Anderson v. Dickson et al
Filing
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OPINION & ORDER: (1) GRANTING Quisenberry's 11 MOTION to Dismiss for failure to state a claim, 17 SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION to Dismiss & 47 MOTION to Dismiss for failure to state a claim; GRANTING Council Oaks & Short's 14 MOTION to Dismiss & 42 MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint; GRANTING Biggerstaff & Wiley's 26 MOTION to Dismiss for failure to state a claim & 44 JOINT MOTION to Dismiss for failure to state a claim; (2) all claims asserted under 42:1981, 1983 & 1985 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; (3) all state-law claims asserted by pla are DISMSISED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Karen K. Caldwell on 7/26/16.(KJR)cc: COR, Anderson & Horn (US Mail). Modified on 7/26/2016 (KJR).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION -- LEXINGTON
ARTIS ANDERSON,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:16-71-KKC
Plaintiff,
V.
OPINION AND ORDER
VANESSA M. DICKSON,
Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on various motions filed by the parties.
I. Background
Plaintiff Artis Anderson is proceeding pro se but he has considerable experience in filing
federal actions, having filed eight federal actions in this Court since 1994. This is at least
his fourth federal action involving allegations that state officials interfered with his
marriage and his third such action that involves his marriage to Mary Ellen Reynolds. See
Anderson v. Conway, No. 6:12-cv-70-GFVT (E.D. Ky. filed April 2, 2012); Anderson v. Wiley,
No. 5:16-cv-34-DCR (E.D. Ky. filed Feb. 1, 2016); Anderson v. Beshear, No. 5:15-cv-207-KKC
(E.D. Ky. filed July 20, 2015) (Anderson I).
In brief, with this action, Anderson alleges that various individuals, including
government workers and officials, conspired to have the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and
Family Services appointed as his wife’s guardian and to have his marriage annulled. He
asserts that on May 18, 2015, two paramedics took his wife, Mary Ellen, to the hospital. He
came to the hospital the following morning to pick her up but was informed she had been
admitted for observation. On May 21, Mary Ellen’s late daughter filed a petition in
Woodford District Court seeking to be named Mary Ellen’s guardian. Woodford District
Court Judge Vanessa Dickson entered an order appointing the Cabinet as Mary Ellen’s
legal guardian. Later, Jessamine Family Court Judge Jeff Moss signed an order annulling
Anderson’s marriage to Mary Ellen. Anderson alleges that, since the Cabinet became Mary
Ellen’s legal guardian, the state has stolen $250,000 from his wife and violated his
constitutional rights.
In a prior action based on substantially the same allegations, Anderson sued the former
Kentucky governor and attorney general, the two then unnamed paramedics who took his
wife to the hospital, an individual Cabinet employee who he asserted was appointed as his
wife’s guardian, and the assisted-living facility where his wife received healthcare services.
See Anderson v. Beshear, et al., No. 5:15-cv-207-KKC (E.D. Ky. filed July 20, 2015). The
Court dismissed that action, finding that all of the plaintiff’s claims lacked the legal
plausibility necessary for subject matter jurisdiction.
With this action, the plaintiff sues various additional individuals including Kentucky
state court Judges Dickson and Moss; another Cabinet employee who Anderson identifies
as Mary Ellen’s court-appointed guardian; a social worker employed by the Cabinet who
Anderson asserts falsely reported that he abused his wife; two police officers; the two nownamed paramedics who Anderson alleges took Mary Ellen to the hospital knowing that she
did not need emergency medical care; the assisted-living facility where Mary Ellen
currently resides and its manager; and two doctors.
In his complaint, Anderson appears to assert that these individuals conspired to violate
his constitutional right to marry. As to defendant J. Costigan, who is a police officer with
the city of Versailles, Kentucky police department, Anderson may also allege that the
officer violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable
searches. Anderson seeks a total of more than $500 million in compensatory and punitive
damages.
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By prior opinion, this Court dismissed the claims against Judges Dickson and Moss.
The Court now reviews the claims against the remaining defendants.
II. Analysis
The Court will first address the possible Fourth Amendment claim against Officer
Costigan. Anderson asserts that Officer Costigan came to his residence to conduct a welfare
check on Mary Ellen and then “secretly recorded communications” between him and his
wife.
“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places; [w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Anderson could not have had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation that took place in the officer’s presence.
Thus, Officer Costigan's recording of those events could not have violated Anderson’s rights
under the Fourth Amendment because Anderson made no effort to keep that interaction
private. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753–54 (1952) (“Petitioner was talking
confidentially and indiscreetly with one he trusted, and he was overheard ... [w]e find no
violation of the Fourth Amendment here.”) Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed.
As to Anderson’s claim that all of the defendants conspired to violate his
constitutional right to marry, this claim must also be dismissed. Throughout his complaint
Anderson invokes 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. Section 1981 “prohibits racial
discrimination in the making and enforcing of private contracts.” Noble v. Brinker Int'l,
Inc., 391 F.3d 715, 720 (6th Cir. 2004). The statute is, “by its very terms, limited to acts of
racial discrimination.” Brady v. Bristol Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621, 623 (8th Cir. 1972).
Anderson has not pled sufficient facts to state a claim under Section 1981. Moreover,
Section 1983 is the exclusive damages remedy for violations of rights guaranteed by Section
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1981. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir. 2008); McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693
F.3d 654, 661 (6th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, any claim asserted by Anderson under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 will be dismissed.
As to any claim under Section 1985, that statute prohibits three particular kinds of
conspiracies: conspiracies to prevent a federal officer from performing his duties, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(1); conspiracies to obstruct justice or intimidate a party, witness, or juror, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(2); and conspiracies to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws on the basis
of a racial or other class-based discriminatory animus, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Subsection 3
requires that a claimant establish “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus.” Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 559-60 (6th Cir. 2000)
(quoting United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825,
829 (1983)). Anderson does not make allegations sufficient to state a claim under any of
these provisions. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss any claim under Section 1985.
As to his constitutional claim against the individual defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
that statute prohibits “actions ‘under color of state law’ which deprive an individual of a
right secured by the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute.” Cherrington v. Skeeter, 344
F.3d 631, 644 (6th Cir. 2003). “Thus, before a defendant may be held liable under section
1983, that defendant must first possess power by virtue of state law, then misuse that
power in a way that violates federal constitutional rights.” Id. (quoting Christian v. Belcher,
888 F.2d 410, 414 (6th Cir.1989)).
Anderson does not make any allegations that defendants Council Oaks, John Short,
Thomas Quisenberry, Thomas Coburn, Robert Horn, or Benny Sowder were government
officials or were otherwise working under color of state law. Accordingly, any § 1983 claim
against these defendants must be dismissed.
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As to Officers Edwards, Anderson alleges only that “he violated the Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights to enjoy his spousal rights while acting under color of state law.” (DE
36, First Amended Complaint ¶ 3.) This single, conclusory allegation is insufficient to state
a claim. “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the >grounds= of his >entitle[ment] to relief=
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.@ Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.544, 555 (2007)
(internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the constitutional claim against Officer Edwards
will be dismissed.
As to paramedics Rankin and Ford, Anderson alleges only that these defendants
took Mary Ellen to the hospital knowing that she did not require emergency care. Even if
these allegations were true, these actions are not sufficient to state a claim for violation of
Anderson’s right to marry.
As to the § 1983 claim against defendants Wiley and Biggerstaff – and as to all
defendants – any claim that the guardian appointment or annulment violated Anderson’s
constitutional rights must be dismissed.
In Anderson I, this Court ruled that the appointment of a guardian does not infringe
upon the right to marry. Anderson v. Beshear, No. 5:15-CV-207-KKC, 2015 WL 4717200, at
*2 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 7, 2015). Anderson I was based on the state court’s emergency order
temporarily appointing the Cabinet for Health and Family Services as Mary Ellen’s
guardian (DE 26-5, Order.) Since that decision, a jury trial was conducted in state court and
the jury found that Mary Ellen was wholly disabled in managing her personal affairs and
financial resources. (DE 26-6, Disability Judgment.) In accordance with the jury’s finding,
Judge Dickson entered an order permanently appointing the Cabinet as Mary Ellen’s
guardian. (DE 26-6, Order.) The Court’s prior finding that the appointment of a guardian
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does not infringe the right to marry applies equally to the permanent guardianship.
More importantly, however, Anderson’s challenges to the state court orders appointing
the Cabinet as Mary Ellen’s guardian and annulling the couple’s marriage are barred under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine which “provides that federal district courts generally lack
jurisdiction to review and determine the validity of state court judgments, even in the face
of allegations that ‘the state court's action was unconstitutional.’” Carr v. Spencer, 13 F.
App'x 296, 298 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983)). “Instead, review of final determinations in state judicial
proceedings can be obtained only in the United States Supreme Court.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 and Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476). The finding in Carr is equally applicable here.
Anderson’s complaint “merely reflects [his] dissatisfaction with the state court's
guardianship [and annulment] judgment[s] and is essentially an attempt to obtain
unauthorized federal review of [those] judgment[s].” Id. Accordingly, any claim that any
defendant violated Anderson’s constitutional rights by obtaining the guardianship or
annulment orders must be dismissed.
Anderson may also assert claims against the state and county employees in their official
capacities. “An official capacity claim filed against a public employee is equivalent to a
lawsuit directed against the public entity which that agent represents.” Claybrook v.
Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 355 n. 4 (6th Cir.2000). Thus, any claim against Wiley or
Biggerstaff in their official capacities is the same as a claim against the state. Section 1983
provides that any “person” acting under color of state law who deprives another of his
constitutional rights is liable to that individual. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A state, however, “not a
person within the meaning of § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64
(1989). Accordingly, any claims against Biggerstaff and Wiley in their official capacities
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must be dismissed.
As to Officers Costigan and Edwards, Anderson alleges that Officer Costigan is
employed by the city of Versailles, Kentucky and that Officer Edwards is employed by the
city of Nicholasville, Kentucky. He alleges that paramedics Rankin, and Ford are employed
by Woodford County. Any official capacity claim against these defendants is actually a
claim against the county or city that employs them. “Unlike states . . . local governments,
municipalities, and counties are considered ‘persons’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §
1983.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 814 (6th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, “[a] municipality or
county cannot be liable under § 1983 absent an underlying constitutional violation by its
officers.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d 890, 900 (6th Cir. 2004). This Court has
determined that any constitutional claims against Officers Costigan and Edwards and
paramedics Rankin and Ford in their individual capacities must be dismissed. Accordingly,
any claim against Officers Costigan and Edwards and paramedics Rankin and Ford in their
official capacities must also be dismissed.
Anderson may also assert certain state-law claims. For example, he asserts that Wiley
has stolen from Mary Ellen and has failed to protect her assets and that other defendants
have interfered with certain contracts between Mary Ellen and him. The Court does not
interpret these claims to assert any constitutional violation. Further, these claims do not
appear to form part of the same case or controversy as the constitutional claims which are
based on the guardianship and annulment judgments and the recording of Anderson’s
conversation with Mary Ellen. Accordingly, the Court cannot exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over these claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Further, the Court has dismissed all of Anderson’s federal claims. The supplemental
jurisdiction statute explicitly allows district courts to dismiss pendent state law claims if all
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federal claims have been dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “[G]enerally, ‘if the federal
claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.’ ” Taylor
v. First of America Bank–Wayne, 973 F.2d 1284, 1287 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). “A district court should consider the interests of
judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests
against needlessly deciding state law issues.” Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994
F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993)
This matter is at its initial stages. Any state-law claims are based on different factual
assertions than the constitutional claims. Accordingly, the Court concludes that, even if it
could exercise jurisdiction over any state-law claims, it should decline to do so. Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), this Court will exercise its discretion and will dismiss any state-law
claims that Anderson may assert.
III.
Conclusion
For all these reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
1) the motions to dismiss filed by Thomas Quisenberry (DE 11, 17, 47), Council Oaks
and John Short (DE 14, 42), J. Costigan (DE 18, 51), Patricia Biggerstaff and
Patricia Wiley (DE 26, 44) are GRANTED;
2) all claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985 against all defendants
are DISMISSED with prejudice; and
3) any state-law claims asserted by the plaintiff are DISMISSED without prejudice.
Dated July 26, 2016.
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