in a routine work environment. Her work cannot require fast-paced
4
production quotas or goals, production rate or pace work. Her work cannot require her to exercise
supervision, negotiation or arbitration.”
[Tr. 22-23.]
At Step 4, the ALJ noted that she could not consider these skills in light of Mock’s prior
work history because Mock “has no past relevant work.” [Tr. 29.] And at Step 5, the burden
shifted to the Commissioner to identify a significant number of jobs in the national economy that
Mock could perform, given her RFC, age, education and experience. Jones, 336 F.3d at 474; 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(g); 20 C.F.R § 404.1560(c). After considering all the evidence and consulting
with a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers
in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” [Id.] She thus found that Mock was not
disabled. [Tr. 31.] The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision [Tr. 1-6], and this
appeal followed.
II
A
This Court must limit its review to the question of whether substantial evidence in the
record supports the ALJ’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 614
(6th Cir. 2003); Shelman v. Heckler, 821 F.2d 316, 319-20 (6th Cir. 1987). To find “substantial
evidence,” courts must perceive “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance,”
which is to say that a court need only find “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d
284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005).
The substantial evidence standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which
decision makers can go either way, without interference from the court.” Mullen v. Bowen, 800
F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
5
When searching the record for this evidence, courts must examine the record as a whole.
Cutlip, 25 F.3d at 286 (citing Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983)). This examination, however, is limited “to the particular
points that [the claimant] appears to raise in her brief on appeal.” Hollon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
447 F.3d 477, 491 (6th Cir. 2006). Courts are not empowered to conduct a de novo review, resolve
conflicts in evidence, or make credibility determinations. Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d
709, 713 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); see also Bradley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
862 F.2d 1224, 1228 (6th Cir. 1988). Rather, if the Court finds substantial evidence to support the
ALJ’s judgment, it must affirm that decision even if the Court would decide the matter differently,
and even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. Ulman, 693 F.3d at 714;
Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007).
B
i
Mock challenges the ALJ’s decision on four grounds. First, she argues that “[t]he ALJ
failed to engage in the appropriate analysis of the medical opinion[ ] of treating Dr. George
Mercado, MD at Comprehend.” [R. 15-2 at 5.] Mock received grief counseling and treatment at
Comprehend shortly after the death of her husband.3 [Tr. 917.] The ALJ recognized Mercado’s
report when she stated that she had “reviewed [Mock’s] grief counseling records from . . . June
Mock briefly attempts to argue that the ALJ “appears to have engaged in inappropriate untrained
medical assessment [by indicating that her] depression was ‘bereavement[,]’ suggesting it was
temporary.” [R. 15-2 at 6.] She cites no section of the ALJ’s decision to support this claim. The Court’s
own review of the ALJ’s decision shows that she did not indicate Mock’s depression was only a product
of “bereavement,” but simply noted that she was “understandably upset by her husband’s death, and can
still be regarded [as] in the grieving stage.” [Tr. 27.] Her grief counseling records indicate that, prior to
her husband’s illness and death, she last received “psychiatric care” for anxiety and depression in 2003.
[Tr. 927.] She reports that her depression “recurred” when her husband was diagnosed with leukemia in
2012, and “escalated” after her husband passed away. [Tr. 926.] These records (not to mention common
sense) support the ALJ’s recognition that Mock’s grief had impacted her emotional state.
3
6
2013” at “Exhibit “B19F,” and noted that Mock’s husband had “died April 1, 2013.” [Tr. 26.] But
Mock apparently believes that the ALJ should have given Dr. Mercado’s “opinion” specific weight
and discussed it at greater length. [R. 15-2 at 5.]
This claim presumes that Dr. Mercado’s treatment record qualified as an “opinion.” The
Commissioner thinks it did not. [R. 19 at 6.] The regulations define “medical opinions” as
“statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect
judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms,
diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental
restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.9527(a)(2). According to the Commissioner, Dr. Mercado’s report
was not a “medical opinion” because he “did not provide any opinion regarding the nature and
severity of Plaintiff’s mental limitations or her functional limitations.” [R. 19 at 6.]
Dr. Mercado’s report detailed Mock’s self-reported health issues, provided a “mental status
assessment,” made a summary diagnosis of “major depressive disorder” and “post-traumatic stress
disorder,” assigned her a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 55 (indicating only
moderate impairments), and laid out a treatment plan. [Tr. 923-929.] This report drew some
overarching conclusions about the “nature and severity” of Mock’s impairments, but made no
attempt to link these observations to Mock’s vocational abilities or limitations. General,
conclusory remarks by treating physicians are often not treated as medical opinions. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 330 F. App'x 563, 570 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding physician’s “brief
statement concerning the potential psychological causes and manifestations of Mitchell’s
condition” did not qualify as a medical opinion); Dunlap v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 509 F. App’x
472, 474 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding physician’s conclusory statement that, “[I]n [his] medical
opinion, [the claimant] has severe low back pain and due to his pain is unable to work” was not a
7
true medical opinion); Welch v. Colvin, 566 F. App’x 691, 694 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding “no error
in the ALJ’s not weighing the physicians ‘opinions’” because “each physician simply diagnosed
[the claimant’s] impairments and in some cases recommended treatment for them,” but none
“opined on [the] limitations resulting from her impairments.”).
Here, Mercado provided a bit more than a single, conclusory statement about Mercado’s
impairments. The “mental status assessment,” for example, rates her intellectual ability across
five categories, and finds that her functioning is “average” or “adequate” in each category. [Tr.
924.] On the other hand, his “diagnosis” of major depression, post-traumatic stress, and a GAF of
55 amounts to less than one complete sentence, and he otherwise fails to “opine[ ] on [the]
limitations resulting from her impairments.”
Welch, 566 F. App’x at 694.
It is at least
questionable, then, whether Mercado’s report amounted to a true “medical opinion” within the
meaning of the regulations.
But even assuming that Mercado’s report qualified as a medical opinion, the ALJ’s failure
to afford it specific weight was plainly harmless error. When “an ALJ does not give good reasons
for rejecting the opinion of a treating source, remand and reversal may not be required if the
violation has only been de minimis.” Hall v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 148 F. App’x 456, 462 (6th Cir.
2005). Courts will thus find the “omission [of a medical opinion in the record] from the ALJ’s
decision harmless [if] the ALJ nevertheless ‘ma[de] findings consistent with the opinion.’”
Francis v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 414 F. App’x 802, 804 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wilson v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2004). Mock does not attempt to argue that the
ALJ’s decision was inconsistent with Dr. Mercado’s report. Nor could she. Dr. Mercado’s
treatment records indicate that Mock is “cooperative, relates well, [is] accessible, [and makes]
good eye contact,” that her thought processes are “goal directed,” that she has “average intellectual
8
functioning” and “no memory impairment,” that her “social judgment” and “concentration” are
“adequate,” and that her overall functional impairments are only “moderate.” [Tr. 923-29.] He
also notes some traumatic events in her past, including a prior abusive relationship and the very
recent death of her husband, and diagnoses her with “major depressive disorder, recurrent” and
“posttraumatic stress disorder.” [Tr. 926, 928.]
These observations are entirely consistent with the ALJ’s findings. The ALJ determined
that Mock suffers from “major depressive disorder/bereavement, anxiety disorder, . . . [and]
posttraumatic stress disorder,” and that all of these impairments are “severe.” [Tr. 20.] She also
found that Mock should be “limited to an object-focused work environment in which contact with
coworkers and supervisors is casual and occasional, in a non-public work setting,” that her
“[h]er work should not require extended conversation, coordinated activities, dispute resolution,
or similar activities,” that she should be “limited to simple routine work tasks,” that she can only
“maintain attention and concentration for two-hour segments during an eight-hour workday,” that
she can only “adapt to gradual changes in a routine work environment,” and that “[h]er work
cannot require fast-paced production quotas or goals, production rate or pace work.” [Tr. 20.] If
anything, the ALJ’s conclusions about Mock’s limitations—including, for example, the fact that
she could only have “occasional” interaction with others and “maintain attention and concentration
for two-hour segments”—went a step further than Dr. Mercado’s assessment, which found that
she “relates well,” has “adequate” social judgment and concentration, and has “no memory
impairment.” [Tr. 923-24.] Even if the ALJ had afforded Dr. Mercado’s opinion great weight,
then, this recognition would have, at best, resulted in an identical evaluation of her mental
impairments and vocational limitations.
9
Mock’s next objection is that the ALJ improperly considered the opinions of two nonexamining state agency physicians. [R. 16-2 at 6.] She points out that these physicians provided
their opinions before she received treatment at Comprehend in 2013, and thus they “did not have
the benefit of” those treatments records—including Dr. Mercado’s report—when assessing her
condition. She then cites Jones v. Astrue, 808 F. Supp. 2d 993 (E.D. Ky. 2011), for the broad
proposition that “the opinions of non-reviewing examiners who did not review the complete record
[cannot] not be used to support the decision denying benefits.” [R. 16-2 at 6.] The court in Jones
did hold that, because two non-examiners had not had an “opportunity to see and comment upon”
certain “records which were entered into evidence after their reviews,” their “opinions [could not]
be used to support the administrative decision.” Id. at 998.
This aspect of Jones’s holding is no longer good law. Numerous cases in this Circuit have
already reached that conclusion. See, e.g., Helm v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin, 405 F. App’x 997,
1002 (6th Cir. 2011) (“There is no categorical requirement that the non-treating source’s opinion
be based on a ‘complete’ or ‘more detailed and comprehensive’ case record.”); Fry v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 476 F. App’x 73, 75 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting claimant’s argument that non-examiner’s
“opinion was inadequate because it was based on a review of the record before she began treatment
with [another doctor],” and holding that “the ALJ properly considered [the non-examiner’s] report
as opinion evidence.”); Keith v. Colvin, 2016 WL 1212068, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 29, 2016)
(“Despite [the claimant’s] reliance on Jones v. Astrue . . . for the proposition that the opinion of a
non-examining expert who does not examine a complete record does not comprise substantial
evidence, this court is bound only by the Sixth Circuit precedent set forth in Helm and Fry.”);
Skaggs v. Colvin, 2016 WL 782309, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 26, 2016) (“[W]hile the District Court in
Jones seems to suggest that, when an ALJ affords more weigh to a non-examining physician over
10
an examining physician, only the most recent opinions are credible since they account for all
preceding opinions, the Sixth Circuit has established that no such completeness rule or requirement
exists.”); Price v. Colvin, 2016 WL 782259, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 26, 2016) (“Jones relied on a
Social Security Ruling that did not create a definitive rule, and, more importantly, the Sixth Circuit
has made it clear that no such rule exists.”).
In the absence of any such completeness rule, the ALJ’s only obligation is to provide
“good reasons” for giving greater weight to the non-examiners’ opinions. Helm, 405 F. App’x at
1000. That brings us to Mock’s third objection, which is that the ALJ should have assigned
more weight to “the functional assessment of the consultative physician, Dr. Jones.” [R. 15-2 at
5.] The ALJ found that Dr. Jones’s report had “inconsistencies and vagaries.” [TR. 28.] The
Court agrees. The ALJ noted, for example, that Dr. Jones ambiguously measured Mock’s
“judgment, insight, and executive functioning” as “likely rang[ing] from functional to impaired,”
without clarifying whether he ultimately felt they were “functional” or “impaired.” [Tr. 769-70.]
He also vaguely characterized her cognitive functioning as “below average or non-impaired.”
[Tr. 772.] And although he gave her a “guarded” prognosis and suggested that she did not have
the “coping mechanisms to adapt or respond to pressures normally found in occupational
settings,” he assigned her a GAF score of 55, which indicates only “moderate” limitations. [Id.]
Just as importantly, the ALJ noted that Dr. Jones believed his findings “were likely indicative of
symptom amplification and embellished memory dysfunction,” coupled with “possible overembellishment of hallucinatory experiences.” [Tr. 773.] Given (1) the ambiguities and
inconsistencies in Jones’s report and (2) his conclusion that Mock had “likely” or “possibl[y]”
engaged in “symptom amplification,” the ALJ reasonably afforded greater weight to the opinions
of the non-treating examiners. [Id.]
11
Mock’s fourth argument is that the ALJ posed inaccurate questions to the vocational expert
(“VE”). She first faults the ALJ for describing her as “an individual with a high school education.”
[Tr. 67.] The ALJ described her this way for a good reason: she repeatedly stated on the record
that she has a high school education. At the hearing, for example, the ALJ asked her if she had a
GED, to which she replied, “Yes.” [Tr. 45.] And in her background application with the SSA, she
answered “yes” when asked if she had “graduate[d] from high school.” [Tr. 405.] Mock does not
dispute that she has a high school education, but apparently argues that her true intellectual ability
is too low to justify her receipt of a high school degree. [R. 15-2 at 8.] It is not the prerogative of
the parties or this Court to question whether the state properly awarded Mock a GED. The ALJ’s
description of her as “an individual with a high school education” was accurate, and providing this
information to the VE was reasonable.
Mock next claims that the ALJ should have incorporated a hypothetical indicating that she
could “not adapt to or handle normal work stress in a daily environment.” [R. 15-2 at 9.] This is
simply a request to reweigh the evidence. Although Dr. Jones suggested that Mock could not
“adapt or respond to pressures normally found in occupational settings,” the Court has already
determined that the ALJ reasonably afforded little weight to Dr. Jones’s assessment. And Dr. Alex
Guerro stated that Mock could “adapt to changes in non-complex work settings with no more than
low to medium stress levels.” [Tr. 140.] Dr. Jane Brake then affirmed Dr. Guerrero’s opinion,
found that Mock could handle a “low stress work environment,” and concluded that Dr. Jones’s
opinion was “inconsistent with the overall [record].” [Tr. 154, 156.] These evaluations also
squared with Dr. Mercado’s observation that Mock is “cooperative, relates well, [is] accessible,
[and makes] good eye contact,” that her thought processes are “goal directed,” that she has
“average intellectual functioning” and “no memory impairment,” that she has “adequate” social
12
judgment, awareness, and concentration, and that she has only a “moderate” difficulty in
functioning. 4 [Tr. 923-29.]
Lastly, Mock argues that the ALJ should have credited a hypothetical including her “likely
unpredicted absence from work due to migraine headaches.” [R. 15-2 at 9.] But she cites no
portion of the administrative record that actually supports her claims about the severity, frequency,
and duration of these alleged headaches. The ALJ noted that any evidence of these alleged
headaches was “based wholly on self-report and not objective findings.” [Tr. 27.] She found that
the records from Mock’s “infrequent emergency room visits” for these headaches “made no
mention of neurologic abnormalities, and brain imaging was normal.” [Tr. 25.] This evidence
was consistent with other indications of Mock’s tendency to overstate her impairments, including
one doctor’s observation that “her exam does not match her complaints,” another’s comment that
“she is neurologically intact with relatively benign radiographic findings,” and Dr. Jones’s
conclusion that his findings “were likely indicative of symptom amplification.” [Id.] On these
facts, the ALJ did not err in failing to include Mock’s self-reported headaches in the credited
Mock relatedly references the purported judgment of “two examining consultative physicians” that she
has “no psychological skills to adapt to or handle normal work stress.” [R. 15-2 at 9.] She does not
specify who these “two” physicians are, although presumably one was Dr. Jones. The second was
probably Dr. Carney, who examined her in 2009. Dr. Carney did not state that she had “no” skills to
adapt to work stress, but did say that she had “fair to poor ability to sustain attention and concentration”
and “appears to have a poor ability to adapt” to work pressures. [Tr. 704.] Dr. Carney’s report was not
prepared for the purpose of this application, but for a previous application that the Commission already
denied. [R. 15-2 at 3.] The ALJ held that those “previous decisions are final for any alleged disability
through April 20, 2011,” and Mock has not asked to reopen those cases. [Tr. 20.] The Court notes, too,
that SSI benefits only apply from the date that the claimant first filed her application for SSI. Dr.
Carney’s assessment, which the Commission already rejected in its previous binding decision, did not
occur in the time period relevant to this dispute. See, e.g., Sutton v. Colvin, 2013 WL 3716540, at *10
(N.D. Ohio July 12, 2013) (finding that ALJ need not “address [a physician’s] report because it was
prepared . . . well before the relevant time period in this case.”); Carson v. Colvin, 2016 WL 1156746, at
*10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2016) (“We do not fault the ALJ for not mentioning this material, however,
because it relates to the period prior to . . . the date [the claimant] filed his application for benefits. SSI
benefits are not payable prior to the month following the month in which the claimant’s application was
filed.”). Mock has waived any argument that the ALJ should have given weight to Dr. Carney’s outdated
and previously rejected report.
4
13
hypotheticals. Cf. Francis, 414 F. App’x at 804 (6th Cir. 2011) (rejecting medical assessment that
“merely regurgitate[d] [the claimant’s] self-described symptoms.”).
III
As previously stated, this Court must limit its inquiry to the question of whether the
ALJ’s decision “is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal
standards.” Ealy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Rogers, 486
F.3d at 241). This is true even if the Court would decide the issue differently, and even if
substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. Ulman, 693 F.3d at 714; Bass, 499
F.3d at 509. In light of the evidence outlined above, the Court finds that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s finding. Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS as follows:
1.
Mock’s Motion for Extension of Time [R. 16] is GRANTED, and her tendered
Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 16-2] is recognized for the purpose of this
Order;
2.
Mock’s Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 16-2] is DENIED;
3.
The Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 19] is GRANTED; and
4.
JUDGMENT in favor of the Commissioner will be entered contemporaneously
herewith.
This 2nd day of September, 2016.
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