Daniels v. Bates et al

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) pla's 1983 claim for monetary damages against dfts Steve Haney, Warden & Duncan Kendal, Chairman, Adjustment Committee are DISMISSED; (2) pla's claims against dfts, Steve Haney,Warden; Duncan Kendal, Chair man, Adjustment Committee & Sergeant Johnny Bates are DISMISSED for pla's failure to establish a viable constitutional claim against them under 1983; (3) all claims against all dfts having been resolved, this action is DISMISSED & STRICKEN from the docket; (4) judgment will be entered. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 10/28/15.(KJR)cc: COR, Daniels (US Mail)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
LEXINGTON

JOHN LARRY DANIELS,
Plaintiff,
V.
JOHNNY BATES, CORR. SGT., et
al.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 5:15-CV-156-JMH

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

Defendants.
****

****

****

****

John L. Daniels is in custody of the Kentucky Department of
Corrections (“KDOC”) and is presently confined in the Northpoint
Training Center (“NTC”) in Burgin, Kentucky.

Proceeding pro se,

Daniels has filed a complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
amended by virtue of his Motion Requesting Leave with Permission
to Amend [DE 5], alleging constitutional violations in respect
to a disciplinary charge and conviction he received while he was
confined at Blackburn Correctional Complex (“BCC”) located in
Lexington, Kentucky.

Daniels has named as defendants Johnny

Bates, Sargent, BCC, in his individual capacity; Duncan Kendall,
individually and in his official capacity as Chairman of the
Adjustment Committee, BCC; and Steve Haney, individually and in

1

his official capacity as Warden, BCC.

[R. 1].

Daniels seeks

compensatory and punitive damages.
The Court must conduct a preliminary review of Daniels’

complaint because he has been granted permission to proceed in
forma

pauperis

and

because

government officials.

he

asserts

claims

against

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A.

A

district court must dismiss any claim that is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.

McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d

601, 607-08 (6th Cir. 1997).

The Court evaluates Daniels’

complaint under a more lenient standard because he is not
represented by an attorney.

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007); Burton v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir. 2003).
At this stage, the Court accepts his factual allegations as
true and liberally construes his legal claims in his favor.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 1, 2015, during a conversation Daniels had with
BCC

Sargent

Johnny

Bates,

Daniels

made

statements

leading

Bates to conclude that Daniels, formerly a grievance aide at
BCC,

was

indebted

to

other

inmates
2

in

his

prison

dorm

regarding grievances he had filed on their behalf or not filed
on

their

behalf,

depending

grievance was meritorious.

on

whether

Daniels

thought

a

Based on this conclusion reached

by Bates, he issued a disciplinary report against Daniels for
being indebted to other inmates.

[R. 1-5, p. 5].

Following

the investigation of this disciplinary report, Daniels was
charged

with

“5-04-Loan

debts,” a major offense.

sharking,
Id.

collecting

or

incurring

Daniels pled not guilty to the

offense, requested to be heard by a Hearing Officer, waived
the

24-hour

hearing.

notice,

and

waived

an

Adjustment

Committee

Id.

Inmate

Legal

assist Daniels.

Aide

Michael

Whitehead

was

assigned

to

He and Daniels appeared before a Hearing

Officer, Duncan J. Kendall, Chairman, Adjustment Committee, on
this

offense;

1:10:30 p.m.

the

hearing

was

held

[R. 1-5, pp. 7-8].

on

April

1,

2015,

at

Hearing Officer Kendall

considered the investigation report of Sgt. Daniels and that
Sgt. Daniels confirmed the report as true and accurate during
the investigation.

[R. 1-5, p. 7].

At the conclusion of the

hearing, Officer Kendall found Daniels guilty of the charged

3

offense, loan sharking, collecting or incurring debts.

He

explained the basis for his findings, as follows:
During the hearing, Inmate Daniels stated that
he wrote the statement, but stated that it was
taken out of context, and denied owing money
to other inmates, and stated that other
inmates, and stated that other inmates felt
that he owed them because he would not file
their grievances on non-grievable incidents.
Inmate
Daniels
stated
that
the
report
misrepresents what he was trying to say.
Due to the report from Sgt. Bates that he
confirmed as true and accurate during the
investigation,
and
the
submitted
written
occurrence
report
from
inmate
Daniels
admitting that he is in debt to several
inmates, I do find inmate guilty of the
category 5-04.
[R. 1-5, p. 7].
Daniels was sanctioned with the loss of 90 days Good Time
Credit on his sentence.

[R. 1-5, p. 8].

Daniels appealed

this disciplinary conviction to BCC Warden, Steve Haney.

On

May 8, 2015, Warden Haney voided the incident and dismissed
the conviction.
dismissal

of

Id.

this

Thus, Daniels has been made whole by the
conviction

and

the

restoration

of

the

forfeited 90 days of Good Time credit.
DISCUSSION
To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege
and show: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the

4

Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state
law.

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) (overruled in

part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986)); Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155–56 (1978); Black v. Barberton
Citizens Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir.1998).

Both parts

of this two-part test must be satisfied to support a claim under
§

1983.

See

Christy

v.

Randlett,

932

F.2d

502,

504

(6th

Cir.1991).

Daniels claims that Sgt. Bates retaliated against him for
filing of grievances on behalf of other inmates, an activity
Daniels asserts is protected by the First Amendment.

Daniels

also claims that the defendants retaliated against him, in
violation

of

the

First

another institution.

Amendment,

by

transferring

him

to

Liberally construing his complaint, it

appears that plaintiff’s claims are confined to claims arising
solely

under

federal

law

and

that

plaintiff’s

complaint

contains no state law claims.
A.

Claims Against Defendants in their Official Capacities
Daniels has sued defendant Duncan Kendall and Steve Haney,

both individually and in their respective official capacities as
government

officials.

If

the

plaintiff
5

seeks

only

monetary

relief, the defendants are not subject to suit for money damages
in their official capacity because government officials sued for
damages in their official capacity are absolutely immune from
liability

under

Constitution.

the

Eleventh

Amendment

to

the

United

States

Will v. Mich. Dep't. of State Police, 491 U.S.

58, 70-71 (1989); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169(1985).
A state, its agencies, and its officials sued in their official
capacities for monetary damages are not considered persons for
purposes of § 1983 or a constitutional claim.

Id.; see also

Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994).
Thus,
against

the

official-capacity

defendants

Duncan

claims

Kendall

and

for

monetary

Steve

Haney

damages
will

be

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

B.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (ii).

Claims Against Defendants in their Individual Capacities
1.

Steve Haney, Warden

Daniels has named Steve Haney, Warden, as a defendant;
however, he does not state what actions Steve Haney took or
identify

any

conduct

by

Steve

Haney

that

violated

his

constitutional rights other than suggesting that he failed to
train his officers not to “issue reprisal[s] or issue [f]alse
[r]ep[or]ts”.

[DE 5 at 3.]

The Court is not persuaded that

6

this is a colorable constitutional claim since he does not
suggest

that

Haney

directed,

instructed,

or

otherwise

permitted his employees to take the actions of which Daniels
complains.

Further, when Daniels appealed his disciplinary

conviction to Warden Haney, the warden voided the incident and
dismissed the charge against Daniels, an action favorable to
Daniels.
Steve

[R. 1-5, p. 8].

Haney

as

a

Thus, it appears that Daniels named

defendant

solely

due

to

his

supervisory

position as Warden at the prison and not for any action or
inaction that he undertook with respect to the wrongs of which
he complains.
It is well settled that a supervisor is not liable under
§ 1983 solely because of his being in a supervisory position.
In

other

entail

words,

being

a

§

1983;

liability

supervisor is required.

supervisor
personal

does

not

automatically

involvement

of

that

See Hays v. Jefferson, 668 F.2d 869,

872 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833 (1982) (“The law is
clear that liability of supervisory personnel must be based on
more

than

supervisor’s

merely

the

liability

right
must

to
be

control
premised

employees.”).
upon

personal involvement in the conduct complained of.

7

direct

A
or

Leach v.

Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989).
See also, Carrie v. Rios, 08-CV-13-KKC, 2008 WL 320329, at *2
(E.D.

Ky.

Feb.

4,

2008)

(supervisor

must

“have

at

least

implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in
the unconstitutional conduct”).
While

Daniels

named

Steve

Haney,

Warden,

in

the

Complaint, he did not allege that Warden Haney was directly
involved

in,

knowingly
alleged

encouraged,

acquiesced

in,

unconstitutional

employees.

Hays,

implicitly

authorized,

or

way

in

any

conduct

supra.

of

Therefore,

approved,

orchestrated

any

other

Daniels’

the

prison

complaint

against Steve Haney, Warden, will be dismissed because Daniels
has failed to state a claim against him for which relief can
be granted.
2.

Duncan Kendal, Chairman, Adjustment Committee

Daniels
Committee

as

has
a

named

Duncan

defendant.

Kendal,

Duncan

Chairman,

Kendal

was

Adjustment
the

hearing

officer who heard the disciplinary offense charged against
Daniels for loan sharking/collecting or incurring debts from
the

inmates.

Duncan

Kendal

found

Daniels

guilty

of

that

offense, and sanctioned him with the loss of 90 days Good Time

8

credit.

[R.

Daniels’

claim,

Adjustment

1-5,

p.

he

8]

In

the

states:

Committee

and

“I

Found

narrative
was

statement

then

Guilty

taken

by

Officer

to

of
the

Duncan

Kendal, on April 1, 2015, and 90 GTL was issued and placed in
Seg Unit, for a day.”

[R. 1, p. 5].

Outside of Kendal’s

conduct as the hearing officer, Daniels does not state what
actions Duncan Kendal took or identify any other conduct by
Kendal that violated his constitutional rights.
Clearly, Duncan Kendal was not involved in the issuance
of

the

charging

subject
him

disciplinary

with

the

loan

report

against

Daniels

sharking/indebtedness

and

offense.

Duncan Kendal was simply the hearing officer who heard the
evidence and made the decision that Daniels was guilty of the
charged offense.

As the hearing officer/judge in this matter,

the Court concludes that Duncan Kendal is immune from Daniels’
claims because as the judicial officer who heard the charge,
weighed the evidence, and made a decision on the evidence
before him, Kendal is entitled to judicial immunity, similar
to any judges in a state or federal prosecution acting in
their judicial capacity.

“It is well established that judges

are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from suits for money
damages for all actions taken in the judge’s judicial capacity,

9

unless these actions are taken in the complete absence of any
jurisdiction.”
(citing

Mireles

Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994)
v.

Waco,

502

U.S.

9

(1991)

(per

curiam)).

Daniels’ claim against Duncan Kendal is premised upon actions he
took when performing his role as judge/hearing officer, and thus
falls

squarely

within

the

scope

of

this

immunity.

Rose

v.

Leaver, 25 F. App’x 191, 192 (6th Cir. 2002).
3.

Johnny Bates, Sergeant

According to Daniels, on April 1, 2015, he went to the
Security Office at BCC to report a conflict he was experiencing
with a previous co-worker, an inmate named Reedy, who replaced
him as an Inmate Grievance Aide, and with other inmates in his
dorm who were disgruntled with Daniels for the manner in which
he had performed or not performed his job when he was an Inmate
Grievance

Aide

at

BCC.

Based

on

these

requested to be placed in Protective Custody.

conflicts,

Daniels

Daniels explained

the situation to Sgt. Bates, telling him that certain inmates in
his dorm were mad at him for not filing certain grievances that
they thought he should have filed on their behalf and/or not
filed appeals concerning a grievance disposition.

During the

course of this conversation, Daniels indicated to Bates that he
owed a few inmates for not carrying out their grievance work.

10

[R. 1, p. 4].

However, Daniels states that he did not state

that he owed any money to these disgruntled inmates.1

Id.

Based

on this conversation, Sgt. Bates issued a disciplinary report
against
inmates.

Daniels,
[R.

charging
1-5,

p.

him

with

5].

This

being
report

indebted
was

to

other

reviewed

by

Correctional Sgt. Daniel C. George, who charged Daniels with “504 Loan sharking, collecting or incurring debts,” id., for which
he was convicted and sanctioned with 90 days of forfeited Good
Time.

[R. 1-5, p. 8].
Based on the written report of Daniels that he submitted to

Sgt. Bates, and then later withdrew, that he owned money to

1

 Daniels’ statement in his complaint is refuted by the Report of

Investigating Officer Daniel C. George, who reviewed this matter
and reported:
I read the above report of I/M Daniels #086174 and
advised him of his rights. I/M Daniels states that he
didn’t occur [sic] any debt and didn’t want to add any
further comment. I asked if he wrote the statement
attached? He stated yes. I asked why he said he owed
money to other inmates? He said he takes his report
back. I spoke with Sgt. Bates and he states the above
report is true and accurate.
[R. 1-5, p. 5].

11

other

inmates,

reasonable

the

basis

Court

for

concludes

issuing

a

that

Sgt.

disciplinary

Bates

report

had

a

against

Daniels for incurring indebtedness to other inmates at BCC.

The

reviewing officer, Sgt. Daniel George, agreed with Sgt. Bates’
assessment and charged Daniels with the “loan sharking” offense.
Given the reasonable basis for Sgt. Bates’ decision to issue a
disciplinary report against Daniels, the Court concludes that
he,

as

a

state

prison

official,

is

entitled

to

qualified

immunity from suit, the same qualified immunity to which federal
officials are entitled in like circumstances.
In
Supreme

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), the
Court

held

that

federal

officials

are

entitled

to

qualified immunity from suit for violations of constitutional
rights

insofar

as

established law.

their

conduct

does

not

violate

clearly

As long as there is a "legitimate question"

about the constitutionality of particular conduct, "it cannot be
said that . . . such conduct violates clearly established law."
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
right

complained

reasonable

of

official

violates that right.”

“must

would

be

sufficiently

understand

that

The scope of the
clear

what

he

that
is

doing

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

12

a

(1987). this standard ensures that government officials are on
notice

of

the

legality

subjected to a lawsuit.

of

their

conduct

before

they

are

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206

(2001).
The Sixth Circuit has analyzed claims of qualified immunity
in

three

steps:

first,

the

court

determines

whether

a

constitutional violation occurred; second, the court determines
whether the right that was violated was a clearly established
right of which a reasonable person would have known; and third,
the

court

plaintiff

must
is

decide

sufficient

whether
to

the

evidence

demonstrate

that

offered
the

by

the

official’s

conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly
established right.
Cir. 1999);
2003).

See

Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 691 (6th

Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 338 F.3d 535 (6th Cir.
also,

Pearson

v.

Callahan,

555

U.S.

223

(2009)

(holding that procedure sequence set forth in Saucier was often
appropriate, but not mandatory).
In the present case, as previously explained above, Sgt.
Bates clearly had a reasonable basis for issuing a disciplinary
report against Daniels.
qualified

immunity

from

Therefore, Sgt. Bates is entitled to
suit,

and

Daniels

has

failed

to

establish a claim that Sgt. Bates violated his First Amendment

13

rights.
also

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Pearson, 555 U.S. 223.

Goudlock

v.

Hernandez,

No.

08-CV-204-BEN(RBB),

2009

See
WL

2982825 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009).
D.

Transfer to Northpoint Training Center
On or about April 1, 2015, Daniels was transferred from BCC

to

NTC.

Daniels

claims

that

his

transfer

was

done

in

retaliation for his exercising his First Amendment right to file
grievances.

It is well settled that a prisoner has no entitlement
protected

by

due

process

to

a

particular

security

classification or to be incarcerated in a particular facility,
or any particular area of a prison.

See Moody v. Daggett, 429

U.S. at 88 n. 9 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224, 96
S. Ct. 2532 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96
S. Ct. 2543 (1976); Marchesani v. McCune, 531 F.2d 459 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976) (inmates have neither
protected

liberty

interests

nor

property

of

prisoners

interests

in

custodial classification).
In

Kentucky,

the

discretion of the KDOC.

transfer

is

Ky.Rev.Stat. § 197.065.

within

the

Irrespective

of Daniels’ claim that his transfer to NTC was retaliatory in
nature, the law is clear that inmates have no constitutional

14

right to be incarcerated in any particular institution or a
particular part of an institution unless the state has created
a liberty interest in remaining at a particular institution.
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245–48 (1983); Montanye v.
Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215, 223–229 (1976); Beard v. Livesay, 798 F.2d 874, 876 (6th
Cir.1986).
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that a
prison transfer is generally not a sufficiently adverse action
to

deter

a

person

of

protected conduct.

ordinary

firmness

from

engaging

in

Jewell v. Leroux, 20 F. App'x 375 (6th

Cir.2001) (A transfer to the general population of another
prison is not considered sufficiently adverse.); Geiger v.
Prison Realty Trust, Inc., 13 F. App'x 313 (6th Cir.2001) (The
prisoner

failed

to

allege

that

his

transfer

to

another

institution prevented or deterred him from continuing to write
grievances and file lawsuits.); Friedman v. Corr. Corp. of
Am.,

11

F.

App'x

467

(6th

Cir.2001)

(Transfer

to

another

institution that was farther away from those who visited him
and

did

not

offer

the

programs

in

which

he

previously

participated was not an “adverse action” for purposes of a

15

retaliation claim.); Goddard v. Ky. Dep't of Corr., 2000 WL
191758 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000) (The transfer of an inmate to
the general population of another prison is not considered
sufficiently adverse.).
Further, the courts are ever cautioned to stay out of the
business of micro-managing prisons.

See Bell v. Wolfish, 441

U.S. 520 (1979); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); and
Turney v. Scroggy, 831 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1987).

The Supreme

Court has explicitly rejected heightened judicial scrutiny of
prison

policies.

Rigorous

scrutiny,

the

Court

noted,

is

simply “not appropriate for consideration of regulations that
are

centrally

concerned

with

security within prisons.”

the

maintenance

of

order

and

Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,

409-10, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989).

“Subjecting the day-to-day

judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny
analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate
security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the
intractable problems of prison administration.”
Safley, 482 U.S. at 89.
wide-ranging

deference

Turner v.

Prison officials “should be accorded
in

the

adoption

and

execution

of

policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to

16

preserve

internal

order

and

institutional security.”

discipline

and

to

maintain

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 562.
CONCLUSION

Having conducted the initial screening required by 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A, and all claims being resolved,
this action is subject to dismissal for plaintiff’s failure to
state a claim for which relief can be granted.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff

John

Larry

Daniels’

§

1983

claims

for

monetary damages against defendants, Steve Haney, Warden, and
Duncan Kendal, Chairman, Adjustment Committee, in their official
capacity

are

barred

by

the

Eleventh

Amendment

and

are

DISMISSED.
2.
Warden;

Plaintiff’s claims against defendants, Steve Haney,
Duncan

Kendal,

Sergeant

Johnny

monetary

damages

Bates,
are

Chairman,
in

Adjustment

their

DISMISSED

individual
for

Committee;

and

capacitites

for

plaintiff’s

failure

to

establish a viable constitutional claim against them under §
1983.
3.

resolved,

All
this

claims
action

against
is

all

DISMISSED

docket.

17

Defendants
and

having

STRICKEN

from

been
the

4.

Judgment will be entered contemporaneously with this

Memorandum Opinion and Order in favor of the defendants.
This 28th day of October, 2015.

18