Wells v. SSA

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) 12 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. (2) 10 Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. (3) Acting Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED. Separate Judgment shall this date be entered. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 6/22/2017. (SCD)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON
TAMMIE WELLS,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY, 1

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Case No.
16-cv-262-JMH

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Defendant.
***

This

matter

is

before

the

summary judgment [Des 10 and 12].

Court

upon

cross

motions

for

For the reasons stated below,

the Acting Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment will be
granted.
The Court’s review of the Acting Commissioner’s decision
concerning

disability

upon

reconsideration

is

limited

to

an

inquiry into whether the findings of the Acting Commissioner are
supported by substantial evidence, and whether the correct legal
standards were applied. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971).

Further, this Court’s

review is limited “to the particular points that [the claimant]
appears to raise in [his] brief on appeal.” Hollon v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 447 F.3d 477, 491 (6th Cir. 2006).
1 The caption of this matter is amended to reflect that Nancy A. Berryhill
became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017,
replacing Carolyn W. Colvin in that role.

Tammie Wells (“Wells” or “Plaintiff”) filed an application
for

Disability

Income

on

April

Insurance
25,

Benefits

2013,

and

alleging

Supplemental

disability

Security

commencing

on

November 5, 2010. [R. 215]. After being denied initially and
upon

reconsideration,

Wells

filed

a

Request

for

Hearing

on

October 16, 2013. [R. 162]. Her case was heard by Administrative
Law

Judge

(ALJ)

Gloria

B.

York,

who

issued

an

unfavorable

decision on January 27, 2015. [R. 27-50].
In her denial decision, the ALJ found Wells could perform
medium exertion work, with restrictions to perform only routine
repetitive

tasks

with

occasional

interaction

with

supervisors

and coworkers, no interaction with the general public and no
fast-paced work. [R. 36]. Wells contends this finding is not
supported by the treating or examining evidence of record.
Wells further contends when determining Ms. Wells’ Residual
Functional Capacity (RFC), the ALJ failed to give proper weight
to the well-supported, disabling opinions of the consultative
examiner. The ALJ, in Wells’s view, also erroneously attributed
the claimant’s serious mental health problems to past drug use,
and in discrediting the claimant’s testimony.
Plaintiff was 43 years old as of the date of the ALJ’s
decision [R. 55, 215, 222].

She has a high school equivalent

education has a waste disposal attendant and industrial cleaner

2

[R.

73,

228-37,

239,

259-67].

She

alleged

disability since

November 5, 2010 [R. 215], due to depression; bipolar, psychotic,
and post-traumatic stress disorders; and an irregular heartbeat
[R. 248, 279-81, 296, 299].
On March 23, 2012, Plaintiff presented to Good Samaritan
Hospital after “doing odd things” over the prior three days [R.
311]. A toxicology screening was positive for methamphetamine
[R.

311].

She

underwent

treatment

with

Risperdal

(an

antipsychotic)[R. 313]. The following day, she appeared closer
to baseline, either because of the effects of methamphetamine
wearing off or the medications [R. 313]. Six days later, she was
diagnosed with psychotic disorder not otherwise specified for
substance-induced

psychosis

[R.

311]

and

discharged

with

prescriptions for medications [R. 313].
In April 2012, Plaintiff presented to Diana Ball, CSW, for
psychotherapy [R. 356]. She reported that she continued to use
methamphetamine after her hospitalization and did not want to be
there [R. 356-57].
A

month

later

in

May

2012,

she

Walden, APRN, of depression [R. 361].

complained

to

Michelle

She said she had not used

alcohol or illicit drugs for a month [R. 362].

Ms. Walden

diagnosed polysubstance abuse and post-traumatic stress and mood
disorders [R. 365].

3

In
APRN,

February
with

obstructive

2013,

Plaintiff

complaints
pulmonary

disorder [R. 376].
hypertension

[R.

of

presented

high

disease

blood

(COPD),

to

Teresa

pressure,

depression,

Casey,
chronic

and

bipolar

Ms. Casey diagnosed cardiac dysrhythmia and
378].

Later

that

month,

she

underwent

an

electrocardiogram stress test, which did not produce chest pain
and showed no ectopy or arrhythmia [R. 391-92].
On June 5, 2013, Marc Plavin, Ph.D., examined Plaintiff at
the request of the state agency [R. 339-46].

Plaintiff said she

could

the

perform

postal

tasks

service,

associated

budgeting

with

her

using

money,

telephone

toileting,

and

bathing,

feeding, dressing, going to the grocery store, doing her laundry
and

dishes,

independently

cooking,
without

sweeping,

supervision

mopping,
[R.

344].

and
She

vacuuming
reported

a

history of sexual abuse, sad moods, agitation, anxiety, auditory
hallucinations, and sleep disturbance [R. 345]. She said she
used methamphetamine on a regular basis for a year and a half
ending six months prior [R. 345].
Dr. Plavin found that she was well oriented and had a good
memory

and

judgment;

fair

ability

to

calculate

and

reason

abstractly; and fair to poor fund of information [R. 345]. Dr.
Plavin

diagnosed

posttraumatic

stress

disorder

(PTSD)

with

psychotic symptoms; rule out psychotic disorder; methamphetamine
abuse in early full remission; and history of alcohol abuse [R.
4

345].

He

said

Plaintiff

had

good

ability

to

conduct

her

activities of daily living and understand and remember simple
instructions; fair ability to interact socially with people that
she knew and sustain concentration, persistence, or pace; and
poor ability to interact socially with the public and people at
work, tolerate stress, and respond to the pressures of a day-today work setting [R. 346].

No objective testing was performed

by Dr. Plavin.
On June 13, 2013, Judith LaMarche, Ph.D., a state agency
psychologist,

reviewed

the

evidence

and

said

Plaintiff

would

perform best in a position with the demands of only simple,
routine, repetitive tasks in a low public exposure setting with
little time pressure [R. 81-94].
Plaintiff continued to see Ms. Walden from June 2013 to
July 2014.

In August 2013, she said she started taking Abilify

(an antipsychotic) after she stopped taking Risperdal on her own
and was experiencing psychotic symptoms [R. 348].

She stated

she had not used illicit drugs for eight months [R. 348].

Ms.

Walden diagnosed PTSD, amphetamine abuse, and a mood disorder
[R. 350] and adjusted Plaintiff’s medications [R. 351].
In September 2013, Diosdado Irlandez, M.D., a state agency
physician, reviewed the evidence and said Plaintiff did not have
a severe physical impairment [R. 111-24].

5

Later that month, Plaintiff told Ms. Walden that she took
Prozac (an antidepressant) and had a stable mood [R. 410].

She

also reported that she had been sober for nine to 10 months [Tr.
410].
In

January

2014,

Plaintiff

presented

to

requesting a change in her Risperdal [R. 401].

Ms.

Walden,

She reported

that she had not relapsed on methamphetamine in over 12 months
[R. 401].

Ms. Walden described Plaintiff’s mood as “stable” and

said she was “best [she had] ever seen her” [R. 402].
prescribed

medications,

including

Geodon

(an

She

antipsychotic),

Prozac, and Risperdal [R. 403].
Later

that

month,

Plaintiff

presented

M.D., with complaints of COPD [R. 416].

to

Renee

Fuller,

Dr. Fuller found that

she had clear lungs with no wheezing, rales, or rhonchi and
prescribed medications, including Albuterol (a bronchodilator)
[R. 418].
In March 2014, Plaintiff told Ms. Walden that she stopped
taking her medications due to weight gain and never picked up
her Geodon, and requested that she re-start her medications [R.
420].

Ms. Walden prescribed Geodon and Prozac [R. 422].

On April 10, 2014, police took Plaintiff to the emergency
room after she got into an argument with her boyfriend and cut
herself on her right leg [R. 490]. She also said she fell off a
porch, striking her head, after drinking that night [R. 490].
6

A

head

CT

470].

scan

She

showed

was

no

diagnosed

acute

intracranial

with

right

leg

abnormalities

laceration,

[R.

alcohol

intoxication, and a mild closed head injury [R. 492].
On

April

15,

2014,

Plaintiff

presented

to

Sherene

El-

Sioufi, D.O., with complaints of allergies, asthma, and dyspnea
[R. 423].

Dr. El-Sioufi found that Plaintiff had no rales,

rhonchi, or wheezing, but diminished air movement [R. 425].
She diagnosed dyspnea secondary to severe COPD and obstructive
sleep apnea and prescribed Symbicort, Spiriva (bronchodilators)
and Albuterol [R. 425].
A week later, Plaintiff returned to Ms. Walden, reporting
that she felt more anxiety, agitation, and anger [R. 526]. She
said her boyfriend was supportive and she got outdoors more,
which

improved

her

mood

[R.

526].

Ms.

Walden

found

that

Plaintiff was fidgety in her chair [R. 527] and adjusted her
medications [R. 528].
On May 1, 2014, a polysomnogram study was consistent with
obstructive sleep apnea [R. 427-30].

In June 2014, Plaintiff

told Ms. Walden that her mood was better [R. 522].

She also

said she heard voices on occasion, but her increased Geodon
helped [R. 522].

Ms. Walden adjusted her medications [R. 525].

In July 2014, Plaintiff presented to Anna Duncan, LPC,
for psychotherapy [R. 530]. Plaintiff said she was “doing
okay” on her medicine and did not need therapy [R. 531]. Ms.
7

Duncan noted that Plaintiff appeared resistant to new coping
skills

[R.

531].

She

said

she

was

not

responsive

to

treatment and did not want to continue in counseling [R.
531].
The following month, Plaintiff presented to Jo Noel, ARNP
[R.

566].

She

said

she

wanted

to

get

her

prescriptions

“straightened out” so she would be easier to deal with [R.
567]. She said her medications were working, other than she
could

not

relax

[R.

567].

She

stated

methamphetamine two years prior [R. 567].
auditory

hallucinations

[R.

567].

she

last

used

She complained of

Ms.

Noel

diagnosed

schizoaffective disorder and prescribed medications, including
Latuda (medication for bipolar disorder) [R. 568].
On September 4, 2014, Plaintiff told Ms. Noel that she was
angry

all

Depakote
Plaintiff

of
(a

the
mood

time

[R.

563-64]

stabilizer)

presented

for

[R.

and
565].

pulmonology

Ms.

Noel

The

prescribed

following

treatment

and

day,
her

medications were continued [R. 548-51].
On September 16, 2014, Plaintiff complained to Ms. Noel of
increased

anxiety

and

sleep

problems

[R.

560].

Ms.

Noel

prescribed Latuda and Remeron (an antidepressant)[R. 562].
Two weeks later, Plaintiff reported that Latuda was helping
her somewhat [R. 557]. Ms. Noel found that Plaintiff had some
improvement in her insight and judgment [R. 559].
8

In October 2014, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Fuller with
complaints
occurred

of

swelling

in

intermittently

her

for

face,

years

hands,
[R.

and

feet

that

She

also

532].

complained of lower back pain that worsened with standing or
bending, and that radiated in to her hips and legs [R. 532-34].
Dr. Fuller diagnosed likely muscular and facet arthropathy [R.
534].

She

prescribed

therapy [R. 534-35].
dyspnea

improved

medications

and

recommended

physical

Later that month, Plaintiff said her

with

Symbicort,

Spiriva,

and

Singulair

(medication for allergies) and continued to use her Albuterol
inhaler and nebulizer [R. 543-46].
In November 2014, Plaintiff reported that she continued to
have

significant

553].

trouble

with

anger

and

“hated”

people

[R.

She said she experienced two panic attacks per day for

the prior two weeks [R. 553]. Ms. Noel prescribed Lithium (a
mood stabilizer) and Trazodone [R. 555].
A

week

later,

she

said

her

medications

seemed

to

be

working [R. 581]. She said she often felt angry, but did not
act on it [R. 581].
From

November

12

to

19,

2014,

Plaintiff

underwent

a

physical therapy evaluation and three therapy sessions for her
lower

back

and

right

leg

pain

[R.

571-77].

During

the

evaluation, she said she tended to her personal grooming and

9

drove a car [R. 574].

She said she performed most housekeeping

and cooking chores with some help from her boyfriend [R. 574].
On

November

20,

2014,

Plaintiff

said

she

stayed

home

because she felt angry in public [R. 578]. She said she ran out
of Latuda and had not yet picked up a prescription for Prazosin
(an antihypertensive) and had panic attacks [R. 578].
The
testified

ALJ
that

held
she

a

hearing.

stopped

At

working

the
in

hearing,

November

Plaintiff

2010

due

to

mental health issues and because she had difficulty breathing
due to COPD and asthma [R. 60-61].

She said her breathing

problems were the greatest deterrent to working and she could
perform physical activities for only short periods [R. 61].

She

said she took medications for her breathing and a rescue inhaler
[R. 61].

She also alleged she had bipolar disorder [R. 61].

She denied using methamphetamine or cocaine for the prior three
or four years [R. 62].

She said she had problems going out in

public and had panic attacks sometimes twice a day and other
times three times per week [R. 63, 65].
her

boyfriend,

watched

television,

She said that she, and

shopped

late

at

night,

cleaned, read, and took care of her dogs [R. 66-68, 71].

She

said she could lift and carry 20 pounds and stand or walk for 15
minutes [R. 68]. She said she had difficulty sleeping due to
hearing noises, nightmares, and fear that someone would harm her

10

[R. 69-70].

She said she had difficulty leaving her home [R.69-

71].
In

evaluating

five-step

Plaintiff’s

sequential

regulations

for

claim,

the

ALJ

set

forth

in

evaluation

determining

disability.

See

followed
the
20

the

agency’s
C.F.R.

§

404.1520(a)(4). As relevant here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
had the residual functional capacity for a range of medium work
with limitations as follows:
[She] requires a clean air environment and cannot be
exposed to respiratory irritants; and is limited to
routine, repetitive tasks which require only occasional
interaction with supervisors and coworkers and no
interaction with the public in a job which is not fast
paced.
[R. 36-43].

Proceeding to step five, based on vocational expert

testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform other work
existing

in

significant

numbers

in

the

national

economy,

including the jobs of assembler or bench worker, medium exertion
machine tender, and light exertion machine tender [R. 44].

Thus,

the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled [R. 45].
As set out above, the Court’s review of the Commissioner’s
decision is limited to an inquiry into whether the findings of
the

Commissioner

are

supported

by

substantial

evidence

and

whether the correct legal standards were applied. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390,
401 (1971).

“The substantial evidence standard is met if a

reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate
11

to support a conclusion.” Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402
F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff bases her attack on the Commissioner’s decision
on the notion that the ALJ erred by not reasonably evaluating
the opinions of Dr. Plavin, an examining physician, that she had
“poor” abilities to interact socially with the public and people
at work, tolerate stress, and respond to the pressure of a dayto-day

work

setting,

in

evaluating

her

residual

functional

capacity [Pl.’s Br. at 6-8]. The Court rejects this argument.
Residual
assessment

functional

of

the

capacity

extent

to

which

“is
an

an

administrative

individual’s

medically

determinable impairment(s), including any related symptoms, such
as pain, may cause physical or mental limitations that may affect
his

or

her

ability

to

do

work

related

physical

and

mental

activities.” Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184,
at

*2.

It

is

the

limitations. See id.

most

that

a

person

can

do,

despite

her

In making this finding, an ALJ must decide

what weight, if any, to give to the medical opinions of record.
“Medical opinions” are defined as
[S]tatements from physicians and psychologists or
other
acceptable
medical
sources
that
reflect
judgments about the nature and severity of your
impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis,
and prognosis, what you can still do despite
impairment(s),
and
your
physical
or
mental
restrictions.

12

20

C.F.R.

§

404.1527(a)(2).

Some

“medical

opinions”

entitled to “controlling weight.” See id. § 404.1527(c)(2).

are
To

be eligible for controlling weight, an opinion must be a medical
opinion and must also (1) come from a treating source, i.e., an
acceptable medical source “who provides you, or has provided you
with medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an
ongoing treatment relationship with you,” id. § 404.1502; (2) be
“well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques”; and (3) be “not inconsistent” with the
other substantial evidence in the case record.
WL 374188, at *2.

SSR 96-2p, 1996

If no opinion is entitled to controlling

weight, the agency considers several factors in deciding how
much weight to give to an opinion, including the nature of the
medical source’s relationship with the claimant, supportability,
consistency, specialization, and any other factors that tend to
support

or

contradict

the

opinion.

See

20

C.F.R.

§§

404.1527(c)(1)-(6).
As

the

Plaintiff

ALJ

had

found,

poor

however,

abilities

to

Dr.

Plavin’s

interact

opinions

socially

with

that
the

public and people at work, tolerate stress, and respond to the
pressures of a day-to-day work setting was not consistent with
his own examination [R. 43].

In June 2013, he found that that

Plaintiff was well oriented and had good memory and judgment;
fair ability to calculate and reason abstractly; and fair to
13

poor fund of information [R. 345].
(“The

more

a

medical

source

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3)

presents

relevant

evidence

to

support an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory
findings, the more weight we will give that opinion.”); Cutlip
v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 287 (6th Cir.
1994) (physician opinions “are only accorded great weight when
they

are

supported

by

sufficient

clinical

findings

and

are

consistent with the evidence.”).
As the ALJ also found, Dr. Plavin’s opinions that Plaintiff
had “poor” abilities to interact socially with the public and
people at work, tolerate stress, and respond to pressure were
based primarily on her subjective complaints [R. 43]. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3); Tate v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 467 F.
App’x 431, 433 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming the ALJ’s decision not
to

give

controlling

weight

to

an

opinion

that

was

based

subjective complaints as opposed to objective findings).

on

As the

ALJ further, found, Dr. Plavin based these opinions on a onetime

examination

404.1527(c)(2)(ii)

of

Plaintiff

(stating

an

[R.
ALJ

43].

must

See

20

consider

C.F.R.

whether

§
the

source has provided treatment for the impairment in question).
For

all

of

these

reasons,

the

ALJ

reasonably

accorded

only

“limited weight” to Dr. Plavin’s opinions that Plaintiff had
“poor” abilities to interact socially with the public and people
at

work,

tolerate

stress,

and
14

respond

to

pressures

in

the

workplace [R. 43].

The Court notes that Dr. Plavin performed no

objective testing of Wells.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred because he did not
explain the weight he gave to the opinions of the state agency
physicians

and

psychologists

[Pl.’s

Br.

at

7].

Immediately

following her evaluation of Dr. Plavin’s opinions, however, the
ALJ said that her “conclusion that [Plaintiff] was not disabled
is

further

supported

by

the

opinion

psychological consultant[s]” [R. 43].

of

the

state

agency

Thus, the ALJ clearly

gave greater weight to the opinions of Drs. LaMarche and Perritt
than the opinions of Dr. Plavin. This, Plaintiff contends, is
error as well.

However, an ALJ can give greater weight to the

opinions of state agency physicians or psychologists where those
opinions are consistent with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(f)(2)(i) (State agency medical consultants “are highly
qualified

physicians,

psychologists,

and

other

medical

specialists who are also experts in Social Security disability
evaluation”); Moon v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1179, 1183 (6th
Cir. 1990) (ALJ reasonably relied on reviewing source opinions).
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred because he did not
reasonably evaluate her subjective complaints in determining her
residual functional capacity [Pl.’s Br. at 8-9].

In raising

this challenge, Plaintiff makes an abbreviated argument that the
ALJ erred by not specifically enumerating her PTSD as a severe
15

impairment

[Pl.’s

Plaintiff

had

Br.

at

multiple

8-9].
severe

The

ALJ,

mental

however,

found

impairments,

that

including

substance-induced psychotic disorder, history of methamphetamine
abuse in reported remission, and mood and antisocial personality
disorders [R. 33].

The ALJ considered all of Plaintiff’s mental

impairments, including her PTSD, in finding that she had the
residual functional capacity for a range of medium work with
limitations as set forth above [R. 33-43]. The ALJ, therefore,
did not err by omitting Plaintiff’s PTSD from the list of her
severe impairments.

Anthony v. Astrue, 266 F. App’x 451, 457

(6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (“[Claimant] cleared step two of
the

analysis.

This

caused

the

ALJ

to

consider

[claimant’s]

severe and nonsevere impairments in the remaining steps of the
sequential

analysis.

impairments

were

not

The

fact

deemed

to

that
be

some

severe

of
at

[claimant’s]
step

two

is

therefore legally irrelevant”).
Returning

to

the

ALJ’s

treatment

of

Wells’s

subjective

complaints, the agency’s regulations describe a two-step process
for

evaluating

adjudicator
medically

a

must

claimant’s
consider

determinable

subjective
whether

physical

or

symptoms.

there
mental

is

an

First,

an

underlying

impairment(s)

that

could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s pain or
other symptoms. Second, once an underlying impairment(s) that
could reasonably be expected to produce the individual’s pain or
16

other symptoms has been shown, the adjudicator must evaluate the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the individual’s
symptoms to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit the
claimant’s ability to do basic work activities.

See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529; SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2.5

In so doing,

adjudicators
evidence;

consider

the

effectiveness,

factors

claimant’s
and

side

such

as

the

activities;

effects

of

any

objective

the

type,

medication

medical
dosage,

that

the

claimant takes or has taken to alleviate her symptoms; and any
other factors concerning the claimant’s functional limitations
and restrictions due to her symptoms. See id.
ALJ

found,

and

the

Court

agrees,

that

Plaintiff’s

noncompliance with treatment was inconsistent with her subjective
complaints [R. 40, 42]. When she saw Ms. Ball in April 2012, she
said she did not want to be there [R. 356-57].
Plaintiff

said

she

started

taking

Abilify

taking Risperdal on her own [R. 348].

In August 2013,

after

she

stopped

In March 2014, she said

she stopped taking her medications due to weight gain and never
picked up her Geodon [R. 420].

The following July, Ms. Duncan

noted that Plaintiff appeared resistant to learning new coping
skills, was not responsive to treatment, and did not want to
continue in counseling [R. 531].

In November 2014, Plaintiff

said she ran out of Latuda and had not yet picked up her Prazosin

17

[R. 578].

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (stating an ALJ must

consider inconsistencies in the evidence).
As

the

ALJ

medications

found,

helped

the

record

Plaintiff’s

contains

symptoms

subjective complaints [R. 41].

evidence

detracted

that

from

her

In September 2013, Plaintiff

told Ms. Walden that she took Prozac and had a stable mood [R.
410].

In

January

2014,

Ms.

Walden

described

her

mood

as

“stable” and said she was the “best [she had] ever seen her” [R.
402]. The following June, Plaintiff told Ms. Walden that her
mood was better and, while she heard voices on occasion, her
increased Geodon helped [R. 522].

In August 2014, she said her

medications were working, other than she could not relax [R.
567].

In September 2014, Plaintiff told Ms. Noel that Latuda

helped her somewhat [R. 557].

In October 2014, Plaintiff said

Symbicort, Spiriva, and Singulair improved her dyspnea [R. 54346].

In November 2014, Plaintiff said her medications seemed to

be working.

See id. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv) (stating an ALJ must

consider the effectiveness of treatment); Torres v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 490 F. App’x 748, 754 (6th Cir. 2012) (unpublished)
(the

fact

that

Plaintiff’s

symptoms

“often

improved

with

medication and treatment” undercuts the claimed severity of her
impairments).
The

record

demonstrates

that

Plaintiff’s

activities

of

daily living undermined her subjective complaints [R. 35, 37-38,
18

42].

In June 2013, she said she could perform tasks associated

with

using

the

telephone

and

postal

service,

budgeting

her

money, toileting, bathing, feeding, dressing, and going to the
grocery store, doing her laundry and dishes, cooking, sweeping,
mopping,
344].

and

vacuuming

independently

without

supervision

[R.

In April 2014, she reported that she got outdoors more,

which improved her mood [R. 526].

In November 2014, she said

she performed most housekeeping and cooking chores with some
help from her boyfriend [R. 574]. At the administrative hearing,
she said she, and her boyfriend, watched television, shopped
late at night, cleaned, read, and took care of her dogs [Tr. 6668, 71]. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (stating an ALJ must
consider a claimant’s activities); Torres, 490 F. App’x at 754
(allegations

of

impairments

could

be

considered

inconsistent

with claimant’s own testimony about the daily activities she is
able to perform).

Moreover, Plaintiff’s demeanor at the hearing

also contradicted her subjective complaints [R. 42].
hearing,
providing

she

had

logical

no

difficulty

answers,

and

responding
she

did

not

to

At the

questions

and

demonstrate

any

behavior consistent with psychosis [R. 51-78].

See Tyra v.

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 896 F.2d 1024, 1030 (6th Cir.
1990) (ALJ could dismiss claimant’s allegation of disabling pain
as

implausible

if

the

objective

19

medical

evidence,

claimant’s

subjective

allegations,

and

the

ALJ’s

personal

observations

contradicted those allegations).
Plaintiff finally challenges an additional finding by the
ALJ that her methamphetamine use damaged her credibility [Pl.’s
Br. at 8].
several

As the Court held above, however, the ALJ considered

factors

supported

by

substantial

evidence

discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints [R. 35-43].
even

setting

aside

methamphetamine

use,

the

ALJ’s

there

finding

are

other

about
valid

discounting Plaintiff’s complaints of disability.

for
Thus,

Plaintiff’s
reasons

for

Shinseki v.

Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (“the burden of showing that
an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the
agency’s determination.” (citations omitted)); Ulman v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir. 2012) (“We now make
explicit

what

we

have

previously

adopted

by

implication:

harmless error analysis applies to credibility determinations in
the social security disability context.”).
Having reviewed the entire administrative record, the Court
concludes that ALJ York’s decision, which ultimately became that
of

the

Acting

Commissioner,

is

evidence.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED herein as follows:

20

supported

by

substantial

(1)

That

the

Acting

Commissioner’s

motion

for

summary

judgment [DE 12] be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.
(2)

That Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be, and

the same hereby is, DENIED.
(3)

That the Acting Commissioner’s final decision be, and

the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.
A separate judgment in conformity herewith shall this date
be entered.
This the 22nd day of June, 2017.

21