Tidaback v. Georgetown et al
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: IT IS ORDERED: (1) Defendant, Georgetown Police Department is DISMISSED as a party; (2) Defendant's 7 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED; (3) Plaintiff's claim for malicious prosecution shall be D ISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; (4) that the remainder of Plaintiffs claims shall be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; (5)that all scheduled proceedings are CONTINUED GENERALLY; (6) that all pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT; (7) that this Order is FINAL AND APPEALABLE and THERE IS NO JUST CAUSE FOR DELAY. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 3/31/2017.(KM)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON
JAMIE S. TIDABACK,
CITY OF GEORGETOWN,
WILLIAMS, in his individual )
capacity, and RICHARD
WILLIAMS, as an employee of )
the City of Georgetown and
Georgetown Police Department,)
Action No. 5:15-cv-226-JMH
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings filed by Defendants City of Georgetown, Georgetown
Police Department, and Richard Williams in his individual capacity
and as an employee of the City of Georgetown and Georgetown Police
Department [DE 7].
Plaintiff has filed a Response in Opposition
[DE 8] and Defendants have filed a Reply [DE 9].
Thus, this matter
is fully briefed and is ripe for review.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
According to the allegations of the Complaint, on July 2,
2014, Georgetown Police Officer Richard Williams responded to a
call for assistance at 1075 Degaris Mill Rd. #18 in Georgetown,
Kentucky [DE 1-1, Complaint at ¶5].
When Officer Williams arrived
at the residence, Plaintiff was on a couch inside the apartment
Although Plaintiff lived in the same apartment complex,
this particular apartment was not her own [Id.].
told Plaintiff that she had to leave and that he would walk her to
her own residence which was located in apartment #25 in the same
After Plaintiff indicated that she did not want to
leave, Officer Williams threatened to arrest her [Id. at ¶6].
this time, Plaintiff agreed to walk back to her residence [Id.].
After Plaintiff left the apartment and reached the bottom
Williams kicked Plaintiff’s feet and legs, causing her to hit the
ground and causing severe pain [Id. at ¶7].
Once Plaintiff was on
the ground, Officer Williams placed his left knee across her back
When Plaintiff begin to question the police action and
complain of pain and injuries, Officer Williams charged her with
resisting arrest and disorderly conduct [Id. at ¶8].
Officer Williams then placed Plaintiff in a police car and
transported her to the Scott County Detention Center [Id. at ¶9].
The Detention Center refused to take her due to her intoxicated
state and directed that she be taken to the Georgetown Community
Hospital for evaluation [Id.].
After the evaluation, Plaintiff
was transported back to the Detention Center by Officer Williams
for booking, arriving at the Detention Center on July 3, 2014 at
approximately 1:12 a.m. [Id. at ¶10].
When Officer Williams
reached the sally port, he reached into the car and grabbed
Plaintiff by her hands, which were still handcuffed behind her
back, pulling her hands almost over her head and yanking her
aggressively out of the vehicle [Id.].
Officer Williams refused
assistance from the Detention Center staff when offered [Id.].
Officer Williams then walked Plaintiff inside to the booking
area and, while grasping Plaintiff’s handcuffed hands with one
hand, took his other hand to Plaintiff’s head, slamming her face
into the counter in the booking area and causing physical injuries
to Plaintiff [Id. at ¶11].
The Detention Staff called the Scott
County EMS for treatment of Plaintiff’s injuries [Id. at ¶12].
The EMS team evaluated Plaintiff and advised that she would need
further medical care at the hospital [Id.].
refused to allow the EMS team to transport Plaintiff back to the
Hospital himself [Id.].
After evaluation, it was determined that
Plaintiff had suffered lacerations to her face, nasal fracture,
and inflamed paranasal sinuses [Id. at ¶13].
received appropriate treatment [Id.].
Plaintiff further alleges that, in an attempt to cover up and
conceal these actions, Officer Williams, his supervisors and the
additional felony charges and submitting reports claiming that
Plaintiff’s injuries were the result of an accident caused by her
intoxication [Id. at ¶14].
Plaintiff also alleges that, as a
result of the blow to her head inflicted by Officer Williams, she
“lost all memory temporarily of the events at the jail” [Id. at ¶
She claims that, after being released from the Detention
Center, she began to ask about what happened and how she was
department withheld and did not make the reports submitted by
Officer Williams describing the events surrounding her arrest
September 2, 2014 [Id.].
She also alleges that she did not receive
a copy of the jail video tape showing the alleged assault, battery
and civil rights violations and, was therefore unaware of the
actions of Defendants until on or after August 1, 2014 [Id. at ¶
Based on these allegations, on July 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed
Williams’s actions establish a cause of action for violation of
specifically false arrest, false imprisonment, assault, battery,
use of excessive force, fraud, abuse of authority, and malicious
prosecution [Id. at ¶15].
She further alleges that, as Officer
Williams’s employer, the City of Georgetown and the Georgetown
Police Department are also liable [Id.].
Plaintiff also alleges
that the City of Georgetown and the Georgetown Police Department
failed to properly train, supervise and/or discipline Officer
Plaintiff, which was and is a proximate and direct cause of her
serious physical injuries, as well as the violation of her rights
[Id. at ¶16].
Defendants filed a Notice of Removal of this action on August
6, 2015 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441, as it is a civil
action wherein Plaintiff alleges that her action arises under the
laws of the United States, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [DE 1].
Defendants have now filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
arguing that Plaintiff failed to file this action within one year
from the date nearly all of her causes of action accrued and,
accordingly, these causes of action are barred by the statute of
limitations; Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim is not yet
ripe; and Plaintiffs claims for fraud and municipal liability are
insufficiently pled [DE 7].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“After the pleadings are closed[,]...a party may move for
judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “For purposes
material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must
be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving
party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.” JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007)
(quoting S. Ohio Bank v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 479 F.2d 478, 480 (6th Cir. 1973)).
“A Rule 12(c) motion is
granted when no material issue of fact exists and the party making
the motion is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 582
(quoting Paskvan v. City of Cleveland Civil Serv. Comm’n, 946 F.2d
1233, 1235 (6th Cir. 1991))(internal quotation marks omitted).
The standard of review applied to a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadsings “is the same as that for a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”
EEOC v. J.H. Routh
Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 851 (6th Cir.2001).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests
the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint.
The Court views the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and must
accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations contained
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
A. Dismissal of Georgetown Police Department
As an initial matter, Defendants have correctly noted that
the Georgetown Police Department is a city police department and
Hornback v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Co. Gov’t., 905 F.Supp.2d 747,
749 (E.D.Ky. 2012).
Plaintiff did not address this argument in
her response, apparently conceding the issue.
As Plaintiff has
not objected, the Georgetown Police Department shall be dismissed
as a party.
B. Statute of Limitations
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims must be
“The statute of limitations applicable to a § 1983
action is the state statute of limitations applicable to personal
injury actions under the law of the state in which the § 1983 claim
Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dept. of Children’s Servs., 510
F.3d 631, 634 (2007) (citing Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. Cnty. of Geauga,
103 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 1997)).
In Kentucky, the statute
requires all personal injury actions to be brought within one year
after the cause of action accrues.
KRS § 413.140(1)(a); see also
Bonner v. Perry, 564 F.3d 424, 430—31 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding
that Kentucky’s one year statute of limitations period applies to
§ 1983 actions).
Although the applicable statute of limitations is determined
by state law, the “date on which the statute of limitations begins
to run in a § 1983 action is a question of federal law.”
510 F.3d at 635 (citing Kuhnle Bros., Inc., 103 F.3d at 519).
Generally, federal law prescribes that accrual occurs “when the
plaintiff has ‘a complete and present cause of action,’ that is,
when ‘the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.’”
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (quoting Bay Area Laundry & Dry
Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192,
“State law claims for false arrest and false imprisonment,
which constitutes a single cause of action in Kentucky when law
enforcement is involved, as well as assault and battery arising
out of an arrest, generally accrue at the time of the arrest.”
Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007).
date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that
is not resolved by reference to state law.”
388 (emphasis in original).
Wallace, 594 U.S. at
Under federal law, accrual occurs
“when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action...,
that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.”
(internal citations omitted).
“A § 1983 claim for excessive force
in effectuating an arrest accrues at the time of arrest,” and “a
claim for wrongful arrest under § 1983 accrues at the time of the
arrest or, at the latest, when detention without legal process
Fox, 489 F.3d at 233 (citing Wallace, 127 S.Ct. at 1095-
Applying these rules to this case, the events alleged in the
Complaint begin when Officer Williams responded to the call for
assistance at the apartment complex at approximately 11:15 p.m. on
July 2, 2014 [DE 1-1, Complaint at ¶ 5] and continue into the early
morning hours of July 3, 2014 [Id. at ¶ 10].
Thus, it is not
entirely clear from the allegations whether Plaintiff was actually
arrested on July 2 or July 3, 2014.
Giving Plaintiff the benefit
of the doubt and assuming, for purposes of this motion, that she
was arrested on July 3, 2014, her § 1983 claims for false arrest,
false imprisonment, assault, battery and use of excessive force
all accrued on July 3, 2014.
Plaintiff did not file her Complaint
in the Scott Circuit Court until July 9, 2015 [DE 1-1, Complaint].
Thus, her claims are untimely.
Plaintiff also asserts a claim for “abuse of authority” in
violation of her rights under § 1983.
As noted by Defendants, the
existence of an independent cause of action under § 1983 for abuse
of authority as a constitutional violation is unclear. Regardless,
constitute an “abuse of authority,” after July 3, 2014.
all of her § 1983 claims are based on her allegations of the events
occurring on July 2-3, 2014.
Thus, to the extent that this claim
exists, it would also have accrued on July 3, 2014.
this claim is also untimely.
limitations bar, Plaintiff argues that she has pled fraud on behalf
of Defendants, in that they conspired to hide their action by
filing false police reports, wrongfully arresting Plaintiff, and
falsely attributing her injuries to her intoxication.
points to her allegation that Defendants continued the fraud upon
her by failing to provide documents to her regarding her arrest
until September 2, 2014 and by failing to provide a copy of the
video tape of her jail visit until August 1, 2014 and argues that
should could not have found out what happened to her until after
August 1, 2014, thus her cause of action did not accrue until after
She also argues that, because she has alleged fraud,
the five-year limitation period provided by KRS § 413.120(11)
applies, rather than the one-year limitation provided by KRS §
actions of Officer Williams “constitute...fraud...in violation of
Tidabacks [sic] rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the same is plead
Thus, Plaintiff pled fraud as a § 1983 claim, not
as a separate state law claim. 1
“The Supreme Court, in a series
of cases, has determined that federal courts should ‘borrow and
Moreover, as noted by Defendants, to the extent that Plaintiff
argues that she has alleged “fraud” as a separate cause of action,
“fraud” by itself is not a federal cause of action and is instead
subsumed within Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.
apply to all § 1983 claims the one most analogous state statute of
limitations of limitations.’”
Bonner, 564 F.3d at 430 (6th Cir.
2009)(quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)). In Owens,
the Supreme Court noted that the Court had previously attempted to
address confusion over the appropriate limitations period for §
1983 claims in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, (1985), explaining
that “[b]ecause ‘§ 1983 claims are best characterized as personal
injury actions,’ we held that a State’s personal injury statute of
limitations should be applied to all § 1983 claims.”
U.S. at 240-41 (quoting Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280).
Court in Owens further clarified that “where state law provides
multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions,
courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the general or
residual statute for personal injury actions.”
Id. at 249-50.
Thus, Kentucky’s one-year limitations period for personal injury
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, including her claim for fraud, not the
five-year limitations period provided for fraud claims by KRS §
Plaintiff also attempts to save her § 1983 claims by referring
to her allegation that “as a result of the blow to her head that
was inflicted by Williams, Tidaback lost all memory temporarily of
the events at the jail” [DE 1-1, Complaint at ¶16].
argues that this memory loss qualifies as a disability for purposes
of KRS § 413.170(1), which provides:
[i]f a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in
KRS 413.090 to 413.160, except for a penalty or
forfeiture, was, at the time the cause of action accrued,
an infant or of unsound mind, the action may be brought
within the same number of years after the removal of the
disability or death of the person, whichever happens
first, allowed to a person without the disability to
bring the action after the right accrued.
KRS § 413.170(1).
Plaintiff is correct that, under Kentucky law, the statute of
limitations for a cause of action for personal injury is tolled if
Plaintiff is “of unsound mind” at the time the cause of action
See Powell v. Jacor Communications Corporate, 320 F.3d
599, 603-604 (6th Cir. 2003).
“The term ‘unsound mind’ within the
meaning of KRS 413.170(1) has been interpreted by [the Kentucky
Supreme Court] to mean that the person claiming the disability
must show that he has been rendered incapable of managing his own
Rigazio v. Archdiocese of Louisville, 853 S.W.2d 295,
297 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993)(citing Southeastern Kentucky Baptist Hosp.
v. Gaylor, Ky., 756 S.W.2d 467 (1988)).
However, Plaintiff’s vague allegation of “temporary memory
loss” with respect to the events at the jail do not equal an
allegation of “unsound mind” sufficient to toll the statute of
limitations under KRS § 413.170(1).
Plaintiff does not allege any
specific facts regarding her memory loss, such as the duration and
severity of the memory loss.
Nor does she allege any facts to
support a finding that she had been rendered incapable of managing
her own affairs.
Indeed, she specifically alleges that after her
release, she began to inquire about what happened to her and the
source of her injuries, suggesting that she was capable of at least
understanding that she may have a potential cause of action [DE 11, Complaint at ¶17].
In fact, it is only in response to Defendants’ Motion to
Plaintiff has been diagnosed with neurocognitive impairment due to
traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress disorder, that
she has an IQ of 75, and that she suffers mild cognitive impairment
regarding the basis for these assertions, such as details regarding
when Plaintiff was diagnosed and by whom.
Moreover, none of this
information was pled in her Complaint and her effort to raise it
only in response to a statute of limitations argument, and with no
evidentiary support, is questionable at best.
Regardless, this Court must examine Plaintiff’s allegations
as pled in her Complaint, which only vaguely allege temporary
While Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 requires only that a pleading
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.3d 562 (6th Cir.2009)(internal citations
Moreover, the factual allegations set forth in the
complaint must “raise a right to relief beyond the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s
vague allegation of temporary memory loss is insufficient to
support tolling the limitations period of her § 1983 claims due to
“unsound mind.” Thus, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief pursuant
to KRS § 413.170(1).
For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s §
battery, use of excessive force, fraud and abuse of authority are
untimely and, accordingly, will be dismissed.
C. Plaintiff’s Malicious Prosecution Claim
Plaintiff has also alleged a malicious prosecution claim
under § 1983.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has outlined
four elements that a plaintiff must prove to succeed on a § 1983
malicious prosecution claim:
(1) a criminal prosecution was initiated against the
plaintiff, and the defendant made influenced, or
participated in the decision to prosecute; (2) there was
a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution;
(3) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty, as
understood under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, apart
from the initial seizure; and (4) the criminal
proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff's favor.
Sanders v. Jones, 845 F.3d 721, 728 (6th Cir. 2017), as amended on
denial of reh'g (Mar. 20, 2017)(citing Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d
294, 308-309 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Here, Plaintiff’s criminal case in the Scott Circuit Court is
Accordingly, her potential claim for malicious
prosecution is not ripe and will be dismissed without prejudice
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) as the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over these claims.
See Norton v. Ashcroft,
298 F.3d 547, 554 (6th Cir.2002)(citing Bigelow v. Michigan Dep't
of Natural Res., 970 F.2d 154, 160 (6th Cir.1992))(“A court lacks
jurisdiction over the subject matter if a claim is not yet ripe
for judicial review.”); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977)(holding that the court has an
independent duty “to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as
to the existence of federal jurisdiction).
D. Plaintiff’s Fraud Claim
As held above, Plaintiff’s fraud claim is subsumed by her §
1983 claims and, accordingly, is dismissed as untimely.
to the extent that Plaintiff attempts to state a claim for fraud
under Kentucky state law, she fails to plead fraud with sufficient
In alleging fraud, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b) requires a party to state with particularity the circumstances
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see also Bennett v. MIS
Corp., 607 F.3d 1076, 1100 (6th Cir. 2010).
To be pled with
particularity, the complaint must “(1) specify the statements that
the plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker,
(3) state where and when the statements were made, and (4) explain
why the statements were fraudulent.”
Indiana State Dist. Council
of Laborers and Hod Carriers Pension and Welfare Fund v. Omnicare,
Inc., 583 F.3d 935, 942-43 (6th Cir. 2009)(quotation marks and
Thus, while the Sixth Circuit reads Rule 9(b)
“liberally” it nevertheless requires that “a plaintiff, at a
minimum...allege the time, place, and content of the alleged
misrepresentation on which he or she relied; the fraudulent scheme;
the fraudulent intent of the defendants; and the injury resulting
from the fraud.” Coffey v. Foamex L.P., 2 F.3d 157, 161-162 (6th
When faced with a motion to dismiss for failure to plead fraud
“with particularity” as required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules
simplicity in pleading which the drafters of the Federal Rules
codified in Rule 8” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A., 848 F.2d 674, 679 (6th
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a “short
and plain statement of the claim,” and calls for “simple, concise,
requirement must be “read in harmony” with Rule 8.
purpose of Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement is to provide the
defendant fair notice of the substance of the plaintiff's claim in
order that the defendant may prepare a responsive pleading.
Here, in support of her fraud claim, Plaintiff alleges that
“[i]n an attempt to cover up and conceal these actions Williams,
his supervisors and the other Defendants conspired and committed
fraud by adding additional felony charges and submitted reports
claiming that [Plaintiff’s] injuries were the result of an accident
caused by her intoxication” [DE 1-1, Complaint at ¶ 14].
bare allegations fail to allege the “time, place and manner” of
the purported fraud with particularity.
For example, although
charges, she fails to identify any felony charges, much less those
that she purports were added fraudulently. Neither does she allege
any facts to establish that these unidentified felony charges were
Similarly, although Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
regarding to whom and when such reports were purportedly made.
purportedly false statements were made to her, or that she relied
on them to act, or refrain from acting, in a way that caused any
injury to her.
Plaintiff’s vague allegations simply fail to state
her claim of fraud with particularity, thus Plaintiff’s fraud claim
fails to state a claim.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s fraud claim is
E. Municipal Liability of the City of Georgetown
In addition to her claims against Officer Williams, Plaintiff
alleges that the City of Georgetown and the Georgetown Police
Department “failed to properly train, supervise and/or discipline
[Plaintiff], which was and is a proximate and direct cause of the
[Plaintiff]” [DE 1-1, Complaint at ¶ 16].
In order to recover on
a § 1983 municipal liability claim, Plaintiff must show that the
alleged violations of her civil rights occurred pursuant to and as
a direct result of an official and unconstitutional municipal
policy, practice, or custom; there can be no liability under a
theory of respondeat superior.
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Matthews v. Jones, 35
F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir.1994); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.
808, 822–23 (1985).
Plaintiff must demonstrate a direct causal
connection between a policy or a custom of the Government and the
Plaintiffs' alleged injuries.
Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823; Johnson v.
Hardin Cnty., Kentucky, 908 F.2d 1280, 1285 (6th Cir.1990).
plaintiff's failure to demonstrate constitutional harm defeats
City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796,
“To establish municipal liability pursuant to § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege an unconstitutional action that ‘implements
or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers' or a
‘constitutional deprivation [ ] visited pursuant to governmental
custom even though such a custom has not received formal approval
through the body's official decisionmaking channels.’”
Gallia County, Ohio, 753 F.3d 639, 660 (6th Cir. 2014)(quoting
Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 338 F.3d 535, 556 (6th Cir.2003)).
to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a
plaintiff must adequately plead (1) that a violation of a federal
right took place, (2) that the defendants acted under color of
state law, and (3) that a municipality's policy or custom caused
that violation to happen.” Bright, 753 F.3d at 660 (citing Lambert
v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir.2008)).
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for false arrest, false imprisonment,
assault, battery, use of excessive force, fraud, and abuse of
authority fail, as they are barred by the statute of limitations.
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a municipal liability claim,
as she can allege no constitutional harm.
In addition, Plaintiff’s Complaint makes the bare allegation
that the City of Georgetown “failed to properly train, supervise,
and/or discipline Williams in the treatment and care of individuals
including Plaintiff” [DE 1-1, Complaint at ¶ 16].
allegation fails to identify any sort of policy or custom of the
City of Georgetown pursuant to which Officer Williams was allegedly
acting, much less identify facts to support a finding that this
claim does not meet the minimal requirements of factual specificity
and sufficiency “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level,” and is subject to dismissal on this basis.
U.S. at 545.
Accordingly, this claim is dismissed.
For the reasons stated above, IT IS ORDERED:
(1) that Defendant Georgetown Police Department is DISMISSED
as a party;
(2) that Defendants Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [DE
7] shall be GRANTED;
(3) that Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution shall be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
that all scheduled proceedings are CONTINUED GENERALLY;
that all pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT; and
that this Order is FINAL AND APPEALABLE and THERE IS
NO JUST CAUSE FOR DELAY.
This the 31st day of March, 2017.
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