Cooper v. SSA

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) Pla Harlan B. Cooper's 11 MOTION for Summary Judgment is DENIED. (2) Dft Carolyn M. Colvin's 12 MOTION for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. (3) The decision of the Administrative Law Judge Christopher R. Daniels will be AFFIRMED by separate Judgment entered this date. Signed by Judge Danny C. Reeves on December 14, 2015.(AWD) cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
(at Lexington)
HARLAN B. COOPER,
Plaintiff,
V.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 5: 15-143-DCR

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

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This matter is pending for consideration of cross-motions for summary judgment filed
by Plaintiff Harlan B. Cooper (“Cooper” or “the Claimant”) and Defendant Carolyn W.
Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”). [Record Nos. 11,
12] Cooper argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in concluding that he is
not entitled to a period of disability and disability insurance benefits.

However, the

Commissioner contends that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and
should be affirmed.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant the

Commissioner’s motion and deny the relief requested by Cooper.
I.
On May 7, 2012, Cooper filed an application for a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”). [Administrative
Transcript, “Tr.,” p. 167] He alleged a disability beginning September 16, 2011. [Tr., pp.
20, 43] Cooper, along with attorney Paul F. Guthrie and vocational expert (“VE”) Betty
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Hale, appeared before ALJ Christopher R. Daniels on December 16, 2013, for an
administrative hearing. [Id., pp. 3468] On February 10, 2014, ALJ Daniels found that
Cooper was not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Act. [Id., p. 30] Cooper
appealed the ALJ’s determination to the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council.
However, the council declined the Claimant’s request for review. [Id., p. 1]
Cooper was 37 years-old when his alleged disability began, and 39 years-old at the
time of the ALJ’s decision. [Tr., pp. 42, 190] He has a tenth grade education and previously
worked as a warehouseman, forklift operator, truck driver, and warehouse supervisor. [Id.,
pp. 63, 17279, 190] After considering the testimony presented during the administrative
hearing and reviewing the record, the ALJ concluded that Cooper suffers from three severe
impairments: (i) degenerative joint disease (“DJD”) of the left shoulder; (ii) degenerative
disc disease; and (iii) epilepsy. [Id., p. 22] Notwithstanding these impairments, the ALJ
determined that the Cooper maintained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform
light work, with the following constraints:
standing or walking six hours in an eight-hour workday and sitting six hours in
an eight-hour workday, except the claimant is able to lift or carry no more than
ten pounds occasionally and less than ten pounds frequently, and has the
following additional limitations: no more than frequent balancing and
kneeling; no more than occasional stooping, crouching, crawling, pushing or
pulling with the left upper and lower extremities, or climbing ramps or stairs.
The claimant can tolerate occasional exposure to extreme cold and vibration.
The claimant is limited to occasional reaching overhead with the left upper
extremity, but has no other limits in reaching, handling, fingering or feeling.
The claimant is unable to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and is unable to be
exposed to hazards.
[Tr., p. 25]

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After considering Cooper’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, ALJ Daniels
concluded that the Claimant could perform a significant number of jobs in the national
economy, including: ticket taker, surveillance systems monitor, and nonhazardous security
guard. [Id., pp. 29, 6566] As a result, the ALJ determined that Cooper was not disabled
from September 16, 2011, through the date of the administrative hearing. [Id., p. 29]
II.
Under the Act, a “disability” is defined as “the inability to engage in ‘substantial
gainful activity,’ because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment of at
least one year’s expected duration.” Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 539 (6th
Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).

A claimant’s Social Security disability

determination is made by an ALJ in accordance with “a five-step ‘sequential evaluation
process.’” Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)). If the claimant satisfies the first four steps of the
process, the burden shifts to the Commissioner with respect to the fifth step. See Jones v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003).
A claimant must first demonstrate that he is not engaged in substantial gainful
employment at the time of the disability application. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, the
claimant must show that he suffers from a severe impairment or combination of impairments.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

Third, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful

employment and has a severe impairment which is expected to last for at least twelve months
and which meets or equals a listed impairment, he will be considered disabled without regard
to age, education, and work experience.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).
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Fourth, if the

Commissioner cannot make a determination of disability based on medical evaluations and
current work activity and the claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner will then
review the claimant’s RFC and relevant past work to determine whether he can perform his
past work. If he can, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
Under the fifth step of the analysis, if the claimant’s impairments prevent him from
doing past work, the Commissioner will consider his RFC, age, education, and past work
experience to determine whether he can perform other work. If he cannot perform other
work, the Commissioner will find the claimant disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). The
Commissioner has the burden of proof only on “‘the fifth step, proving that there is work
available in the economy that the claimant can perform.’” White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 312
F. App’x 779, 785 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 391
(6th Cir. 1999)).
Judicial review of the denial of a claim for Social Security benefits is limited to
determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether
the correct legal standards were applied. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241
(6th Cir. 2007). The substantial-evidence standard presupposes that there is a zone of choice
within which decision makers can go either way, without interference from the court.
McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006).

Substantial

evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support
the conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bass v. McMahon, 499
F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007).

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If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed
even if the Court would decide the case differently and even if the claimant’s position is also
supported by substantial evidence. Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 876 (6th Cir.
2007); Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007); Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005); Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993). In other words, the Commissioner’s findings are
conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
III.
A.

Severe Mental Impairment

Cooper first argues that the ALJ erred by failing to classify his alleged depression and
anxiety as severe impairments. [Record No. 11-1, pp. 89] Specifically, Cooper notes that
Dr. Phillis Corbitt rendered an opinion that Cooper was disabled due to physical and mental
limitations. [Tr., p. 33233]

He also highlights consultative examiner (“CE”) Jennifer

Fishkoff’s opinion in August 2012 that Cooper “does not appear to be capable of tolerating
the stress and pressures associated with full time work activity.” [Id., p. 327]
It is the claimant’s burden to prove the severity of his impairments at the second step
of the sequential evaluation process. See Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 391 (6th
Cir. 1999). “An impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it does not
significantly limit [a claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,”
which are the “abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a),
(b). The Sixth Circuit has held that “the severity determination is ‘a de minimis hurdle in the
disability determination process.’” Anthony v. Astrue, 266 F. App’x 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2008)
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(quoting Higgs, v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 862 (6th Cir. 1988)). “[A]n impairment can be
considered not severe only if it is a slight abnormality that minimally affects work ability
regardless of age, education and experience.” Higgs, 880 F.2d at 862. Additionally, the
mere diagnosis of a condition does not thereby establish its severity. Id. at 863.
Once step two is cleared by determining that some severe impairments exist, the ALJ
must then consider a claimant’s “severe and nonsevere impairments in the remaining steps of
the sequential analysis.” Anthony, 266 F. App’x at 457; S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at
*5 (July 2, 1996). “The fact that some of [a claimant’s] impairments were not deemed to be
severe at step two is therefore legally irrelevant.” Anthony, 266 F. App’x at 457.
At step two, the ALJ determined that Cooper suffered from severe impairments,
including DJD of the left shoulder, degenerative disc disease, and epilepsy. [Tr., p. 22]
Consequently, the fact that his depression and anxiety were not deemed to constitute severe
impairments is “legally irrelevant.” Anthony, 266 F. App’x at 457. Additionally, the ALJ
“considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be
accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence” in determining the Claimant’s
RFC. [Id., p. 25] In short, the ALJ’s failure to find that the alleged depression and anxiety
qualified as severe impairments is not reversible error. Riepen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 198
F. App’x 414, 415 (6th Cir. 2006); Maziarz v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 837 F.2d 240,
244 (6th Cir. 1987); Talos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 11-CV-13207, 2012 WL 1392156, at
*8 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2012).

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B.

RFC

Cooper also argues that the ALJ erred in determining his RFC. First, he asserts that
the ALJ failed to properly consider treating and non-treating source opinions concerning his
mental health.

[Record No. 11-1, pp. 23]

Second, he claims that the ALJ erred in

evaluating the opinions of these sources with respect to his physical health. [Id., pp. 911]
Cooper also contends that the ALJ improperly assessed his credibility. [Id., p. 11] However,
after a review of the record, the Court does not find any of Cooper’s arguments to be
persuasive. The ALJ applied the proper legal standard, and his findings are supported by
substantial evidence. Therefore, the Court will affirm the ALJ’s decision.
RFC is “an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical
and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis.” S.S.R. 96-8p,
1996 WL 374184, at *1 (July 2, 1996). The RFC determination is a matter reserved for the
ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). In making this determination, the ALJ considers the
medical evidence, non-medical evidence, and the claimant’s credibility. Coldiron v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 391 F. App’x 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2010). An ALJ’s RFC finding will be upheld
where it is supported by substantial evidence.
1.

Mental Health

The ALJ thoroughly analyzed Cooper’s mental health records. After conducting this
analysis, he accorded “little weight” to treating physician Dr. Corbitt’s opinion because her
conclusions were not supported by objective findings in her treatment records. [Tr., p. 23]
Second, he accorded “[s]ignificant weight” to examining psychologist Fishkoff’s second

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opinion. [Id.] Lastly, he accorded “great weight” to the opinions of State agency reviewing
psychologists. [Id.] Cooper asserts that the ALJ improperly evaluated these opinions.1
a.

Treating Source’s Opinion

Generally, the ALJ must give the treating physician’s opinion controlling weight if it
is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and
is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” in the claimant’s record. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2). However, an “ALJ ‘is not bound by conclusory statements of doctors,
particularly where they are unsupported by detailed objective criteria and documentation.’”
Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 286 (6th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting
Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001)).
In determining the appropriate weight to give a treating physician’s medical opinion,
the ALJ looks to: (i) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of
examination; (ii) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (iii) the supportability of
the opinion; (iv) the consistency of the opinion with regard to the record as a whole; (v)
whether the treating source is a specialist in the area of his or her opinion; and (vi) any other
factors which tend to support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(6).
Here, the ALJ provided a valid reason for discounting Dr. Corbitt’s opinion, noting
that her opinion lacked a basis in objective findings. Kornecky, 572 F.3d at 286; Payne v.

1

Cooper also alleges that the ALJ failed to mention Lexington Clinic treatment records
from April 11 to September 5, 2013. [Record No. 11-1, p. 2] Contrary to this assertion, the ALJ
referred to these records throughout his decision. For instance, the ALJ detailed Cooper’s
substance abuse, the fall that resulted in hemiarthroplasty, the July 2013 left shoulder X-ray, and
the reports of Dr. Marlowe and Dr. Wilkes. [Tr., p. 27, referring to pp. 368, 373, 381, 383] He
also discussed the panic attacks that Cooper reported to Dr. Marlowe. [Id., p. 23, referring to p.
381] Thus, this allegation is unfounded.
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Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F. App’x 109, 11213 (6th Cir. 2010). [Tr., p. 23] Further, Dr.
Corbitt’s records suggested that Cooper’s anxiety and depression resulted from “prescribed
medication” and “withdrawal” from that medication, indicating that the conditions were
temporary in nature. [Id., pp. 23, 301] The ALJ properly discounted Dr. Corbitt’s opinion
based on the fact that Cooper appears to have abused prescription medications while under
Dr. Corbitt’s care. Brasseur v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 525 F. App’x 349, 351 (6th Cir. 2013)
(per curiam) (ALJ did not err in relying on prescription medication abuse for discounting
treating physician’s opinion).
Cooper points to LaRiccia v. Commissioner of Social Security to support his argument
that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Dr. Corbitt’s opinion. 549 F. App’x 377 (6th Cir.
2013). [Record No. 11-1, pp. 58] However, in LaRiccia, the ALJ did not state the weight
assigned to the treating source opinions. Id. at 386. Further, the ALJ in that case did not
provide good reasons for discounting the opinions of treating physicians. Id. Unlike the ALJ
in LaRiccia, ALJ Daniels addressed Dr. Corbitt’s opinion, providing valid reasons for
discounting it. As a result, the ALJ did not err in according little weight to Dr. Corbitt’s
opinion.
b.

Non-treating Psychologists’ Opinions

The weight the ALJ gives to a consultative or State agency reviewing medical
opinion depends on a variety of factors, including whether the source actually treated the
claimant, the supportability of the source’s opinion, consistency of the opinion compared
with the record as a whole, and other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Further, under
S.S.R. 96-6p, opinions of non-treating physicians and psychologists may be entitled to
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greater weight than the opinions of treating sources. 1996 WL 374180, at *3 (July 2, 1996).
There is “no categorical requirement that the non-treating source’s opinion be based on a
‘complete’ or ‘more detailed and comprehensive’ case record.” Helm v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 405 F. App’x 997, 1002 (6th Cir. 2011).
In the present case, the ALJ did not explicitly state his reason for according
“significant weight” to Fishkoff’s January 2013 opinion; however, the ALJ referenced both
Fishkoff’s August 2012 and January 2013 opinions. [Tr., p. 23, referring to pp. 327, 346]
In the August 2012 opinion, Fishkoff found that Cooper’s work abilities were
“compromised,” but in January 2013, she found that Cooper was “capable of tolerating the
stress and pressures associated with day-to-day work activity.” [Compare Tr., p. 327 with p.
346] Because Fishkoff’s August 2012 opinion was based partly on the Claimant’s subjective
complaints, it was entitled to less weight. Tate v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 467 F. App’x 431,
433 (6th Cir. 2012).

Further, the ALJ properly considered the internal consistency of

Fishkoff’s opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3). Moreover, immediately following his
discussion of Fishkoff’s opinion, the ALJ focused on the opinions of the State agency
reviewing psychologists, which supported Fishkoff’s January 2013 findings. [Id., p. 23]
Thus, the ALJ properly considered the consultative examiner’s opinion as it related to the
record as a whole. Id.
Cooper also argues that Fishkoff’s opinion was flawed because it did not include a
review of all his records. [Record No. 11-1, pp. 89] However, the regulations do not
require consultative psychologists to review a claimant’s entire record. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1517; Helm, 405 F. App’x at 1002.
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Next, Cooper takes issue with the fact that the ALJ gave “great weight” to the
opinions of State agency reviewing psychologists Richard Gross and Ann Hess. [Record No.
11-1, p. 11]

For example, Hess concluded that Cooper had normal recall, short-term

memory, and concentration. [Id., p. 92] She also found that he had average abstract
reasoning and judgment. [Id.] Further, Gross concluded that Cooper was “not limited from a
psychological point of view,” based on the fact that Cooper was able to take care of his
children and manage his life. [Id., p. 75]
The ALJ afforded more weight to these psychologists’ opinions because they were
consistent with the “evidence as a whole,” which highlighted the temporary nature of
Cooper’s impairments. [Tr., p. 23] For instance, consultative examiner Owen made record
of Cooper’s withdrawal from Xanax, an anti-anxiety medication. [Id., pp. 351] Moreover,
as noted by the ALJ, Cooper testified that taking Trazodone helped alleviate his depression
and anxiety. [Id., p. 59] Because the ALJ followed 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) in evaluating
the non-treating source opinions, he did not err in determining that Cooper’s anxiety and
depression are consistent with the RFC finding.
2.

Physical Health

Cooper also asserts that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate his physical limitations in
determining his RFC.

In particular, Cooper claims that the ALJ erred by improperly

weighing the opinions of: (i) treating physician Dr. Corbitt; (ii) treating physician Dr. Tibbs;
(iii) consultative examiner Dr. Owen; and (iv) State agency reviewing physician Dr. Lange.
[Record No. 11-1, pp. 912] He also argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating his subjective
complaints. [Id., p. 11]
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a.

Dr. Tibbs

Cooper contends that the ALJ improperly discounted treating physician Dr. Phillip
Tibbs’ opinion that Cooper is “disabled for a combination of lumbar degenerative disc
disease and left shoulder replacement.” [Record No. 11-1, p. 3, referring to Tr., p. 309] As
noted by the Commissioner and the ALJ, a determination that the Claimant is “disabled” is
not a medical opinion; rather, it is an administrative finding reserved for the ALJ. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d). [Tr., p. 28] Thus, the ALJ properly rejected this opinion. Bass v. McMahon,
499 F.3d 506, 51112 (6th Cir. 2007).
Further, Dr. Tibbs’ opinion was not supported by his findings. For instance, Dr.
Tibbs found that Cooper’s cranial nerves were intact, he had manual muscle testing of 5/5,
and he performed a negative straight leg raise. [Id., p. 309]

Consequently, Dr. Tibbs’

opinion was not entitled to controlling weight.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
b.

Dr. Corbitt

The Claimant also argues that the ALJ erred in giving “[l]ittle weight” to treating
physician Dr. Corbitt’s opinions regarding Cooper’s physical limitations. [Record No. 11-1,
p. 4, referring to Tr., p. 28] Specifically, Dr. Corbitt advised that Cooper could lift no more
than four pounds occasionally and sit only two to three hours in an eight-hour day. [Tr., p.
33233] The ALJ accorded less weight to this opinion because it was “based primarily on
the [C]laimant’s report.” [Id., p. 28] For example, the ALJ noted that in response to one of
the assessment’s questions, Dr. Corbitt wrote, “Claims he can’t.” [Id., referring to p. 333]
The ALJ also noted the limited nature of Dr. Corbitt’s treatment notes and the fact that she
failed to provide findings that supported her conclusions.
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[Id., p. 28, referring to pp.

33135] Moreover, he recorded that Dr. Corbitt’s opinion was not consistent with the record
as a whole. [Id., p. 28]
The ALJ’s stated reasons for discounting Dr. Corbitt’s opinion are valid. First, the
ALJ was not required to give controlling weight to an opinion based on the Claimant’s
subjective complaints. Tate v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 467 F. App’x 431, 433 (6th Cir. 2012).
Second, he was permitted to discredit the opinion because it was not supported by the
physician’s own objective findings. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3). [Tr., p. 309] Finally, Dr.
Corbitt’s opinion was further discredited by other medical opinions and Cooper’s own report.
For example, a State agency reviewing physician found that Cooper could perform light
work. [Id., p. 94] And two months after Dr. Corbitt formed her opinion, the Claimant
reported that he continued to engage in hobbies, such as playing basketball and hunting. [Id.,
p. 344]
In commenting on the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Corbitt, Cooper appears to argue that
the ALJ placed too little emphasis on records of a seizure occurring in May 2013. [Record
No. 11-1, p. 3] However, the ALJ discussed these records in detail. For instance, the ALJ
noted that Cooper lost consciousness during the seizure, but that he had no focal motor
activity or incontinence. [Tr., pp. 27, 374] Further, ALJ Daniels reasoned that the seizures
had little effect on the Claimant’s ability to work because of their infrequency and ability to
be controlled by medication.

[Id., pp. 27, 364]

Even though this seizure resulted in

increased pain in Cooper’s left shoulder, the ALJ properly noted that Cooper informed Dr.
Marlowe in September 2013 that he was doing “pretty well” with the pain in his shoulder.
[Id., pp. 27, 381] Thus, the ALJ adequately assessed the seizure records. Dawson v.
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Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 468 F. App’x 510, 513 (6th Cir. 2012) (ALJ did not err in according
less weight to the opinions of treating physicians because the overall record indicated that the
claimant’s seizures were infrequent).
Because the ALJ provided several good reasons for discounting Dr. Corbitt’s opinion,
he did not err. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001).
c.

Consultative Examiner Owen

Next, Cooper alleges that the ALJ improperly accorded “[g]reat weight” to
consultative examiner Dr. James C. Owen’s opinion. [Record No. 11-1, p. 10, referring to
Tr., p. 28] Dr. Owen concluded that the Claimant “would have moderate-to-severe difficulty
lifting, handling, and carrying objects.” [Tr., p. 351] The ALJ’s stated reason for giving
more weight to Dr. Owen’s opinion was that it was “consistent with the record as a whole.”
[Id., p. 28] The ALJ also noted that Dr. Owen’s own medical findings supported his
conclusion. [Id., p. 27]
The ALJ properly evaluated Dr. Owen’s opinion by comparing it with the objective
medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4). For example, immediately before discussing
Dr. Owen’s opinion, the ALJ noted that the Claimant had normal muscle testing and negative
straight leg raising in May 2012. See Brooks v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 531 F. App’x 636, 642
(6th Cir. 2013) (before giving more weight to a non-examining source opinion, ALJ should
consider other medical findings). [Id., p. 27, referring to p. 309] In addition, Dr. Owen
found that Cooper had normal strength, sensation, and coordination, except for Cooper’s heel
walk on the left side, which was a 4/5. [Id., referring to p. 351] Regarding Cooper’s
shoulder, the ALJ recorded that X-rays in July 2013 failed to reveal any dislocation or
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fracture. [Id., referring to p. 373] Moreover, Cooper reported in September 2013 that he
was “doing pretty well with the pain of his shoulder.” [Id., referring to p. 381] Because Dr.
Owen’s conclusion was internally consistent and supported by the record as a whole, the ALJ
did not err in according it great weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3)(4).
d.

State Agency Reviewing Physician Dr. Lange

Cooper also contends that the ALJ improperly accorded “[s]ignificant weight” to the
opinion of State agency reviewing physician Amanda Lange. [Record No. 11-1, p. 10] The
ALJ only assessed Dr. Lange’s opinion after thoroughly reviewing the objective medical
evidence and the opinions of the treating physicians and consultative examiner. [Tr., p. 28]
As a result, he only utilized Dr. Lange’s opinion to support his RFC finding. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(3).
As the Commissioner notes, Dr. Lange’s opinion was consistent with the findings of
Dr. Owen, Dr. Harned, and Dr. Grider. [Record No. 12, p. 13] For instance,  Dr. Grider
determined that Cooper had intact strength in his bilateral lower extremities, though Grider
noted knee and Achilles issues. [Tr., p. 273] In fact, at his appointment with Dr. Grider,
Cooper stated that his back and lower leg pain had improved. Further, Dr. Harned noted that
Cooper’s cranial nerves were intact, he had a normal gait, and his lumbar spine had full
extension. [Id., p. 366] While Dr. Owen found that Cooper had significant limitations, he
did not conclude that they were disabling. [Id., p. 351]
Dr. Lange’s RFC opinion took into account Cooper’s exertional and postural
limitations. For instance, Dr. Lange advised that the Claimant could only walk or sit for six
hours in an eight-hour workday. [Id., p. 94] In addition, he imposed limitations on Cooper’s
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ability to climb, stoop, kneel, push, and pull. [Id.] The ALJ limited Cooper even further
than Dr. Lange, which demonstrates that he compared Dr. Lange’s opinion with the record as
a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4). [Id., p. 28]
e.

Subjective Complaints

Cooper seems to argue that the ALJ unreasonably evaluated his credibility. [Record
No. 11-1, p. 11] When an ALJ makes a determination regarding a claimant’s credibility, he
is entitled to great deference because he is able to “observe the claimant and judge [his]
subjective complaints.” Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001). However, an
ALJ who rejects a claimant’s testimony must clearly state his reasons. Felisky v. Bowen, 35
F.3d 1027, 1036 (6th Cir. 1994).
The Sixth Circuit applies a two-prong test for evaluating subjective allegations. First,
the court examines whether objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged
pain arising from the condition. Hash v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 309 F. App’x 981, 990 (6th
Cir. 2009). Second, it examines whether the medical condition can reasonably be expected
to produce the alleged disabling pain. Id.
The ALJ followed this test, finding that (1) Cooper was credible regarding the nature
of his impairments, and (2) his impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the
alleged symptoms. [Tr., p. 26] However, he did not find Cooper’s statements concerning the
“intensity, persistence and limiting effects” to be credible. [Id.] The ALJ noted that Cooper
discontinued physical therapy, even though the first three sessions showed improvement and
his prognosis was considered “excellent.” See Dewberry v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
811 F.2d 604, 1986 WL 16087, *2 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding claimant’s testimony not to be
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credible where he did not regularly follow through with physical therapy treatments). [Id.,
referring to pp. 27172] Second, the ALJ reasoned that some of the objective medical
evidence contradicted Cooper’s allegations. 20 C.F.R. § 1529(c)(4); Cruse v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 543 (6th Cir. 2007). [Id., p. 27, referring to pp. 311, 366]
Additionally, the ALJ described Cooper’s apparent abuse of prescribed narcotic
medications, which suggests that Cooper had ulterior motives for complaining to physicians
about his pain. [Id., p. 27, referring to p. 369] Finally, the ALJ reasoned that Cooper’s own
statements regarding his daily activities contradicted his allegations of disabling pain. [Id., p.
27] For example, the Claimant testified that he could walk 700 yards, stand for an hour, and
perform light chores around the house. [Id., pp. 52, 57] He also testified that he looked for
other employment opportunities. [Id., p. 10] Because the ALJ is entitled to deference in his
credibility determinations, and because he explained the discrepancies between Cooper’s
subjective complaints and the record as a whole, he did not err in according little weight to
Cooper’s statements. Cruse, 502 F.3d at 543.
IV.
ALJ Daniels did not err in his assessment of the Claimant’s physical and mental
impairments and his corresponding RFC determination was supported by substantial
evidence. He properly evaluated the opinions of Cooper’s treating and non-treating sources,
as well as Cooper’s own credibility.

Further, substantial evidence supports the

Commissioner’s determination. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:

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1.

Plaintiff Harlan B. Cooper’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Record No. 11]

is DENIED.
2.

Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Record No.

12] is GRANTED.
3.

The decision of Administrative Law Judge Christopher R. Daniels will be

AFFIRMED by separate Judgment entered this date.
This 14th day of December, 2015.

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