Anderson v. Beshear et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1) 4 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is DENIED. 2) 5 Motion to Dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT. 3) 6 Motion to Dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT. 4) Pla's claims under Obergefell are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 5) Pla� 39;s claims re annulment of Pla's marriage are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 6) Pla's claims under KRS are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 7) Pla's claims under 42 USC 1983 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 8) Pla's claims under 42 USC 1985 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 9) Pla's claims under 31 USC 3729-3733 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 10) Matter is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court's active docket. Signed by Judge Karen K. Caldwell on 8/7/2015.(SCD)cc: COR,Pro Se Pla(via US Mail)

Eastern lii!i~.riot o1 Kentucky

FILED

AUG - 7 2015
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
AT LEXINGTON
ARTIS ANDERSON,

AT LEXINGTON
ROBERT R. CARR
CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15-cv-207-KKC

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER

v.
STEVE BESHEAR, et al.,
Defendants.

*** *** ***
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Artis Anderson's motion for a temporary
restraining order and motions to dismiss Defendant Steve Beshear and Defendant Jack
Conway. (DE 4; DE 5; DE 6). Plaintiffs prose motion-and pro se complaint-contain broad
allegations of Constitutional violations. (DE 1; DE 4). The Court screened this non-prisoner,
fee-paid complaint under the authority of Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477 (6th Cir. 1999). In

Apple, the Sixth Circuit held that a district court may conduct screening procedures to sua
sponte dismiss a non-prisoner, fee-paid complaint "pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure [if] the allegations . . . are totally implausible, attenuated,
unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion." 183 F .3d at 4 79.

I. BACKGROUND

A. SUMMARY OF FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
In August 2012, Plaintiff met Mary Ellen Reynolds while eating in the Golden
Corral. (DE 4 at 2; DE 4-1 at 4.) Plaintiff and Reynolds commenced a relationship and
married on May 11, 2015. (DE 4-1 at 1.) Unfortunately, in May 2015 Reynolds experienced
a number of health problems, including a urinary tract infection, requiring hospitalization.

(DE 4 at 3.) Reynolds returned home after she was discharged. (DE 4 at 3.) On May 18,
2015, Reynolds's daughter, Cheryl Webster, traveled to Reynolds's home to check on her
mother's condition. (DE 4 at 3-4; DE 4-1 at 7.) Webster arrived and found Reynolds lying in
bed naked. (DE 4-1 at 7, 10.) Webster alleges that she observed her mother "completely
dirty with urine and feces on her person" and unresponsive; therefore, Webster called for an
ambulance. (DE 4-1 at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that Webster's "claim that [Reynolds] had urine
and feces on her was completely untrue to [his] knowledge." (DE 4-1at10.)
Woodford County Emergency Medical Services ("WCEMS") arrived. (DE 4-1 at 7,
10.) WCEMS determined that Reynolds needed medical care and also noted that Reynolds
injured her ankle; however, Plaintiff asserts that he and Reynolds objected to WCEMS
taking Reynolds to the hospital. (DE 4 at 4; DE 4-1 at 7, 10.) Plaintiff claims that WCEMS
then took Reynolds to the hospital against her will. (DE 4 at 4.)
Reynolds spent four hours in the emergency room at Saint Joseph's hospital. (DE 4
at 4.) Plaintiff contends that "she was released[; h]owever, because of her weakness and an
injured foot ... , the Plaintiff asked them to keep her overnight until he could obtain a
wheelchair." (DE 4 at 4.) Plaintiff states that the hospital admitted Reynolds and-a few

days later-Reynolds suffered a stroke while receiving treatment and care for her May 18
condition. (DE 4 at 4.) Less than a week after suffering a stroke, Saint Joseph's hospital
discharged Reynolds and she is receiving continued care from The Willows at Citation. (DE
1 at 4.)

After learning that Reynolds suffered a stroke, Webster initiated a guardianship
proceeding in Woodford District Court. (DE 4 at 4; DE 4-1 at 7-9.) Webster and a doctor
filed affidavits with the court, and the court held a guardianship hearing on May 29, 2015.
(DE 1 at 3; DE 4 at 4.) Plaintiff received timely notice of the guardianship petition, and
2

Plaintiff appeared at the guardianship hearing with retained counsel. (DE 1 at 4.) After the
guardianship hearing, the Woodford District Court appointed Melinda Meade as Reynolds's
guardian. (DE 1 at 3.)
On June 22, 2015, Plaintiff filed an action in Woodford Circuit Court "seeking a Writ
of Prohibition" because Plaintiff objected, among other things, to the Woodford District
Court's guardianship decision and Reynolds's continued care at The Willows at Citation.
(See DE 1 at 4.) This action is still pending before Woodford Circuit Court. (DE 1 at 4); see

also (DE 6-1 at 2-3) (describing the general procedural history of Plaintiffs pending state
court actions).

B. RELIEF REQUESTED
The Court recognizes that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se; therefore, the Court
evaluates all potential claims raised in Plaintiffs filings. The Court interprets Plaintiffs
sweeping allegations as, in fact, six discrete claims. First, Plaintiff alleges that the
guardianship proceeding itself and the results of the guardianship proceeding violated
Plaintiffs Constitutional rights to marriage as articulated in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (2015). (DE 1 at 5-7; DE 4 8-12.) Second, Plaintiff claims that Webster violated
his Constitutional rights by attempting to annul his marriage to Reynolds. (DE 4 at 9-11.)
Third,

Plaintiff asserts

that

Kentucky

statutes,

KRS

§§

311.631,

387.300,

are

unconstitutional. (DE 1 at 6-8; DE 4 at 8-9.) Fourth, Plaintiff contends that WCEMS,
Meade, and The Willows at Citation infringed Plaintiffs Constitutional rights in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE 1 at 7-8; DE 4 at 13.) Fifth, he alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1985. (DE 1 at 11; DE 4 at 13.) And sixth, Plaintiff claims that Meade and The Willows at
Citation submitted false claims in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733. (DE 1 at 9.)

3

Plaintiff requests a temporary restraining order, injunctive relief, and money
damages totaling over $21 million. (DE 1at10-11.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. RIGHTS UNDER 0BERGEFELL
Plaintiffs claim that his Constitutional rights in guardianship proceedings have
been infringed pursuant to the principles enunciated in Obergefell is founded on a mistaken
reading of the decision. Obergefell established that both same- and opposite-sex couples
have the right to marry. 135 S. Ct. at 2601. Obergefell protects individuals' right to
participate in the act and institution of marriage. Id. at 2608. But the right to participate in
the institution of marriage does not alter the substantive and procedural rights in
guardianship matters. See Woods v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 24, 50-51 (Ky. 2004).
Kentucky has a strong interest in guardianship matters, has developed a comprehensive
statutory scheme, and has upheld the Constitutionality of this scheme. See id., see also KRS
§§ 311.621-.643, 387.020, 387.520.

Although Plaintiff feels strongly that Reynolds should not have a guardian and that
he should be able to participate in Reynolds's health care decisions, his claim that the
guardianship proceedings violated his rights under the principles articulated in Obergefell
"lack[s] the legal plausibility necessary to invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction." Apple,
183 F.3d at 480; see also Russell v. Vittands, 79 F. App'x 859, 861 (6th Cir. 2003) ("To the
extent [Anderson] is challenging the results of his state court cases, his claim is barred by
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents a federal court from
exercising jurisdiction over a claim alleging error in a state court decision.")

4

B. ATTEMPTED ANNULMENT
Plaintiffs assertion that Webster has attempted to annul his marriage to Reynolds
is premature, and this is not the proper forum to contest an attempted annulment. First,
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Webster has initiated an annulment proceeding.
Therefore, Plaintiffs claim is premature. Second, a decree of annulment must be appealed
within the state court system. See KRS §§ 402.030, 402.250, 403.120. Accordingly, this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Apple, 183 F.3d at 480; Russell, 79 F. App'x at 861.

C. KENTUCKY STATUTES
Plaintiff contends that KRS § 311.631 is unconstitutional "because it places the
spouse third in line as a decision maker for his I her marriage partner" and that this
violates the Constitutional rights established in Obergefell. (DE 4 at 8-9.) For the reasons
stated above, this claim misreads Obergefell's holding and lacks the legal plausibility
necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Supra Part II.A.
Plaintiff argues that KRS § 387.300 is unconstitutional "because it allows a 'next
friend' to usurp the rights and authority reserved to the spouse and authorizes a court
appointed guardian to exercise authority over" property rights in violation of Obergefell.
(DE 1 at 6.) First, Plaintiffs claim is founded on a mistaken understanding of the 'next
friend' statute. Chapter 387 addresses the protection of minors' rights; a 'next friend' suit is
commonly a parent suing to enforce the rights of their minor child. Second, Plaintiff
misreads Obergefell's holding. Supra Part II.A. Therefore, his claims lack the legal
plausibility necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Apple, 183 F.3d at 480.

D. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 CLAIMS
Plaintiff claims that Defendants WCEMS, Meade, and The Willows at Citation
infringed his rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE 1 at 7-8; DE 4 at 13.) To establish
5

a right to relief, a plaintiff must plead and prove "that (1) the conduct in controversy was
committed by a person acting under color of law, and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff
of a federal right, either constitutional or statutory." Ziegler v. Aukerman, 512 F.3d 777,
782-83 (6th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). Plaintiff asserts that the federal rights violated
were his Constitutional rights established by "the Supreme Court's mandate in

Obe[r}gefell." (DE 4 at 13.) For the reasons stated above, this claim misreads Obergefell's
holding and lacks the legal plausibility necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Supra
Part II.A; Apple, 183 F.3d at 480.

E. 42U.S.C.§1985 CLAIMS
Plaintiff also contends that there was a conspiracy to violate his rights. (DE 1 at 11;
DE 4 at 13.)
To state a § 1985 claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) a conspiracy;
(2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges or immunities of the laws; (3) an act
in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either
injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States.

Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 671-72 (6th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted). Plaintiff
asserts that the infringed rights that provide a basis for his § 1983 claim are the same as
his§ 1985 claim. For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs§ 1985 claim misreads Obergefell's
holding and lacks the legal plausibility necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Supra
Parts II.A, II.D; Apple, 183 F.3d at 480.

F. FALSE CLAIMS ACT
Plaintiff asserts that Meade and The Willows at Citation submitted false claims in
violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733. (DE 1 at 9.) The basis for Plaintiffs claim is that
Reynolds was admitted to The Willows at Citation after she was discharged from Saint
6

Joseph's Hospital. (DE 1 at 9.) Essentially, Plaintiff argues that Reynolds does not need
continued care from The Willows at Citation despite Saint Joseph's Hospital having to
admit Reynolds for multiple days to treat her May 18 condition and Reynolds suffering a
stroke. (DE 4 at 4.) Further, Plaintiff admits that he could not provide Reynolds proper care
to help her recover from her urinary tract infection. (DE 4-1 at 10.) Therefore, Plaintiff has
not established that it is not in Reynolds's best interest-let alone fraudulent-that she
receive care from The Willows at Citation. Accordingly, Plaintiffs FCA claim lacks the legal
plausibility necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Apple, 183 F.3d at 480; see also United

States ex rel. Antoon u. Cleveland Clinic Found., 788 F.3d 605, 61314 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting
that a qui tam relator must be a true whistleblower to have standing to bring a claim under
the FCA and if the relator does not having standing, then the federal courts do not have
subject matter jurisdiction over the relator's FCA claim).

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, all of Plaintiffs claims lack the legal plausibility
necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Apple, 183 F.3d at 480. Accordingly, IT IS

ORDERED as follows:
1. Plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order (DE 4) is DENIED;

2. Defendant Beshear's motion to dismiss (DE 5) is DENIED AS MOOT;
3. Defendant Conway's motion to dismiss (DE 6) is DENIED AS MOOT;
4. Plaintiffs claims under Obergefell u. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
5. Plaintiffs claims concerning annulment of Plaintiffs marriage are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE;

7

6. Plaintiffs claims under KRS §§ 311.631, 387.300 are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;
7. Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
8. Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
9. Plaintiffs claims under the 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE; and
10. This matter is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court's active docket.
Dated August 7, 2015.

8