D.O. et al v. Commonwealth of Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services et al
Filing
13
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: Dft's 8 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or, Alternatively Pleaded, MOTION for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Danny C. Reeves on March 23, 2016. (AWD) cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
(at Lexington)
D.O., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
V.
STEVE BESHEAR, in his official
capacity as Governor of Kentucky, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil Action No. 5: 15-048-DCR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
*** *** *** ***
This matter is pending for consideration of the motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment filed by Defendant Vickie Yates Brown Glisson, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services (“CHFS”).1 [Record
No. 8] For the reasons that follow, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be
granted and the plaintiffs’ claims will be dismissed.
I.
Plaintiffs D.O. and A.O. are minor children who were removed from their
mother’s custody and permanently placed with Plaintiff R.O., who is a relative guardian
of the minor children. [Record No. 1-1, pp. 21–22] The plaintiffs allege that they are
entitled to foster care maintenance payments under federal law. Congress passed the
1
Vickie Yates Brown Glisson was named as Secretary of the Kentucky Cabinet for Health
and Family Services in December 2015, after the Complaint was filed. The Clerk of Court is
directed to replace Audrey Tayse Haynes with Vickie Yates Brown Glisson in the caption of the
docket.
-1-
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (“CWA”), which created Title IV-E
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620, et seq., 670, et seq., pursuant to its authority
under the Constitution’s Spending Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. A participating state is
eligible for partial reimbursement of some of the state’s expenditures on foster care
maintenance payments made to those who qualify under Title IV-E. The plaintiffs argue
that Title IV-E, specifically 42 U.S.C. §§ 671 and 672, creates a mandatory obligation for
the state to make foster care maintenance payments to Plaintiff R.O., a relative guardian.
The defendant admits that the state does not make payments to relative care providers
under §§ 671 and 672. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants’ failure to make these
payments is a violation of the statute itself, and their equal protection and due process
rights under the Kentucky and United States Constitutions.
The plaintiffs seek
declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The defendant contends that the state is not required to make payments on behalf
of (or to) these plaintiffs. First, the defendant claims that the state is immune from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment and that the doctrine of Ex parte Young does not apply.
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Second, the defendant argues that the plaintiffs do
not have a private right of action to enforce §§ 671 and 672, but even if they do, R.O. is
not a foster care provider who qualifies as a party entitled to payments under the CWA.
Thus, the defendant asserts that she has not violated the plaintiffs’ due process rights.
Further, the defendant claims that she has not violated the plaintiffs’ right to equal
protection because there is a rational basis for the classification.
-2-
The parties agreed to certain stipulated facts, which are adopted in this opinion.
[Record No. 8-1] The Commonwealth of Kentucky filed Dependency, Neglect and
Abuse proceedings against the children’s mother, C.O., in Clark County in 2012 when
her minor boys were one and eight years old. A.O. is now four. He is a half-brother to
D.O., who is now even years old. C.O. has a history of using illegal drugs, including
cocaine. These cases were transferred to Fayette County after C.O. relocated there. A.O.
and D.O. were placed with R.O., their great aunt, at different times while the
Dependency, Neglect and Abuse cases against C.O. were pending. On September 10,
2014, the Fayette Family Court closed the family court cases so that the children would
achieve “permanency.” The state family court granted joint legal custody of the children
with the birth mother and R.O. However, R.O. was granted physical custody and the
children are assumed to continue to reside with her.
R.O. did not file for relief through any administrative proceedings with the CHFS
before she filed suit in the Fayette Circuit Court. R.O. currently receives $225.00 per
month in K-TAP benefits, $110.00 per month in Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
benefits and Medicaid health care benefits for her nephews to assist with the costs of
childcare.
II.
Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if “matters
outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded by the court, the motion must be
treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” The Court “may consider the
Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record
-3-
of the case and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as they are
referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein” without
converting a motion to a summary judgment motion. Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). The obligation to convert to a summary
judgment motion is mandatory if matters outside the pleadings are not excluded by the
Court. Max Arnold & Sons, LLC v. W.L. Hailey & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 494, 503 (6th Cir.
2006) (applying Rule 12(d) to a Rule 12(c) motion); see Tackett v. M & G Polymers,
USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 487–88 (6th Cir. 2009). In this case, the Court will consider
the parties’ stipulated facts and affidavits submitted by the defendants.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine disputes regarding
any material facts and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Chao v. Hall
Holding Co., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). A dispute over a material fact is not
“genuine” unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. That
is, the determination must be “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986); see
Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 516 (6th Cir. 2008). In deciding whether to grant
summary judgment, the Court views all the facts and inferences drawn from the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Here, the parties agree that there are no genuine
-4-
issues of material fact in dispute. Thus, the matter may be resolved the standards set
forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
III.
A. Ex parte Young
The Eleventh Amendment bars “all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory or
monetary relief, against the state and its departments by citizens of another state,
foreigners or its own citizens.” Thiokol v. Dep’t of Treasury, State of Mich., Revenue
Div., 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993) (internal citations omitted). Suits for monetary
relief against state officials sued in their official capacity are also barred, but the
amendment “does not preclude actions against state officials sued in their official
capacity for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief.” Thiokol, 987 F.2d at 381 (citing
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
Where relief is based upon past acts, and not continuing conduct, the relief does
not fall under the doctrine of Ex parte Young. 209 U.S. at 155–56. “[W]hen a federal
court commands a state official to do nothing more than refrain from violating federal
law, he is not the [s]tate for sovereign immunity purposes.”
Virginia Office for
Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011). However, the “doctrine
is limited to that precise situation” and does not apply if the state is the real, substantial
party in interest, “as when ‘the judgment sought would expend itself on the public
treasury or domain, or interfere with public administration.’” Stewart, 563 U.S. at 255
(quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 n.11 (1984)).
However, “an ancillary effect on the state treasury is a permissible and often an inevitable
-5-
consequence of the principle announced in Ex parte Young.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 668 (1974).
“When a court addresses a claim made under Ex parte Young[,] it should simply
ask ‘whether a complainant alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief
properly characterized as prospective.’” Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852,
861 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296
(1997) (O’Conner, J., concurring)). Here, the plaintiffs have brought suit against the
defendant in her official capacity for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief based
on an alleged ongoing violation of federal law. [See Amended Complaint, Record No. 1]
The plaintiffs do not ask for damages or monetary relief for past violations, but ask that
the defendant comply with the federal mandate to provide the same benefits to relative
care providers as non-relative care providers.
While the relief sought would have an impact on the treasury, the impact is only
ancillary to the extent that payment from the treasury would be required to comply with
federal law in the future. Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 368 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986)) (“[R]elief that serves directly to bring an
end to a present violation of federal law is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment even
though accompanied by a substantial ancillary effect on the state treasury.”); see
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668. The relief requested is for future compliance with the federal
statute, rather than monetary relief alone. Thus, sovereign immunity does not bar this
case and the plaintiffs’ claims may proceed under the doctrine of Ex parte Young.
-6-
B. There Is No Private Right Of Enforcement Under The Subject Provisions.
Having determined that the defendant is not immune from suit, the next question is
whether the plaintiffs have asserted a claim for violation of a statute that creates a right
privately enforceable against state officers through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
“[T]o seek redress through § 1983 . . . a plaintiff must assert the violation of a
federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,
341 (1997) (quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106
(1989)). As outlined in Blessing, a statute will be found to create an enforceable right if,
after a particularized inquiry, the court concludes that (i) the statutory section was
intended to benefit the putative plaintiff; (ii) it sets a binding obligation on a government
unit, rather than merely expressing a congressional preference; and (iii) the interests the
plaintiff asserts are not so “vague and amorphous that their enforcement would strain
judicial competence.” Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 862–63 (6th Cir.
2002) (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341).
If the conditions identified above are met, a statute is presumed to create an
“enforceable right unless Congress has explicitly or implicitly foreclosed” it. Westside
Mothers, 289 F.3d at 863. Thus, if a provision meets the three factors of the Blessing
test, there is a rebuttable presumption that the federal statutory right is enforceable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983; however, the claim may be dismissed if Congress has foreclosed a
remedy under § 1983. See 42 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 411, § 2 (2009). “Anything short of an
unambiguously conferred right” will not support a cause of action under § 1983.
Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002). “[I]t is rights, not the broader or vaguer
-7-
‘benefits’ or ‘interests’ that may be enforced under [Section 1983].” Gonzaga, 536 U.S.
at 283.
Legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending powers, such as the CWA, can
give rise to enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if Congress “‘speaks with a clear
voice’ and manifests an ‘unambiguous’ intent to confer individual rights.” See Gonzaga,
536 U.S. at 279–80 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, 28, and n.21) (describing prior
cases in which spending legislation gave rise to enforceable rights). Here, the plaintiffs
correctly argue that the court must examine the individual sections at issue, rather than
the statutory scheme as a whole, to determine whether there is a private right conferred.
The majority of courts considering the CWA have determined that each provision must
be reviewed under the Blessing test on an individual basis, rather than looking at the
CWA as a whole.
The plaintiffs argue that the mandatory language in 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) applies.
That provision requires that “[e]ach State with a plan approved under this part shall make
foster care maintenance payments on behalf of each child who has been removed from
the home of a relative . . . into foster care if—(A) the removal and foster care placement
met and the placement continues to meet, the requirements of [§ 672(a)](2); and (B) the
child, while in the home, would have met the AFDC eligibility requirement of [§ 672(a)]
(3).” Under § 672(a)(2)(C), the child must be placed in a “foster family home” or “child
care institution.” R.O. contends that the children’s placement qualifies as a “foster family
home,” meaning that it “is licensed by the State in which it is situated or has been
-8-
approved, by the agency of such State having responsibility for licensing homes of this
type, as meeting the standards established for such licensing.” 42 U.S.C. § 672(b).
In addressing the first part of the Blessing analysis—whether the statutory section
was intended to benefit the putative plaintiff—the Supreme Court in Gonzaga looked at
three specific factors to be applied. See Hughlett v. Romer-Sensky, 497 F.3d 557, 562
(6th Cir. 2006); Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 541–42 (6th Cir. 2006);
New York Citizens’ Coalition for Children v. Carrion, 31 F. Supp. 3d 512, 519 (E.D.N.Y.
2014). The statute must contain rights-creating language “that is unmistakably focused
on the individuals benefitted.” Hughlett, 497 F.3d at 562. Second, the court must
consider whether the statute has an individual focus, as opposed to a systemwide or
aggregate focus.
Hughlett, 497 F.3d at 562.
Third, a court must “consider[] the
availability of a congressionally mandated federal review mechanism.” Carrion, 31 F.
Supp. 3d at 519. In other words, the “statute must lack an enforcement scheme for
aggrieved individuals” to find that the statute creates an actionable right. Hughlett, 497
F.3d at 562.
In Midwest Foster Care and Adoption Ass’n v. Kincade, 712 F.3d 1190 (8th Cir.
2013), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that § 672(a) did
not confer a private right of enforcement. The court initially concluded that § 672(a) did
not contain “rights-creating language,” because the focus of the language was on the
persons or institutions being regulated rather than “in the terms of the individuals who
benefit.” Midwest Foster Care, 712 F.3d at 1196, 1198; see also Carrion, 31 F. Supp. 3d
at 520. That provision requires that “[e]ach State with a plan approved under this part
-9-
shall make foster care maintenance payments on behalf of each child who has been
removed from the home of a relative . . . into foster care if—(A) the removal and foster
care placement met and the placement continues to meet, the requirements of [§
672(a)](2); and (B) the child, while in the home, would have met the AFDC eligibility
requirement of [§ 672(a)](3).” 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1). While the text of § 672(a)
identifies that the children are the ultimate beneficiaries, the focus of the provision and its
subparts are the conditions precedent that trigger the federal government’s obligation to
reimburse funds expended by the state on the behalf of those beneficiaries. Id.; see 42
U.S.C. § 672(a)(1).
“Where the statutory language primarily concerns itself with
commanding how states are to function within a federal program, the statute is less likely
to have created an individually enforceable right.” Midwest Foster Care, 712 F.3d at
1200 (citing Walters v. Weiss, 392 F.3d 306, 313 (8th Cir. 2004)). Identification of the
plaintiffs as the beneficiary of a federal law and, in this case, a reimbursement program,
in the statutory language is insufficient to conclude that a statutory right has been
conferred. Carrion, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 522. Instead, “to create private rights, [the
statute’s] text must be phrased in terms of the persons benefitted.” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at
274.
For instance, “Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 create individual rights because those statutes are
phrased ‘with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class.’” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284
(citations omitted). Both statutes include the language “no person . . . shall . . . be subject
to discrimination.” Id. “There would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor
-10-
of individual persons if Congress, instead of drafting Title IX with an unmistakable focus
on the benefited class, had written it simply as a ban on discriminatory conduct by
recipients of federal funds. . . .” Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690–93
(1979).
The plaintiffs do not dispute the validity of this analysis, but argue that the statutes
at issue are more similar to those in Wright and Wilder, which the Supreme Court found
gave rise to enforceable rights. Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479
U.S. 418 (1987); Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990). In Wright, tenants
were permitted to bring a § 1983 suit to “recover past overcharges under a rent-ceiling
provision of the Public Housing Act, on the ground that the provision unambiguously
conferred ‘a mandatory [benefit] focusing on the individual family and its income.’”
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280. Similarly, in Wilder, claims under § 1983 were permitted by
health care providers seeking to reimburse certain provisions of the Medicaid Act. In
both cases, the provisions at issue “explicitly conferred specific monetary entitlements
upon the plaintiffs.” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280.
In Wright and Wilder, the Supreme Court noted that “Congress spoke in terms that
‘could not be clearer.’” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280. But such is not the case here. Using
the Blessing test, as elaborated in Gonzaga, the statutes on which the plaintiffs rely do not
evidence “an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under §
1983.” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283.
The plaintiffs argue that § 672 speaks to the interests of the child, who is the real
party in interest. Certainly, the children are the intended beneficiaries of the statutory
-11-
scheme. However, the statute itself is not phrased in terms of giving the child, or the
foster parent or facility, any rights or privileges. The statute is phrased in terms of
qualifying events for the state plan to receive reimbursement. “Statutes that focus on the
person regulated rather than the individuals protected create no implication of an intent to
confer rights on a particular class of persons.” Hughlett, 497 F.3d at 563 (quoting
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289 (2001)). Thus, the statute does not have an
unmistakable focus on the individual benefitted, but on the state as the regulated party.
This weighs strongly against finding that the statute confers an individual right upon the
plaintiffs.
Likewise, in looking to the second factor discussed in Gonzaga, the statutory
language at issue has an aggregate, rather than individual, focus. The Secretary of Health
and Human Services is charged with promulgating regulations for the review of state
programs to determine if there is “‘substantial conformity’ between the terms of the state
plan and federal requirements, as well as between the state plan as written and the way in
which it is implemented.” Midwest Foster Care, 712 F.3d at 1194; 42 U.S.C. § 1320a2a(a), (b)(3)(A). If a state’s plan does not substantially comply, the Secretary of Health
and Human Services may take corrective actions, including termination of federal funds.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2a(b)(3)(C).
“‘[S]ubstantial compliance’ provisions in Spending
Clause legislation are inconsistent with individually enforceable rights, and indicate an
aggregate or system-wide focus.” Hughlett, 497 F.3d at 564; Blessing, 520 U.S. at 343
(“[T]he [substantial compliance] standard is simply a yardstick for the Secretary to
measure the system-wide performance.”). As discussed in Midwest Foster Care and
-12-
Carrion, the CWA only requires “substantial conformity” with its requirements to receive
funding, which “counsels against the creation of individually enforceable rights.”
Midwest Foster Care, 712 F.3d at 1200–01; Carrion, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 522–23.
Additionally, “[w]hen the reference to the asserted individual right is in the
context of describing the type of action that triggers a funding prohibition, an aggregate
focus is evident.” Carrion, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 523 (quoting Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288–89)
(quotations omitted). In Hughlett, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit noted that the enforcement scheme of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act
suggested that the remedy for noncompliance militated against finding that an
enforceable right was conferred under that statutory scheme. Hughlett, 497 F.3d at 564.
“In legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power, the typical remedy for state
noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for
noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to the
state.” Hughlett, 497 F.3d at 564 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 281).
In other words, an aggregate focus is indicated “when the statute couches the
plaintiff’s purported right in terms of what state actions will terminate federal funding.”
Carrion, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 523. In contrast to the decisions in Wilder and Wright in
which there is no termination of funding associated with noncompliance, the failure to
meet the requirements in § 672(a) “‘triggers a funding prohibition’ and the asserted right
is only mentioned in the context of these funding prohibitions.” Midwest Foster Care,
712 F.3d at 1202. Thus, the second factor weighs heavily against finding that Congress
intended to create a private right of action.
-13-
The third factor of the first Blessing issue is whether Congress provided a
“centralized federal review mechanism for individuals asserting statutory violations.”
Midwest Foster Care, 712 F.3d at 1202. Such a mechanism weighs against finding that
Congress intended to create individually enforceable rights through the courts. Midwest
Foster Care, 712 F.3d at 1202.
In this case, the plaintiffs challenge Kentucky’s implementation of the plan itself.
They argue that the plan incorrectly fails to provide benefits to these plaintiffs. The plan
has been reviewed by the Secretary for Health and Human Services, as described above,
although there are no means by which an individual can request individual federal
review. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2a(a). Instead, each state is responsible for “granting an
opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for
benefits . . . is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness.” 42 U.S.C. §
671(a)(12). Thus, while review of individual benefits is delegated to the State under
§ 671, the overall plan is reviewed and approved through centralized federal review.
However, consistently with the analysis in Midwest Foster Care and Carrion, and
because the other factors weigh against finding an unambiguous intent to create an
individually enforceable right, the court concludes that the lack of a federal review
mechanism is not alone sufficient to find that the first Blessing factor supports finding an
individual right of action. See Midwest Foster Care, 712 F.3d at 1202; Carrion, 31 F.
Supp. 3d at 525–27.
Because the first factor of the Blessing test weighs strongly against finding that the
statute confers a private right of enforcement, it is unnecessary to address the remaining
-14-
conditions or the parties’ arguments regarding whether the plaintiffs qualify as a “foster
family home” under 42 U.S.C. § 672(c)(1) or whether the federal foster care maintenance
program mandates payments to the plaintiffs by its terms. The Court concludes that there
is no private right of action conferred by 42 U.S.C. §§ 671, 672 upon the plaintiffs.
C. Due Process
The plaintiffs also contend that the defendant has deprived them of their due
process guarantees under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and the corresponding guarantees under the Kentucky Constitution.
“To determine
whether a due process violation has occurred, the court must first decide whether
plaintiffs had a property right that entitled them to procedural protections.” Hughlett, 497
F.3d at 566 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985)).
Only then can the court determine the process that is due. Id.
“To have a property interest in a benefit, a recipient must have a legitimate claim
of entitlement to it.” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). This entitlement
to a benefit must be grounded in some statute, rule, or policy. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576. The
plaintiffs rely on 42 U.S.C. §§ 670–72 as the source of their asserted property rights.
However, they do not have a right to payments under that statute, as described above.
Thus, the plaintiffs have not established that they have a property interest in foster care
payments for which they would be entitled to procedural due process and the defendant is
entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
-15-
D. Equal Protection
The plaintiffs argue that the defendant’s determination that they are not entitled to
foster care maintenance payments violates the equal protection clause. They contend that
the children are similarly-situated to children in non-relative foster homes who are
receiving payments.
Plaintiff R.O., the relative caregiver, also argues that she is
similarly-situated to non-relative caregivers who are receiving foster care maintenance
payments.
“The Equal Protection Clause protects against arbitrary classifications, and
requires that similarly situated persons be treated equally.” Bowman v. United States,
564 F.3d 765, 772 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
The
Kentucky Constitution mirrors the federal guarantees. See Vision Mining v. Gardner,
364 S.W.3d 455, 465 (Ky. 2011). “To state an equal protection claim, a party must claim
that the government treated similarly situated persons differently.” Braun v. Ann Arbor
Charter Tp., 519 F.3d 564, 574 (6th Cir. 2008). Generally, “legislation is presumed to be
valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to
a legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985). “An equal protection claim is subject to rational basis review unless it involves
infringement of a fundamental right or application to a suspect class.” Bowman, 564 F.3d
at 772. The plaintiffs have not argued that they are members of a suspect class or that a
fundamental right is implicated by the statutory scheme. The plaintiffs agree that their
claim shall be evaluated under a rational basis inquiry.
-16-
“[G]overnmental action subject to equal protection scrutiny under the rational
basis test must be sustained if any conceivable basis rationally supports it.”
Fed.
Commc’n Comm’n v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1993). There is no
need for the government to “produce evidence to sustain the rationality of its action; its
choice is presumptively valid and ‘may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
evidence or empirical data.’” TriHealth, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, Hamilton Cnty. Ohio,
430 F.3d 783, 790–91 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315).
The defendant contends that Congress and the Kentucky Legislature may rely on
several rational bases for treating these groups differently. First, they argue that family
members may need less financial incentive than other non-family foster care providers to
take foster children into their homes. Moreover, the additional training and requirements
for licensed foster-care providers justifies treating them differently.
The defendant also argues that foster care payments are made to temporary
caregivers, but do not apply once permanent placement is achieved. Thus, she asserts
that the plaintiffs’ permanent status prohibits them from qualifying for foster care
benefits regardless of their relative placement status. Finally, the defendant contends that
the state’s need to maximize the state funds available, and to extend the federal funds
allowable for reimbursement, is rational.
The Court agrees that the distinction recognized by Kentucky has a rational basis.
And as the Supreme Court has recognized, “[i]f the classification has some ‘reasonable
basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made
with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’”
-17-
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)). “[T]he Constitution does not empower this Court to
second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited
public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients.” Id.
In Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc), the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed claims by children in foster care that Oregon’s
statutory scheme allowing state-funded foster care benefits to children placed with
nonrelatives, but disallowing benefits to children placed with relatives, violated the
children’s equal protection rights. The plaintiffs in Lipscomb were divided into two
subclasses: (i) children who claimed that they were entitled to state funding even though
their relatives were willing and financially able to care for them; and (ii) children who
would be denied placements because their relatives are financially incapable of accepting
the placement without the foster care benefits at issue. Id. at 1376–77. The court
rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that heightened scrutiny applied. Instead, it examined
whether Oregon had a rational basis for choosing to provide benefits to nonrelative foster
parents but not relative foster parents. Oregon argued that it was maximizing the amount
of money available for the benefit of foster care children. The court found that “[t]he
state has a rational basis for not paying state funds to family members who provide foster
care: The state wished to take advantage of relatives who are willing and able to take care
of foster children regardless of whether they receive help from the state.” Id. at 1380.
“The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not
require, rough accommodations—illogical, it may be, and unscientific,” yet those
-18-
classifications “will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it.” Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Likewise, Kentucky’s need to maximize limited resources and to make the most of funds
available for federal reimbursement provide a rational basis to justify treating these
plaintiffs differently from children placed with certified foster families. Based on the
foregoing analysis, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claim
alleging a violation of equal protection.
IV.
For the reasons outlined above, it is hereby
ORDERED that the defendant’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment [Record No. 8], shall be construed as a motion for summary
judgment. That motion is GRANTED.
This 23rd day of March, 2016.
-19-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?