Harris v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: (1) Pla's 10 Motion to Amend her Complaint is DENIED. (2) Dfts' 8 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on September 30, 2016. (AWD) cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DIVISION OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON
CHARMEAIRRIA HARRIS,

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Plaintiff,
v.
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN
COUNTY GOVERNMENT, et al.,
Defendants.

Action No.
5:15-cv-367-JMH
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

***
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss [DE 8], to which Plaintiff has filed a Response [DE 9]
stating her objections and in further support of which Defendants
have filed a Reply [DE 11].

Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to

Amend her Complaint [DE 10], to which Defendants have filed a
Response [DE 12], stating their objections, and in further support
of which Plaintiff has filed a Reply [DE 13].
Defendants’

Motion

to

Dismiss

[DE

8]

As set forth below,

shall

be

granted

as

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim, and Plaintiff’s
Motion to Amend shall be denied as

amendment would not prevent

dismissal on the same grounds.1

1

Defendants have also filed a Motion to Take Judicial Notice of Certain Public
Documents in Support of Motion to Dismiss [DE 6], to which Plaintiff makes no
objection, but which addresses materials not necessary to the resolution of the
Motions to Dismiss or Amend the Complaint. This Motion shall be denied as moot.

I.
Plaintiff

brings

this

putative

class

action

against

Defendants Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (“LFUCG”) and
Rodney Ballard, Director of Community of Corrections, in his
individual

capacity,

on

behalf

of

all

persons

who,

while

incarcerated or detained at the LFUCG jail have been wronged by
the policy, custom, or practice of charging persons admitted to
the jail for the costs of their incarceration without due process
of law.

Plaintiff’s Complaint claims that she was injured when

the LFUCG jail retained funds held for her by the jail while she
was detained to cover the cost of her confinement under KRS
441.265, which does not require entry of a court order before
assessing such charges.
a

county

jail

shall

be

KRS 441.265 provides that a “prisoner in
required

by

the

sentencing

court

to

reimburse the county for expenses incurred by reason of the
prisoner’s confinement as set out in this section, except for good
cause shown.”2

Specifically, she avers in Count I of her Complaint

that the collection of these fees in the absence of a court order
is a deprivation of property without due process of law and
violates the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Fourth Amendment’s provision against unreasonable searches
and seizures, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3
Her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails as a matter of law in
light of Sickles v. Campbell Cty., 439 F. Supp. 2d 751, 755 (E.D.
2

Ky. 2006) aff'd, 501 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2007) ("May a municipal
jail, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, withhold a portion of an inmate’s canteen-account in
order to cover the costs of booking, room and board without
providing the inmate with a hearing before it withholds the money.
Yes, we hold, and accordingly we affirm the district court’s
rejection of this claim and two others.”); see also Jones v. Clark
Cty., Kentucky, Action No. 5:15-cv-350-JMH, 2016 WL 1050743 (Mar.
11, 2016) (addressing nearly identical issue as presented in the
present case).

In Sickles, the money that pretrial detainees had

on their person was confiscated upon detention and placed in
canteen accounts, in addition to any money provided by relatives
or friends, and the canteen accounts were debited a fee for booking
and a per diem fee for housing.
Looking

to

KRS

411.265(6)

Sickles, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 755.

(which

provides

for

the

automatic

deduction of fees from a prisoner’s account) and the definition of
“prisoner” in KRS 441.005(3)(c)4 (which includes not just convicted
individuals, but any person confined and charged with an offense),
the Court held that “the correct reading of [KRS 441.265] is that
the fees may be imposed as soon as the prisoner is booked into the
jail and may be periodically deducted from the prisoner’s account

4

“Prisoner” is defined as “any person confined in jail pursuant to any code,
ordinance, law, or statute of any unit of government and who is: (a) Charged
with or convicted of an offense; or (b) Held for extradition or as a material
witness; or (c) Confined for any other reason.” KRS § 441.005(3).

3

as provided by local regulation.”

Sickles, 439 F. Supp. 2d at

755. The Sickles Court further concluded that “[s]ince the statute
is valid, the inmate owes fees that begin to accrue immediately
upon his or her being booked into the jail.”

Id.

The reference

to “sentencing court” in KRS 411.265(1), according to Sickles, is
to allow the court to impose a judgment for any deficiency at
sentencing which was not defrayed by automatic deduction.

Id.

While Harris believes that the district court’s opinion in
Sickles is “just plainly, demonstrably wrong,” [DE 9 at 93], “this
[C]ourt cannot ignore binding precedent” from the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals.

Willoughby v. Simpson, No. 08-179-DLB, 2014 WL

4269115, at *32 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 29, 2014).

As this Court has noted,

“[a]bsent a clear directive from the Supreme Court or a decision
of the Court of Appeals sitting en banc , . . . a district court,
is not at liberty to reverse the circuit's precedent.”

Id.

(quoting Hall v. Eichenlaub, 559 F.Supp.2d 777, 781–82 (E.D. Mich.
2008)).

Further, to the extent that Harris believed it would

change the legal calculus in this matter, the Kentucky Supreme
Court has declined to grant discretionary review in Cole v. Warren
Cty., Kentucky, No. 2014-CA-000778, No. 2014-CA-000812-MR (stating
in dicta that Kentucky Court of Appeals would conclude, if asked,
that KRS 441.265 does not violate constitutional guarantee of due
process).

4

In

other

words,

Plaintiff’s

claim

cannot

survive

an

application of the law to the facts, even if the Court accepts the
facts averred as true.
for

a

motion

to

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (providing

dismiss

which

tests

the

sufficiency

of

a

plaintiff’s complaint; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555-56, 570 (2007), (only a claim which is “plausible on its
face” will survive dismissal and factual allegations in a complaint
“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint
are true (even if doubtful in fact).”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that a court must accept as true
all of the well-pleaded factual allegations contained in the
complaint and that “[a] claim is plausible when it contains facts
that allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.”); Weisbarth v.
Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 542 (6th Cir. 2007). Accordingly,
her claims in Count I will be dismissed with prejudice.
II.
Since Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded her substantive
claim in Count I as set forth above, the Court has no basis upon
which to issue declaratory relief, and therefore, Plaintiff’s
claim seeking a declaratory judgment is dismissed.

Int'l Ass'n of

Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 108 F.3d
658, 668 (6th Cir. 1997).

Similarly, because Plaintiff cannot
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establish that in the absence of an injunction, she or anyone else
will suffer irreparable harm with no remedy at law, an injunction
is not appropriate either.

Plaintiff’s claims under federal law

in Counts VII and IX also fail and must be dismissed under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
III.
Finally,

the

Court

declines

to

exercise

supplemental

jurisdiction over her remaining state law claims in Counts II
through IX.

These claims shall be dismissed without prejudice.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection
(a) if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which
it has original jurisdiction. . . .”).
Accordingly, for all of the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that:
(1)

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend her Complaint [DE 10] is

DENIED;
(2)

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [DE 8] is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART.
This the 30th day of September, 2016.

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