Heath v. Quintana et al
Filing
9
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1. Petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 2. This Action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court's docket. 3. Judgment shall be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Karen K. Caldwell on 4/12/16.(LC)cc: COR, Petitioner via US Mail
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
at LEXINGTON
DAVID WAYNE HEATH,
Petitioner,
Civil Action No. 5: 15-354-KKC
V.
FRANCISCO QUINTANA, Warden,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Respondent.
AND ORDER
*** *** *** ***
Inmate David Wayne Heath is confined at the Federal Medical Center in Lexington,
Kentucky. Proceeding without counsel, Heath has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the method used by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
to calculate the amount of the payments he must make against his restitution obligation if
he wishes to do so under the Inmate Financial Responsibility Plan (“IFRP”). [R. 1]
The Court conducts an initial review of habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2243;
Alexander v. Northern Bureau of Prisons, 419 F. App’x 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011). A petition
will be denied “if it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts (applicable to § 2241 petitions pursuant to Rule 1(b)). The Court
evaluates Heath’s petition under a more lenient standard because he is not represented by
an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). At this stage of the proceedings, the
Court accepts the petitioner’s factual allegations as true and construes all legal claims in his
favor. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
Heath committed several bank robberies in Kansas between 2001 and 2006, United
States v. Heath, No. 6: 01-CR-10030-JTM-1 (D. Kan. 2001); United States v. Heath, No. 6: 06CR-10030-MLB-1 (D. Kan. 2006), and was arrested in 2013 after he committed three more
such robberies in Oklahoma. He pled guilty to a single count of robbery in violation 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a), and was sentenced to a 151-month term of imprisonment. United States v. Heath,
No. 5: 13-CR-102-D-1 / 5:13-CR-154-D-1 (W.D. Okl. 2013).
In his petition, Heath complains that while the 2013 judgment against him directed
that he must make payments of ten percent of his quarterly earnings against his $43,000
restitution obligation, the BOP has indicated that if he wishes to participate in the IFRP, he
must make payments equal to fifty percent of his monthly income. [R. 1 at 4, 5]
As part of Heath’s judgment, the sentencing court directed that:
Having assessed the defendant’s ability to pay, payment of the total criminal
monetary penalties shall be due as follows:
...
F.
... If restitution is not paid immediately, the defendant shall make
payments of 10% of the defendant’s quarterly earnings during the term of
imprisonment.
[R. 1-3 at 2] Heath contends that under the IFRP, the BOP is required to calculate his
payments as set forth in the judgment because it set forth a specific payment plan. [R. 1-1
at 2-3]
The IFRP is a program to encourage inmates to meet their financial obligations. 28
C.F.R. §§ 545.10-545.11; Program Statement 5380.08 (2005). Participation in the program is
entirely voluntary, but if the inmate refuses to participate, he will lose various privileges,
including bonus pay or vacation pay, higher spending limits at the commissary, and access
2
to better housing assignments. 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d)(1)-(11). Because Heath is employed at
UNICOR Grade 3 [R. 1-1 at 2], if he wishes to make payments under the IFRP he must “allot
not less than 50% of [his] monthly pay to the payment process.” 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(b)(2).
Heath’s arguments are premised upon his belief that the 2013 judgment mandated
that he participate in the IFRP, thus rendering his participation involuntary, and that it
established the amount of his payments under the IFRP. He is mistaken on both counts.
The 2013 judgment required that he make minimum restitution payments of ten percent of
his quarterly earnings [R. 1-3 at 2], but only recommended that he make payments pursuant
to the IFRP. United States v. Heath, No. 5: 13-CR-102-D-1 / 5:13-CR-154-D-1 (W.D. Okl.
2013) [R. 18 at 2 (“The Court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:
Inmate Financial Responsibility Program at a rate determined by the Bureau of Prisons with
the requirements of the program.”)]
Such recommendations, like the trial court’s
recommendation that Heath be housed at the Federal Medical Center in Springfield,
Missouri and that he be allowed to participate in the Residential Drug Abuse Program, are
not binding upon the BOP. Indeed, because “the IFRP is a voluntary program ... an order
compelling an inmate’s participation is plain error.” United States v. McKnight, 665 F.3d
786, 795 (7th Cir. 2011).
Instead, the judgment’s requirement that Heath pay ten percent of his quarterly
earnings towards his restitution obligation established the minimum payment he must make
regardless of whether he chose to participate in the IFRP. The IFRP is designed to provide
inmates with additional incentives to make payments upon their restitution obligation
consistent with their ability to do so. Thus, the BOP has in no way required Heath to pay
more than is required by the judgment - it has rather indicated that if he wished to participate
3
in the IFRP (which he is not obligated to do) he must make payments consistent with the
amounts required by the IFRP in Program Statement 5380.08. See United States v. Lemoine,
546 F. 3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The MVRA does not prohibit an inmate from
voluntarily making larger or more frequent payments than what was set by the sentencing
court. Nor does it limit the authority of the BOP, through the IFRP, to offer incentives to
inmates to pay their restitution obligations in larger amounts or at a faster rate than the
court has required.”).
Nor is Heath’s participation in the IFRP rendered involuntary simply because the
BOP imposes costs upon him should he choose not to participate. The benefits withdrawn if
he does not participate are privileges, not rights. Lemoine, 546 F. 3d at 1046 (“We also reject
Lemoine’s argument that his participation in the IFRP was involuntary because he would
have been denied certain privileges if he had refused to join the program. Lemoine did not
have a preexisting right to receive any of the benefits conditioned on his participation during
his incarceration, and the consequences the BOP imposes on inmates who refuse to
participate in the IFRP are reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest of
rehabilitation.”); see also Tisthammer v. Walton, 542 F. App’x 521, 522-23 (7th Cir. 2013)
(BOP does not improperly compel participation in the IFRP by denying privileges to inmates
who opt out); United States v. Snyder, 601 F. App’x 67, 70-71 (3d Cir. 2015).
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
1.
David Wayne Heath’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 [R. 1] is DENIED.
4
2.
This action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court’s docket.
3.
Judgment shall be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum
Opinion and Order.
Dated April 12, 2016.
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?