Singleton v. Alcala et al

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) Pla shall SHOW CAUSE on or before 8/7/2015 why his claims should not be dismissed. (2) Pla's 13 MOTION for Extension of Time is DENIED. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 7/14/2015.(SCD)cc: COR,Pro Se Pla(via US Mail)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
at Lexington
ERNEST WILLIAM SINGLETON,

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Plaintiff,
V.
HECTOR ALCALA, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 5: 15-131-JMH

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

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This matter is before the Court upon its own motion to conduct
screening, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 1915(e), as well as
to address the Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of certain named
and

unnamed

Plaintiff

Kentucky

Ernest

State

William

Police

Singleton

(“KSP”)

officers

seeks

additional

[DE

12].

time

to

respond to that motion [DE 13], and Defendants object [DE 14].
For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that there is no
need to extend time for Plaintiff to respond to Defendants’ Motion
because Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Rather,

Plaintiff shall show cause why his claims should not be dismissed
for the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

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I.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants caused
him injury because named and unnamed KSP officers and local police
officials committed violations of state and federal law in the
course of a criminal investigation which ultimately led to his
arrest, federal prosecution, and conviction.

Counts 1 and 2 of

Plaintiff’s Complaint allege that he was denied due process of
law, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because he was convicted as
a result of evidence collected when various defendants violated
KRS §§ 218A.320 and 218A.140 by providing fake identification or
providing fake identification to others serving as confidential
informants in an effort to obtain a controlled substance.

In

Counts 3 and 4, he alleges that the defendants violated Kentucky
law when they engaged in abuse of process and malicious prosecution
by investigating and prosecuting him. In another, unnumbered count
of

his

Complaint,

defendants

he

committed

alleges

that

“Tortuous

an

unknown

Interference

defendant
with

or

Business

Practices” or tortious interference with business relations in
violation

of

Kentucky

law

when

someone

connected

to

the

investigation threw nails in the parking lot of his pain management
clinics, resulting in two days of lost business.

Having reviewed

these claims, the Court is persuaded that all must be dismissed
for the reasons stated below.

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II.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint is
skeletal at best, but the Court’s attention is captured by that
sentence which suggests that some or all of Singleton’s claims may
be barred at this time in light of his extant federal conviction.
[DE 12 at pp. 2-3.]

Although Defendants offer this without

elucidation or even a reference to the seminal case on the issue,
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Court concludes that
Defendants are correct with respect to some of the claims.1

“[A]

§ 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an [allegedly]
unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the
conviction or sentence has been invalidated.”

Id. at 489-90.

A

prisoner “has no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until the
conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or
impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Id. at

489.

The Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff Singleton’s
judgment of conviction upon a verdict of guilty by a jury in
Lexington Criminal Action No. 5:13-cr-00008-KKC-REW [see DE 285]
for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846,

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Counsel for defendants should note that, in all future pleadings,
they should offer citation to relevant legal authority and at least
a modestly developed argument in support of their request for
relief.
As offered, their pleading is woefully inadequate.
However, since this matter is subject to screening pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A, the Court may consider the argument
upon its own motion, as well as their motion.
3

856(a)(1), 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (a)(1)(B)(i), and 1956(h), for
conspiracy to distribute oxycodone, the distribution of oxycodone,
the maintenance of a drug involved premises, money laundering, and
the promotion and concealing of money laundering.

The Court also

takes judicial notice that an appeal of that judgment of conviction
has been filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit [see Lexington Criminal Action No. 5:13-cr-00008KKC-REW, DE 288] and that the appeal, No. 14-5534, remains pending.
For the purposes of evaluating Plaintiff’s complaint before the
Court, that conviction remains intact, and the judgment of the
district court with respect to United States v. Singleton, Criminal
Action No. 5:13-cr-00008-KKC-REW, is in full force and effect.
It follows that Plaintiff’s claims for violations of due
process in Counts 1 and 2 of his Complaint are not yet ripe and
should be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) as the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these
claims.

See Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547, 554 (6th Cir. 2002)

(citing Bigelow v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Res., 970 F.2d 154,
160 (6th Cir. 1992)) (“A court lacks jurisdiction over the subject
matter if a claim is not yet ripe for judicial review.”); Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278
(1977) (holding that the court has an independent duty “to inquire
sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal

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jurisdiction).
III.
Once Plaintiff’s federal claims are dismissed, the Court will
have dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction
and

shall

decline

to

exercise

supplemental

jurisdiction

over

Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims, dismissing them without
prejudice.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
IV.

For all of the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that
Singleton’s claims should be dismissed.
Accordingly, upon the Court’s own motion, IT IS ORDERED:
(1) that Plaintiff shall SHOW CAUSE on or before August 7,
2015, why his claims should not be dismissed for the reasons set
forth above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:
(2) that Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Extension of Time to file
a response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [DE 13] is DENIED.
This 14th day of July, 2015.

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