Simmons v. SSA
Filing
11
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Pla's 9 Motion for Summary Judgment is OVERRULED and Dft's 10 Motion for Summary Judgment is SUSTAINED. A judgment in favor of the Dft will be entered contemporaneously herewith. Signed by Judge Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr on September 14, 2016. (AWD) cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
at LEXINGTON
Civil Action No. 15-178-HRW
WYNIMA SIMMONS,
v.
PLAINTIFF,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
CAROLYN COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
DEFENDANT.
Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g) to challenge a final
decision of the Defendant denying Plaintiffs application for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income benefits. The Court having reviewed the record in this case and
the dispositive motions filed by the parties, and being otherwise sufficiently advised, for the
reasons set forth herein, finds that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is suppo1ied by
substantial evidence and should be affirmed.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed her current application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income benefits on July 25, 2012, alleging disability beginning on July 13, 2012, due to
degenerative disc disease, diabetes, art!U"itis in right hip and asthma (Tr. 188). This application
was denied initially and on reconsideration. Thereafter, upon request by Plaintiff, an
administrative hearing was conducted by Administrative Law Judge Karen Jackson (hereinafter
"ALJ"), wherein Plaintiff, accompanied by counsel, testified. At the hearing, Joyce P. Forrest, a
vocational expe1i (hereinafter "VE"), also testified.
At the hearing, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, the ALJ performed the following fivestep sequential analysis in order to determine whether the Plaintiff was disabled:
Step 1: If the claimant is performing substantial gainful work, he is not disabled.
Step 2: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work, his impairment(s) must
be severe before he can be found to be disabled based upon the requirements in 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(b).
Step 3: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work and has a severe
impairment (or impairments) that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period
of at least twelve months, and his impairments (or impairments) meets or medically
equals a listed impairment contained in Appendix 1, Subpmi P, Regulation No. 4, the
claimant is disabled without further inquity.
Step 4: If the claimant's impairment (or impairments) does not prevent him from doing
his past relevant work, he is not disabled.
Step 5: Even ifthe claimant's impairment or impairments prevent him from performing
his past relevant work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national
economy that accommodates his residual functional capacity and vocational factors, he is
not disabled.
The ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled (Tr. 13-24). Plaintiff
was 4 3 years old at the time she allegedly became disabled. She has a high school education as
we as two years of college; her past relevant work includes employment as an inspector,
machinist, clerical worker and financial aid advisor (Tr. 189).
At Step 1 of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability (Tr.15).
The ALJ then determined, at Step 2, that Plaintiff suffers from back pain secondmy to
degenerative disc disease lumbar spine, insulin dependent diabetes mellitus with peripheral
neuropathy, asthma and obesity, which she found to be "severe" within the meaning of the
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Regulations (Tr. 15-16).
At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiffs impairments did not meet or medically equal any
of the listed impairments (Tr. 16-18).
Finally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to do sedentmy
exertion work with additional postural and environmental limitations, including her past relevant
work as a financial aid advisor and the representative sedentary exertion positions of clerical
worker, handpacker/laborer, and bench assembler, existing in significant numbers in the national
economy
Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff not to be disabled at Steps 4 and 5 of the sequential
evaluation process.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review and adopted the ALJ's decision
as the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff thereafter filed this civil action seeking a
reversal of the Commissioner's decision. Both parties have filed Motions for Summary
Judgment [Docket Nos. 9 and I OJ and this matter is ripe for decision.
II. ANALYSIS
The essential issue on appeal to this Comi is whether the ALJ' s decision is supported by
substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence" is defined as "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to suppoti a conclusion;" it is based on the record as a
whole and must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Garner
v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6'11 Cir. 1984). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by
substantial evidence, the reviewing Court must affirm. Kirk v. Secretary ofHealth and Human
Services, 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6'11 Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). "The court may
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not try the case de novo nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility."
Bradley v. Secretary ofHealth and Human Services, 862 F.2d 1224, 1228 (6'h Cir. 1988).
Finally, this Court must defer to the Commissioner's decision "even ifthere is substantial
evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion, so long as substantial
evidence supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ." Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th
Cir.1997).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ' s finding of no disability is erroneous because the ALJ
failed to properly evaluate the medical source opinions.
"In order to determine whether the ALJ acted properly in disagreeing with a medical
source, we must first determine the medical source's classification," Ealy v. Comm'r a/Soc. Sec.,
594 F.3d 504, 514 (6th Cir.2010), as "not all medical sources need be treated equally," Smith v.
Comm'r ofSoc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 875 (6th Cir.2007). The Social Security regulations classify
"acceptable medical sources into three types: nonexamining sources, nontreating (but examining)
sources, and treating sources." Id. at 875. Generally, more weight is given to the medical
"opinion of a source who has examined [the claimant] than to the opinion of a source who has
not examined [the claimant]." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(l); see also Norris v. Comm'r a/Soc.
Sec., 461 Fed.Appx. 433, 439 (6th Cir.2012) (noting that a nonexamining source's opinion is
given less deference than an examining (but not treating) source's opinion, which is given less
deference than a treating source). But "[i]n appropriate circumstances, opinions from State
agency medical and psychological consultants ... may be entitled to greater weight than the
opinions of treating or examining sources." SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *3. One such
instance is where the "[s]tate agency medical or psychological consultant's opinion is based on a
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review of a complete case record that includes a medical report from a specialist in the
individual's particular impairment which provides more detailed and comprehensive information
than what was available to the individual's treating source." Id "The more a medical source
presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory
findings, the more weight [the ALJ] will give that opinion." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3).
Generally, more weight is given to opinions that are "more consistent ... with the record as a
whole," id.§ 404.1527(c)(4), and opinions of"a specialist about medical issues related to his or
her area of specialty." Id.§ 404.1527(c)(5).
The opinion which Plaintiff asse1is was not properly considered is that of Vinod
Muniswamy, M.D, a examining consultative physician. In his notes, which are pati of the record,
he states Plaintiff presented as obese and well-nourished. Dr. Muniswamy fmiher noted Plaintiff
was not in acute distress but did shift position in the seat during the examination due to right hip
pain (Tr. 343). Dr. Muniswamy's physical examination revealed normal respiratory and
cardiovascular findings, with the musculoskeletal exam revealing no atrophy, structural
deformity, effusion, swelling, or tenderness of any joint with exception of the right hip and the
lumbar spine at L5-S 1. Dr. Muniswamy noted that although Plaintiff was unable to stand
unassisted from a seat, she was able to bend without difficulty. Plaintiff also demonstrated
normal 5/5 strength with adequate fine motor movements and dexterity, and was able to grasp
objects bilaterally. Further, Plaintiffs extremities were not subject to edema, cyanosis, or
erythema. Dr. Muniswamy noted Plaintiffs subjective complaints, but further noted that a
neurological examination revealed no evidence of weakness with good tone, normal 5/5 strength
bilaterally in all muscle groups and normal reflexes (Tr. 344). Notwithstanding his relatively
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benign objective findings and somewhat inarticulate conclusion, it appears that he opined that
Plaintiff would be subject to significant limitations in sitting, walking, standing, and
lifting/carrying objects, secondary to her subjective complaints of pain (Tr. 344). Also
notwithstanding his relatively benign objective findings, Dr. Muniswamy submitted an associated
medical source statement as to Plaintiffs ability to do work-related physical activities containing
vety restrictive limitations including, no ability to lift/carry any weights, and sit no more than one
hour, or stand and walk no more than 30 minutes in an 8-hour day (Tr. 346-351 ).
In her decision, the ALJ discussed the findings and opinions of several medical sources,
including that of Dr. Muniswamy. Indeed, the ALJ stated that "great weight" was given to Dr,
Muniswamy' s opinions with the exception of his suggestion that Plaintiff "should never lift
weights, only 15 for 15 minutes at a time and for a total of one hour per day and stand I walk for
only thirty minutes per day" (Tr. 21). The ALJ found these dire restrictions to be at odds with
other medical evidence in the record, including the findings of her treating physicians, Hany
Lockstatdt, M.D. and Erin Stephens, M.D., as well as Plaintiffs own testimony.
To the extent that Plaintiff suggests that this evidence is open to another interpretation that
favors her claim, the Court declines to reweigh the evidence in this fashion. If the Commissioner's
decision denying benefits is supported by substantial evidence, as it is here, the Court must affirm
that decision. Longworth v. Commissioner a/Social Security, 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6'h Cir. 2005).
Even if substantial evidence exists to support Plaintiffs claim, the Court should still affirm the
Commissioner's decision because it is supported by substantial evidence. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d
762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Smith v. Chafer, 99 F.3d 780, 782 (6th Cir. 1996) (even if the
Court would have decided the matter differently than the ALJ, if substantial evidence supports the
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ALJ's decision, it must be affirmed.)
The Court is mindful that a claimant's residual functional capacity is assessed by the ALJ
between steps three and four and is not a litany of her impairments, but, rather, "the most [a
claimant] can still do despite [the]impairments." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 404.1545(a)(l) &
(5). An ALJ is required to "assess a claimant's residual functional capacity based on all of the
relevant medical and other evidence." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). Thus, no medical source
opinion is alone conclusive on this issue. SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *2, 4-5. Similarly, a
claimant's subjective complaints of pain or other symptoms cannot alone establish disability. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). The claimant retains the burden of establishing her residual functional
capacity litnitations. Jordon v. Comm 'r ofSoc. Sec., 548 F.3d 417, 423 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted) ("The SSA's burden at the fifth step is to prove the availability of jobs in the national
economy that the claimant is capable of performing ... The claimant, however, retains the
burden of proving her lack of residual functional capacity.")
As for the hypotheticals posed to the VE, they complied with this circuit's long-standing
rule that the hypothetical question is proper where it accurately describes a claimant's functional
limitations. Varley v. Secretwy of Health and Human Services, 820 F.2d 777, 779. (6'h Cir.
1987). This rule is necessarily tempered by the requirement that the ALJ incorporate only those
limitations which he or she finds to be credible. Casey v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6 1h Cir. 1993). In this case, the hypotheticals posed accurately
portray the RFC as formulated based upon the objective medical evidence. As such, the Court
finds that the ALJ's RFC and findings based upon the VE's testimony are supported by
substantial evidence in the record.
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III. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the ALJ' s decision is supp01ied by substantial evidence on the
record. Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment be OVERRULED and the Defendant's Motion for Summmy Judgment be
SUSTAINED. A judgment in favor of the Defendant will be entered contemporaneously
herewith.
This
J ~ of September, 2016.
\
Signed By:
l:tgnr't R. Wilhoit. Jr...
United States District Judge
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