Zeefe v. American Heritage Life Insurance Company
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: (1) Dft's 8 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. (2) Pla's wrongful termination claim (Count III) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Karen K. Caldwell on April 20, 2016. (AWD) cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
AT LEXINGTON
KEVIN ZEEFE,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15-cv-303-KKC
Plaintiff,
V.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
AMERICAN HERITAGE LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant American Heritage Life Insurance
Company’s (“AHL”) Motion to Dismiss. (DE 43). For the reasons set forth below the Court
will grant Defendant’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
AHL removed this action from Woodford Circuit Court on October 12, 2015. (DE 1.)
Plaintiff Kevin Zeefe’s (“Zeefe”) state court complaint alleges that AHL wrongfully denied
his disability claim, breached its duty of good faith, and wrongfully terminated his license
to sell AHL insurance products. (DE 1-2.) In December of 2010, Plaintiff purchased an
Individual Disability Income Policy from AHL, for whom Zeefe was then licensed to sell
insurance products. (DE 1-2 at 5.) Plaintiff suffered a shoulder injury which required
surgeries he claims left him incapable of working from November 2012 through May 2014.
(DE 1-2 at 6.) Plaintiff filed a claim for disability benefits with AHL on November 1, 2012.
(DE 1-2 at 6.) Benefits were paid under the AHL policy initially, but were denied thereafter.
(DE 1-2 at 6.) On July 12, 2013, AHL terminated Plaintiff’s license to sell its products. (DE
1-2 at 6.) Plaintiff claims AHL’s actions constituted retaliation for a properly asserted claim
under his personal disability policy. (DE 1-2.) This conduct purportedly violated state and
federal anti-retaliation laws. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3; KRS § 280(1).
II. ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court may dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) if the plaintiff fails to provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The court must
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all factual
allegations as true, but the factual allegations must “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Id. at 555. The complaint must “contain either direct or inferential
allegations respecting all material elements necessary for recovery under a viable legal
theory.” D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 383 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Failure to include plausible factual allegations for all material elements necessary
for recovery warrants dismissal. Id.
B. EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT
With its motion, AHL only seeks dismissal of Zeefe’s wrongful termination claims
under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (“KCRA”), KRS §344.280(1), and Title VII of the
Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3. These state and federal statutes prohibit
employer retaliation against employees that have asserted legally valid claims. See 42
U.S.C. §2000e-3; KRS §344.280(1). Kentucky courts have held that the same analysis is
applicable to claims under Title VII and the KCRA. See Jefferson Cnty. v. Zaring, 91 S.W.3d
583, 590 (Ky. 2002).
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AHL originally sought dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction resulting from
Zeefe’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. However, absent express legislative
intent to the contrary, exhaustion is not a prerequisite to this Court’s exercising
jurisdiction. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (“We hold that
filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to
suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to
waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”). Nonetheless, exhaustion of administrative
remedies remains a prerequisite to bringing a retaliation claim. See Scott v. Eastman
Chem. Co., 275 F. App'x 466, 470 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted) (“As a
prerequisite to bringing suit under Title VII, a claimant must exhaust his or her
administrative remedies.”).
This is not a case where it would be “unduly harsh” to dismiss the Plaintiff's
complaint; Plaintiff not only failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing
suit, but also has offered no evidence of an attempt to pursue such remedies since. Compare
Dickerson v. Associates Home Equity, 13 Fed. Appx. 323, 324 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Parry v.
Mohawk Motors of Michigan, Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 310 (6th Cir .2000) (claim made under
Americans with Disabilities Act)). Likewise, this Court can find no evidence of, and the
Plaintiff makes no argument for any grounds justifying waiver, estoppel or equitable tolling
of the exhaustion requirement. See Rivers v. Barberton Bd. Of Educ., 143 F.3d 1029, 1031–
32 (6th Cir. 1998). Under these circumstances, exhaustion remains a condition precedent to
filing a retaliation claim. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(1). Consequently, Plaintiff’s failure to
file a claim with the EEOC prevents him from stating a claim upon which relief could be
granted.
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Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (DE 9) is GRANTED; and
2. Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim, (DE 1-2 at 8–9 (“COUNT III”) is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Dated April 20, 2016.
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