Coleman v. Quintana

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1) 1 Petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 2) Court will enter a judgment w this order. 3) Matter is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the docket. Signed by Judge Karen K. Caldwell on 1/4/2018.(SCD)cc: Pro Se Petitioner via US Mail

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON
CURTIS COLEMAN,
Petitioner,

Civil Action No. 5: 17-271-KKC

V.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

FRANCISCO QUINTANA, Warden,
Respondent.

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Inmate Curtis Coleman has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241. [R. 1] This matter is before the Court to conduct an initial screening of
Coleman’s petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2243; Alexander v. Northern Bureau of Prisons, 419 F.
App’x 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011).
In March 2014, a grand jury in Greeneville, Tennessee issued an indictment
charging Coleman and others with two counts of possession with intent to distribute crack
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and with conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute 280 or more grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Two months
later, Curtis signed an agreement to plead guilty to the conspiracy count in exchange for
the dismissal of the two drug trafficking counts.

As part of the agreement, Coleman

expressly waived his right to collaterally attack either his conviction or his sentence, the
sole exception being a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to assert a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel.
Prior to sentencing the probation office issued a presentence report. The report
concluded that Coleman had at least two prior felony convictions for controlled substance

offenses under Tennessee law, one for drug possession and one for drug trafficking. As a
result, he constituted a “career offender” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 and his criminal
history category was set at VI.

Combined with an offense level of 34, the applicable

guideline range was 262 to 327 months incarceration. In his sentencing memorandum,
Coleman contended that application of the career offender guideline categorically resulted
in excessive sentences, and that his punishment would be too severe in light of his criminal
history. He therefore requested a 120-month sentence, the mandatory minimum required
by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). In August 2015, the trial court sentenced Coleman to 150
months imprisonment, approximately half the prison term established by the applicable
guidelines range. United States v. Coleman, 2: 14-CR-28-RLJ-1 (E.D. Tenn. 2014).
In December 2015 Coleman filed a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255, contending that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
enhancement of his sentence on the ground that his two prior drug convictions were related
and arose out of the same course of conduct. That motion remains pending as of this
writing.
In his current § 2241 petition Coleman contends that in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Mathis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), his prior drug
convictions no longer qualify as valid predicate offenses to support the enhancement of his
sentence. [R. 1]
Coleman’s petition must be denied without prejudice because his motion for relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 remains pending before the trial court.

The correct

mechanism for a federal prisoner to challenge his or her conviction or sentence is through a
motion to vacate filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Terrell v. United States, 564 F.3d
442, 447 (6th Cir. 2009). A habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 may only be used

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to challenge a federal conviction under very narrow circumstances where § 2255(a) provides
a remedy that is structurally inadequate. Martin v. Perez, 319 F.3d 799, 804 (6th Cir.
2003).
Here, Coleman’s challenge to the enhancement of his sentence is presently pending
before the trial court, rendering resort to a § 2241 petition to obtain the same measure of
relief premature.

Smith v. United States, 89 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished

disposition) (noting that the “well established general rule is that, absent extraordinary
circumstances, the district court should not consider § 2255 motions while a direct appeal is
pending.”) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 8 F.3d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1993)). Because
Coleman’s § 2255 motion may render his claims in this proceeding moot, he must complete
the process of seeking relief via § 2255 before he may make even a colorable argument that
his remedy under that section is “inadequate and ineffective.” Charles v. Chandler, 180
F.3d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1999); White v. Grondolsky, No. 6: 06-309-DCR, 2006 WL 2385358,
at *3 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 17, 2006).
Even if this were not so, the collateral attack waiver in Coleman’s plea agreement
precludes him from challenging his sentence in a § 2241 petition. Muse v. Daniels, 815 F.
3d 265, 266 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that a collateral attack waiver “would apply equally in
a proceeding under § 2241, had not § 2255(e) taken precedence, for § 2241 is a form of
collateral attack.”); Muller v. Sauers, 523 F. App’x 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Muller’s plea
agreement included a waiver of collateral-attack rights ‘in any post-conviction proceeding,
including-but not limited to-any proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.’ Therefore, his plea
agreement forecloses relief pursuant to § 2241 …”). See also Rivera v. Warden, FCI, Elkton,
27 F. App’x 511, 515 (6th Cir. 2001); Solis-Caceres v. Sepanek, No. 13-21-HRW, 2013 WL
4017119, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 6, 2013) (collecting cases).

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Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:
1.

Coleman’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus [R. 1] is DENIED.

2.

The Court will enter a judgment contemporaneously with this order.

3.

This matter is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the docket.

Entered January 4, 2018.

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