Baughman v. Brooks et al
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1) Dfts' 12 MOTION to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 2) All claims against the Kentucky State Police are DISMISSED. 3) All claims against Dfts Brooks, Murrell, St. Blancard, and Taulbee in their official capacity are DISMISSED. 4) All claims against Dfts Murrell, St. Blancard, and Taulbee in their individual capacity are DISMISSED. 5) Pla's 14 MOTION for Order Setting Matter for Oral Argument is DENIED. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 6/25/2015.(SCD)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON
CAITLIN BAUGHMAN,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
TROY BROOKS, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Case No.
5:15-cv-29-JMH
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
***
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion
to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in this action. [DE 12].
Plaintiff
replied,
has
responded.
although
the
[DE
time
13].
has
Defendants
now
passed
have
to
not
do
so.
Plaintiff has also filed a motion for the Court to hear
oral argument on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, [DE 14], to
which
Defendants
have
responded.
[DE
16].
Thus,
these
motions are now ripe for review. For the reasons which
follow,
denied
Defendants’
in
part.
motion
The
Court
will
be
being
granted
in
part
sufficiently
and
advised,
Plaintiff’s motion for oral argument will be denied.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In the evening of February 6, 2014, Defendant Troy
Brooks,
a
Kentucky
State
Police
Trooper,
arrived
at
Plaintiff Caitlin Baughman’s home to serve a bench warrant
on her brother. [DE 1 at ¶ 13-15]. Plaintiff avers that she
has been diagnosed with a number of social phobias and “is
forced to spend considerable time insulating herself from
excessive stimulations from sound, taste, and touch.” [DE 1
at ¶ 16]. According to her Complaint, Plaintiff was sitting
in the kitchen while Officer Brooks knocked on the door for
several minutes. Officer Brooks looked inside to see her
but Plaintiff was wearing ear plugs and could not hear the
knocking. [DE 1 at ¶ 17–18]. Her brother eventually heard
the knocking and directed Plaintiff to go to her room, as
was her practice when individuals besides her mother and
brother were in her home. He then opened the door and was
immediately taken into custody. [DE 1 at ¶ 22-24]. After
securing
entered
Plaintiff’s
Plaintiff’s
brother,
home
Officer
according
Brooks
to
returned,
Plaintiff,
and
arrested Plaintiff for resisting arrest for her failure to
respond to Officer Brooks’ knocking at the door. [DE 1 at ¶
34-35].
Plaintiff
was
released
from
the
Bourbon
County
Regional Detention Center on a surety bond to her brother
and returned to court on March 12, 2014, for arraignment,
at
which
time
the
district
court
judge
dismissed
the
criminal citation due to a lack of probable cause. [DE 1 at
¶ 41-42].
2
Plaintiff’s Complaint names Officer Brooks and four
other Kentucky State Police Officers, individually and in
their official capacities, as well as the Kentucky State
Police. Plaintiff brings federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging a violation of her rights under the Fourth,
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff includes
assault
and
battery,
prosecution,
hiring,
abuse
state
of
supervision,
constitutional
law
false
criminal
training
violations
claims
imprisonment,
imprisonment,
or
under
for
malicious
process,
and
retention
§
1983.
assault
and
prosecution
malicious
negligent
as
alleged
also
brings
battery,
false
She
and
intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff seeks economic
damages,
damages
for
pain
and
suffering,
as
well
as
R.
Civ.
P.
punitive damages.
II. Standard of Review
A
motion
12(b)(6)
to
tests
dismiss
the
pursuant
sufficiency
to
Fed.
of
the
plaintiff’s
complaint. The court views the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and must accept as true all
well-pleaded
factual
allegations
contained
within
it.
Thompson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 773 F.3d 741, 750 (6th Cir.
2014). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain
sufficient
factual
matter,
3
accepted
as
true,
to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A
claim is plausible when it contains facts that allow the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. “The plausibility
standard ... asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
III. Discussion
A. Claims Against the Kentucky State Police
Defendants
move
to
dismiss
all
claims
against
the
Kentucky State Police on the basis of sovereign immunity.
Plaintiff asserts federal claims pursuant to § 1983 and
state law claims as well.
It
is
well
settled
that
states
are
entitled
to
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and, absent
waiver, cannot be sued under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). This immunity
extends to a public agency if “said agency or institution
can be characterized as an arm or alter ego of the state.”
Hall v. Med. Coll. of Oh., 742 F.2d 299, 301 (6th Cir.
1984). Plaintiff does not dispute that there is no waiver,
nor that the Kentucky State Police is an alter ego of the
state.
See
Barnes
v.
Hamilton,
4
946
F.2d
894,
1991
WL
203113, *2 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished); see also Kenney
v.
Paris
1582125,
Police
at
*5
Dep't,
(E.D.
No.
Ky.
5:07-CV-358-JMH,
Apr.
26,
WL
Fleming
2011);
2011
v.
Kentucky State Police, No. 3: 09-35-DCR, 2010 WL 881907, at
*3 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 5, 2010). Accordingly, the federal claims
against the Kentucky State Police will be dismissed.
The
Kentucky
State
Police
are
also
entitled
to
immunity on Plaintiff’s state law claims. Under Kentucky
law “[a] state agency is entitled to immunity from tort
liability
to
the
extent
that
it
is
performing
a
governmental as opposed to a proprietary function.” Yanero
v.
Davis,
65
governmental
S.W.3d
510,
immunity
and
interchangeably
Police
is
by
tasked
519
sovereign
Kentucky
with
(Ky.
courts).
enforcement
2001)
(noting
immunity
The
of
are
Kentucky
the
that
used
State
law,
a
governmental function, and is, thus, entitled to immunity.
See Gaither v. Justice & Pub. Safety Cabinet, 447 S.W.3d
628, 633 (Ky. 2014); see also Allen v. Booth, No. CIV.A.
08-135, 2008 WL 4829875, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 5, 2008).
Also,
Plaintiff
Plaintiff’s
state
does
law
not
dispute
claims
Police will be dismissed.
5
against
this.
the
Therefore,
Kentucky
State
B.
Official Capacity
Police Officers
Claims
Against
Kentucky
State
Defendants also move to dismiss the federal and state
law claims against the named Defendants in their official
capacity
as
officers
of
the
Kentucky
State
Police
Department. Defendants’ argument for dismissal is difficult
to understand, for they discuss qualified immunity at the
outset of the section but then appear to make a sovereign
immunity argument thereafter. It is well established that
qualified immunity is not an available defense for official
capacity claims; rather, it may be used for suits against
officials
in
their
individual
capacities.
Kentucky
v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985).
However, sovereign immunity is an available defense,
see id., as “official-capacity suits generally represent
only another way of pleading an action against an entity of
which an officer is an agent.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). The
Court
having
found
that
the
Kentucky
State
Police
is
entitled to sovereign immunity on both federal and state
law claims, it concludes that Defendants are also entitled
to sovereign immunity on the claims against them in their
official capacity as officers of the Kentucky State Police.
See Hall, 742 F.2d at 300; Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521-22.
6
Accordingly,
the
official
capacity
claims
will
be
dismissed.
C.
Individual Capacity Claims Against
Murrell, St. Blancard, and Taulbee
Defendants
capacity
also
claims
move
against
to
the
dismiss
Defendants
the
defendants
individual
who
Plaintiff
alleges were Officer Brooks’ supervisors: Sergeant Murrell,
Lieutenant
asserts
St.
four
Blancard,
federal
and
claims
Captain
pursuant
Taulbee.
to
§
Plaintiff
1983
against
these defendants (Count One, Five, Seven, and Nine) and one
state law claim for false imprisonment (Count Four). In
support of their motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff
has failed to allege they had any actual contact with the
Plaintiff or were present on the night in question and,
thus, has failed to allege facts sufficient to support any
of the claims against Defendants Murrell, St. Blancard, and
Taulbee.
In order to make out a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff
must
allege
direct
involvement
in
constitutional
deprivations, as a defendant cannot be held liable on a
respondeat superior theory under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S.
at
691.
In
claims
asserting
liability
based
on
a
defendant’s supervisory role, “[t]here must be a showing
that
the
supervisor
encouraged
7
the
specific
incident
of
misconduct or in some other way directly participated in
it. At a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a
supervisory
official
at
least
implicitly
authorized,
approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional
conduct of the offending subordinate.” Bellamy v. Bradley,
729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984).
Plaintiff’s
Complaint
fails
to
allege
sufficient
facts, or any facts for that matter, to support her § 1983
claims
against
Defendants
Murrell,
St.
Blancard,
and
Taulbee. Plaintiff argues that more discovery is needed to
understand their involvement. However, before discovery the
complaint
must,
at
least,
contain
facts
upon
which
a
plausible claim can be based. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The
Complaint includes no facts from which the Court could draw
an
inference
Taulbee
that
Defendants
“implicitly
acquiesced”
allegation
to
that
Murrell,
authorized,
the
actions
these
St.
approved
by
defendants
Officer
were
Blancard,
or
and
knowingly
Brooks.
Officer
The
Brooks’
supervisors is not enough. See Bellamy, 729 F.2d at 421.
Accordingly,
the
Court
will
dismiss
the
federal
claims
against Defendants Murrell, St. Blancard, and Taulbee.
Plaintiff’s sole state law claim against Defendants
Murrell,
St.
Blancard,
and
Taulbee
asserts
false
imprisonment and alleges that she was “taken into custody
8
by
Officer
Brooks
while
under
the
supervision
of
the
remaining Defendants [Murrell, St. Blancard, and Taulbee]”
and that “Defendants, without probable cause, wrongfully
and
unlawfully
detained
and
restrained
the
Plaintiff
against her will through use of force.” [DE 1 at ¶ 71, 74].
Whether
Plaintiff
Defendants
intends
Murrell,
St.
to
assert
Blancard,
this
and
claim
Taulbee
against
based
on
their direct involvement or supervisory role, Plaintiff has
alleged no facts to show how they were involved, either
directly or in a supervisory capacity. Thus, the Complaint
does
not
contain
sufficient
facts
to
sustain
a
false
imprisonment claim against them. See Dunn v. Felty, 226
S.W.3d 68, 71 (Ky. 2007) (explaining the elements of a
false
imprisonment
claim).
Accordingly,
the
state
law
individual capacity claim against Defendants Murrell, St.
Blancard, and Taulbee will also be dismissed.
D. Individual Capacity Claim Against Officer Brooks
Finally,
Defendants
move
to
dismiss
all
individual
capacity claims against Officer Brooks. Defendants suggest
that such claims lie only when the action arises from a
ministerial act. Referencing only Officer Brooks’ actions
when
he
allegedly
her,
Defendants
entered
assert
Plaintiff’s
that
9
Officer
home
and
Brooks’
arrested
acts
were
discretionary
and,
thus,
all
personal
capacity
claims
against him should be dismissed.
Defendants’
focus
on
the
ministerial/discretionary
distinction may be an attempt to claim qualified immunity,
although Defendants never actually state as much. Similarly
confusing, Defendants rely heavily upon Gaither v. Justice
& Pub. Safety Cabinet, 447 S.W.3d 628 (Ky. 2014), which
concerns
suits
brought
ministerial/discretionary
under
KRS
distinction
44.073
and
the
the
context
of
in
suit before the state’s Board of Claims and has little
relevance
to
the
question
at
bar,
not
to
mention
the
federal claims before this Court.
Plaintiff
has
responded,
apparently
assuming
that
Defendants are claiming qualified immunity with respect to
the Fourth Amendment claim and have put forth an argument
in opposition. Indeed, Defendants have at least asserted
that the actions related to the § 1983 claim alleging a
Fourth
Amendment
violation—Officer
Brooks
entering
Plaintiff’s home and arresting her—are discretionary acts,
thus meeting their initial burden for a qualified immunity
defense.
See
Flint
ex
rel.
Flint
v.
Kentucky
Dep't
of
Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 347 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Wegener v.
Covington, 933 F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir. 1991)); see also
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523.
10
To
the
extent
that
Defendants
attempt
to
claim
qualified immunity on the remaining claims, the Court is
unable to discern Defendants’ argument as it relates to
each of the state and federal claims against Officer Brooks
from the broad assertions and limited use of facts in their
analysis on this issue and will not construct an argument
on their behalf. See Lewless v. Sec'y of Health & Human
Servs.,
25
obligation
F.3d
of
1049
this
(6th
court
Cir.
to
1994)
(“It
research
not
the
construct
and
is
the
legal arguments open to parties, especially when they are
represented
by
counsel.”)(citation
omitted).
Accordingly,
the Court will construe Defendants’ argument as a qualified
immunity defense to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim alleging a
Fourth Amendment violation only.
The
defense
of
qualified
immunity
requires
a
two-
tiered inquiry. “The first step is to determine whether the
facts
alleged
right....If
make
the
out
a
plaintiff
violation
has
shown
of
a
a
constitutional
violation
of
a
constitutional right, then the second step is to ask if the
right
at
issue
was
clearly
established
when
the
event
occurred such that a reasonable officer would have known
that his conduct violated it.” Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d
421, 428 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation, indication of
alteration, and citation omitted). Plaintiff claims that
11
there are two separate violations of her Fourth Amendment
rights; warrantless entry of her home and arrest without
probable cause.
1. Home Entry
A police officer’s warrantless entry into a home is
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, except in a
few limited circumstances. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967); see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S.
398, 403 (2006). Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Officer
Brooks entered her home without a warrant and without her
consent.
Accepting
as
true
the
facts
alleged
in
the
Complaint and viewing them in a light most favorable to the
Plaintff,
Officer
Brooks
believing
that
exception
applied.
Thus,
establish
a
an
Plaintiff
had
has
constitutional
no
to
reasonable
the
pled
warrant
basis
requirement
sufficient
violation
of
for
facts
the
to
clearly
established right of citizens to be free of warrantless
entry
into
their
homes.
See
Keeton
v.
Metro.
Gov't
of
Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 228 F. App'x 522, 525 (6th Cir.
2007) (affirming lower court’s denial of qualified immunity
on
motion
to
dismiss
where
warrantless
entry
was
a
violation of clearly established right and there was no
valid justification for entry); see also Lyons v. City of
Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 579 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting where
12
constitutional
violation
is
sufficiently
obvious,
“plaintiff need not show a body of materially similar case
law.”).
Accordingly,
Defendants’
motion
to
dismiss
the
individual capacity claim against Officer Brooks based on
an alleged warrantless entry into Plaintiff’s home must be
denied.
2. Arrest
To survive a motion to dismiss a claim for wrongful
arrest, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that her arrest for
resisting
arrest
was
unsupported
by
probable
cause.
See
Wesley, 779 F.3d at 429. Probable cause exists when “the
facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and
of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information are
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the
plaintiff had committed or was committing an offense.” Id.
(quoting Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964))
(indication of alteration omitted).
The
Court
finds
that
Plaintiff
has
pled
sufficient
facts to show Officer Brooks did not have probable cause to
believe Plaintiff was resisting arrest when she failed to
answer
the
door
in
response
to
his
knocking.
See
KRS
520.090(1) (requiring use or threats of physical force or
violence or some other means to create a substantial risk
of physical injury in order to intentionally prevent arrest
13
to
be
guilty
established
of
that
resisting
arrest
arrest).
without
It
probable
is
clearly
cause
is
a
violation of the Fourth Amendment and on the facts alleged
in the Complaint, taken as true, Officer Brooks did not
have
a
reasonable
basis
to
believe
probable
cause
was
present. See Alman v. Reed, 703 F.3d 887, 901 (6th Cir.
2013) (citing Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 355 (6th
Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the
individual capacity claim against Officer Brooks based on
Plaintiff’s arrest allegedly without probable cause must be
denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, IT IS ORDERED:
1) that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, [DE 12], is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART;
2) that all claims against the Kentucky State Police
are DISMISSED;
3) that all claims against Defendants Brooks, Murrell,
St. Blancard, and Taulbee, in their official capacity, are
DISMISSED;
4)
Blancard,
that
and
claims
Taulbee,
against
in
their
DISMISSED; and
14
Defendants
individual
Murrell,
capacity
St.
are
5) that Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Setting Matter
for Oral Argument, [DE 14], is DENIED.
This, the 25th day of June, 2015.
15
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