May v. Blackhawk Mining, LLC

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 10 is DENIED; (2) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 10 is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 7/6/2016.(STC)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON
JEREMY MAY,

)

Action No. 5:15-CV-377-JMH

)
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

v.

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)

BLACKHAWK MINING, LLC,

)
)

Defendant.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

)

ORDER

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Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment [DE 10-1], pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56, respectively. For the
reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED
and the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

I. Background
Plaintiff, Jeremy May, alleges, and Defendant does not deny,
that Plaintiff was dismissed from his employment at the Blackhawk
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Mining site in Printer, Kentucky on December 14, 2015. [DE 1, 10,
19]. Plaintiff further alleges that he and the other employees at
the Printer facility were dismissed by Defendant without notice.
[DE 1, 19]. Defendant, Blackhawk Mining, LLC, is a Kentucky
corporation with its principal place of business in Lexington,
Kentucky,

and

which

employed,

according

to

Plaintiff,

approximately 200 full-time employees at the Printer facility. [DE
1]. Thus, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated the Worker’s
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (“the WARN Act”), 29
U.S.C. §2101, et seq., requiring workers to receive 60-day advanced
notice of plant facility closing or mass layoff. [DE 19]; see 29
U.S.C. §2102. Plaintiff filed his complaint with this Court on
December

18,

2015,

and

the

Court

issued

a

decision

denying

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary
Judgment at the conclusion of the hearing convened in this matter
on July 5, 2016. [DE 10].

This Memorandum Opinion and Order

memorializes the reasoning behind that decision.

II. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard and Analysis
The

propriety

of

the

Defendant’s

Rule

12(b)(6)

motion

requires this Court to “construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Jones
v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F2d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2008). However,
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a complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level,” and the complaint
should be dismissed unless the “plain statement” required under
Rule 8(a) “possess[es] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
557, (2007). Additionally, this Court is not required to accept as
true the Plaintiff’s “recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, and this Court will dismiss a complaint
if the factual allegations alleged insufficiently raise “a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(internal citations omitted). That said, a well-pleaded complaint
may survive a motion to dismiss even if the facts it states are
improbable. Id., 550 U.S. at 556.
To state a claim for Defendant’s violation of the WARN Act,
Plaintiff must, at a minimum, establish that he did not receive
timely notice of his employment loss before Defendant ordered the
closing of the facility at which Plaintiff was employed. See 29
U.S.C. §1202. With some exceptions and conditions, the WARN Act
forbids employer of 100 or more employees to order plant closing
until end of 60-day period after employer serves written notice of
such order. Saxion v. Titan-C-Manufacturing, Inc., 86 F.3d 553
(6th Cir. 1996). Under WARN, when an affected employee's layoff
date is earlier than the date of the plant shutdown, the employer
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is required to give the affected employee notice of the closing 60
days before the date of that employee's layoff.

United Mine

Workers of America v. Martinka Coal Co., 202 F.3d 717 (4th Cir.
2000). Plaintiff has plead that Defendant employed in excess of
100 employees and failed to give timely notice of the plant
facility closing or mass layoff. [DE 1]. Construing Plaintiff’s
complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has
established a plausible claim satisfying the prima facie elements
of a violation of the WARN Act, upon which this Court can grant
relief. As such, Plaintiff’s claims must survive Defendants’ Rule
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.

III. Rule 56 Standard and Analysis
In the Sixth Circuit, summary judgement under Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate when there are no
genuine issues of material fact in dispute. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);
Cacevic v. City of Hazel Park, 226 F.3d 483, 491 (6th Cir. 2000).
“In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view
the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party.” Id. See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587(1986). “A genuine issue for
trial exists when there is sufficient evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Cacevic v. City of Hazel
Park, 226 F.3d at 491 (internal citations omitted).
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In the case at bar, Defendant’s argument for summary judgment
is relatively threadbare. Genuine issues of material fact exist as
to whether Defendant’s closure of a plant facility constituted a
mass layoff, which would require 60-day notice under the WARN Act.
Thus, the Court is precluded from granting a summary judgment in
favor of the moving party until such time as these issues of fact
are settled. Pena v. American Meat Packing Corp., 362 F.3d 418
(7th Cir. 2004); Local 2-1971 of Pace International Union v.
Cooper, 364 F.Supp.2d 546 (W.D.N.C. 2005).

IV. Conclusion
Upon review of the pleadings and motions of the parties, the
Court has determined that Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim
upon which this Court may grant relief and survives Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss. Likewise, and because genuine issues of material
fact exist, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the hearing before
this Court on July 5, 2016, as well as for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED:
(1)

That Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [DE 10-1] is DENIED;

(2)

that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 10-1]

is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
This the 6th day of July, 2016.

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