Biesty v. City Of Irvine et al
Filing
48
OPINION & ORDER: GRANTING IN PART & DENYING IN PART dft's 29 MOTION in Limine; (1) GRANTED to the extent that Officer Knuckles moves to exclude any argument or statement that the arrest or warrant was "wrongful" or "illegal&quo t; or any similar description; it is the Court's understanding that there has never been any finding that the arrest or arrest warrant was in any way unlawful; that this Court has already determined that Officer Biesty is not subject to liabilit y for entering Biesty's residence; any argument or statement that the arrest or arrest warrant was unlawful or otherwise wrongful is EXCLUDED; (2) Officer Knuckles moves to exclude any argument or evidence that his execution of the arrest warran t was unlawful or otherwise wrongful; GRANTED for the reasons stated in paragraph 1; (3) Officer Knuckles moves to exclude any evidence or argument that the charges for which Biesty was arrested were ultimately dismissed; this motion is DENIED; (4) O fficer Knuckles moves to exclude any testimony, evidence, or reference to his resignation from the Irvine police department; this motion is GRANTED tas stated in this order; (5) Officer Knuckles moves to exclude any testimony, evidence or reference t o his mental state or condition; this motion is GRANTED for the reasons discussed in paragraph 4; (6) Officer Knuckles moves to exclude evidence of another excessive force claim filed against him in 2014 which was resolved by the parties to that acti on; this motion is GRANTED; (7) Officer Knuckles moves to prohibit Biesty from introducing any evidence thatwould prove his damages; this motion is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part as stated in this order; (8) Officer Knuckles moves to exclude evid ence re certain types of damages Biesty may claim; this motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as stated in this order; any non-expert evidence that Biesty suffers from PTSD is EXCLUDED. Signed by Judge Karen K. Caldwell on 8/1/16.(KJR)cc: COR
Eastern District of Kentucky
FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
AT LEXINGTON
THOMAS BIESTY,
AUG 0 1 2016
AT LEXINGTON
ROBERT R. CARR
CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15-23-KKC
Plaintiff,
v.
OPINION AND ORDER
JEFF KNUCKLES,
Defendant.
*** *** ***
This matter is before the Court on the defendant's motion in limine (DE 29). For the
following reasons, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I.
Facts
The following facts are either undisputed or construed in the plaintiffs favor.
At about 10:45 p.m. on February 25, 2014, Officer Knuckles received a call from Estill
County Central dispatch that an arrest warrant had been issued for the plaintiff Thomas Biesty
at 141 North Plum Street. (DE 22-3, Knuckles Dep. at 42-43; DE 22, Response at 2.) Officer
Knuckles drove to the Plum Street address and parked his patrol car in an alley away from the
house so the occupants would not see it. (DE 22-3, Knuckles Dep. at 52.) When he arrived at the
house, he looked in the windows but was unable to see anyone or hear anything. (DE 22-3,
Knuckles Dep. at 53-54, 56.)
The house has two front doors adjacent to each other. (DE 22-2, Biesty Dep. at 21.) One
leads directly to what the plaintiff Thomas Biesty described as his mother-in-law's bedroom.
(DE 22-2, Biesty Dep. at 11.) The plaintiff described the second door as "my bedroom door."
(DE 22-2, Biesty Dep. at 11.) He testified, "there's one door from coming outside the house to
get into my room, and then the other door goes to my mother-in-law's bedroom. It's weird. The
bedrooms are in the front of the house, so when you come in, you come right into the bedroom."
(DE 22-2, Biesty Dep. at 10.)
Biesty testified as follows as to the events immediately preceding his arrest:
Okay, it was two doors on the porch. Well, there was a knock on the other door,
not mine, then the knock came on our door. My wife got up; she opened up the
door, and she said, "What can I do for you?" It was a cop. He said, "Is Tommy
here?" And she was, like, "Yeah, why?" Before she could get "why" out, he just
pushed the door open, walked right past my old lady and drug me out of the bed.
(DE 22-, Knuckles Dep. at 9-10.)
Biesty testified that Officer Knuckles immediately handcuffed him and then, as he and
Office Knuckles were walking to his patrol car, for no reason, Officer Knuckles kicked him in
the back, causing Biesty to fall onto the pavement. (DE 22-2, Biesty Dep. at 24, 51.) Biesty
testified that he started screaming and Officer Knuckles then "picked me up by the handcuffs ...
and there was one solid shot to the eye, then it was another." (DE 22-2, Biesty Dep. at 51-52.)
When the two arrived at Officer Knuckles' patrol car, Officer Knuckles "opened up the back
door and just - I went face first down again, couldn't protect my face, face down into the car."
(DE 22-2, Biesty Dep. at 54.)
Officer Knuckles then transported Biesty to the Estill County Jail where he was
incarcerated for approximately twelve hours. He was then transported to the Madison County jail
where he was incarcerated six and a half days. (DE 22-2, Biesty Dep. at 70, 160-61.) Biesty was
charged with criminal possession of a forged instrument. The claim was dismissed by Madison
District Court. (DE 22-12, Madison District Docket.)
Biesty then filed this claim against Officer Knuckles and the city of Irvine. As to Officer
Knuckles, he asserts a state-law claim of assault and battery and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
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asserting that Officer Knuckles violated his fourth amendment right to be free from excessive
force and unlawful entry. He also asserts a constitutional claim against the city under§ 1983,
asserting that the city had a custom, practice, or policy which resulted in the constitutional
violations against him.
In its ruling on the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the Court dismissed the
claims against the city of Irvine and the unlawful entry claim against Officer Knuckles. In his
motion for summary judgment, Officer Knuckles conceded that there were material factual
disputes regarding the excessive force and assault-and-battery claims against him and those
claims remain set for trial.
II.
Analysis
Officer Knuckles' moves to exclude various kinds of evidence. This motion is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
1) Officer Knuckles moves to exclude any evidence that Biesty's arrest warrant or
arrest were mistaken or wrongful based on Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and
403. Officer Knuckles concedes that the warrant had inaccurate information and
that it was later "determined to be a case of mistaken identity." Nevertheless,
there has been no argument in this case that it was unlawful for Officer Knuckles
to arrest Biesty or that the arrest warrant itself was unlawfully issued. Biesty has
argued only that it was unlawful for Officer Knuckles to enter the residence to
arrest him without a search and that Officer Knuckles used excessive force to
carry out the arrest.
This motion will be GRANTED to the extent that Officer Knuckles moves to
exclude any argument or statement that the arrest or warrant was "wrongful" or
"illegal" or any similar description. The only issue remaining in this case is
whether Officer Knuckles used excessive force in effecting Biesty' s arrest. It is
the Court's understanding that there has never been any finding that the arrest or
arrest warrant was in any way unlawful. Further, this Court has already
determined that Officer Biesty is not subject to liability for entering Biesty's
residence. Accordingly, any argument or statement that the arrest or arrest warrant
was unlawful or otherwise wrongful is EXCLUDED.
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2) Officer Knuckles moves to exclude any argument or evidence that his execution
of the arrest warrant was unlawful or otherwise wrongful. This motion is
GRANTED for the reasons stated in paragraph 1.
3) Officer Knuckles moves to exclude any evidence or argument that the charges for
which Biesty was arrested were ultimately dismissed. This motion is DENIED.
As the Court understands it there is no dispute that the charges against Biesty
were ultimately dismissed. Nor is there any dispute or contradictory evidence that
Officer Knuckles had no part in procuring the warrant but instead merely
executed it. Accordingly, the Court will permit limited evidence on both issues:
evidence that the charges against Biesty were ultimately dismissed and evidence
that Officer Knuckles was not in any way involved in procuring the arrest warrant
and that he was only involved in executing it. Since there is no dispute on these
issues, such evidence may be best presented through a stipulation. If the parties
can agree on such a stipulation, they should submit it for the Court's consideration
at the pretrial conference. If the parties cannot reach an agreement on the
stipulation, the Court may provide the jury with an appropriate instruction on
these issues.
4) Officer Knuckles moves to exclude any testimony, evidence, or reference to his
resignation from the Irvine police department. This motion is GRANTED to the
extent that Officer Knuckles moves to exclude the timing and reasons for his
resignation from the police department. Such evidence is irrelevant to the issues
before the jury. Again, the issue here is whether Officer Knuckles used excessive
force in effecting Biesty's arrest. Biesty argues that evidence that Officer
Knuckles resigned due to mental health issues will help establish "why he did
what he did." As both parties agree, however, Officer Knuckles' intent is not an
issue in this case. (DE 41, Response at 4.) To the extent that Biesty argues that
proof of Officer Knuckles' mental state is probative of whether he did the acts at
issue, he has submitted no expert testimony to establish that.
5) Officer Knuckles moves to exclude any testimony, evidence or reference to his
mental state or condition. This motion is GRANTED for the reasons discussed in
paragraph 4.
6) Officer Knuckles moves to exclude evidence of another excessive force claim
filed against him in 2014 which was resolved by the parties to that action. This
motion is GRANTED. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(l), evidence
of such "other acts" is not admissible to prove that a person acted in accordance
with his character. Such evidence may, however, be used for other purposes. In
his response, Biesty does not argue that evidence of any other acts by Officer
Knuckles would be used for any permitted purpose. He argues only that the
evidence could be used for impeachment if Officer Knuckles denies having been
involved in any other excessive force cases. Biesty has not argued, however, that
evidence of any of Officer Knuckles other acts should be admitted for any
allowable purpose under Rule 404(b)(2). Accordingly, Biesty is not permitted to
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ask Officer Knuckles any questions about any such acts. If Biesty believes that
any testimony or evidence at trial opens the door to the introduction of evidence
of such acts for impeachment purposes, he shall approach the bench before
attempting to elicit or introduce such evidence.
7) Officer Knuckles moves to prohibit Biesty from introducing any evidence that
would prove his damages. This motion is DENIED in part and GRANTED in
part as follows. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(l )(A)(iii) requires that each
party provide the other party with a computation of each category of damages
claimed by the disclosing party. When "a party fails to provide information ... as
required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information .. .
to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was
substantially justified or is harmless." Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(l). The rule recognizes,
however, that "instead of this sanction, the court, on motion and after giving an
opportunity to be heard ... may impose other appropriate sanctions including any
of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi)." Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(l)(C).
In his disclosures, Biesty stated only that he is seeking "all damages available"
under Section 1983 but that "his economic and non-economic damages cannot be
calculated at this time." (DE 41-2, 41-3). Nevertheless, Officer Knuckles states
that Biesty attached two medical lien letters from Medicare and Medicaid to his
disclosures. Biesty provides no reason for failing to notify Officer Knuckles of
any additional medical expenses. Further, the failure to notify Officer Knuckles of
precisely what medical damages he seeks beyond those reflected in the lien letters
is not harmless. Officer Knuckles could not prepare to contest any unidentified
expenses. The Court finds no sanction appropriate here other than excluding
evidence of the unidentified medical damages. Accordingly, the motion is
GRANTED as to any medical expenses other than those reflected in the medical
lien letters. Evidence regarding the expenses reflected in the medical lien letters
will be permitted provided Biesty offers sufficient proof that the expenses at issue
were caused by the altercation.
Biesty stated in his deposition that he sought damages for pain and suffering
though he was unable to quantify the amount. Likewise, he stated in his complaint
that he seeks punitive damages. Nevertheless, Biesty did not provide a
computation of the amounts of such damages. "Rule 26(a)(l )(A)(iii) is
unambiguous-it applies to each category of damages claimed; it is not limited to
economic damages." Lucas v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., No. 5:10-CV-76-KKC,
2011 WL 5148883, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 2011). The Court declines to follow
courts that have held to the contrary. "A litigant (and the system) may relegate
any final award to the jury, but the parties and Court should know the range
sought and basis for same ... In general, the economic scope of a case informs
decisions about resource use, burdensomeness, settlement, and potentially
insurance issues." Id. Nevertheless, because these damages are less amenable to
precise calculation than other damages, the Court does not find exclusion of
evidence regarding pain and suffering or punitive damages appropriate. Instead,
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the Court hereby ORDERS that, prior to the pretrial conference, Biesty SHALL
supplement his disclosures with specified amounts for the pain and suffering and
punitive damages he seeks.
As to the matter of attorney's fees, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), "the 'prevailing
party' in an action to enforce civil rights under § 1983 may recover 'a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs' of litigation." Green Party of Tennessee v.
Hargett, 767 F.3d 533, 552 (6th Cir. 2014). The amount of any such fees will be
decided by the Court, not the jury, after the trial of this matter. See Brooks v.
Cook, 938 F.2d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The award of attorneys' fees is a
matter of law for the judge, not the jury.") Accordingly, any motion to exclude
evidence at the trial regarding attorney's fees is GRANTED as such evidence is
irrelevant to the issues to be decided at trial. Nevertheless, if Biesty should prevail
at trial and continues to seek attorney's fees, he will be required to calculate his
attorney's fees for the Court and will be permitted to support that calculation with
evidence as necessary. The Court sees no reason to require any such calculation
prior to trial. To the extent that a calculation of Biesty's attorney's fees may help
to inform decisions about resource use, burdensomeness, or settlement, unlike
other kinds of damages, defense counsel can adequately estimate the amount of a
"reasonable attorney's fee" in a case.
8) Officer Knuckles moves to exclude evidence regarding certain types of damages
Biesty may claim. This motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as
follows.
• Officer Knuckles move to exclude evidence that Biesty' s right foot was
broken in the altercation; evidence that Biesty suffers ongoing headaches,
pain in his right eye or vomiting after the altercation; and evidence that the
altercation aggravated a prior elbow injury. Officer Knuckles argues that
Biesty has offered no expert proof regarding causation on these issues.
Biesty points out that he has identified various treating physicians as
witnesses, although he does not state that these physicians will testify that
any of these injuries were caused by the altercation. Regardless, the
motion is GRANTED to the extent that Officer Knuckles moves to
exclude any non-expert evidence that Biesty's right foot was broken in the
altercation with Officer Knuckles; that Biesty suffers any permanent
injuries as a result of the altercation; or that the altercation aggravated a
prior elbow injury. Biesty is not qualified to testify as to causation on
these issues and no juror could make such a finding based on lay
knowledge. Biesty may present the testimony of any treating physician as
to causation on these damages and Biesty may himself testify as to any
symptoms he suffered immediately after the accident that were readily
observable by him.
•
Officer Knuckles moves to exclude evidence that Biesty has suffered
depression, anxiety, or post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") as a result
of the altercation. This motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
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part. Biesty offers no expert evidence that he suffers PTSD as a result of
the altercation. PTSD is a specific disorder and expert testimony is
required to establish its existence. Biesty is not qualified to testify that he
has PTSD. Nor could a juror make a finding of PTSD based on lay
knowledge. Accordingly, any non-expert evidence that Biesty suffers from
PTSD is EXCLUDED. As to evidence that Biesty suffers from
"depression" or "anxiety," Biesty may testify that he believes he has
experienced such symptoms since the altercation. He has personal
knowledge of any feelings of depression or anxiety. To the extent that
Biesty has not been diagnosed by a medical professional with depression
or anxiety or to the extent that Biesty is unable to present expert testimony
establishing that the altercation caused such depression or anxiety, Officer
Knuckles may explore those issue on cross examination.
Signed By:
Karen K. Caldwell
United States District Judge
i/! /:;_O/l(
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