Williams v. Unknown Federal Agents et al
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1) Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 2) Judgment will be entered w this Memo Opinion and Order. 3) Clerk shall send a copy of this Memo and Judgment to Williams at listed address. 4) Proceeding is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court's docket. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 12/3/2015.(SCD)cc: Pla via US Mail
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION AT LEXINGTON
MARSHALL DeWAYNE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
V.
UNKNOWN FEDERAL AGENTS and
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants.
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Civil No.
5:15-CV-211-JMH
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
***
***
Plaintiff Marshall DeWayne Williams is an inmate confined by
the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) in the United States Penitentiary
(“USP”)-Lee, located in Pennington Gap, Virginia.1
On January 14,
2015, while confined in the USP-Beaumont, located in Beaumont
Texas, Williams filed a pro se civil rights action in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas asserting
numerous constitutional claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, pursuant to
the doctrine announced in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).2
Williams alleged that he had been
1
The Court obtained Williams’s current location from the BOP’s website.
See http://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited on December 2, 2015, in
re: Williams, BOP Register No. 14130-077).
2
To state a claim that is cognizable in a Bivens action, the plaintiff
must plead two essential elements: first, that he has been deprived of
rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and
second, that the defendants acted under color of federal law. Bivens,
403 U.S. at 397. This implied cause of action is “the federal analog
1
assaulted and mistreated while confined in various federal prisons
located in Memphis, Tennessee; Forest City, Arkansas; Lexington,
Kentucky; Inez, Kentucky; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and Lewisburg,
Pennsylvania. [R. 2]. Williams named the United States of America
and “Unknown Federal Agents” as the defendants to the action,
alleging that he was asserting claims against them “…only in their
official capacity.”
[R. 2, p. 1]
On April 16, 2015, the Texas federal court severed all of the
claims except those arising in Memphis, Tennessee, and directed
the clerk of that court to create a new civil action for each set
of geographically-related claims. [R. 1]. See Williams v. Unknown
Federal Agents, No. 1:15-CV-16 (E.D. Tex. 2015).
The clerk of the
Texas court created a new civil action for the claims related to
alleged events at the Federal Medical Center (“FMC”)-Lexington,
located in Lexington, Kentucky. These claims form the subject
matter of this action.
case
should
be
A magistrate judge then determined the
transferred
to
this
Court
considerations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1406.
based
on
venue
The transfer of the
case was not effectuated until July 24, 2015 [R. 6], upon the Fifth
Circuit’s dismissal of Williams’s appeal for want of prosecution.
[R. 5, 6]. See Williams v. Unknown Federal Agents, No. 1:15-CV158 (E.D. Tex. 2015).
to suits brought against state officials” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n. 2 (2006).
2
On August 24, 2015, this Court granted Williams’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.
See Order, R. 13.
The Court now
conducts a preliminary review of Williams’s complaint because he
asserts claims against government officials, and because he has
been granted in forma pauperis status in this action.
28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2); 1915A. In such cases, a district court must dismiss
any action which (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Id.
Because Williams is proceeding without an attorney, the Court
liberally construes his claims and accepts his factual allegations
as true.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
But as explained
below, the Court will dismiss Williams’s Bivens claims stemming
from his prior confinement at FMC-Lexington.
WILLIAMS’S CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
On July 1, 2010, a federal grand jury in Frankfort, Kentucky,
handed down a two-count Indictment against Williams, charging that
on August 20, 2009, Williams: (1) forcibly assaulted, resisted,
opposed, impeded, intimidated, and interfered with a U.S. Secret
Service Special Agent, while the Special Agent was engaged in his
official duties, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111; and (2) while
an inmate in USP-Big Sandy, possessed a prohibited object, to wit
a shank, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1791(a)(2) and (b)(3).
3
United States v. Marshal Dewayne Williams, No. 3:10-CR-11-KSF-REW
(E. D. Ky. 2010) [R. 1, therein] (“the Frankfort Criminal Case”).
On April 7, 2011, Williams was indicted in the Pikeville
Division of this Court, charged with twenty-one (21) counts of
mailing threatening letters to various state and federal officials
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1038(a)(1)(A) in July and August 2009.
United States v. Marshal DeWayne Williams, Case No. 7:11-CR-10KSF-REW-1 (E. D. Ky. 2011) [R. 1, therein] (“the First Pikeville
Criminal Case”).3
When Williams was indicted in the various
federal cases in Kentucky, he was already serving a ninety-nineyear sentence for maliciously destroying a newspaper dispenser
with a pipe bomb, which resulted in the death of his step-father,
and a ten-year consecutive term for possession of the pipe bomb
and the making of the pipe bomb without required approval.
United
States v. Williams, 775 F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Williams, 819 F.2D 605, 607 (5th Cir. 1987)
On April 18, 2011, the United States filed a motion to dismiss
without prejudice the two charges filed in the Frankfort Criminal
3
On July 1, 2010, a federal grand jury in Pikeville, Kentucky, returned yet
another indictment charging that Williams did “forcibly assault, resist, oppose,
impede, intimidate, and interfere with a U.S. Secret Service Special Agent,
while the Special Agent was engaged in his official duties, all in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 111.” See United States v. Marshal DeWayne Williams, No. 7:10-CR17-DCR-REW-1 (E. D. Ky. 2010) [R. 1, therein; Indictment Count 1] (“the Second
Pikeville Criminal Case). In Count 2 of the Indictment, the grand jury charged
that Williams possessed a prohibited object while an inmate at the USP-Big
Sandy, a federal prison located in the Eastern District of Kentucky, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2) and (b)(3). On August 17, 2010, the Court
entered an Order directing that “…all future pleadings should be filed in
Frankfort Criminal Action No. 3: 10-11-DCR.” [R. 25, therein]
4
Case.
[R. 128, therein]
On April 19, 2011, the Court granted
that motion and dismissed the Frankfort Criminal Case without
prejudice.
[R. 129, therein].
Invoking his rights under the
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2), Williams then moved to
dismiss the indictment with prejudice [R. 130, therein], but the
Court denied that motion [R. 132, therein].
Williams appealed
both orders, but the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed his
appeal for lack of jurisdiction because both of the orders from
which Williams appealed were non-appealable, interlocutory orders.
[Id., R. 137, therein; United States of America v. Marshal DeWayne
Williams, No. 11-5549 (6th Cir. June 30, 2011)]
On June 1, 2011, the United States filed a motion to dismiss
without prejudice the twenty-one criminal charges filed in the
First Pikeville Criminal Case. [R. 42, therein]. On June 2, 2011,
the Court granted that motion and dismissed the First Pikeville
Criminal Case without prejudice. [R. 43, therein]. Again invoking
his rights under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2)
Williams moved to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, see id.
R. 44, therein, but the Court denied that motion, see id., R. 46,
therein.
William appealed, but the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that both
of the orders from which Williams appealed were interlocutory.
[Id., R. 51, therein; United States of America v. Marshal DeWayne
Williams, No. 11-5723 (6th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011)]
5
ALLEGATIONS OF WILLIAMS’S BIVENS COMPLAINT
Williams asserts two specific sets of claims relating to his
confinement in the FMC-Lexington.
See R. 2, pp. 6; p. 8.
In his
first set of claims, Williams alleges that “on or about June 2012”,
unidentified federal agents tortured him, assaulted and battered
him, applied various and extreme methods of excessive force on
him, and subjected him to dangerous conditions of confinement, all
of which caused him to sustain severe physical and psychological
injuries, from which he currently suffers.
[R. 2, p. 6]
In his second set of claims, Williams alleges that “…on or
about
June
2010,”
unidentified
federal
agents
“…did
psychologically force plaintiff to physically kidnap former state
congressman governor-elect Steve Nunn.”
[Id., p. 8]
In that same
passage, Williams further alleges that the defendants inflicted
the same forms of extremely cruel and unusual punishment on him
which he had earlier described on page six of his complaint. [Id.]
Finally,
under
the
heading
of
“No
Specific
Location,”
Williams asserts a series of claims challenging specific past
conditions of his confinement, such as being placed in isolation,
being denied bed clothes, a toothbrush, toothpaste, and toilet
paper; being subjected to abuse and torture; being the target of
a conspiracy; deliberate indifference to his safety and medical
needs; and the confiscation of his papers and mattress.
6
[Id., p.
12]
Williams alleges that these actions occurred between June
2008 and December 2014, but he does not specify where (or in which
federal prison) these alleged events transpired.
seeks
unspecified
defendants.
compensatory
and
punitive
[Id.]
damages
Williams
from
the
[Id., p. 4; p. 13]
DISCUSSION
Williams’s claims stemming from his confinement in the FMCLexington must be dismissed for a variety of reasons. First and
foremost, all of his claims are barred by Kentucky’s one year
statute of limitations.
Williams’s alleged Bivens claims arose in
a federal prison located in Kentucky, and in Kentucky, the oneyear limitation period under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a) applies
to claims alleging the commission of constitutional torts.
Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140(1)(a); Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d
811, 825 (6th Cir. 2003);
Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d
179, 181–82 (6th Cir. 1990).
Thus, Bivens claims have a one-year
statute of limitations under Kentucky law.
Mitchell, 343 F.3d at
825; McSurely v. Hutchison, 823 F.2d 1002 (6th Cir. 1987).
The next step requires the Court to determine when that oneyear period began to run.
Federal law governs when the statute of
limitations begins to run.
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 267
(1985); Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996);
Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984).
A cause of
action accrues when “... the plaintiff knows or has reason to know
7
that
the
act
occurred.”
providing
the
basis
of
his
or
her
injury
has
Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1159
(6th Cir. 1991); see also Sevier, 742 F.2d at 273.
Under that framework, and based on his own allegations,
Williams either knew or should have known about the basis of claims
set forth on page six of his complaint (that in June 2012,
unidentified federal officials subjected him to extreme forms of
cruel
and
unusual
punishment
and
applied
various
methods
of
excessive force to him) on or before June 30, 2012. Thus, Williams
was required to have asserted any claims based on those alleged
events within one year of that time, which would have been no later
than June 30, 2013. Williams did not, however, assert these claims
until January 14, 2015, when he filed his Bivens complaint in the
Texas federal court.
Admittedly, the BOP’s administrative remedy process set forth
in 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.14-18 can take 90 days to complete—sometimes
120 days if time extensions are granted.
But even allowing for
liberal
compliance
time-extensions
to
accommodate
with
that
administrative exhaustion process, it is clear from the face of
Williams’s complaint that his claims set forth on page six (6) of
his complaint are time-barred.
Although
defense,
when
the
it
statute
appears
of
limitations
clear
on
initial
is
an
affirmative
screening
of
the
complaint that the action is time-barred, the complaint may be
8
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). Cf. Fraley
v. Ohio Gallia Cnty., No. 97–3564, 1998 WL 789385, at *1–2 (6th
Cir. Oct.30, 1998) (holding that the district court “properly
dismissed” the pro se plaintiff's § 1983 civil rights claims under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because the complaint was filed years
after Ohio's two-year statute of limitations had expired); Anson
v. Corr. Corp. Of America, No. 4:12cv357, 2012 WL 2862882, at *2–
3 (N.D. Ohio July 11, 2012) (dismissing a complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e) sua sponte, based in part on the fact that the plaintiff
was asserting his Bivens claims “six years after the events upon
which they are based occurred” and were thus time-barred under
Ohio's two-year statute of limitations for bodily injury).
The same rationale applies to the other allegations set forth
on page eight (8) of the complaint, wherein Williams alleges that
during the month of June 2010, unidentified federal officials
subjected him to extreme forms of cruel and unusual punishment,
and that they applied various methods of excessive force to him.
Williams was required to have asserted any claims based on those
alleged actions and events within one year of that month, which
would have been no later than June 30, 2011.
Williams did not
assert these claims until January 14, 2015, when he filed his
Bivens complaint in the Texas federal court.
9
Second, Williams further alleges on page eight (8) of his
complaint
that
unidentified
federal
“forced” him to kidnap “Steve Nunn.”4
agents
psychologically
As noted, a district court
must dismiss any prisoner civil complaint if it is frivolous. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). A frivolous
complaint is one that lacks a rational or arguable basis in fact
or
law.
Neitzke
v.
Williams,
490
U.S.
319,
328-29
(1989)
(interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196,
1198 (6th Cir. 1990).
An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations
are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly
incredible.”
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Lawler,
898 F.2d at 1199.5
Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed
as frivolous give “judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim
based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the
unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual
4
Williams incorrectly asserts that “Steve Nunn” was the governor-elect of
Kentucky.
Stephen Roberts Nunn was a former representative in the Kentucky
State Legislature, but the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Nunn is
now a state prisoner in the custody of the Kentucky Department of Corrections,
Inmate No. 246151, serving a life without parole sentence following his murder
conviction in the Fayette Circuit Court, Case No. 09-CR-01678.
See
http://kool.corrections.ky.gov/KOOL/Details/313971 (last visited on December 2,
2015).
5
Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept
all factual allegations as true, Ascroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 556 U.S. 662, 678,
129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949–50 (2009), a district judge does not have to accept
“fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints
that are reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327–28.
10
allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are
clearly baseless.”
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
Here, Williams’s allegation that unnamed federal officials
forced him to kidnap “Setve Nunn” is, on its face, a fantastic,
“wholly incredible,” and delusional assertion which requires no
further analysis.
A claim such as this must be dismissed sua
sponte as delusional and frivolous.
12881,
2014
WL
525032,
at
*4
See Henry v. Caruso, No. 13-
(E.
D.
Mich.
Feb.
7,
2014)
(recommending that state prisoner’s claims alleging that Michigan
Department
of
Corrections
officials
had
surgically
implanted
transmitters in his neck, were subject to sua sponte dismissal as
frivolous because they were based upon irrational and delusional
factual averments); See Golden v. Coleman, 429 F. App'x 73 (3d
Cir.2011) (prisoner's allegations that prison employees violated
his
constitutional
rights
by
planting
“Government
Micro
Eye
Cameras” in his food, which then attached to his visual cortex and
sent images to a computer, were fantastic, delusional, and simply
unbelievable, and warranted dismissal of his § 1983 action);
Abascal v. Jarkos, 357 F. App'x 388 (2d Cir. 2009) (claim that
prison doctors and officials were deliberately indifferent in
using high-tech equipment to control the plaintiff's thoughts and
to cause him pain and injury was properly dismissed sua sponte as
fantastic or delusional).
11
As
for
Williams’s
“No
Specific
Location”
condition
of
confinement claims set forth on page 12 of his complaint (that he
was denied certain items such as a toothbrush, toothpaste, a
mattress, and that unidentified prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs), Williams fails to allege
where the alleged actions (or inactions) about which he complains
occurred.
passage,
Williams makes no reference to FMC-Lexington in that
but
he
specifically
alleges
that
he
was
allegedly
mistreated while confined in the USP-Lewisburg, in Lewisburg,
Pennsylvania, between December 2012 and August 2014.
Based on
Williams’s bizarre allegations, it appears that his confinement in
the FMC-Lexington ended sometime in June 2012, after which he was
transferred to another BOP facility.
To the extent that Williams
broadly challenges various conditions of his confinement at FMCLexington which date back to June 2012 (at the latest), those
claims are also time-barred for the reasons previously discussed.
Third, Williams asserts Bivens claims against unidentified
federal officials in their official capacities, see R. 2, p. 1.
These claims must be dismissed, as it has long been established
that a Bivens claim may not be asserted against a federal officer
in his official capacity.
Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393, 397
(6th Cir. 1991); Okoro v. Scibana, 63 F. App’x 182, 184 (6th Cir.
2003) (affirming dismissal of Bivens claim asserted by a federal
prisoner against a federal official in his official capacity).
12
Fourth
shields
Loeffler
the
and
finally,
Federal
v.
Frank,
absent
Government
486
a
waiver,
and
U.S.
its
549,
sovereign
agencies
554;
immunity
from
Federal
suit.
Housing
Administration v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 244. Sovereign immunity is
jurisdictional
in
nature.
Indeed,
the
“terms
of
[the
United
States'] consent to be sued in any court define that court's
jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). See also United States v. Mitchell, 463
U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may
not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent
is a prerequisite for jurisdiction”).
Simply put, Bivens actions may not be maintained against the
United States.
See e.g., Shaner v. United States, 976 F.2d 990,
994 (6th Cir. 1992) (“a Bivens action may be brought only against
individual federal officials, not against the United States”);
Nuclear Transport and Storage, Inc. v. United States, 890 F.2d
1348, 1352 (6th Cir. 1989) (United States cannot be sued under
Bivens because it “has not waived sovereign immunity and consented
expressly to be sued in a Bivens-type action”).
For all of these
reasons, Williams’s complaint will be dismissed, with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
1.
Plaintiff Marshal DeWayne Williams’ 28 U.S.C. § 1331
civil rights complaint [R. 2] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
13
2.
Judgment will be entered contemporaneously with this
Memorandum Opinion and Order in favor of the named defendants.
3.
The
Clerk
of
the
Court
shall
send
a
copy
of
this
Memorandum Opinion and Order, and attached Judgment, to Williams
at the following address:
No.
14130-077,
Marshall DeWayne Williams, BOP Register
USP-Lee,
U.S.
Penitentiary,
P.O.
Box
305,
Jonesville, VA. 24263.
4.
This
proceeding
is
DISMISSED
Court’s docket.
This December 3, 2015.
14
and
STRICKEN
from
the
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