Humphrey v. SSA

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Pla's 10 Motion for Summary Judgment is OVERRULED and Dft's 12 Motion for Summary Judgment is SUSTAINED. A judgment in favor of the Dft will be entered contemporaneously herewith. Signed by Judge Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr on January 2, 2018. (AWD) cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
at LEXINGTON
Civil Action No. 16-477-HRW
RICIDE A. HUMPHREY,

v.

PLAINTIFF,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

DEFENDANT.

Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g) to challenge a final
decision of the Defendant denying Plaintiffs application for disability insurance benefits. The
Court having reviewed the record in this case and the dispositive motions filed by the parties, and
being otherwise sufficiently advised, for the reasons set forth herein, finds that the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed his current application for disability insurance benefits on November 1,
2013, alleging disability beginning on August 14, 2012, due to depression, anxiety, acute stress,
mood swings and trigeminal neuralgia (Tr. 269). This application was denied initially and on
reconsideration. Thereafter, upon request by Plaintiff, an administrative video hearing was
conducted by Administrative Law Judge Roger Reynolds (hereinafter "ALJ"), wherein Plaintiff,
accompanied by counsel, testified. At the hearing, Betty Hale, a vocational expert (hereinafter
"VE"), also testified. 1

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Plaintiff filed a prior application for disability benefits which was denied on June 25,
2012 (Tr. 107-125).

At the hearing, pursuant to 20 C.F .R. § 416.920, the ALJ performed the following fivestep sequential analysis in order to determine whether the Plaintiff was disabled:
Step 1: If the claimant is performing substantial gainful work, he is not disabled.
Step 2: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work, his impairment(s) must
be severe before he can be found to be disabled based upon the requirements in 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(b).
Step 3: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work and has a severe
impairment (or impairments) that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period
of at least twelve months, and his impairments (or impairments) meets or medically
equals a listed impairment contained in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4, the
claimant is disabled without further inquiry.
Step 4: If the claimant's impairment (or impairments) does not prevent him from doing
his past relevant work, he is not disabled.
Step 5: Even if the claimant's impairment or impairments prevent him from performing
his past relevant work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national
economy that accommodates his residual functional capacity and vocational factors, he is
not disabled.

The ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. Plaintiff was 4 7 years
old at the time of the hearing decision. He has a high school education (Tr. 270). His past
relevant work experience consists of work as a marketing specialist and substance abuse
counseling center worker (Tr. 254).
At Step 1 of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability (Tr. 13).
The ALJ then determined, at Step 2, that Plaintiff suffers from bipolar disorder, attention
deficit disorder, polysubstance dependence in reported sustained remission and trigeminal
neuralgia, which he found to be "severe" within the meaning of the Regulations (Tr. 13).

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At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiffs impairments did not meet or medically equal any
of the listed impairments (Tr. 13).
The ALJ further found that Plaintiff could not return to his past relevant work (Tr. 20) but
determined that he has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a range of light level
work with certain restrictions, to-wit:
no exposure to industrial hazards. He further requires entry-level
work with simple[,] repetitive procedures, only occasional changes in
work routines, and no requirement for detailed or complex problem
solving, independent planning, or the setting of goals. He should
work in an object oriented, non-public environment with only
occasional and casual contact with coworkers, supervisors,
or the general public.
(Tr. 15-16).
The ALJ finally concluded that these jobs exist in significant numbers in the national and
regional economies, as identified by the VE (Tr. 21).
Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff not to be disabled at Step 5 of the sequential
evaluation process.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review and adopted the ALJ' s decision
as the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff thereafter filed this civil action seeking a
reversal of the Commissioner's decision. Both parties have filed Motions for Summary
Judgment [Docket Nos. 10 and 12] and this matter is ripe for decision.

II. ANALYSIS
The essential issue on appeal to this Court is whether the ALJ's decision is supported by
substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence" is defined as "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;" it is based on the record as a

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whole and must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Garner
v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by
substantial evidence, the reviewing Court must affirm. Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). "The court may
not try the case de nova nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility."
Bradley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 862 F.2d 1224, 1228 (6th Cir. 1988).
Finally, this Court must defer to the Commissioner's decision "even ifthere is substantial
evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion, so long as substantial
evidence supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ." Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th
Cir.1997).
Plaintiffs main argument on appeal is that the ALJ failed to adopt the opinion of his
treating psychiatrist, James Mcferrin, M.D.
"In order to determine whether the ALJ acted properly in disagreeing with a medical

source, we must first determine the medical source's classification," Ealy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
594 F.3d 504, 514 (6th Cir.2010), as "not all medical sources need be treated equally," Smith v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 875 (6th Cir.2007). The Social Security regulations classify
"acceptable medical sources into three types: nonexamining sources, nontreating (but examining)
sources, and treating sources." Id. at 875. Generally, more weight is given to the medical
"opinion of a source who has examined [the claimant] than to the opinion of a source who has
not examined [the claimant]." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(l); see also Norris v. Comm'r ofSoc.
Sec., 461 Fed.Appx. 433, 439 (6th Cir.2012) (noting that a nonexamining source's opinion is
given less deference than an examining (but not treating) source's opinion, which is given less

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deference than a treating source). But "[i]n appropriate circumstances, opinions from State
agency medical and psychological consultants ... may be entitled to greater weight than the
opinions of treating or examining sources." SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *3. One such
instance is where the "[ s]tate agency medical or psychological consultant's opinion is based on a
review of a complete case record that includes a medical report from a specialist in the
individual's particular impairment which provides more detailed and comprehensive information
than what was available to the individual's treating source." Id. "The more a medical source
presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory
findings, the more weight [the ALJ] will give that opinion." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3).
Generally, more weight is given to opinions that are "more consistent ... with the record as a
whole," id. § 404.1527(c)(4), and opinions of "a specialist about medical issues related to his or
her area of specialty." Id.§ 404.1527(c)(5).

In order to be given controlling weight, the opinions of a treating source on issues
involving the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments must be well supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and be consistent with other
substantial evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2). Such opinions receive great
weight only if they are supported by sufficient medical data. Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431,
435 (6 1h Cir. 1985).
At the outset, the Court notes that the ALJ correctly disregarded Dr. McFerrin's
evaluations dated between March 2010 and May 2012 (Tr. 360-366), as these fall outside the
date of Plaintiffs alleged onset of disability.

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In April 2015, Dr. McFerrin said Plaintiffs condition, although marginally stable, had not

improved to the point where he could live independently (Tr. 392). He said he remained at his
parents' home for support purposes and could not sustain himself, even in part-time employment,
due to his symptoms, which included medication side effects, lethargy, malaise, decreased
concentration or focus, and overall retrogression of his past level of functioning
(Tr. 392). In June 2015, Dr. McFerrin said Plaintiff fair abilities to follow work rules, relate to
coworkers, interact with supervisors, function independently, and maintain attention and
concentration, but poor to no ability to deal with the public, use judgment, deal with work
stresses, and demonstrate reliability (Tr. 393). In August 2015, Dr. Mcferrin said Plaintiffs
impairments met the requirements of§§ 12.03, 12.04, and 12.06 of the impairments listed in
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (the Listings) (Tr. 411-15).
The ALJ explained that he gave little weight to Dr. McFerrin's April and August 2015
opinions as there was no cited medical evidence to lend support to these opinions. The ALJ
noted that Dr. Mcferrin appeared toe relying wholly on Plaintiffs subjective complaints, which
are a far cry from objective findings. See Tate v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec., 467 F. App 'x 431, 433
(6th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (affirming the ALJ's decision not to give controlling weight to an
opinion that was based on subjective complaints as opposed to objective findings).
In addition, the ALJ found, Dr. McFerrin's April and August 2015 opinions were not

consistent with his own generally upbeat treatment notes (Tr. 19). Indeed, in January 2013, Dr.
Mcferrin noted that Plaintiffs medications were working well without side effects (Tr. 388).
Dr. McFerrin repeated this statement in February, April, July, and September 2013 (Tr. 384-87). In

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December 2014, Dr. McFerrin noted that Plaintiff had been stable on Adderall (a stimulant) (Tr.
497). In February 2015, Dr. McFerrin said Plaintiff had no more depressive episodes and only mild
difficulties with his family (Tr. 396). The following April, Dr. McFerrin noted that Plaintiff had
overall stable moods and daily routines and no depressive symptoms (Tr. 395). In June 2015, Dr.
Mcferrin noted that Plaintiff tried to establish a daily routine with some stabilization of moods and
stable depression (Tr. 394).
Further, Dr. McFerrin's opinion of dire limitation is at odds with the other medical
opinions in the record. In 2014, Ed Ross, Ph.D., a state agency psychologist, reviewed the
evidence and said Plaintiff could perform unskilled work consisting of simple tasks and
instructions with occasional contact with the public and changes in the workplace (Tr. 132-44).
The following month, Mary Thompson, Ph.D., a state agency psychologist, reviewed the
evidence and agreed with Dr. Ross's opinion (Tr. 147-60). Sudhideb Mukherjee, M.D., a state
agency physician, reviewed the evidence and said Plaintiff could perform sedentary work, but
should avoid all exposure to hazards (machinery, heights, etc.) (Tr. 147-60).
Given the lack of supporting medical data and corroborating opinions, the Court finds no
error in the ALJ's consideration of Dr. McFerrin's opinion.
As for Dr. McFerrin's opinion that Plaintiffs impairments met the requirements of§§
12.03, 12.04, and 12.06 of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (the
Listings), the ALJ was correct in disregarding these conclusory remarks. It is within the province
of the ALJ to make the legal determination of disability. The ALJ is not bound by a treating
physician's conclusory statement, particularly where the ALJ determines, as he did in this case,
where these is medical proof that Plaintiff retains the RFC to work in some capacity other than

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his past work.

See King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 973 (61h Cir. 1984).

Plaintiff also suggests that the ALJ should have given more weight to the statements of
his mother and father-in-law. This argument lacks merit. The pertinent regulation provides:
In considering evidence from "non-medical" sources who have not
seen the individual in a professional capacity, in connection with
their impairments, such as spouses, parents, friends, and
neighbors, it would be appropriate to consider such factors as the
nature and extent of the relationship, whether the evidence is
consistent with other evidence, and any other factors that tend to
support or refute the evidence.

SSR 06-03p.
Furthermore, the ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence or data in his
opinion as long as he considers all of the evidence and makes a "reasoned conclusion." Baseley
v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 397 F. App'x 195, 199 (6th Cir. 2010)
In the decision, the ALJ stated that he considered "all the evidence," in the "entire

record." (Tr. 11, 13). There is nothing to indicate that he disregarded the testimony of Plaintiffs
family members.

Moreover, the statements of Plaintiffs family do not change the ALJ's

assessment of the medical evidence in the record.
Ill. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the ALJ' s decision is supported by substantial evidence on the
record. Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment be OVERRULED and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be
SUSTAINED. A judgment in favor of the Defendant will be entered contemporaneously
herewith.

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This

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day of January, 2018.

Signed By:

HenaR. Wilhoit.__Jr.
United States District Judge

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