Seales v. Quintana et al
Filing
10
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1) 1 Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 2) Court will enter a judgment. 3) Matter is STRICKEN from the docket. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 12/8/2016.(SCD)cc: Pro Se Pla via US Mail
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON
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)
) Civil Action No. 5: 16-222-JMH
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)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
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AND ORDER
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)
LERON L. SEALES,
Plaintiff,
v.
WARDEN QUINTANA, et al.,
Defendants.
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Inmate Leron L. Seales is confined at the Federal Medical
Center in Lexington, Kentucky.
Proceeding without an attorney,
Seales has filed a complaint asserting civil rights claims against
federal officials pursuant to the doctrine announced in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
The
Court
must
conduct
a
preliminary
review
of
[R. 1]
Seales’
complaint because he has been granted permission to pay the filing
fee
in
installments
government officials.
and
because
he
asserts
claims
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A.
against
When
testing the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint, the Court
affords it a forgiving construction, accepting as true all nonconclusory factual allegations and liberally construing its legal
claims in the plaintiff’s favor.
Davis v. Prison Health Servs.,
679 F.3d 433, 437-38 (6th Cir. 2012).
A district court must
dismiss any claim that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Hill v. Lappin,
630 F. 3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010).
In
his
complaint,
Seales
alleges
that
one
of
the
responsibilities of his job at the prison involved cleaning the
rectum and penis of sick inmates at the prison after that inmate
had used the restroom.
Seales states that as a result he was
exposed to blood borne pathogens, felt degraded, and was mocked
and insulted by other inmates. Seales indicates that he complained
about having to perform this task as part of his prison job for
more than one year, and while he was initially told that he would
be fired if he did not perform this task, eventually the prison
transferred
this
responsibility
entirely
to
nurses.
Seales
indicates that he was required to perform this task beginning in
2014 until nurses overtook this responsibility in 2016.
Seales
has named as defendants Warden Francisco Quintana, Nurse Blair,
Nurse Smith, and Supervisor Ratliffe, and seeks $18 million in
damages.
[R. 1 at 2-3, 8]
Having
thoroughly
reviewed
Seales’
complaint,
the
Court
concludes that it must be dismissed for a number of reasons.
First, Seales’ claims are barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.
Seales alleges that he was forced to perform this
task as part of his job responsibilities beginning in 2014, and
that
he
complained
about
that
fact
for
more
than
one
year.
However, the statute of limitations for constitutional tort claims
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arising in Kentucky is one year.
Hornback v. Lexington-Fayette
Urban Co. Gov’t., 543 F. App’x 499, 501 (6th Cir. 2013); Mitchell
v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 825 (6th Cir. 2003).
Because Seales
waited more than one year after his claims accrued before filing
suit, his claims are time-barred, and must be dismissed.
Dellis
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001); Baker v.
Mukaskey, 287 F. App’x 422, 424-25 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming
dismissal of claims upon initial screening as barred by the statute
of limitations).
The running of the statute of limitations can be tolled while
an inmate exhausts his administrative remedies, Brown v. Morgan,
209 F.3d 595, 596 (6th Cir. 2000), but this applies only if he has
pursued them diligently, Miller v. Collins, 305 F.3d 491, 495-96
(6th Cir.2002).
Seales began his job as an “Inmate Companion” on
January 24, 2014, and signed a form acknowledging that one of his
responsibilities including assisting inmates “with bathing and
with activities of daily living.”
[R. 1-1 at 3]
Seales further
alleges that he was informally complaining about this issue as far
back as 2014.
However, he did not file a formal grievance
regarding the issue until December 9, 2015, twenty-two months after
he began performing these kinds of tasks.
[R. 1-1 at 1]
BOP
regulations require an inmate to file a grievance within twenty
days after the event complained of, 28 C.F.R. 542.14(a), and his
grievance was therefore plainly untimely.
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Having failed to timely
pursue and exhaust his inmate grievances in a diligent fashion, no
tolling is warranted.
Cuco v. Federal Medical Center – Lexington,
No. 05-CV-232-KSF, 2006 WL 1635668 (E.D. Ky. 2006), aff’d, 257 F.
App’x 897 (6th Cir. 2007).
Second, federal law provides that “[n]o Federal civil action
may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other
correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury ...”
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Here, Seales alleges only that he has “night
mares (sic) and get emotionally disturbed when I think about what
I was forced to do ...”
[R. 1 at 2]
Such alleged purely emotional
injuries plainly fail to satisfy § 1997e(e)’s “physical injury”
requirement. Cf. Chatham v. Adcock, 334 F. App’x 281, 284-85 (11th
Cir. 2009) (holding that a plaintiff’s claims of anxiousness,
nausea, nightmares, hallucinations and increase in blood pressure
were
not
enough
requirement).
to
satisfy
§
1997e(e)’s
physical
injury
Nor does Seales’ present fear that he was exposed
to “bloodbourne disease” suffice: Seales alleges that he was
required to clean urine or feces, but makes no allegation that he
was exposed to blood, and “a plaintiff who has not been physically
injured but who seeks damages for emotional distress based on
exposure to disease must establish a reasonable concern that he or
she has an enhanced risk of future disease.”
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Michel v. Levinson,
437 F. App’x 160, 163 (3d Cir. 2011).
Seales’ complaint makes no
such allegations, and § 1997e(e) therefore bars his claim.
Finally
Seales’
allegations
fail
to
state
a
claim
of
constitutional dimension because, contrary to his assertions,
prison officials did not “force” him to engage in the activity
about which he complains at all.
Rather, cleaning the urine and
feces of other inmates was one of his responsibilities as an
“Inmate Companion.”
But federal inmates are not required to hold
or retain a particular job in the prison.
Newsom v. Norris, 888
F.2d 371, 374 (6th Cir.1989); Mejia v. Ortiz, No. 11-937(NLH),
2014 WL 2812015, at *3-4 (D.N.J. June 23, 2014) (collecting cases).
To the contrary, the availability of working in the prison is a
potential benefit which prisoners may choose to avail themselves,
not a right to which they are entitled.
Nor do prisoners have any
protectible due process liberty or property interest in retaining
a prison job.
Cf. Cosco v. Uphoff, 195 F.3d 1221, 1224 n.3 (10th
Cir. 1999); Miller v. Benson, 51 F.3d 166, 170 (8th Cir. 1995);
James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 630 (3d Cir. 1989). Seales, having
voluntarily chosen to accept a position as an Inmate Companion and
signed an acknowledgement of the responsibilities it entailed,
cannot contend that he was “forced” to perform the tasks required
by the job when he could have voluntarily chosen to quit the
position or seek another.
See generally Smith v. Lief, No. 10-
08-JMH, 2010 WL 411134, at *3-4 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 27, 2010).
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For
each of the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s complaint must be
dismissed.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
1.
Seales’ complaint [R. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2.
The Court will enter a judgment contemporaneously with
this order.
3.
This matter is STRICKEN from the docket.
This 8th day of December, 2016.
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