Anderson v. Beshear et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Pla's 8 Motion to Set Aside this Court's order dismissing Pla's cause of action and for reconsideration of Pla's motion for temporary restraining order is DENIED. Signed by Judge Karen K. Caldwell on September 14, 2015. (AWD) cc: COR,Pla via US Mail

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
AT LEXINGTON
ARTIS ANDERSON,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15-cv-207-KKC

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER

V.
STEVE BESHEAR, et al.,
Defendants.

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This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Artis Anderson’s motion (DE 8) to set
aside the Court’s August 7, 2015 Order, which dismissed this action and denied Anderson’s
motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. For reasons stated below, the Court will deny
the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint under the authority of Apple v. Glenn, 183
F.3d 477 (6th Cir. 1999). (DE 7 at 1.) In Apple, the Sixth Circuit held that a district court
may conduct screening procedures to sua sponte dismiss a non-prisoner, fee-paid complaint
“pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [if] the allegations . . . are
totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open
to discussion.” 183 F.3d at 479. Plaintiff’s renewed motion provides no basis for departure
from the Court’s prior decision.
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff was married to Mary Ellen Reynolds on May 11, 2015. (DE 4-1 at 1.)
Unfortunately, in May 2015 Reynolds experienced a number of health problems, including a

urinary tract infection and stroke, eventually requiring hospitalization. (DE 4 at 3.) Prior to
her stroke, Reynolds’s daughter, Cheryl Webster, traveled to Reynolds’ home to check on
her mother’s condition. (DE 4 at 3–4; DE 4-1 at 7.) Webster arrived and found Reynolds
lying in bed naked. (DE 4-1 at 7, 10.) Webster alleges that she observed her mother
“completely dirty with urine and feces on her person” and unresponsive; therefore, Webster
called for an ambulance. (DE 4-1 at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that Webster’s “claim that
[Reynolds] had urine and feces on her was completely untrue to [his] knowledge.” (DE 4-1
at 10.)
Once Woodford County Emergency Medical Services (“WCEMS”) arrived, they
determined that Reynolds needed medical care and also noted that Reynolds injured her
ankle; however, Plaintiff asserts that over his and Reynolds’ objections, WCEMS took
Reynolds to the hospital against her will. (DE 4 at 4; DE 4-1 at 7, 10.) Reynolds spent four
hours in the emergency room at Saint Joseph’s hospital. (DE 4 at 4.) Plaintiff contends that
“she was released[; h]owever, because of her weakness and an injured foot . . ., the Plaintiff
asked them to keep her overnight until he could obtain a wheelchair.” (DE 4 at 4.) Plaintiff
states that the hospital held Reynolds and—a few days later—Reynolds suffered a stroke
while receiving treatment and care for her May 18 condition. (DE 4 at 4; DE 8 at 2.) Less
than a week after suffering a stroke, Saint Joseph’s hospital discharged Reynolds, but she
is receiving continued care from The Willows at Citation. (DE 1 at 4.)
After learning that Reynolds suffered a stroke, Webster initiated a guardianship
proceeding in Woodford District Court. (DE 4 at 4; DE 4-1 at 7–9.) Webster and a doctor
filed affidavits with the court, and the court held a guardianship hearing on May 29, 2015.
(DE 1 at 3; DE 4 at 4.) Plaintiff received timely notice of the guardianship petition, and
appeared at the guardianship hearing. (DE 1 at 4; DE 8 at 2.) After the guardianship
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hearing, the Woodford District Court appointed Melinda Meade as Reynolds’s guardian.
(DE 1 at 3.) On June 22, 2015, Plaintiff filed an action in Woodford Circuit Court “seeking a
Writ of Prohibition” because Plaintiff objected, among other things, to the Woodford District
Court’s guardianship decision and Reynolds’ continued care at The Willows at Citation. (See
DE 1 at 4.)
In the Order now under consideration, the Court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims.
First, the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s right to marriage under Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (2015) was rejected because Plaintiff’s right to be married was not infringed by the
state court’s appointment of a guardian.1 (DE 7 at 4.) Second, no constitutional violation
could be grounded in an alleged annulment proceeding because Plaintiff did not allege any
such proceeding had occurred, and even if it had, this Court is not the proper venue for
appeal. (DE 7 at 5.) Third, constitutional challenges to Kentucky Statutes were rejected as
implausible due to Plaintiff’s misunderstandings of both the Obergefell holding—as
explained above—and the import of a “next friend” suit. (DE 7 at 5.) Fourth and Fifth,
Plaintiff’s §§ 1983 and 1985 claims were also denied due to Plaintiff’s misreading of
Obergefell. (DE 7 at 5–6.) Finally, Plaintiff’s False Claims Act allegations were rejected as
failing to provide adequate grounds for the Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.
(DE 7 at 6–7.)
B. BASES FOR RECONSIDERATION
Plaintiff’s current motion presents both factual and legal arguments as grounds for
reconsideration. First, Plaintiff alleges error in several of the Court’s factual findings. (DE 8

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“To the extent [Anderson] is challenging the results of his state court cases, his claim is barred by
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents a federal court from exercising
jurisdiction over a claim alleging error in a state court decision.” Russell v. Vittands, 79 F. App’x 859,
861 (6th Cir. 2003).

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at 1–2.) Second, new facts are offered in support of the proposed relief. (DE 8 at 2–3.) Third,
Ferguson v. Ferguson, 610 S.W.2d 925 (Ct. App. 1980), among other state and Supreme
Court decisions, is cited as supporting Plaintiff’s marriage interference claims. (DE 8 at 3–
4.) And fourth, Plaintiff points to the holding in O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)
to bolster his §§ 1983 and 1985 claims. However, as explained below, nothing in Plaintiff’s
motion persuades the Court to alter its earlier decision.
II. DISCUSSION
A. FACTUAL ERRORS
Plaintiff disputes the Court’s factual findings regarding the inception of his
relationship with Mary Reynolds, the necessity of Ms. Reynolds’ hospitalization following
her UTI, and the representation status of the Plaintiff at the guardianship proceedings.
These factual findings were irrelevant to the Court’s decision and were only provided as
context. Thus, these objections do not require the Court to alter its prior ruling.
B. NEW FACTS
Plaintiff offers new exhibits in support of his assertions that Ms. Reynolds was not
in need of medical care on May 18th; that Ms. Reynolds’ daughter, Ms. Webster, did not
have Ms. Reynolds’ best interest at heart when she called WCEMS on May 18th; and that
neither Ms. Webster nor Mr. Robert Horn were valid candidates for guardianship under
state law. In the first instance, the Court must question the first two assertions given that
Ms. Reynolds suffered a stroke shortly after May 18th. More importantly, however, all of
these contentions are moot.
The first two factual allegations concern conduct only by Ms. Webster, a private
actor. Her conduct cannot provide the basis for any of the Plaintiff’s claims. See, e.g., NCAA
v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (“[w]hen Congress enacted § 1983 as the statutory
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remedy for violations of the Constitution, it specified that the conduct at issue must have
occurred under color of’ state law”). Private action will only be grounds for a §1983 claim “if,
though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that
seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Brentwood
Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff fails to allege any facts which would
establish the requisite nexus between Ms. Webster and the state.
Likewise, the contentions regarding guardianship applicants are mooted by
Plaintiff’s own admission that neither Ms. Webster nor Mr. Horn was selected as Ms.
Reynolds’ guardian. (DE 1 at 3.) Even if Ms. Webster or Mr. Horn were appointed as
guardian, the result here would remain unchanged. As the Court explained in its prior
order, under Russell v. Vittands, 79 F. App’x 859, 861 (6th Cir. 2003), this Court is not the
appropriate forum for challenging the state’s guardianship ruling. (DE 7 at 4.)
C. MARITAL INTERFERENCE CLAIMS
Plaintiff cites Ferguson v. Ferguson, 610 S.W.2d 925 (Ct. App. 1980) for the
proposition that third parties “CANNOT attack a marriage,” and Plaintiff includes citations
to, inter alia, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 372
(1978), to bolster his marital interference claims. (DE 8 at 3–4.) However, these citations,
like Plaintiff’s earlier resort to Obergefell, are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of
the rights found violated in those cases.
Plaintiff has admitted that he was allowed to marry Ms. Reynolds. (DE 4-1 at 1.)
Thus, Plaintiff’s right to marry as clarified in Zablocki and Loving, has not been impugned.
Nor can it be validly contended that state guardianship proceedings “concern[ ] a
relationship lying within the zone of privacy” like the “sacred precincts of marital
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bedrooms.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). And as the Plaintiff was
advised in this Court’s prior order, the constitutionality of the Kentucky’s comprehensive
guardianship scheme has previously been addressed and upheld. (DE 7 at 4.)
Furthermore, Ferguson’s holding addresses a collateral challenge to the validity of a
marriage in state court. 610 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980). As the Court’s prior
opinion explained, Plaintiff does not allege any collateral challenge to the validity of his
marriage has occurred. (DE 7 at 5.) In addition, any appeal of such a challenge must be
heard in state courts, as was the case in Ferguson itself. 610 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Ky. Ct. App.
1980). Consequently, the Court is not moved to set aside its prior holdings on Plaintiff’s
marital interference claims.
D. O’CONNOR V. DONALDSON
Finally, Plaintiff would have the Court find an alternative basis for his §§ 1983 and
1985 claims in O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). (DE 8 at 3.) Yet, again,
precedent cannot do the work Plaintiff would like. O’Connor does not, as Plaintiff argues,
support the broad proposition that the state “CANNOT hold a person against their will who
has family and friends to care for them.” (DE 8 at 3.)

In that case, the plaintiff was

involuntarily committed, under civil commitment procedures, to a state mental hospital for
15 years and sued the hospital's superintendent and others alleging that they had deprived
him of his constitutional right to liberty.
The Court took great pains to clarify that the issue before it was “a narrow one” and
that it was not deciding whether a state could involuntarily confine a person “to ensure his
own survival or safety.” Id 573-74. In that case, the jury specifically found that no such
grounds for continued confinement existed. Id. However, “the constitutional right to liberty
is not violated if the State takes custody of a citizen following a judicial determination that
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he is unable to care for himself or is a serious risk to the safety of himself or others.” King v.
Beavers, 148 F.3d 1031, 1034 (8th Cir. 1998). Similarly, the constitutional right to liberty is
not violated where the state orders an individual into the custody of a guardian pursuant to
state guardianship proceedings. Thus, O’Connor provides no new basis for Plaintiff’s claims
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has made it abundantly clear that he feels the events concerning his wife
have unjustly interfered with his marriage. Absent some action by the state in violation of a
recognized federal right, this Court can provide no relief. Plaintiff should be advised that
his efforts would be better spent towards litigating his ongoing claims in the appropriate
state court forums.
For the reasons discussed herein, all of Plaintiff’s claims continue to lack the legal
plausibility necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Apple, 183 F.3d at 480. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to set aside this Court’s order
dismissing Plaintiff’s cause of action and for reconsideration of Plaintiff’s motion for
temporary restraining order (DE 8) is DENIED.
Dated September 14, 2015.

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