Thomson v. SSA
Filing
25
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) Commissioner's 22 MOTION to Remand to Agency is DENIED; (2) Commissioner's decisions denying the plaintiffs' disability claims are hereby REVERSED; (3) Plaintiffs' requests to reinstate benef its are GRANTED and consistent with this opinion; (4) Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), these matters are REMANDED to the SSA for further proceedings; (5) These matters are STRICKEN from the active docket of this Court; (6) Any pe nding requests for relief in these actions are DENIED AS MOOT; (7) This is a FINAL AND APPEALABLE ORDER and there is NO JUST CAUSE FOR DELAY; and (8) A separate judgment will this date be entered. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 7/11/2019.(JJ)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
IN RE VARIOUS SOCIAL SECURITY
CASES AFFECTED BY THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT DECISION IN HICKS V.
BERRYHILL, NO. 17-5206,
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Civil Case Nos.
0:16-cv-062-JMH
5:16-cv-128-JMH
5:16-cv-351-JMH
5:17-cv-169-JMH
6:16-cv-184-JMH
6:16-cv-298-JMH
6:17-cv-006-JMH
7:16-cv-035-JMH
7:16-cv-076-JMH
7:16-cv-096-JMH
7:16-cv-167-JMH
7:16-cv-171-JMH
7:16-cv-181-JMH
7:16-cv-194-JMH
7:16-cv-233-JMH
7:16-cv-245-JMH
7:16-cv-270-JMH
7:16-cv-272-JMH
7:16-cv-286-JMH
7:16-cv-287-JMH
7:16-cv-298-JMH
7:17-cv-016-JMH
7:17-cv-022-JMH
7:17-cv-092-JMH
7:17-cv-107-JMH
7:17-cv-129-JMH
7:17-cv-131-JMH
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
***
These matters come before the Court on the Commissioner’s
motions to remand pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
in the above-captioned cases. For the following reasons, the Court
will deny the Commissioner’s motions to remand pursuant to sentence
- 1 -
six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and remand the above-captioned cases
under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The above-captioned cases arise from the plaintiffs, with the
assistance of former attorney Eric C. Conn, being awarded Social
Security disability benefits. Subsequently, the Social Security
Administration’s (“SSA”) Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”)
developed reason to believe Conn, Administrative Law Judge David
Daugherty, and four examining doctors, Bradley Atkins, Ph.D.,
Srinivas Ammisetty, M.D., Frederic Huffnagle, M.D., and David P.
Herr, D.O., had participated in a fraudulent scheme to obtain
benefits for Conn’s clients, including the plaintiffs in the abovecaptioned cases. 1 Hicks v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 909 F.3d 786, 794
(6th Cir. 2018). On May 12, 2015, after the OIG investigated the
suspected
fraudulent
conduct
further
and
identified
1,787
individuals whose applications appeared to be tainted by fraud,
the
OIG
advised
the
SSA
that
it
could
move
forward
with
redetermining the affected claimants’ eligibility for benefits
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(u) and 1383(e)(7)(A)(i). Id. “In particular,
the OIG . . . ‘ha[d] reason to believe that Mr. Conn or his firm
submitted pre-completed ‘template’ Residual Functional Capacity
1
Conn, Daugherty, and Dr. Bradley Adkins were convicted of various
criminal charges arising out of this scheme. See Lexington Criminal
Action Nos. 5:16-cr-022; 5:17-cr-043; 5:17-cr-104; 5:17-cr-066;
5:18-cr-059.
- 2 -
[“RFC”]
forms
purportedly
from
[the
four
doctors
identified
above], dated between January 2007 and May 2011, in support of the
individuals’ applications for benefits.’” Id.
On
May
18,
2015,
the
Commissioner
sent
letters
to
the
plaintiffs in the above-captioned cases, and approximately 1,500
similarly situated individuals, explaining:
[T]he SSA needed to redetermine plaintiffs’ eligibility
for benefits because “there was reason to believe fraud
was involved in certain cases involving [Adkins,
Ammisetty, Huffnagle, and Herr],” one or more of these
doctors “provided evidence” in plaintiffs’ cases, and
the ALJ (i.e., Daugherty) “previously used that evidence
to find [plaintiffs] disabled.”
Id.
(citations
omitted).
“The
letters
further
explained
that
during the redetermination process, the SSA ‘must disregard any
evidence
from
one
of
the
medical
providers
above
when
the
information was submitted by representative Eric C. Conn or other
representatives associated with Mr. Conn’s law office.’” Id. at
794-95. “Notably, in redetermining plaintiffs’ eligibility for
benefits, the SSA excluded all evidence submitted by Adkins,
Ammisetty, Huffnagle, and Herr—not just the RFC forms that the OIG
had identified as possibly fraudulent in its referral to the SSA.”
Id. at 795 (footnote and citations omitted). “Beyond the RFC forms,
the
four
doctors
had
submitted
evidence
detailing
their
examinations of plaintiffs, including any testing that they had
performed and behavioral observations they had made.” Id. Upon
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redetermination, the Commissioner found the plaintiffs were not
eligible for benefits. Id. at 795.
The plaintiffs and many similarly affected individuals filed
lawsuits alleging the SSA’s redetermination process was unlawful.
Judges in this Court issued conflicting rulings, and the issue was
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit. Id. at 796. In Hicks, a split panel of the Sixth Circuit
held in pertinent part, “The Due Process Clause of the Constitution
and the Administrative Procedure Act required the SSA to allow
plaintiffs an opportunity to show why the medical reports uniformly
and entirely disregarded in their redetermination proceedings were
not, in fact, tainted by fraud.” Id. at 813. Furthermore, the Sixth
Circuit held, “[T]he plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment
on their due-process claim.” Id. at 792.
Specifically
regarding
the
SSA’s
requirements
under
the
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), “[T]he APA provides that
‘[w]hen an agency decision rests on official notice of a material
fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is
entitled,
on
timely
request,
to
an
opportunity
to
show
the
contrary.’” Id. at 805 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 556(e)). In Hicks, the
Sixth Circuit found that plaintiffs similarly situated to those
presently before this Court “have provided evidence demonstrating
that the ALJs assigned to plaintiffs’ redetermination hearings
essentially rejected the only remaining medical opinions that
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could have established plaintiffs’ claims based on the OIG’s offthe-record
determination
that
the
records
involved
fraud—
determinations plaintiffs had no opportunity to rebut or contest.”
Id. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit stated that in cases like those
presently before this Court, where “the SSA’s procedures failed to
comply with the APA’s formal-adjudication requirements,” such as
those found in 5 U.S.C. § 556(e), “the ALJ’s failure to comply
with § 556 would require reversal of the ALJ’s determination and
remand for further fact-finding unless the error was harmless.”
Id. at 805 (citing Dixie Fuel Co., LLC v. Dir., Office of Workers’
Comp. Programs, 820 F.3d 833, 846 (6th Cir. 2016); Baker v. Dir.,
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 980 F.2d 729, 1992 WL 361287,
at *2 (6th Cir. 1992)). “[The Sixth Circuit] held in Baker that
the ALJ’s error was not harmless because the ALJ ‘essentially
rejected
the
established
only
[the
remaining
medical
opinion
plaintiff’s
claim]’
based,
that
in
could
part,
on
have
his
assessment of the drafting physician’s qualifications, which were
not included in the record.” Id. at 805-06 (citing Baker, 1992 WL
361287, at *2). Accordingly, in Hicks, the Sixth Circuit, finding
plaintiffs such as those presently before this Court are like the
plaintiff in Baker, stated the following:
[P]laintiffs have provided evidence demonstrating that
the ALJs assigned to plaintiffs’ redetermination
hearings essentially rejected the only remaining medical
opinions that could have established plaintiffs’ claims
based on the OIG’s off-the-record determination that the
- 5 -
records involved fraud—determinations plaintiffs had no
opportunity to rebut or contest. The SSA’s process
therefore fails under the APA.
Id. at 806.
The
above-captioned
cases
were
stayed
pending
the
Sixth
Circuit’s decision in Hicks. The stay remained in effect while the
Commissioner sought rehearing or en banc consideration in the Sixth
Circuit, which was denied. While still considering whether to file
a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court regarding the Hicks decision, the Commissioner moved to
remand
the
above-captioned
cases
to
the
Social
Security
Administration pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 2
The plaintiffs contend remand should be under the fourth sentence
of § 405(g).
II. DISCUSSION
Sentences four and six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) are the only
kinds of remand permitted under the statute. Melkonyan v. Sullivan,
501 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1991). Sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
states, “The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings
and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or
reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security,
2
While the Court does not find the Commissioner is judicially
estopped from arguing in favor of remand under sentence six, the
Commissioner’s position is weakened by her previous concession
that “the circumstances described in sentence six [were] not
present” in Hicks v. Commissioner of Social Security, 7:16-cv-154ART, Record No. 59 n.4.
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with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” Sentence six
provides the following:
The court may, on motion of the Commissioner of Social
Security made for good cause shown before the
Commissioner files the Commissioner’s answer, remand the
case to the Commissioner of Social Security for further
action by the Commissioner of Social Security, and it
may at any time order additional evidence to be taken
before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only
upon a showing that there is new evidence which is
material and that there is good cause for the failure to
incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior
proceeding.
Accordingly, under sentence four, the Court may make a substantive
ruling regarding the correctness of the Commissioner’s decision
and enter a corresponding judgment either affirming, modifying, or
reversing the decision. On the other hand, the Court may remand
under sentence six in the two following scenarios: (1) Before
filing a response in an action, the Commissioner may request remand
in a motion that shows good cause for the remand; or (2) When new
evidence comes to light that was both unavailable to the claimant
at the time of the administrative proceeding and may have changed
the outcome of the prior proceeding, and there is good cause shown
for failing to incorporate the evidence into the record in the
prior proceeding. For the following reasons, the Court will remand
the above-captioned cases under sentence four.
A. APPROPRIATE SENTENCE FOR REMAND
“[A] sentence-four remand is based upon a determination that
the Commissioner erred in some respect in reaching the decision to
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deny benefits.” Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1095 (11th Cir.
1996). Where the Commissioner “‘has failed to provide a full and
fair hearing, to make explicit findings, or to have correctly
[applied] the law and regulations,’” a district court may remand
under sentence four in conjunction with a judgment affirming,
modifying, or reversing the administrative decision. Melkonyan,
501 U.S. at 101 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96-100, at 13 (1979)). While
a district court retains jurisdiction following a sentence six
remand, a sentence four remand is a final and appealable order,
and the district court’s entry of judgment after a sentence four
remand terminates the district court’s jurisdiction over the case.
See Jackson, 99 F.3d at 1095 (citing Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496
U.S. 617, 625-26 (1990); Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 299
(1993)). Moreover, “A judgment of remand on sentence-four grounds
is a final judgment under the EAJA, and it usually starts the EAJA
attorney's fees application filing period running.” Id. (citing
Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 102).
As previously mentioned, in Hicks, the Sixth Circuit held
that plaintiffs such as those in the above-captioned cases “are
entitled to summary judgment on their due-process claim.” Hicks,
at 909 F.3d at 792. Additionally, the Sixth Circuit found that in
cases such as those presently before this Court, “[T]he ALJ’s
failure to comply with § 556 would require reversal of the ALJ’s
determination and remand for further fact-finding unless the error
- 8 -
was harmless.” Id. at 805 (citing Dixie Fuel Co., LLC, 820 F.3d at
846; Baker, 1992 WL 361287, at *2). Since the Sixth Circuit found
that, like the ALJ’s error in Baker, the ALJs’ errors in the abovecaptioned
cases
were
not
harmless,
the
ALJs’
redetermination
hearings should be reversed and remanded.
Reversal of the ALJs’ redetermination hearing decisions in
the above-captioned cases requires remand be under sentence four.
The possibility that new evidence may be introduced does not
preclude the Court from remanding under sentence four. See Faucher
v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1994)
(“[R]emands under both sentence four and sentence six of § 405(g)
can involve the taking of additional evidence.”). Moreover, even
in the above-captioned cases where the SSA has yet to file an
answer or other responsive pleading, this Court may not remand
under sentence six because pursuant to the Sixth Circuit’s decision
in Hicks, the ALJs’ redetermination hearing decisions in the abovecaptioned cases violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution
and the APA, Hicks, 909 F.3d at 813, which necessitates reversal
of
those
decisions.
“substantive
ruling”
Furthermore,
that
the
the
ALJs
Hicks
erred
decision
in
making
was
a
their
redetermination hearing decisions, so remanding under sentence six
due
to
arguably
new
evidence
coming
to
light
would
be
inappropriate. See Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 100 (“Under sentence
six, the district court may remand in light of additional evidence
- 9 -
without making any substantive ruling as to the correctness of the
Secretary's decision, but only if the claimant shows good cause
for failing to present the evidence earlier.”) (emphasis added);
see also Jackson, 99 F.3d at 1095. Therefore, the Court may not
remand under sentence six. Instead, the SSA’s failure to provide
full and fair hearings and comply with the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution and the APA requires that this Court reverse the
ALJs’ redetermination hearing decisions and remand the abovecaptioned
consistent
cases
with
under
the
sentence
Sixth
four
Circuit’s
for
further
decision
in
proceedings
Hicks.
See
Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 101 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96-100, at 13
(1979)).
B. REINSTATEMENT OF BENEFITS
One final consideration remains: does remand under sentence
four require reinstatement of the plaintiffs’ Social Security
benefits?
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the United States Supreme Court
explained that “[p]rocedural due process imposes constraints on
governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or
‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.” 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
An individual’s interest in continued receipt of Social Security
“benefits is a statutorily created ‘property’ interest protected
by the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 333.
- 10 -
At bottom, procedural due process requires “the opportunity
to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 552 (1965)).
Here, the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Hicks requires that the
plaintiffs’ benefits be reinstated and that the plaintiffs be
returned
to
the
status
quo
during
continued
redetermination
proceedings. As previously discussed, in Hicks, the majority held
that “the SSA’s procedures violate the long-standing principles of
procedural due process that predate the Mathews test.”
F.3d
at
797.
plaintiffs
Moreover,
would
prevail
the
majority
under
also
Mathews.
Hicks, 909
concluded
Id.
Thus,
that
the
the
Hicks
decision granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and reversed
the
Commissioner’s
determination
based
on
violation
of
the
plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights.
It follows, then, that if the SSA violated the plaintiffs’
procedural
due
plaintiffs’
provided.
process
benefits
Any
other
rights
until
result
that
the
would
SSA
must
appropriate
be
reinstate
due
inapposite.
process
It
would
the
is
be
illogical to grant summary judgment for the plaintiffs based on a
procedural due process violation but then allow the government to
continue to deprive the plaintiffs of a protected property interest
while the plaintiffs await the due process to which they are
legally entitled. Ultimately, the SSA may not discontinue the
- 11 -
plaintiffs’ Social Security benefits until it has provided the
basic procedural due process protections outlined in the Hicks
decision.
This result is also supported by Judge Amul R. Thapar’s
previous decision in Hicks at the district court level. In a
memorandum opinion clarifying that the Court’s opinion was a
reversal
of
the
Commissioner’s
determination,
Judge
Thapar
explained that “[t]he SSA must therefore return Hicks to the
position
she
was
in
before
the
agency's
decision.”
Hicks
v.
Berryhill, No. 16-cv-154-ART, 2017 WL 1227929, at *3 (E.D. Ky.
Mar. 31, 2017). Judge Thapar reached this conclusion for two
reasons.
One,
require
Judge
that
Commissioner’s
Thapar
the
SSA
explained
resume
redetermination
that
payment
decision
the
of
is
SSA’s
regulations
benefits
if
the
reversed.
Id.
SSA
regulations require that a recipient of SSDI and SSI benefits
receive a hearing before benefits are terminated. See Soc. Sec.
Admin., Hearings, Appeals, and Litigation Law Manual (“HALLEX”) §
I-1-3-25(C)(5). But here, the plaintiffs did not receive a hearing
that comported with the basic tenants of procedural due process.
Two, it appears that the Commissioner agreed to reinstate
Hicks’s benefits if Judge Thapar’s opinion was in fact a reversal
of the Commissioner’s redetermination decision. See id.
Three additional considerations warrant discussion.
- 12 -
First, some authorities suggest that this Court may not award
benefits if all essential factual issues have not been resolved.
In Faucher, the Sixth Circuit explained that “the [district] court
can reverse the decision and immediately award benefits only if
all essential factual issues have been resolved and the record
adequately establishes a plaintiff's entitlement to benefits.” 17
F.3d at 176. But Faucher is easily distinguished from these cases.
The Faucher decision addressed a district court’s award of benefits
at the initial disability determination stage, not reinstatement
of benefits after a violation of procedural due process. Here, the
cases before the Court are instances where the plaintiffs were
determined to be disabled and their disability benefits were
terminated during the redetermination process. As such, the Court
is not awarding benefits here in the first instance. Instead the
Court is simply requiring reinstatement of benefits that were taken
from plaintiffs without due process.
In fact, application of the Faucher rule in this case would
make little sense seeing as the defect with the Commissioner’s
determination is based on the violation of due process as a matter
of law, not based on an unresolved issue of fact or review of the
record.
Preventing
courts
from
reinstating
benefits
based
on
procedural due process defects during redetermination proceedings
would make little sense. Such a rule would render courts unable to
remedy procedural due process violations by the SSA. Even if Courts
- 13 -
do not have the authority to award benefits in the first instance
if essential factual issues are unresolved, surely courts may
reinstate
benefits
after
finding
an
unlawful
deprivation
of
benefits by an administrative agency.
Second, the Court acknowledges that a statement in a wellreasoned decision by Chief Judge Karen K. Caldwell seems to suggest
that reinstatement of benefits is not required, even if the court
finds for the plaintiffs on the due process claim. Previously,
some of the plaintiffs filed motions for preliminary injunctions,
requesting that the Court require the SSA to continue issuing
benefits during the pendency of the appeals of the Commissioner’s
decision.
In
the
order
denying
the
motions
for
preliminary
injunctions, Judge Caldwell stated:
[E]ven if the Court were to find in favor of Plaintiffs’
due process claims (or any other substantive claim), the
ultimate remedy Plaintiffs seek—the reinstatement of
their previously awarded benefits—is not something the
Court would provide even in a final decision on the
merits in this action. To resolve any potential
infirmity in the redetermination process, the most
likely relief this Court would award to Plaintiffs would
be to remand the decision for the ALJ to hold a
supplemental hearing to allow Plaintiffs the opportunity
to dispute the alleged fraud in the previously excluded
evidence. It would not be to completely re-do the
redetermination process, nor would it be to reverse the
ALJ’s decision to eliminate Plaintiffs’ benefits out of
hand. See Hicks, No. 16–cv–154–ART, D.E. 36 at 32 (E.D.
Ky. Oct. 12, 2016).
Wombles v. Colvin, No. 7:16-cv-079-KKC, DE 16 at 4, Pg ID 227 (E.D.
Ky. Dec. 7, 2016). Still, after considering the context of this
- 14 -
statement and accounting for subsequent legal developments, there
are
various
reasons
that
this
statement
does
not
impact
the
reinstatement of benefits at present.
One, Judge Caldwell seems to have based this conclusion on
Judge Thapar’s October 12, 2016, decision in Hicks. But Judge
Caldwell’s order was entered in December 2016, before Judge Thapar
entered an order on March 31, 2017, which clarified that his
decision did reverse the Commissioner’s redetermination decision,
requiring continuance of Hicks’s benefits. See Hicks, 2017 WL
1227929, at *3. Thus, it is unclear if Judge Caldwell would have
reached the same conclusion after Judge Thapar clarified his
earlier decision.
Two, Judge Caldwell’s order was entered before the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in Hicks. Again, it is unclear if Judge Caldwell
would have reached the same conclusion after the Sixth Circuit’s
decision
holding
that
the
Commissioner’s
redetermination
procedures violated the plaintiffs’ due process rights.
Three, Judge Caldwell was considering motions for preliminary
injunctions, which require courts to weigh four factors, including
the likelihood of success on the merits and the risk of immediate
irreparable harm. When Judge Caldwell entered her decision, courts
in the Eastern District of Kentucky had split on the plaintiffs’
due process claims. This likely made consideration of likelihood
of success on the merits difficult.
- 15 -
As a result, after considering the context of the statement
quoted above and subsequent legal developments in the Conn cases,
it appears that Judge Caldwell’s statement in Wombles has little,
if any effect on the present determination on reinstating benefits
to the plaintiffs in the above-captioned cases.
Third, this result does not indicate that the
plaintiffs are
in fact disabled or that the plaintiffs will be entitled to SSDI
or SSI benefits after additional proceedings. The Sixth Circuit’s
holding is based on the government’s violation of the basic tenants
of procedural due process, not a finding that the plaintiffs are
in fact disabled. Essentially, the Sixth Circuit’s holding stands
for
the
proposition
that
the
plaintiffs
are
entitled
to
an
opportunity to rebut the Commissioner’s finding that all the
evidence submitted by four doctors who participated in Conn’s
fraudulent
scheme
Commissioner’s
was
tainted
decision
to
with
fraud
disregard
and
all
challenge
medical
the
evidence
submitted by these doctors. Still, there is no dispute that some
of the evidence submitted by former Conn clients was tainted with
fraud. It is possible that the plaintiffs, once provided this
required process, will be deemed ineligible for SSDI and SSI
benefits
and
ultimately
have
their
benefits
terminated.
The
government must return the plaintiffs to the status quo until they
are
afforded
decision
to
an
opportunity
disregard
to
medical
challenge
evidence
- 16 -
the
Commissioner’s
submitted
by
certain
doctors,
but
plaintiffs
that
will
does
be
not
necessitate
entitled
to
a
benefits
finding
after
that
the
additional
redetermination proceedings.
In
sum,
determination
reversed
the
that
because
Sixth
the
the
Circuit
held
plaintiffs
that
were
redetermination
not
the
Commissioner’s
disabled
process
must
violated
be
the
plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights. Thus, it follows that
this procedural due process violation resulted in a deprivation of
a
property
interest
without
due
process,
which
necessitates
additional proceedings and reinstatement of the benefits which
were terminated without due process. As a result, the SSA must
reinstate the plaintiffs’ benefits and return the plaintiffs to
the status quo before the Commissioner’s determinations in these
cases. Additionally, the SSA must also adjust any overpayment that
it has sought from the plaintiffs in the above-captioned cases
until it proves through a valid hearing that they are not entitled
to
benefits. Cf. Califano
v.
Yamasaki,
442
U.S.
682,
705–06
(1979).
III. CONCLUSION
The Court, having considered the matters fully, and being
otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS ORDERED as follows:
(1) The Commissioner’s motions to remand pursuant to sentence
six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) are DENIED;
- 17 -
(2)
The
Commissioner’s
decisions
denying
the
plaintiffs’
disability claims on redetermination are hereby REVERSED;
(3) The plaintiffs’ requests to reinstate benefits pending
the Commissioner’s decision on remand are GRANTED consistent with
this opinion;
(4) Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), these
matters are REMANDED to the SSA for further proceedings consistent
with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Hicks v. Commissioner of
Social Security, 909 F.3d 786 (6th Cir. 2018);
(5) These matters are STRICKEN from the active docket of this
Court, to be restored to the active docket upon motion by any party
for good cause shown;
(6) Any pending requests for relief in these actions are
DENIED AS MOOT;
(7) This is a FINAL AND APPEALABLE ORDER and there is NO JUST
CAUSE FOR DELAY; and
(8) A separate judgment will this date be entered.
This, the 11th day of July, 2019.
- 18 -
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