Huntzinger et al v. Coyle et al

Filing 79

OPINION & ORDER: 1) Dft's 61 MOTION to Exclude Pla's expert is DENIED except as to the specific testimony identified by the Court; and 2) Pla's 62 MOTION to Exclude Dft's Expert is DENIED except as to the specific testimony identified by the Court. Signed by Judge Karen K. Caldwell on 01/10/2022. (MDC) cc: COR

Case: 5:17-cv-00184-KKC Doc #: 79 Filed: 01/10/22 Page: 1 of 15 - Page ID#: 1207

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
AT LEXINGTON
SUSAN HUNTZINGER, et al.,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:17-184-KKC

Plaintiffs,
V.

OPINION AND ORDER

TOBY COYLE, et al.,
Defendants.

*** *** ***
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s motion to exclude the expert opinion
of Roger Clark (DE 61) and Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the expert opinion of David Jude.
(DE 62.) The motions having been fully briefed and the parties having agreed that a hearing
is not required (DE 77), the matter is now ripe for the Court’s review. For the reasons set
forth herein, both Defendant’s motion and Plaintiffs’ motion are DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the shooting of Kenneth Huntzinger (“Kenneth”). The Court
has recounted the facts thoroughly in a previous order (DE 59) but will briefly summarize
them again here.
On February 7, 2017, Kentucky State Police (“KSP”) Trooper Sergeant Toby Coyle
responded to a call for assistance placed by Plaintiff Susan Huntzinger (“Huntzinger”),
Kenneth’s wife. Huntzinger told the dispatcher that Kenneth had “over taken” his
medication, including Ambien and other pills, and was trying to take their 14-year old son,
R.H., out in his truck. (DE 55-4 at 7.) She further told the dispatcher that Kenneth had

1

Case: 5:17-cv-00184-KKC Doc #: 79 Filed: 01/10/22 Page: 2 of 15 - Page ID#: 1208

gotten physical with her and R.H., had hit her vehicle while trying to push it out of the way,
and would probably be combative with police upon their arrival. (DE 55-4 at 11–12, 15.)
When Coyle arrived on the scene, he observed Kenneth trying to maneuver his vehicle.
(DE 55-4 at 18.) Coyle exited his cruiser, pulled out his gun and attempted to give Kenneth
verbal commands which went unheeded. (DE 55-2 at 13–16.) What happened next is
disputed, but Coyle ultimately shot Kenneth (DE 56-4 at 35; DE 56-9 at 1), who died from his
injuries eight days later. (DE 55-3 at 12.)
On April 20, 2017, Huntzinger—individually, as administrator of the Estate of
Kenneth Huntzinger, and as custodian and legal guardian of R.H.—and her other son,
Brandon Huntzinger (“Plaintiffs”), brought suit against Coyle, in his individual and official
capacity, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, doing business as the KSP. (DE 1.) Plaintiffs
asserted claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and various state law causes of action. (DE 1 at 7–12.) Plaintiffs subsequently
dismissed all claims against the Commonwealth of Kentucky and Coyle in his official
capacity. (DE 7.) Coyle also asserted counterclaims against the Plaintiffs, however, those
claims have also been dismissed. (DE 54.) Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims and state law causes of
action against Coyle in his individual capacity remain before the Court. Coyle filed a motion
for summary judgment requesting dismissal of all remaining claims (DE 55), but the Court
denied the motion in September 2020, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact.
(DE 59.)
In preparation for trial, both parties filed motions to exclude the expert testimony of
the opposing party’s expert. (DEs 61, 62.) The motions are fully briefed, the parties have
agreed that a hearing is not required (DE 77), and the matter is now ripe for the Court’s
review.

2

Case: 5:17-cv-00184-KKC Doc #: 79 Filed: 01/10/22 Page: 3 of 15 - Page ID#: 1209

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme
Court “established guidelines for district courts to use in determining the admissibility of
expert testimony pursuant to Rules 702 and 104 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Pride v.
BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2000). Daubert applies to “scientific,” “technical,” and
“otherwise specialized” knowledge. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
“Although . . . the evaluation of expert testimony is generally left to juries, the Court
emphasized the trial judge’s ‘gatekeeping’ role with respect to expert proof.” Pride, 218
F.3d at 577 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597–98). Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides
that an expert who is qualified:
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form
of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the
facts of the case.
A proposed expert witness “must first establish his expertise by reference to ‘knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education.’” Pride, 218 F.3d at 577 (quoting FED. R. EVID.
702). Next, the expert must testify as “to ‘scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge.’” Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702). “[T]his requirement serves to establish a
standard of evidentiary reliability or trustworthiness” and “the Daubert Court instructed
district courts . . . to determine whether the principles and methodology underlying the
testimony itself are valid – not to second guess the validity of conclusions generated by
otherwise valid methods, principles, and reasoning.” Id. (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).

3

Case: 5:17-cv-00184-KKC Doc #: 79 Filed: 01/10/22 Page: 4 of 15 - Page ID#: 1210

“Red flags that caution against certifying an expert include reliance on anecdotal
evidence, improper extrapolation, failure to consider other possible causes, lack of testing,
and subjectivity.” Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Raymond Corp., 676 F.3d 521, 527 (6th Cir.
2012) (citing Best v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 177 (6th Cir. 2009)). The fact
that a purported expert’s opinion was prepared solely for litigation may also be considered
as a basis for exclusion. Id. (citing Johnson v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc., 484 F.3d 426,
434 (6th Cir. 2007)). The trial court’s gatekeeping role does not permit it to reject
admissible expert testimony with a reasonable factual basis, but it does permit exclusion
when an expert’s testimony amounts to “mere guess or speculation.” In re Scrap Metal
Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing U.S. v. L.E. Cooke Co., Inc., 991
F.2d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 1993)).
If the Court decides that the expert testimony is both reliable and relevant, then the
Court must also determine if the probative value of the expert testimony is outweighed by
its prejudicial effect. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595; see also, United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d
516, 528 (6th Cir. 2004). The testimony must assist the trier of fact and “must ‘fit’ the facts
of the case . . . .” Pride, 218 F.3d at 578 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592). But it is not
“proper for the witness to testify as to a legal conclusion; it is the sole function of the trial
judge to instruct the jury on the law.” United States v. Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384, 397 (6th Cir.
1984). Nevertheless, “[t]he Rules’ basic standard of relevance . . . is a liberal one,” Daubert,
509 U.S. at 587.
Ultimately, a Rule 702 inquiry is “a flexible one.” Id. at 594; see also Kumho Tire
Co., 526 U.S. at 152 (“[T]he trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a
particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is
reliable.”). The party proffering the expert testimony must demonstrate by a preponderance

4

Case: 5:17-cv-00184-KKC Doc #: 79 Filed: 01/10/22 Page: 5 of 15 - Page ID#: 1211

of proof that the potential expert witness meets the requirements discussed above. Pride,
218 F.3d at 578 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10).
In evaluating whether to allow an expert witness to testify about some aspect of
police affairs, the Court should look at the expert’s particularized knowledge about the area
based on training, research, and experience. Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d
893, 908 (6th Cir. 2004). “Courts have permitted experts to testify about discrete policepractice issues when those experts are properly credentialed and their testimony assists the
trier of fact.” Id. However, courts must ensure that police expert testimony focuses on facts
rather than legal conclusions. See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1353 (6th Cir.1994)
(“We would not allow a fingerprint expert in a criminal case to opine that a defendant was
guilty (a legal conclusion), even though we would allow him to opine that the defendant's
fingerprint was the only one on the murder weapon (a fact). The distinction, although
subtle, is nonetheless important.”); see also DeMerrell v. City of Cheboygan, 206 Fed. App’x
418, 426 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding a police use of force expert opinion improper when the
expert described an officer’s actions as “objectively unreasonable” and “improper and
unnecessary” because those were legal conclusions). Ultimately, the Court has discretion to
decide whether the expert’s testimony will assist the particular jury in the case, or whether
the expert’s testimony will be too irrelevant to the ultimate issue at hand or too far within
the realm of common knowledge and common sense. Goodwin v. Richland Cty., Ohio, 832
Fed. App’x 354, 359 (6th Cir. 2020).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiffs’ Expert Roger Clark
Plaintiffs’ expert Roger Clark has offered six numbered opinions as part of his written
report. Coyle’s motion to exclude refers to Clark’s opinions as “irrelevant, unhelpful, or
unreliable for a variety of reasons.” (DE 61 at 1.) The Court will first evaluate Clark’s

5

Case: 5:17-cv-00184-KKC Doc #: 79 Filed: 01/10/22 Page: 6 of 15 - Page ID#: 1212

qualifications and then analyze the reliability of Clark’s testimony and its helpfulness to the
trier of fact.
1. Clark’s Qualifications
Coyle does not appear to dispute Clark’s qualifications. Clark spent twenty-seven (27)
years in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD). He holds a California Peace
Officer Standards and Training (POST) Advanced Certificate and graduated from the POST
Command College, a two-year Masters level course of study in Police Administration. (DE
61-1 at 28.) During his time in the LASD, Clark spent many years conducting police work
himself and training and supervising other officers. (DE 61-1 at 28–31.) Clark has also
previously testified as an expert on various aspects of police affairs in numerous cases. (DE
61-1 at 31–34.) The Court finds that Clark is qualified to provide expert testimony in this
case.
2. The Reliability of Clark’s Testimony
The Court will next examine the reliability of Clark’s testimony. A district court’s
reliability inquiry is a flexible one. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594–95. The Supreme Court
provided a list of potentially relevant factors, such as whether the expert’s theory has been
tested, peer-reviewed, or generally accepted. See id. at 591–95. However, that list is not
exhaustive, nor is any one factor dispositive. In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d at
528–29. An expert witness may also rely solely or primarily on experience as long as the
expert explains how that experience leads to the conclusion reached and how that
experience is reliably applied to the facts. Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 432
(6th Cir. 2005). District courts are permitted “considerable leeway in deciding in a
particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is
reliable.” Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152.

6

Case: 5:17-cv-00184-KKC Doc #: 79 Filed: 01/10/22 Page: 7 of 15 - Page ID#: 1213

In formulating his opinion, Clark reviewed: the Complaint; various photographs;
various KSP manuals; Kenneth’s medical records; a post-shooting audio recording of Coyle’s
interview; a transcript of Coyle’s post-shooting interview; various 3-D recreations of the
incident; relevant deposition transcripts; Coyle’s Motion for Summary Judgment; a relevant
article in Police Magazine; and satellite imagery of the scene of the incident. (DE 61-1 at 3–
4.) Clark then produced an overview of the events as he understood them based on all of
the documents he reviewed. (DE 61-1 at 4–8.) Next, Clark described the basic rules
regarding the use of lethal force by police officers and analyzed the incident at issue in
accordance with those rules. (DE 61-1 at 21–26.) Finally, Clark offered his opinions. (DE
61-1 at 26–28.)
The Court finds that Clark’s methodology was reliable and that he thoroughly
analyzed the available evidence and applied his own experience to the facts in a manner
that meets the appropriate standard for expert testimony on police use of force.
3. The Helpfulness of Clark’s Testimony
Finally, the Court must determine whether Clark’s testimony is relevant and
helpful. Rule 702 requires that expert testimony assist the trier of fact. Pride, 218 F.3d at
578. At the same time, the testimony must not contain legal conclusions. Zipkin, 729 F.2d
at 397. The Court will go through each of Clark’s numbered opinions to make this
determination.
Clark’s first opinion is as follows:
Throughout the Country, police departments for decades have trained their
officers in safe and accepted ways to contain, assess and arrest subjects in order
to avoid injuries and or deaths. These methods are well known among all police
agencies and have been proven effective for the safety and welfare of both
responding officers and the public. Sergeant Coyle - did not follow the tactical

7

Case: 5:17-cv-00184-KKC Doc #: 79 Filed: 01/10/22 Page: 8 of 15 - Page ID#: 1214

guidelines required of every reasonably trained law enforcement officer in his
response to the scene and his shooting death of Mr. Huntzinger. The manner in
which this incident was grossly mishandled and resulted in the unnecessary
shooting of Mr. Huntzinger reflected a complete lack of effective, appropriate,
and/or meaningful training on the commonly understood and observed
practices that are the foundation of my opinion. Accordingly, his use of force
was grossly inappropriate, excessive, and unreasonable.
The actions of Sergeant Coyle are also indicative of the inadequate KSP policy
and procedure – regarding high-risk vehicle pull-overs and shooting at a
moving vehicle. As a result, the individual and collective actions of Sergeant
Coyle were directly connected to the preventable, unnecessary and excessive
shooting that occurred. His actions were also so far below the established
professional standards that they can only be viewed as recklessly dangerous. As
such, Sergeant Coyle’s actions constituted unreasonable and excessive force and
reflected a deliberate indifference to the life and safety of Mr. Huntzinger.
(DE 61-1 at 26–27.) The majority of this testimony is relevant, helpful to the trier
fact, and properly classified as “opinion” testimony. However, it contains several
impermissible legal conclusions with a potentially prejudicial effect that substantially
outweighs their probative value. In accordance with Sixth Circuit guidance as to police
expert testimony, see, e.g., Berry, 25 F.3d at 1353 and DeMerrell, 206 Fed. App’x at
418, the Court orders that the following sentences be stricken from the first numbered
opinion in Clark’s report:


“. . . this incident was grossly mishandled and resulted in the unnecessary
shooting of Mr. Huntzinger . . .”

8

Case: 5:17-cv-00184-KKC Doc #: 79 Filed: 01/10/22 Page: 9 of 15 - Page ID#: 1215



“Accordingly, his use of force was grossly inappropriate, excessive, and
unreasonable.”



“As a result, the individual and collective actions of Sergeant Coyle were directly
connected to the preventable, unnecessary and excessive shooting that occurred.
His actions were also so far below the established professional standards that
they can only be viewed as recklessly dangerous. As such, Sergeant Coyle’s
actions constituted unreasonable and excessive force and reflected a deliberate
indifference to the life and safety of Mr. Huntzinger.”

Clark’s second opinion is as follows:
Among an officer’s overarching duties is to protect lives, including the lives of
those they pursue to place into their custody. Officer Coyle had the responsibility
to wait for backup, which was just minutes away. Instead, he exited his patrol
car (which could have been used as a barrier to occlude Mr. Huntzinger’s exit),
drew his firearm, left cover, and placed himself in a situation where he fired his
handgun, which led to the death of Mr. Huntzinger.
(DE 61-1 at 27.) Again, the Court finds the majority of this testimony relevant, helpful to
the trier fact, and properly classified as “opinion” testimony. However, the Court orders
that the following sentence be stricken because it may be construed as a legal conclusion
and its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect:


“Officer Coyle had the responsibility to wait for backup, which was just minutes away.”

Clark’s third opinion is as follows:
As discussed above, officers throughout the nation are trained that their use of
lethal force is only justified in defense of self or others who are at risk of great
bodily harm or death – and only absent obvious reasonable alternatives. In this

9

Case: 5:17-cv-00184-KKC Doc #: 79 Filed: 01/10/22 Page: 10 of 15 - Page ID#: 1216

case, it is uncontested that Sergeant Coyle shot Mr. Huntzinger as he was
positioned at the side of the truck as it passed by him and while he was not at
any risk whatsoever of being struck by the truck. It is uncontested that Sergeant
Coyle was not at any risk of harm when he fired his gun into Mr. Huntzinger.
(DE 61-1 at 27.) The Court finds the first sentence of this testimony relevant, helpful to the
trier fact, and properly classified as “opinion” testimony. However, the Court orders that
the following sentences be stricken because their probative value is outweighed by their
prejudicial effect:


“In this case, it is uncontested that Sergeant Coyle shot Mr. Huntzinger as he was
positioned at the side of the truck as it passed by him and while he was not at any risk
whatsoever of being struck by the truck. It is uncontested that Sergeant Coyle was not
at any risk of harm when he fired his gun into Mr. Huntzinger.”

Clark’s fourth opinion is as follows:
Additionally, the use of lethal force to prevent Mr. Huntzinger from entering the
roadway was excessive and unreasonable in this case. The physical evidence
belies the claims that Mr. Huntzinger was desperately “ramming” his truck
back and forth into the house and SUV in an irrational intent that would justify
using lethal force to prevent him to drive any further. Rather, this is a simple
case of “failure to yield” – a common occurrence – handled by responding officers
acting as a team.
(DE 61-1 at 27.) The Court finds this testimony relevant, helpful to the trier fact, and
properly classified as “opinion” testimony with the exception of the first sentence. Thus, the
Court orders that the following sentence be stricken as an improper legal conclusion:

10

Case: 5:17-cv-00184-KKC Doc #: 79 Filed: 01/10/22 Page: 11 of 15 - Page ID#: 1217



“Additionally, the use of lethal force to prevent Mr. Huntzinger from entering the
roadway was excessive and unreasonable in this case.”

Clark’s fifth opinion is as follows:
Despite his apparent deliberate departure from the required tactics, Sergeant
Coyle was returned to duty without meaningful discipline and corrective
retraining. Sergeant Coyle has stated that he was adequately trained to handle
situations of this type, and he continues to hold to the opinion that he acted
within the established policy of the KSP as it had been conveyed to him prior to
this incident. Additionally, no new KSP policies have been implemented, and
no existing KSP policies have been corrected or clarified since this incident.
Additionally, no new training has occurred in the KSP since this incident. As
such, the existing KSP policy facilitated the unreasonable and excessive force
that occurred and reflected a deliberate indifference to the life and safety of Mr.
Huntzinger.
(DE 61-1 at 27–28.) The Court finds the majority of this testimony relevant, helpful to the
trier fact, and properly classified as “opinion” testimony. However, the Court orders that
the following sentence be stricken as an improper legal conclusion:


“As such, the existing KSP policy facilitated the unreasonable and excessive force that
occurred and reflected a deliberate indifference to the life and safety of Mr.
Huntzinger.”

Clark’s sixth opinion is as follows:
Across the country police departments for decades have recognized and trained
their officers in safe and accepted ways to pursue, contain and arrest subjects
in order to avoid deaths and excessive force, such as the one that occurred in

11

Case: 5:17-cv-00184-KKC Doc #: 79 Filed: 01/10/22 Page: 12 of 15 - Page ID#: 1218

this case. These methods are well known and proven effective for the safety and
welfare of both officers and the public. KSP Sergeant Coyle appears to have used
none of these, and there is no evidence that he was ever adequately trained in
these methods, or, since this incident, retrained. There is nothing reflecting any
new training or policies in any of the materials produced in this case. Without
such, it is only a matter of time before additional tragic and unnecessary deaths
occur again.
(DE 61-1 at 28.) The Court finds the majority of this testimony relevant, helpful to the trier
fact, and properly classified as “opinion” testimony. However, the Court orders that the
following be stricken as an improper legal conclusion and as irrelevant, respectively:


“. . . , such as the one that occurred in this case.”



“Without such, it is only a matter of time before additional tragic and unnecessary
deaths occur again.”

Having reviewed the expert testimony of Roger Clark, the Court denies Coyle’s motion to
exclude Clark’s testimony and report, except as to the specific language identified above.
B. Defendants’ Expert David Jude
Defendant’s expert David Jude has also offered opinion testimony as part of his
written report. Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude argues that “Mr. Jude is unqualified, and his
testimony is unreliable as it based [sic] entirely on insufficient data, void of independent
validation, and contains imprecise, biased conclusions.” (DE 62.) The Court will first
evaluate Jude’s qualifications and then analyze the reliability of Jude’s testimony and its
helpfulness to the trier of fact.

12

Case: 5:17-cv-00184-KKC Doc #: 79 Filed: 01/10/22 Page: 13 of 15 - Page ID#: 1219

1. Jude’s Qualifications
Plaintiffs dispute Jude’s qualifications to provide expert testimony. Jude spent
twenty-three (23) years in law enforcement, including eighteen (18) years as part of the
Kentucky State Police. He holds certifications as an instructor in various police tactics
courses and developed the curriculums for several other courses. (DE 62-3 at 4.) During his
time in law enforcement, Jude spent many years conducting police work himself and
training and supervising other officers, including as commander of the KSP Academy. (DE
62-3 at 2–3.) Jude has not previously testified as an expert on police use of force, but that is
certainly not fatal. See United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]here is
a first time in court for every expert[.]”). Given Jude’s professional experience, the Court
finds that he is qualified to provide expert testimony in this case.
2. The Reliability of Jude’s Testimony
The Court will next examine the reliability of Jude’s testimony using the same
standard laid out in Section III.A.2. In addition, the Court will analyze Plaintiffs’ concerns
about Jude’s potential bias as a former member of the KSP, including at the time of this
incident.
In formulating his opinion, Jude reviewed: the Complaint; the multi-volume KSP
investigation related to this incident; relevant deposition transcripts; various relevant legal
opinions; and Roger Clark’s expert report. (DE 62-3 at 5.) Jude then produced an overview
of the events as he understood them based on all of the materials he reviewed. (DE 62-3 at
5–9.) Finally, Jude offered his opinions, commented on Clark’s expert report, and provided
some concluding thoughts. (DE 62-3 at 9–11.)
The Court finds that Jude’s methodology was reliable and that he thoroughly
analyzed the available evidence and applied his own experience to the facts in a manner
that meets the appropriate standard for expert testimony on police use of force.

13

Case: 5:17-cv-00184-KKC Doc #: 79 Filed: 01/10/22 Page: 14 of 15 - Page ID#: 1220

As to Plaintiffs’ concerns about Jude’s potential bias as a former member of the KSP,
including at the time of this incident, those concerns are not a reason to exclude Jude’s
testimony. “Determining the credibility of a witness, which includes ‘[a]ssessing the
potential bias of the expert witness,’ is ultimately an issue for the jury.” In re Davol,
Inc./C.R. Bard, Inc., Polypropylene Hernia Mesh Prod. Liab. Litig., 510 F. Supp. 3d 538,
556 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (quoting Cruz-Vazquez v. Mennonite General Hosp., Inc., 613 F.3d 54,
59 (1st Cir. 2010)).
3. The Helpfulness of Jude’s Testimony
Finally, the Court must determine whether Jude’s testimony is relevant and helpful
using the same standard laid out in Section III.A.3. The Court finds the majority of Jude’s
testimony relevant, helpful to the trier fact, and properly classified as “opinion” testimony.
However, the Court orders that the following be stricken as they could be construed as
improper legal conclusions or improper speculation:


“. . . Sergeant Coyle demonstrated a desire to find the least amount of force necessary
to effectively resolve the situation.” (DE 62-3 at 9.)



“. . . Mr. Huntzinger escalated the interaction to a level where lethal force was justified.”
(DE 62-3 at 10.)



“At this point, Sergeant Coyle’s life was in danger of serious physical injury or death.”
(DE 62-3 at 10.)



“Sergeant Coyle, in reasonable fear that he or a member of the general public would be
killed or seriously injured by Mr. Huntzinger in his truck, made the difficult,
unfortunate, but proper decision to discharge his firearm into the truck and ultimately
into Huntzinger with the intent to stop the threat to himself and others.” (DE 62-3 at
10–11.)

14

Case: 5:17-cv-00184-KKC Doc #: 79 Filed: 01/10/22 Page: 15 of 15 - Page ID#: 1221

Having reviewed the expert testimony of David Jude, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion to
exclude Jude’s testimony, except as to the specific language identified above.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court finds that the testimony of both experts complies with the standards
for expert testimony set forth in Rule 702 and Daubert, as interpreted by the Sixth Circuit,
except in the specific instances identified by the Court above. Accordingly, for the reasons set
forth herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
(1) Defendant’s motion to exclude Plaintiffs’ Expert (DE 61) is DENIED except as to the
specific testimony identified by the Court; and
(2) Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Defendant’s Expert (DE 62) is DENIED except as to the
specific testimony identified by the Court.
This 10th day of January, 2022.

15