Phar v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (14th District Circuit Court)

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: IT IS ORDERED as follows: (1) This matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and STRICKEN from the Court's active docket; (2) Plaintiff's MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis 2 is DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 4/4/2017.(KM)cc: COR,Pla via US mail

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON
ROSS “WORD” PHAR,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, 14TH
DISTRICT CIRCUIT COURT,
Defendant.

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Civil Case No.
5:17-cv-159-JMH
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

***
Plaintiff Ross “Word” Phar has filed a pro se Complaint [DE
1] against the Commonwealth of Kentucky (14th District Circuit
Court), seeking redress for federal constitutional violations that
allegedly occurred while he was incarcerated pending trial on state
criminal charges. 1

Because Plaintiff has also submitted a Motion

to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [DE 2], the Court must conduct an
initial

screening

of

the

Complaint

1

pursuant

to

28

U.S.C.

§

There is no “14th District Circuit Court” in Kentucky. See Kentucky Court of
Justice, Publications and Resources, Kentucky Judicial Circuit Map and Kentucky
Judicial District Map,
www.courts.ky.gov/resources/publicationsresources/Pages/default.aspx
(last
visited April 4, 2017).
Instead, Kentucky has a 14th Judicial Circuit,
consisting of the Woodford Circuit Court, Bourbon Circuit Court, and Scott
Circuit Court.
Id.
It also has a 14th Judicial District, composed of the
Woodford District Court, Bourbon District Court, and Scott District Court. Id.
Because Plaintiff’s allegations relate to his incarceration and treatment during
the pendency of a Woodford Circuit Court case, this Court will construe
Plaintiff’s Complaint as one against the 14th Judicial Circuit, as well as the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.
See Kentucky Court of Justice, CourtNet 2.0,
https://kcoj.kycourts.net/CourtNet/Search/Index (last visited April 4, 2017).
1

1915(e)(2). 2 If the Court determines that this matter is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from

such

relief,

dismissal

is

appropriate. 3

See

McGore

v.

Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on
other grounds by LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir.
2013)).
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that “allegations of
a complaint drafted by a pro se litigant are held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991).

Jourdan v.

But see Frengler v. Gen.

Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976 (6th Cir. 2012) (observing that “this
lenient treatment has limits”).

Because Plaintiff alleges that a

Kentucky court violated his federal constitutional rights, and
requests monetary compensation in connection therewith, the Court
finds it appropriate to construe Plaintiff’s Complaint as an action
for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

2

See Will v. Mich. Dept. of

Although the Complaint indicates that Plaintiff was incarcerated at one time,
he is not still confined.
Thus, the screening requirements of 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a) are inapplicable. See Kane v. Lancaster Cty. Dept. of Corrections,
960 F. Supp. 219, 220 (D. Neb. 1997) (finding that a case was not subject to §
1915A(a) screening requirements, even though the plaintiff was incarcerated at
the time of the incident underlying the case, because he had been released prior
to the filing of his complaint).
3
When dismissal is appropriate because the plaintiff seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief, courts have treated the
disposition as a dismissal with prejudice. See Armstrong v. Russell, No. 1:14cv-00036, 2014 WL 1317299, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 28, 2014); Gould v. Suffety,
No. 07-11235-BC, 2007 WL 1599716, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 4, 2007); Preston v.
Preston, Civ. A. No. 5:11-00170-JBC, 2011 WL 2445967, at *1 (E.D. Ky. June 14,
2011).
2

St. Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (explaining that “Section 1983
provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil
liberties”).
That being said, Section 1983 “does not provide a federal
forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged
deprivations of civil liberties.”

Id. (emphasis added) (holding

that a state is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983).
Under the Eleventh Amendment, “an unconsenting State is immune
from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well
as by citizens of another State.”

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.

651, 663 (1974).

“[A] State may consent to suit against it in

federal

but

court,”

expressed.”

Id.

such

consent

must

be

“unequivocally

The Court is not aware of any case law or statute

indicating that the Commonwealth of Kentucky has consented to suits
against it in federal court.
While Congress also “has power with respect to the rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment
expression

immunity,”
of

constitutionally

there

must

congressional
guaranteed

again
intent

immunity

of

be
to
the

an

“unequivocal

‘overturn
several

the

States.’”

Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984)
(quoting Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979)).

The Supreme

Court of the United States has held that “Congress, in passing §
1983, had no intention to disturb the States’ Eleventh Amendment
3

immunity.”
cannot

Id. (citing Quern, 491 U.S. at 66).

maintain

his

§

1983

suit

against

the

Thus, Plaintiff
Commonwealth

of

Kentucky.
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to sue the 14th Judicial
Circuit, the ultimate conclusion is the same, although the analysis
differs slightly.

“[E]ven though a State is not named a party to

the action, the suit may nonetheless be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.”

Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663; see also Regents of the

Univ. of Ca. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (explaining that the
Eleventh Amendment “encompasses not only actions in which a State
is actually named as the defendant, but also certain actions
against state agents and state instrumentalities”).

In short,

“when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from
the state, the state is the real substantial party in interest and
is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though
individual officials are nominal defendants.”

Ford Motor Co. v.

Dep’t of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
In determining whether an entity qualifies as an “arm of the
State,” the Supreme Court of the United States has “inquired into
the relationship between the State and the entity in question.”
Doe, 519 U.S. at 429.

The United States Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit has distilled this “arm-of- the-state” analysis into
a four-factor test: (1) the State’s potential liability for a
judgment against the entity; (2) the language by which state
4

statutes and state courts refer to the entity and the degree of
state control and veto power of the entity’s actions; (3) whether
state or local officials appoint the board members of the entity;
and (4) whether the entity’s functions fall within the traditional
purview of state or local government.

Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d

351, 359 (6th Cir. 2005).
The
Court,

14th

Bourbon

Kentucky
courts.

Judicial
Circuit

Constitution
See

Ky.

Circuit

includes

Court,

and

Scott

provides

for

the

Const.

§

109

(“The

the

Woodford

Circuit

Court.

establishment
judicial

Circuit

of

power

of

The
such
the

Commonwealth shall be vested exclusively in one Court of Justice
which shall be divided into a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals,
at trial court of general jurisdiction known as the Circuit Court
and a trial court of limited jurisdiction known as the District
Court.”).

It also mandates that the General Assembly shall fix

the compensation for judges presiding over these courts and that
“[a]ll compensation and necessary expenses of the Court of Justice
shall be paid out of the State Treasury.”

Ky. Const. § 120.

Taken together, these statutes suggest that the State would
be liable for a potential judgment against the 14th Judicial
District.

They

also

demonstrate

that

the

State

exercises

considerable control over the 14th Judicial Circuit, dictating the
types of cases it may hear and financing its activities.

For these

reasons, the Court finds that the 14th Judicial Circuit is an arm
5

of the state, and thus, is immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment.

See Anglin v. Ky. Supreme Court, Civ. A. No. 3:13-33-

GFVT, 2013 WL 6253159, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 3, 2013) (stating that
the Kentucky Supreme Court “is unquestionably an arm of the state
for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, and is thus immune from
suit”); Newton v. Ky. St. Police, 2009 WL 648989, at *6 (E.D. Ky.
Mar. 11, 2009) (treating the Franklin Circuit Court as an “arm of
the state” for Eleventh Amendment purposes); McKee v. Fayette
Circuit Court, 68 F.3d 474 (Table), 1995 WL 559331, at *2 (6th
Cir. Sept. 20, 1995) (affirming dismissal of Fayette Circuit Court
on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds). Because the 14th Judicial
District has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, dismissal
of this action is appropriate.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein,
IT IS ORDERED as follows:
(1)

This

matter

is

hereby

DISMISSED

WITH

PREJUDICE

and

STRICKEN from the Court’s active docket; and
(2)

Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [DE 2]

is hereby DENIED AS MOOT.
This the 4th day of April, 2017.

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