Rorick v. Service Experts Heating & Air Conditioning LLC et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: It is ordered that Pla's 34 MOTION to Transfer is DENIED. It is further ordered that Pla shall SHOW CAUSE w/in 10 days of entry of this order why her Complaint against Dft Freije Treatment Systems, Inc., should not be dismissed w/o prejudice for lack of prosecution. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 9/19/2018.(SCD)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON
KIMBERLY S. RORICK,
Plaintiff,
v.
SERVICE EXPERTS HEATING
& AIR CONDITIONING LLC,
d/b/a KNOCHELMANN PLUMBING,
HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING
d/b/a KNOCKELMANN SERVICE
EXPERTS,
SERVICE EXPERTS, LLC,
LENNOX INDUSTRIES, INC., and
FREIJE TREATMENT SYSTEMS,
INC.,
Defendants.
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) Action No. 5:17-cv-132-JMH
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) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion to
Transfer [DE 34].
For the reasons stated herein, essentially the
same reasons stated in the Court’s Order dated August 28, 2018,
[DE 30] in the companion case to this one, Newberry v. Service
Experts
Heating
&
Air
Conditioning,
LLC,
5:17-cv-131-JMH,
Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
Plaintiff argues for the first time in the instant motion
that transfer is appropriate and that all previous orders in this
case are null and void because this Court somehow lacks subject
matter and personal jurisdiction over this matter in light of the
voluntary dismissal of a prior case, Rorick v. Service Experts
1
Heating
&
Air
Conditioning,
LLC,
2:13-cv-81-WOB-CJS.
That
dismissal order stated that “subsequent law suits must be re-filed
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky, Covington Division.”
7].
[DE 13 in the instant matter, Ex.
The dismissal order also stated that the parties agreed “not
to contest jurisdiction or venue in this Court.”
Plaintiff also
argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) obligates the undersigned to
transfer this matter to the Covington.
Plaintiff’s arguments are
unavailing.
Section 1404(a) provides that a district court “may” transfer
a civil action “to any other district or division in which it might
have been brought or to any district or division to which all
parties have consented” when it is “for the convenience of the
parties and witnesses” and “in the interest of justice.”
Section
1404(a) does not speak to jurisdiction in this matter, and, in any
event, the language is permissive and not mandatory.
Furthermore,
the
assignment
of
the
present
matter
to
a
particular jury division within the Eastern District of Kentucky
does
not
implicate
jurisdictional
issues.
While
the
Eastern
District of Kentucky is a creation of statute, 28 U.S.C. § 97(a),
jury divisions and assignment of actions to jury divisions in the
Eastern District of Kentucky are governed by local rules adopted
by the judges of the district.
See LR 3.1 and 3.2.
The “Joint
Local Rules for the United States District Courts for the Eastern
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and Western Districts of Kentucky provide standardized procedures
for the convenience of the bench and bar” and must be “construed
to be consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and to
secure the just, efficient and economical determination of civil
actions.” LR 1.1.
The Complaint in this matter states that Plaintiff resides at
1217 Criswell, Berry, Kentucky 41003, which is also the place where
the events giving rise to this case occurred.
[DE 1, Comp. ¶ 6].
Berry, Kentucky, is in Harrison County, Kentucky, which is part of
the Lexington Division of the Eastern District of Kentucky.
3.1(a)(2)(B).
LR
Accordingly, this case was properly assigned by the
Clerk at the time of filing to the Central Division at Lexington
by operation of the relevant Local Rule.
See LR 3.1(a)(2)(B) and
3.2(a)(2)(A); see also Complaint [DE 1]; cf. United States v.
Lewis, 504 F.2d 92, 97 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that Fed. R. Crim.
P. 18 was not violated when transferring criminal case from one
place within district to another where assignment of cases is
within the exclusive domain of local district judges).
While jury division assignments may be changed by rule or by
Court order, LR 3.1(c), the Court sees no reason to reassign this
matter to another division.
To request such relief is a patently
transparent effort at judge shopping in its rankest form on the
part of Plaintiff.
Plaintiff may wish to replace the devil she
did not know until this Court’s rulings (the undersigned) with the
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devil that she does know (Judge Bertlesman) or, for that matter,
any devil she has not yet met (Judge Bunning or any other judge of
this district), but that would do nothing to secure the “just,
efficient
and
economical
determination
required by Joint Local Rule 1.1.
of
civil
actions”
as
Further, the Court rejects
Plaintiff’s argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction or that
its prior orders are somehow invalid because the parties agreed
that this matter should proceed in the Covington Division at some
point in the past.
Accordingly,
IT
IS
Transfer [DE 34] is DENIED.
ORDERED
that
Plaintiff’s
Motion
to
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff
shall SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days of entry of this order why
her Complaint against Defendant Freije Treatment Systems, Inc.,
should not be dismissed without prejudice for lack of prosecution.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) .
This the 19th day of September, 2018.
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