Travis v. Quintana et al
Filing
8
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1) First and Eighth Amendment claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 2) Claims asserted under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 3) Court will enter Judgment. 4) Matter is STRICKEN from the docket. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 12/8/2016.(SCD)cc: Pro Se Pla via US Mail
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION AT LEXINGTON
ROBBY TRAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
WARDEN FRANCISCO QUINTANTA, et
al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No.
5: 16-CV-341-JMH
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
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Inmate Robby Travis is confined by the Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”)
at
the
Federal
Correctional
Institution-Lexington,
located in the Lexington, Kentucky. Proceeding pro se, Travis
has
filed
a
civil
rights
action
in
which
he
asserts
claims
under: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1331, pursuant to the doctrine announced
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971); and (2) the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2671–2680.
Travis has previously been granted in
forma pauperis status in this proceeding, see R. 5, and has paid
the assessed $39.21 initial partial filing fee.
The Court has conducted a preliminary review of Travis’s
complaint
because
he
asserts
1
claims
against
government
officials,1 and because he has been granted pauper status.
U.S.C. §§ 1915(a); 1915A.
28
In such cases, a district court must
dismiss any action which: (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2); 1915A(b)(1).
Travis is
proceeding pro se, so the Court liberally construes his claims
and
accepts
his
factual
allegations
as
true.
Erickson
v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
But as explained below, Travis has not alleged a claim upon
which relief as to his allegations that the defendants violated
his various federal constitutional rights, and those claims will
be
dismissed
with
prejudice.
Travis’s
FTCA
claims
will
be
dismissed without prejudice to his right to file another FTCA
action naming the proper defendant.
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
Travis challenges the conditions of his confinement at FMCLexington, alleging that he was, or has been, required to attend
prison educational classes “ … without a full time accredited
1
Travis has named the following defendants, all of whom he identifies as
officials employed at FMC-Lexington: (1) Warden Francisco J. Quintana, sued
as “Francisci J. Quintana;” (2) “J.” Toney, Supervisor of Education; (3) “J.”
Frisby, Teacher; (4) “E.” Mullins, SLN/Teacher; (5) J. Gochnauer, Teacher;
(6) “R.” Rotherford, Apprencticeship Teacher; (7) “K.” Collins, Library
Supervisor.
2
staff teacher … ” and that this alleged deprivation has “ …
amounted
pain.”
or
to
an
unnecessary
[R. 1, p. 2]
adequately
qualifies
as
and
wanton
infliction
of
mental
Travis claims that the lack of competent
trained
educational
indifference
deliberate
staff
to
his
at
FMC-Lexington
needs,
and
thus
violates his rights guaranteed under the Eighth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.
Travis
also
broadly
alleges
that
the
alleged
instructional
deficiencies at the prison violate his rights guaranteed by the
First
Amendment
of
the
U.S.
Constitution.
Travis
demands
various amount of significant monetary damages to compensate him
for the allegedly inadequate educational instruction, and for
his resulting mental anguish and suffering.
[Id., pp. 3-4]
DISCUSSION
As
a
preliminary
matter,
Travis
fails
to
provide
any
information in support of his broad and conclusory challenge to
the prison’s educational classes and teaching staff, such as
when
the
alleged
events
occurred;
the
nature
of
classes
or
instruction being challenged; why or how the lack of accredited
teaching staff caused him injury; and how long he was required
to attend the classes.
In one passage, Travis alleges that he
is entitled to substantial monetary compensation “… for each day
3
Plaintiff is mentally challenged for lack of proper education.”
[R.
1,
p.
4]
But
even
liberally
construing
the
complaint,
Travis fails to allege a valid Eighth Amendment claim.
The
Eighth
violates
Amendment
civilized
prohibits
standards
of
any
decency
punishment
or
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”
429
U.S.
97,
102–03
citation omitted).
(1976)
(internal
which
“involve[s]
the
Estelle v. Gamble,
quotation
marks
and
To establish an Eighth Amendment violation,
a prisoner must demonstrate that he was deprived of “the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities.”
452
U.S.
337,
347,
(1981);
Wilson
v.
Rhodes v. Chapman,
Seiter,
501
U.S.
294
(1991)(an Eighth Amendment claim is stated where a prisoner is
denied
some
element
of
civilized
human
deliberate indifference or wantonness);
existence
due
to
Street v. Corrections
Corp. of America, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996).
The Eighth Amendment obligates the government to provide
prisoners with the necessities of life, basic hygiene and a
hygienic
environment.
As
the
Sixth
Circuit
stated:
“We
recognize that a deprivation of the basic necessities of life,
e.g.,
food,
shelter,
clothing,
by
prison
officials
would
undoubtedly be a violation of an inmate's Eighth Amendment right
to
be
free
from
cruel
and
unusual
4
punishment.”
Bellamy
v.
Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 419 (6th Cir.1984); see also Dellis v.
Corrs. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 512 (6th Cir. 2001) (the
deprivation of life's necessities, such as food or water, can
constitute a claim under the Eighth Amendment).
But as the Sixth Circuit has pointed out, “a prisoner has
no constitutional right to rehabilitation, education, or jobs.”
Bullock v. McGinnis, 5 F. App'x 340, 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App'x 427,
429 (6th Cir. 2003). In Saunders v. Kiska, 165 F.3d 28, 1998 WL
708763 (6th Cir. Sept. 29, 1998), a state prisoner (Saunders)
alleged that the cancellation of the prison’s education program
was cruel and unusual punishment.
Id. at *2
The district court
dismissed Saunders’s Eighth Amendment claim and on appeal, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that because Saunders failed
to
allege
that
the
cancellation
of
the
educational
program
deprived him of life's necessities, he did not establish an
Eighth Amendment violation.
The
same
constitutional
rationale
right
Id.
applies
to
any
here;
in
the
educational
absence
classes
of
a
and/or
advancement, much less classes taught by accredited instructors,
Travis’s
bald
allegation
that
the
5
prison’s
the
failure
to
provide
such
accredited
instructors
treatment
violates
the
Eighth Amendment simply fails on the merits.
Further, Travis has named as defendants six FMC-Lexington
officials whom he identifies as “teachers,” but he sets forth no
facts
explaining
how
or
when
any
violated his Eighth Amendment rights.
allege
that
the
defendants
were
of
these
six
defendants
A Bivens plaintiff must
personally
involved
in
or
responsible for the alleged deprivation of his federal rights.
See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373–77; Hall v. United States,
704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983).
Travis has also named Francisco Quintana, the Warden of
FMC-Lexington, as a defendant, but again, he alleges no facts
alleging how Warden Quintana violated any of his constitutional
rights.
The
supervisory
fact
that
position
Quintana
over
the
holds
other
an
named
administrative
prison
or
official-
defendants does not suffice under Bivens, because the theory of
respondeat
superior
civil rights actions.
(vicarious
liability)
does
not
apply
in
See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481
(6th Cir. 1995); Jones v. City of Memphis, 586 F.2d 622, 624–25
(6th Cir. 1978).
Even broadly assuming that Warden Quintana may
have denied a grievance filed by Travis, Bivens liability may
6
not
be
imposed
simply
because
a
supervisor
denied
an
administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information
contained in a grievance.
See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295,
300 (6th Cir. 1999).
To
the
deficient
extent
that
educational
Travis
instruction
alleges
that
at
prison
the
the
allegedly
violated
his
Eighth Amendment rights and caused him to suffer mental anguish
and
emotional
relief.
The
distress,
Prison
Travis
Litigation
again
Reform
states
Act
no
grounds
states
that
for
“[n]o
Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a
jail,
prison,
emotional
or
injury
other
correctional
suffered
showing of physical injury.”
while
in
facility,
custody
for
mental
without
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)
a
or
prior
This statute
applies to, and bars, Travis’s Eighth Amendment claims seeking
damages for emotional or mental distress, because Travis alleges
no facts which even remotely suggest that he has sustained any
type of physical injury.
Thus, all of Travis’s Eighth Amendment
claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
Next, Travis alleges in broad and sweeping fashion that the
allegedly deficient teaching staff at the prison violates his
rights under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
7
But
the First Amendment guarantees various rights, such as freedom
of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
fails
to
identify
which
of
his
First
Amendment
Travis
rights
was
violated by the alleged actions or omissions of the named prison
official-defendants,
or
explain
how
the
alleged
deprivation
harmed him.
A complaint will not pass the screening test unless it
presents “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable
inference
that
misconduct
alleged,”
so
plausibility.”
the
as
defendant
to
clothe
is
a
liable
claim
in
for
the
“facial
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The “facial plausibility” standard does not require “detailed
factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.”
Id.
at
678
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
As previously explained, the pleadings of pro se litigants
must be liberally construed, but that liberality extends only so
far; a district court is not required to “guess” what facts or
circumstances underlie a pro se litigant’s claim.
elaboration
of
the
facts
and
circumstances
Absent some
surrounding
his
claim, Travis’s bald and factually unsupported allegations are
8
insufficient to establish a viable First Amendment violation.
See
Harden–Bey
(“[I]n
the
v.
context
Rutter,
of
a
524
F.3d
civil
789,
rights
796
(6th
claim
...
Cir.2008)
conclusory
allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual
allegations fail to state a claim.”) (citing Lillard v. Shelby
County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1987)); Nafziger
v.McDermott
Int'l,
Inc.,
467
F.3d
514,
520
(6th
Cir.
2006)
(observing that “the court is not required to create a claim for
the
plaintiff[
]”)
(internal
quotation
marks
and
citation
omitted); Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 184 (6th Cir. 1996)
(instructing courts not to suppose a plaintiff would be able to
show facts not alleged or that a defendant has violated the law
in ways not alleged).
Travis’s claims alleging a violation of
his First Amendment right will also be dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)
Finally, Travis states that he asserts claims under the
FTCA.
[R. 1, p. 1]
Travis’s FTCA claim(s) will be dismissed,
but without prejudice.
The United States of America is immune from suit except
where its sovereign immunity is explicitly waived.
Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).
9
Fed. Deposit
The FTCA waives
this immunity and allows federal district courts to hear tort
actions against the federal government for “injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b)(1).
Substantively, the FTCA renders the United States
liable “to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances,” subject to enumerated exceptions.
28 U.S.C. §
2674; see Levin v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1224, 1228 (2013).
The FTCA is the exclusive remedy for tort actions against the
federal
government,
its
agencies,
and
its
employees.
Ascot
Dinner Theatre v. Small Business Admin., 887 F.2d 1024, 1028
(10th Cir. 1989)
Federal prisoners are among the possible plaintiffs in FTCA
cases. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963); 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b)(1); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 700 (2004),
The factual basis underlying Travis’s invocation of the FTCA is
unclear,
but
his
FTCA
claim
must
be
dismissed
for
another
reason, which is that an FTCA claim may be asserted only against
the United States of America.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2674; Smith v.
United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1099 (10th Cir. 2009) (“The United
States
is
the
only
proper
defendant
10
in
an
FTCA
action.”);
Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2008) (same).
Failure to name the United States as defendant in an FTCA suit
results in a fatal lack of jurisdiction.
States, 909 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1990)
Allgeier v. United
Here, Travis did not
name the United States as defendant to this action, so dismissal
of
his
FTCA
claim(s)
without
prejudice
is
appropriate.
Allgeier, 909 F.2d at 871.2
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1.
Plaintiff
The
First
Robby
and
Travis
Eighth
against
Amendment
the
claims
named
alleged
defendants
by
are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
2.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
Travis’s claims asserted under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§
1346(b), 2671–2680, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Travis’s
right to file another FTCA action naming the proper defendant.
3.
4.
The Court will enter an appropriate Judgment.
This matter is STRICKEN from the docket.
This December 8, 2016.
2
Travis is advised that if he files a new civil action alleging a claim under
the FTCA, he must first present his claim in writing to the appropriate
agency (here, the BOP), within two years of the date the claim accrued, and
bring a civil action within six months after the agency mails the notice of
final denial of the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); Blakely v. United States, 276
F.3d 853, 865 (6th Cir.2002); Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 448 (9th
Cir.1996).
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