Williams v. Unknown Federal Agents et al
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: It is ordered that Plas's 19 Motion to Amend his complaint is DENIED. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 8/1/2016. (SCD)cc: Pro Se Pla via US Mail
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION AT LEXINGTON
MARSHALL DeEWAYNE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
V.
UNKNOWN FEDERAL AGENTS and
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants.
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Civil No.
5:15-CV-211-JMH
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
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Plaintiff Marshall DeWayne Williams is an inmate confined by
the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) at the United States Penitentiary
(“USP”)-Lee located in Jonesville, Virginia.
Proceeding without
counsel, Williams has filed a motion [R. 19] to amend his civil
rights
complaint
[R.
2],
which
this
Court
dismissed
in
the
Memorandum Opinion and Order (“the Opinion and Order”) and Judgment
entered on December 3, 2015 [R. 14; R. 15]
As explained below,
Williams’s motion to amend his dismissed complaint will be denied.
BACKGROUND
In 2015, while confined in Texas, Williams brought suit under
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), alleging that he had been assaulted and mistreated while
confined
in
various
federal
prisons
in
Tennessee,
Arkansas,
Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. Williams named the United
1
States and “Unknown Federal Agents” as defendants “only in their
official capacity.”
Two separate district-court case numbers and
orders arose in this Court from that single complaint: this
proceeding and Marshall Dewayne Williams v. Unknown Feeral Agents.
Et al., 5:15-CV-68-JMH (E.D. Ky. 2015), also a Bivens case.
In the instant Bivens proceeding, Williams challenged various
conditions of his confinement at the Federal Medical Center (“FMC”)
Lexington, located in Lexington, Kentucky, where he alleged that
“on or about June 2012” federal agents tortured him, assaulted
him, and subjected him to excessive force and dangerous conditions
of confinement. He also alleged that “on or about June 2010”
federal agents psychologically forced him to kidnap a former
Kentucky state congressman, and that the agents inflicted cruel
and unusual punishment on him.
Finally, without specifying where
he was confined, Williams alleged that between June 2008 and
December 2014, he suffered unlawful conditions of confinement,
including but not limited to, being placed in isolation, denied
personal hygiene items, and that he was subjected to abuse, torture
and conspiracy.
On December 3, 2015, the Court screened the Bivens complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2); 1915A, and, in the Opinion
and Order, dismissed all of the claims which Williams had asserted.
[R. 14] The Court dismissed Williams’s claims stemming from his
confinement
at
FMC-Lexington
and
2
his
“No
Specific
Location”
condition-of-confinement claims because they were barred by the
applicable statute of limitations Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a));
dismissed Williams’s claim that he was psychologically forced to
kidnap a former congressman as lacking a rational or arguable basis
in law or fact pursuant to Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 32829 (1989); dismissed the unidentified federal agents as being not
amenable to suit in their official capacities; and dismissed
Williams’s Bivens claims against the United States as prohibited
by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
[Id.]
In the Judgment,
the district court also certified that an appeal could not be taken
in good faith.
[R. 15, ¶ 4]
Williams appealed, but on May 24, 2016, the Sixth Circuit
Court determined that for the reasons set forth in the Opinion and
Order, Williams’s appeal did not have an arguable basis in law or
fact; denied Williams in forma pauperis status on appeal; and
ordered Williams to pay the $505 appellate filing fee within thirty
days, or risk dismissal for want of prosecution.
Marshall DeWayne
Williams v. Unknown Federal Agents, et al., No. 16-5006 [R. 14,
therein]
On July 22, 2016, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal
because Williams did not pay the assessed appellate filing fee
within the prescribed time. [Id., R. 15, therein]
On July 28, 2016, less than a week after his appeal was
dismissed, Williams filed motion to amend his Bivens complaint in
this Bivens proceeding.
[R. 22]
3
Williams contends that because
the BOP transferred him among its various prison facilities between
July 2009 and December 2014, and between August 2015 through June
2016, the applicable statute of limitations (Ky. Rev. Stat. §
413.140(1)(a)) should have been tolled with respect to his nonspecific
condition
of
FMC-Lexington
condition
of
confinement
claims, thus allowing him to proceed with those claims.
[Id.]
DISCUSSION
This
case
is
closed,
judgment
has
been
entered
against
Williams, and Williams has unsuccessfully appealed the Opinion and
Order and Judgment.
Williams has not alleged facts which warrant
amendment of his original complaint under any provision of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
See Clark v. United States, 764 F.3d
653, 661 (6th Cir. 2014) (“When a party seeks to amend a complaint
after an adverse judgment, it thus must shoulder a heavier burden
[than if the party sought to amend a complaint beforehand].
Instead of meeting only the modest requirements of Rule 15, the
claimant
must
meet
the
requirements
for
reopening
a
case
established by Rules 59 or 60.”) (quoting Leisure Caviar, LLC v.
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2010)).
The Sixth Circuit’s approach on this issue follows that of the
Seventh Circuit.
See Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of
Greater Chicago and Northwest Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 521 (7th Cir.
2015) (“… when a district court has entered a final judgment of
dismissal, the plaintiff cannot amend under Rule 15(a) unless the
4
judgment is modified, either by the district court under Rule 59(e)
or 60(b), or on appeal.”)
In his current motion, Williams claims—for the first time-that the applicable one-year statute of limitations should have
been tolled with respect to
his condition of confinement claims
because of his frequent transfers among BOP facilities. When
determining whether equitable tolling is appropriate, the Sixth
Circuit applies a five-factor balancing test, which weighs:
(1) the petitioner's lack of [actual] notice of
filing requirement; (2) the petitioner's lack
constructive knowledge of the filing requirement;
the petitioner's diligence in pursuing his rights;
absence of prejudice to the respondent; and (5)
petitioner's reasonableness in remaining ignorant of
legal requirement for filing his claim.
the
of
(3)
(4)
the
the
Solomon v. United States, 467 F.3d 928, 933 (6th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Dunlap v. United States, 250 F.3d 1001, 1008 (6th Cir.
2001), adopting factors set forth in Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146,
151 (6th Cir. 1988)) (alteration in Solomon). “The Andrews factors
are not necessarily comprehensive or always relevant; ultimately
every court must consider an equitable tolling claim on a caseby-case basis.”
King v. Bell, 378 F.3d 550, 553 (6th Cir.2004)
(citation omitted).
Applying
Williams
these
could
and
five
criteria
should
have
to
the
raised
instant
his
proceeding,
equitable
tolling
argument (vis-à-vis his FMC-Lexington condition of confinement
5
claims) in a motion seeking post-judgment relief under either Rule
59(e) or 60(b), but he did not do so;1 he directly proceeded with
an appeal, which was dismissed because Williams did not pay the
appellate filing fee after the Sixth Circuit determined that his
appeal lacked an arguable basis in law or fact as to any issue
asserted.
Williams is therefore not entitled to assert the
equitable tolling argument “anew” in motion to amend under his
complaint under Rule 15; to allow Williams to amend his complaint
at this juncture would result in an improper “after the fact”
manipulation of the judicial process.
And most fundamentally, Williams’s belated assertion that he
was “in transit” continually between 2009 and 2014, and again
between
August
2015
and
June
2016,
does
not
constitute
an
extraordinary circumstance that would allow the Court to equitably
toll the applicable one-year statute of limitation period.
the
BOP
intermittently
transferred
1
Williams
to
While
different
Williams also did not allege in his original Bivens complaint that his
various BOP transfers between 2009 and 2014 prevented him from filing
suit on his FMC-Lexington condition of confinement claims. Further, as
noted in the Opinion and Order, Williams’s own discussion of his “No
Specific Location” condition of confinement claims were deficient in all
respects, as Williams failed to specify exactly where or when those
claims and the alleged deprivations occurred. See R. 14, at p. 12. This
Court was basically required to reconstruct Williams’s confinement
history, based on the sparse information contained on page 12 of his
Complaint [R. 1], determine where Williams was confined during the
relevant time-periods, and proceed with analyzing challenging his
condition of confinement claims regarding FMC-Lexington. [Id.] Now,
eight months after the dismissal of his complaint and an unsuccessful
appeal, Williams wishes to submit details concerning his BOP transfers.
6
facilities, Williams was not in a perpetual and/or continual state
of “transit” for five straight years between 2009 and 2014,
rendering him unable to file suit on his condition of confinement
claims.
held
This Court, and other district courts, have consistently
that
temporary
periods
of
transfer
do
not
qualify
as
extraordinary circumstances which justify the equitable tolling of
the applicable statute of limitations period.
See Dodd v. United
States, 365 F.3d 1273, 1283 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that the
fact that the plaintiff had been transferred to another prison and
did not have access to his papers was not an exigent circumstance
sufficient
to
justify
equitable
tolling
of
the
limitations
period); Brown v. United States, 20 F. App’x 373 (6th Cir. 2001)
(concluding that the movant's “ninety days in transit do not
explain his lack of diligence in filing his [28 U.S.C.] § 2255
motion during the nine-month period that remained open to him to
file timely”); United States v. Clay, No. 5:06-CR-83-JMH-JGW-1,
No. 5:09-CV-07079-JMH-JGW, 2010 WL 5564051, at *2 (E. D. Ky. May
13, 2010) (denying petitioner’s § 2255 motion as time-barred and
rejecting his claim that he was “in transit,” holding that “To the
extent that defendant seeks equitable tolling for the statute of
limitations, it is highly unlikely that defendant was ‘in transit’
the entire year following the date on which his conviction became
final.”); Hulsman v. Rebecca Pancake, No. 3:09-CV-P87-C, 2009 WL
1458239 at *3 (W.D. Ky. May 20, 2009)( “The petitioner's assertion
7
that
his
petition
should
be
considered
timely
because
KDOC
transferred him a number of times and because the only legal
assistance available to inmates is jail-house writ writers also
fails to demonstrate entitlement to equitable tolling.
circumstances do not toll the one-year period.
does
not
explain
why
being
transferred
to
Those
The petitioner
different
prisons
prevented him from filing his habeas petition earlier.”); Nguyen
v. United States, Nos. 3:07-cv-207-J-32HTS, 3:04-cr-093-J-32HTS,
2007 WL 2904141 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2007) (prisoner-petitioner
presented no evidence to show he made efforts to file a petition
or secure his legal papers during a temporary transfer period).
For the foregoing reasons, Williams’s post-judgment (and
post-unsuccessful appeal) motion to amend his complaint under Rule
15 will be denied.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Marshal DeWayne
Williams’ motion to amend his complaint [R. 19] is DENIED.
This the 1st day of August, 2016.
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