Williams v. Paris, City of et al
Filing
55
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Dfts' 34 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. Signed by Judge Danny C. Reeves on May 4, 2016. (AWD) cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
(at Lexington)
PHYLLIS WILLIAMS,
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Plaintiff,
V.
CITY OF PARIS, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 5: 15-108-DCR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
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This matter is pending for consideration of the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment regarding Plaintiff Phyllis Williams’ claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
[Record No. 34]
Because Williams has not alleged any facts demonstrating that
Defendant David Thompson violated her constitutional rights, Thompson is entitled to
summary judgment on all of Williams’ § 1983 claims. Williams also has not presented
any proof that the City of Paris failed to properly train its officers. As a result, the motion
for summary judgment will be granted insofar as it seeks dismissal of Williams’ failure to
train claim.
Finally, Defendant Jon Humphries is entitled to qualified immunity
regarding Williams’ First Amendment claim and summary judgment is also appropriate
regarding her Fourteenth Amendment claim against the defendants. However, the motion
will be denied insofar as the City and Humphries seek summary judgment regarding
Williams’ Fourth Amendment claims.
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I.
On the evening of July 4, 2014, Thompson and Humphries, police officers
employed by the City of Paris, were dispatched to 1000 Crestwood Heights after a 911
call was received from that location. [Record Nos. 34-1; 38, pp. 13-14] The parties
vigorously dispute what happened once police arrived. For the purposes of evaluating the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court accepts the plaintiff’s version of
the facts as true. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
456 (1992).
When police arrived, Williams testified that she and her adult son, Cody Turner,
were the only ones at the residence. [Record No. 37, p. 10] Turner was lounging on a
hammock outside with his dog while Williams was inside watching television. Id. at 39.
Williams was first alerted to the police’s arrival when “Cody came in the house and said,
mom, the police are here.” Id. at 40. As she approached the front door, Williams saw
Officer Humphries opening the screen door, preparing to enter the house. Id. at 40-41.
Williams told Officer Humphries that he was not allowed in her house and demanded that
he shut the door. Id. at 41.
During her deposition, Williams offered the following testimony:
Q. When you told Officer Humphries that – to shut the door, that he was
not allowed in the house, what did he say or do?
A. I can come in your house.
Q. What happened next?
A. I said, no, you cannot come in my house.
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Q. What happened next?
A. He got angry. He said, yes, I can. On a 911 distress call, I can come in
your house. I said, no. There’s no distress here.
Q. What happened next?
A. Officer Humphries got angry, come on in the door and shoved my son
against the wall. Cody had a glass of chocolate milk in his hand, spilled
chocolate milk all over my wall, all over the floor. This other officer came
in behind him and grabbed Cody and shoved him. When he come in
behind him, pushed me backwards. I hit the door, almost went down the
steps. I grabbed my phone, and I started videoing.
Id. at 43.
The officers handcuffed Turner and then walked him out of the house and into the
yard toward their police cruisers. Id. at 51. Williams continued recording the officers as
she followed them. Id. Williams maintains that Turner did not resist arrest, although she
does admit that he was saying, “I didn’t do a f_ _ _ing thing” as officers walked him out
of the house. Id. at 49, 51-52, 55. Williams claims that, at some point on the way to the
cruisers, Officer Humphries turned around and told her that he would put her in jail if she
did not stop the recording. Id. at 58. Williams responded that she was not doing
anything except recording the officers as they arrested her son. Id. Williams alleges that
Officer Humphries then “walks up to me, grabs me by my elbows, slides his hands as
hard as he could, jerks my arms, pops my thumbs and throws my phone up in the air.
Throws it in the cruiser and says, it’s evidence now, b_ tch.” Id. at 58-59. The officers
eventually placed Turner in the police cruiser and left with the phone. Williams refused
to give the police consent to search her phone, and the phone was not returned until early
September. Id. at 35, 74. Officer Humphries claims that the phone was booked into
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evidence but its contents were never accessed. [Record No. 38, pp. 21-23] Conversely,
Williams asserts that when she received the phone in September, several videos had been
deleted, including the video of her son’s arrest. [Record No. 37, pp. 75-77]
Turner later pled guilty in Bourbon District Court to menacing, disorderly conduct
in the second degree, and resisting arrest. [Record No. 34-3; 36, pp. 55-56] On March
26, 2015, Williams filed this action in Bourbon Circuit Court against the City of Paris,
Officer Thompson, and Officer Humphries. [Record No. 1-1] In Counts I and II of her
Complaint, Williams claims that she is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages
for assault and battery. Id. at 3. Williams also asserted two additional claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 4. She alleges that the defendants violated the Fourth Amendment
by unlawfully seizing and searching her phone without a warrant. Id. Williams also
contends that the City of Paris is liable for its failure to adequately train and supervise its
police force. Id.
Williams amended her Complaint after the defendants removed the case to this
Court to include two additional § 1983 claims. [Record Nos. 1; 19] Williams alleges in
her Amended Complaint that the defendants violated her First Amendment right to record
police officers performing their duties and that the defendants violated her Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process by confiscating and retaining her phone. [Record No.
19, pp. 3-4]
II.
The Court should grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is ‘sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.’”
Chao v. Hall Holding Co., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). See Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 516
(6th Cir. 2008). In deciding whether to grant a motion for summary judgment, the Court
must view all the facts and draw all inferences from the evidence in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The defendants claim that summary judgment is appropriate for all of Williams’
claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Record No. 34]
III.
Williams does not specify in her original or amended Complaints whether she is
suing Officer Humphries and Officer Thompson in their individual capacities, their
official capacities, or both. [Record Nos. 1; 19] “In an official capacity action, the
plaintiff seeks damages not from the individual officer, but from the entity for which the
officer is an agent.” Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 657 (6th Cir. 1993). See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all
respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”) Suing the City of
Paris and its officers in their official capacities would be redundant. Therefore, the Court
will assume for the purpose of this motion that Williams intended to sue the officers in
their individual capacities. Moreover, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
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addresses the officers’ individual liability, and the plaintiff did not correct that reading of
the Complaint in her response to the defendants’ motion. [Record Nos. 34; 42]
A.
Qualified Immunity for Claims Against Humphries
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)). In other words, if no reasonably competent officer would have taken the same
action, then qualified immunity is inappropriate. Humphrey v. Mabry, 482 F.3d 840, 847
(6th Cir. 2007).
However, immunity is appropriate where officers of reasonable
competence could disagree about the action’s legality. Id. “The doctrine protects ‘all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Id. (quoting Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
1.
First Amendment Claim
The plaintiff claims that Officer Humphries’ violated her First Amendment right
to record police activity by seizing her cellphone while she was recording her son’s
arrest. [Record No. 19, pp. 3-4] In response, Officer Humphries argues that the right to
record police officers is not “clearly established,” such that a reasonable officer would
have known that he was violating Williams’ First Amendment rights. [Record No. 34,
pp. 6-8]
In determining whether a constitutional right is clearly established, this Court must
first look to the Supreme Court’s decisions, then the decisions of the United States Court
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of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, then to the decisions of this court and other district
courts within the Sixth Circuit, and lastly to the decisions of other circuits. See Higgason
v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 876 (6th Cir. 2002). The parties do not dispute that this issue
has not been addressed by the Supreme Court or the Sixth Circuit. This Court, however,
addressed this precise issue shortly before the July 4th incident in this case. See Williams
v. Boggs, No. 6:13-65-DCR, 2014 WL 585373 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 13, 2014). In Williams,
this Court held that the right to film a police officer is not clearly established. Id. at *6.
In reaching that conclusion, the Court first considered cases from the First, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits finding that the right existed. Id. at *5. The Court also considered
cases from other federal circuits finding that the right was not clearly established. Id.
Williams cites six cases from other circuits to support her theory that the right to
film police is clearly established. [Record No. 42, p. 5] Notably, three of those cases
were considered by this Court in Williams, 2014 WL 585373, at *5. See Glik v. Cunniffe,
655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583
(7th Cir. 2012); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000).
The
defendants cite a number of more recent federal decisions concluding that the right to
record police is not clearly established. [Record No. 43, pp. 3-4] The fact that the parties
have been able to find a number of conflicting cases beyond those considered in Williams
only confirms this Court’s prior determination. Simply put, “a disagreement among the
circuit courts is evidence that a certain matter of federal law is not clearly established.”
Williams, 2014 WL 585373, at *6 (quoting Miller v. Colson, 694 F.3d 691, 698 (6th Cir.
2012)).
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The plaintiff also notes that on, July 4, 2014, one court within this Circuit
determined that the right to record police is a clearly-established First Amendment right.
[Record No. 42, p. 5] See Crawford v. Geiger (Crawford I), 996 F. Supp. 2d 603, 615
(N.D. Ohio 2014) (“[T]here is a First Amendment right to openly film police officers
carrying out their duties.”). But the Crawford court conducted a more thorough analysis
of the relevant case law and reversed itself on this issue after July 4th. See Crawford v.
Geiger (Crawford II), 131 F. Supp. 3d 703, 715 (N.D. Ohio 2015), appeal docketed, No.
15-4181 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 2015) (“On further consideration in connection with the instant
motions, however, I believe the right openly to film police carrying out their duties is not
so clear cut that it is proper in this case to withhold qualified immunity as to the First
Amendment claim.”). Because Crawford I, not Crawford II, was in effect at the time of
the July 4th incident, the plaintiff argues that the right was clearly established according
to at least one court within this Circuit. [Record No. 42, p. 5] Williams is correct that the
clearly-established inquiry requires the court to consider decisions at the time the action
in question was taken. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244. However, the undersigned agrees
with the defendants’ analysis of the Crawford cases:
[W]hat police officers were left with on July 4, 2014, in the Sixth Circuit
were two recent rulings – one issued on February 13, 2014 (i.e., Williams,
supra), and one issued on February 10, 2014 (i.e. Crawford I) – that
conflicted on the issue [of] whether there was a clearly established right
under the First Amendment to record police.
[Record No. 43, p. 4] A constitutional rule is certainly not clearly established where
courts in other circuits and courts in this Circuit have issued conflicting opinions.
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Finally, Williams relies on a Department of Justice letter dated May 14, 2012,
addressing the case of Christopher Sharp v. Baltimore City Police Department, et al.
[Record Nos. 42, p. 6; 42-1] Because the Department of Justice has taken the position
that the First Amendment protects an individual’s right to film police, Williams argues
that the right is clearly established. However, the Department of Justice is not a court of
law, and its policy statements have no binding authority. As discussed above, the clearlyestablished inquiry requires courts to look at Supreme Court, federal circuit court, and
federal district court precedent. See Higgason, 288 F.3d at 876. Letters from the
Department of Justice do not establish constitutional law, nor do they bind local law
enforcement agencies. In summary, Officer Humphries has shown that the right to film
police was not clearly established.
Accordingly, he is entitled to the protection of
qualified immunity.
As for Williams’ First Amendment claim against the City of Paris, “a municipality
cannot be made liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a respondeat superior basis.” Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 168 (1985). In other words, even if Officer Humphries did
violate a protected constitutional right, the City of Paris cannot be held liable for the
violation simply because Humphries is a city employee. “It is only when the execution of
the government’s policy or custom inflicts the injury that the municipality may be held
liable under § 1983.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the plaintiff has not alleged that any City of
Paris police officer has unlawfully seized a cellphone other than on this one occasion, nor
has she presented any proof tending to show that the city has a policy or custom of
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infringing on the First Amendment rights of its citizens. Accordingly, the defendants’
motion for summary judgment will be granted with respect to Williams’ First
Amendment claims against the City of Paris.
2.
Fourth Amendment Claim
Williams also claims that the warrantless seizure of her phone violated her Fourth
Amendment rights. [Record No. 19, p. 4] But Officer Humphries argues that he is
entitled to qualified immunity on that claim as well.
[Record No. 34, pp. 11-12]
According to Officer Humphries, the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. California,
134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), “clearly established that the warrantless seizure of a cell phone in
the absence of exigent circumstances violates the Fourth Amendment.”
Id. at 11.
Because Riley was decided a mere ten days before the seizure of Williams’ phone,
Officer Humphries contends that he did not have time to learn about and adjust to the
newly-established law. Id. at 11-12. In deciding whether a rule is “clearly established,”
the Court must recognize that officials need “some time to adjust to and learn about
judge-made law as it evolves . . . .” Lintz v. Skipski, 25 F.3d 304, 306 (6th Cir. 1994).
The Sixth Circuit and other circuits “have struggled to decide how long after a decision []
officials have to become familiar with ‘the law,’ and no rule has emerged.”
Id.
Nevertheless, this Court need not decide whether ten days was sufficient for Officer
Humphries to adjust to the Court’s decision in Riley because the constitutional law at play
in this case was clearly established long before Riley.
In Riley, the Court determined “whether the police may, without a warrant, search
digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.”
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134 S. Ct. at 2480. However, Riley is distinguishable. Unlike the plaintiffs in Riley,
Williams’ phone was not seized during a search incident to her arrest because Williams
was not arrested. Additionally, this case is less about the search of the phone and more
about the seizure. In this case, the defendants claim that they never accessed the data on
Williams’ phone (i.e., the primary issue addressed by the Court in Riley). The question
here is whether police were allowed to seize Williams’ property without a warrant and
without her consent, and that issue has been addressed before Riley.
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures of
property by the government.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Over twenty years ago, the
Supreme Court determined that for Fourth Amendment purposes, a seizure occurs when
“there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in [the]
property.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). Officer Humphries
undoubtedly seized Williams’ cell phone when he confiscated and caused it to be placed
into evidence at the City of Paris’ police department. It was also well-established on July
4, 2014, that a seizure of property is subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny regardless of
whether the property is subsequently searched. Soldal v. Cook Cnty. Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 68
(1992). Accordingly, even if Officer Humphries is correct that the phone’s contents were
never searched, Officer Humphries’ seizure of the phone is subject to the Fourth
Amendment’s protections.
The Supreme Court has recognized for over thirty years that a warrantless search
or seizure is per se unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment if it does not fall
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within one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971). The parties agree that police did not obtain a
warrant to seize or to search Williams’ phone. [See Record No. 38, p. 33] Regardless of
the outcome of the “clearly-established” inquiry, Officer Humphries asserts that his
seizure of William’s phone fell under the exigent circumstances exception. The exigent
circumstances exception is also not a new invention. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (“Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to
probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search.”).
During his deposition, Officer Humphries testified that he took the phone from
Williams because he was concerned that she would delete the video once she realized that
it showed her son resisting arrest. [Record No. 38, p. 21] The likelihood that a suspect
will destroy evidence has long been recognized as an exigent circumstance that may
justify a warrantless seizure of property. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505
(1973) (“Where there are exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be
‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action
withou[t] prior judicial evaluation.”). On July 4, 2014, any reasonable officer would
have known that the warrantless seizure of Williams’ cell phone without her consent was
unlawful absent an exception to the warrant requirement.
By invoking the exigent
circumstances doctrine, Officer Humphries demonstrated that he understood a warrant
was generally required for the cell phone’s seizure unless an exception applied.
Williams’ and Officers Humphries’ conflicting version of events reveals a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether exigent circumstances justified the phone’s
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seizure. Officer Humphries testified that Turner resisted arrest and any video of the event
would be evidence supporting the charges against him. [Record No. 38, p. 21] Once
Williams watched the video and realized that it might implicate her son in a crime,
Officer Humphries contends that Williams was likely to destroy the evidence by deleting
the video. Id. Conversely, Williams testified that her son did not resist arrest and the
video was exculpatory evidence. [Record No. 37, pp. 49, 51-52] Thus, she argues that
“[i]t would make no sense” for her to destroy the evidence. [Record No. 42, p. 7] Since
the video of the incident is no longer available, this issue is certainly in dispute and
therefore summary judgment is not appropriate regarding this claimed violation. Also,
because the defendants have not explained why the City of Paris is entitled to summary
judgment on this issue, Williams’ Fourth Amendment claim against the City also remains
pending.
B.
Constitutional Claims Against Thompson
The plaintiff also asserts First and Fourth Amendment claims against Officer
Thompson based on the warrantless seizure of her phone. [Record No. 19, pp. 3-4]
Officer Thompson argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on both claims because
the plaintiff has not alleged any facts tending to show that he seized the phone. [Record
No. 34, pp. 5, 9] The plaintiff does not at all address this issue in her response to the
motion for summary judgment. [Record No. 42] Further, the plaintiff testified during
her deposition that she never saw Officer Thompson touch the phone. [Record No. 37, p.
67] She also testified that she did not recall Officer Thompson saying anything to her or
Turner during the July 4th encounter. Id. at 69. Officer Thompson has met Rule 56’s
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requirements for summary judgment by showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact regarding the plaintiff’s First and Fourth Amendment claims against him and that he
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those claims.
C.
Fourteenth Amendment Claims
The plaintiff further contends that the defendants violated her Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process by confiscating and retaining her phone. [Record No.
19, p. 4] The defendants claim that the Fourth Amendment is a more appropriate avenue
for Williams to challenge the police’s seizure of her phone. [Record No. 34, pp. 13-14]
Because Williams has also brought a Fourth Amendment claim based on the seizure, the
defendants argue that they are all entitled to summary judgment on her Fourteenth
Amendment claim. Id.
Where the Fourth Amendment explicitly protects against the conduct at issue,
claims based on that conduct should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, rather
than the more generalized notion of “substantive due process” found in the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (“Because the Fourth
Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this
sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more
generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these
claims.”).
Williams challenges the police’s unlawful seizure of her phone but, as
explained above, the Fourth Amendment protects her from unreasonable search and
seizure. Thus, her substantive due process claim is unnecessary under Graham.
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On at least one occasion, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment claims can coexist under certain circumstances. In Wilson v.
Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 423 (6th Cir. 2008), the plaintiff challenged the involuntary
collection and retention of his DNA by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction. Even though the plaintiff’s substantive due process claim was rejected on its
merits, the Court held that he could pursue his Fourteenth Amendment claim without
transgressing Graham. Id. at 428. However, unlike the DNA in Wilson, the phone in this
case was not indefinitely retained by the government. The police have now returned
Williams’ phone to her, and the only harm she alleges is the initial seizure of the phone
and the search and destruction of some its contents. The Fourth Amendment’s protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures protects against that kind of harm. The
plaintiff has not provided the Court with any reason why Graham does not apply to her
Fourteenth Amendment claim.
Williams also seems to assert that her procedural due process rights were violated
when the police “irrevocably deprived [her of her] recordings without first providing
notice and opportunity to object.” [Record No. 42, p. 7] For support, Williams cites
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Id. In Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 323, the
Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiff was entitled to an evidentiary hearing
prior to the termination of his Social Security disability benefit payments. Unlike the
seizure of property, the termination of Social Security benefits is not covered by the
Fourth Amendment. In Eldridge, the Constitution’s due process provisions were the only
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avenue available to the plaintiff for obtaining the relief he sought. That is not the case
here.
Unlike in Wilson and Eldridge, Williams has not shown that her harm is ongoing,
requiring further process. In fact, she testified during her deposition that she received her
phone back after the judge in her son’s case held a hearing on the matter. [Record No.
37, pp. 73-74] According to Williams, the judge “signed an order to release my phone.”
Id. at 74. Williams has not specified what other procedures she believes that she was
due.
Nor has she addressed the defendants’ argument that the Fourth Amendment
provides sufficient protections for the harm that she alleges. Accordingly, summary
judgment will be granted regarding the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.
D.
Failure to Train Claim
Finally, the City of Paris challenges Williams’ claim that it failed to adequately
train and supervise its police force. [Record No. 34, pp. 14-15] “[T]he inadequacy of
police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train
amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom police come into
contact.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 388. It is not enough to merely allege that the City is
responsible for the police’s training. Id. at 389. The question is whether the training the
police officers received was adequate, “and if it is not, the question becomes whether
such inadequate training can justifiably be said to represent ‘city policy.’” Id.
The defendants have provided a substantial amount of evidence regarding the
training that Paris police officers receive.
In their responses to the plaintiff’s
interrogatories, the City explained that its officers are required to attend “basic law
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enforcement training conducted by the Kentucky Department of Criminal Justice
Training, which typically consists of 768 hours of classroom and hands-on training at the
Police Academy at Eastern Kentucky University . . . .” [Record No. 34-5, p. 2] Officers
are required to obtain at least 40 hours of additional training annually after they attend the
academy. Id. Officer Humphries testified to the same training requirements during his
deposition. [Record No. 38, pp. 8-9] In fact, Humphries even testified that in his
training, he learned that citizens have a right to film his activities. Id. at 11. He also
testified that he learned that he normally needs to obtain a search warrant to get evidence
from a cellphone. Id. at 11-12.
The defendants contend that the plaintiff has not at all explained how the training
the officers received was lacking. [Record No. 34, p. 14] Upon review of the record, the
undersigned agrees that the plaintiff has failed to allege any facts tending to show that the
training was deficient. When asked during her deposition about what type of training city
police officers receive, Williams only stated that the police were expected to “protect and
serve.” [Record No. 37, pp. 36-37] She has failed to offer anything beyond this assertion
in support of her failure to train claim. Therefore, the defendants’ motion to dismiss will
be granted as to this claim.
E.
Remand to State Court
The defendants request that the case be remanded back to state court for
adjudication of the remaining assault and battery claims if the Court grants the motion for
summary judgment. [Record No. 34, pp. 15-17] The plaintiff agrees that remand would
be proper in that event.
[Record No. 42, p. 8]
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However, the plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment claims against the City and Officer Humphries remain pending. Thus,
remand of the state law claims is not appropriate.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Record No. 34]
is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.
This 4th day of May, 2016.
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