Barnett v. Quintana

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1. Petitioner Barnett's writ of habeas corpus 1 is DENIED 2. This action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court's docket. 3. Judgment shall be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Karen K. Caldwell on 7/18/2018.(JJ)cc: COR, pro se pltf via usp Modified text on 7/18/2018 (JJ).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
LEXINGTON
SAMUEL BARNETT,
Petitioner,

Civil Action No. 5: 18-211-KKC

V.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

FRANCISCO QUINTANA, Warden,
Respondent.

*** *** *** ***
Inmate Samuel Barnett has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. [R. 1] This matter is before the Court to screen the petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2243. Alexander v. Northern Bureau of Prisons, 419 F. App’x 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011).
A petition will be denied “if it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that
the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts (applicable to § 2241 petitions pursuant to Rule 1(b)). The Court evaluates Barnett’s
petition under a more lenient standard because he is not represented by an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 84-85 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting that “allegations
of a pro se habeas petition, though vague and conclusory, are entitled to a liberal construction”
including “active interpretation” toward encompassing “any allegation stating federal relief” (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
I
Barnett indicates that in June 2017 he was moved to a new unit at the Federal Medical Center,
but that upon arrival he did not get along with his new cellmates. Barnett immediately talked to a staff
member in hopes of being transferred to a new cell, without success. Upon returning to his cell, Barnett
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found that some of his personal property had been displaced and some of it stolen. At that time Barnett
clenched his fists and yelled that he was going to kill someone. [R. 1-1 at 1]
Officers responding to the incident found Barnett standing in the cell sweating profusely.
When the officers told Barnett that he would be escorted to the Lieutenant’s office, he alternatively
complied and then refused to proceed, on one occasion approaching a staff member aggressively.
However, Barnett was cooperative once his anger had subsided. For his conduct, staff issued Barnett
a Code 203 Incident Report for Threatening Another with Bodily Harm. Barnett requested that Dr.
Boateng, his psychologist, represent him at the disciplinary hearing. [R. 1-2 at 7]
A Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) held that hearing on June 20, 2017. During the
hearing, Barnett acknowledged that he stated that he could kill someone, but contended that it was not
directed at any one person and that he was just venting his anger. Barnett alleges that prior to the
hearing, Dr. Boateng told him that he would give the DHO records of his history of mental illness, but
that during the hearing Boateng failed to do so and did nothing more than act as a character witness.
Despite this glaring omission, Barnett states that he did not raise the issue of the missing records at the
hearing, and the DHO report itself makes no mention of them. [R. 1-1 at 4-5]
The DHO, relying upon the statement of the reporting officers, concluded that Barnett’s
statements were threatening, but were not sufficiently directed towards another inmate to constitute a
threat to a particular inmate. The DHO therefore found Barnett guilty of a lesser charge, the Code 299
offense Conduct Disruptive of the Orderly Running of the Institution (Most Like Threatening Another
with Bodily Harm). As a result the DHO imposed various sanctions, including the loss of 27 days of
good time credits as required by 28 C.F.R. § 541.4(b)(2). [R. 1-2 at 8-11]
Barnett administratively appealed the disciplinary conviction, contending that (1) the DHO
failed to consider his mental health history which reduced or eliminated his responsibility for his
actions; and (2) Dr. Boateng failed to provide adequate representation during the hearing because he
did not submit Barnett’s mental health records as evidence.
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The BOP responded that it had

independently confirmed that the DHO considered all of the evidence actually presented during the
hearing, and that no documentary evidence was offered for consideration. Nor did the BOP find error
based upon Barnett’s belief that Dr. Boateng would file his medical records into the record as evidence.
[R. 1-2 at 3-6]
II
When a prison disciplinary board takes action that results in the loss of good time credits in
which the prisoner has a vested liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires prison officials to
observe certain protections for the prisoner. Specifically, the prisoner is entitled to advanced notice of
the charges, the opportunity to present evidence in his or her defense, whether through live testimony
or documents, and a written decision explaining the grounds used to determine guilt or innocence of
the offense. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974). Further, the board’s findings used as
a basis to revoke good time credits must be supported by some evidence in the record. Superintendent
v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Selby v. Caruso, 734 F. 3d 554, 559 (6th Cir. 2013). When
determining whether a decision is supported by “some evidence,” the Court does not conduct an
independent review of the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. It asks only “whether there
is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill,
472 U.S. at 455-56; Higgs v. Bland, 888 F. 2d 443, 448-49 (6th Cir. 1989).
Barnett’s petition before this Court repeats the arguments he made to the BOP during his
administrative appeal of his disciplinary conviction. First, he contends that the DHO failed to consider
evidence regarding his mental illness. Barnett points to the reporting officer’s statements in the
Incident Report that Barnett was sweating profusely, “appeared to be passive aggressive” and walked
directly at an officer during his escort. [R. 1-1 at 2-4] But the DHO indicated that he had reviewed
the Incident Report, and the body of the DHO report itself recites the officer’s statements in the Incident
Report verbatim. [R. 1-2 at 7] The DHO may not have drawn from that information the inferences

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that Barnett would have preferred, but there is no basis in the record to conclude that the DHO did not
consider all of the evidence before him.
Second, Barnett asserts that prior to the hearing Dr. Boateng told him that he would provide
the DHO with his mental health records at the hearing, but that he failed to do so. Barnett explains his
failure to protest at the time by stating that he “was under the impression that Dr. Boateng had maybe
given [the] DHO his medical records prior to the hearing.” Given the asserted importance of the
records that Barnett now attaches to them, this explanation strains credibility. Regardless, Barnett
contends that this failure deprived him of “adequate” representation at the DHO hearing by
undermining his ability to present documentary evidence at the hearing. [R. 1-1 at 5-6]
The Due Process protections required by Wolff do not include representation by either an
attorney or any other person during a prison disciplinary proceeding. Cf. Watters v. Ray, 175 F. App’x
212, 214 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 315 (1976)). The failure of a
staff representative chosen by an inmate to perform “adequately,” including by failing to present
evidence the inmate deems beneficial, does not violate the inmate’s due process rights. Cf. Richardson
v. Williams, No. 3: 14-CV-129, 2015 WL 3937004, at *5 (N.D. W.Va. June 26, 2015). This is so, at
least in part, because in the informal context of prison disciplinary proceedings, the assistance provided
by a staff representative is merely supplemental to, not a substitute for, an inmate’s right to represent
his own interests at the hearing by making independent arguments or presenting his own evidence in
support of his cause. Cf. 28 C.F.R. § 541.8; BOP Program Statement 5270.09 Ch. 5 (2011). Here,
Barnett does not allege that any one refused to permit him to submit documentary evidence, only that
his expectation that his staff representative would do so on his behalf was disappointed. Barnett’s
claim is thus purely one arising from the insufficiency of that representation, a claim that fails to
establish a violation of his rights to Due Process. Jordan v. Wiley, 411 F. App’x 201 (10th Cir. 2011).
Finally, Barnett asserts that the conduct of the DHO and his staff representative failed to
comply with applicable BOP regulations, and that such failure violated his Due Process rights. [R. 14

1 at 9 (citing United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954))] But “[p]rison
regulations are primarily designed to guide correctional officials in the administration of a prison.
[They are] not designed to confer rights on inmates.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1995).
Therefore, “a failure to adhere to administrative regulations does not equate to a constitutional
violation.” Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1068 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Davis v. Scherer, 468
U.S. 183, 194 (1984)). Cf. Farrakhan-Muhammad v. Fox, No. 16-CV-2272-PAB, 2018 WL 637460,
at *6 (D. Colo. Jan. 31, 2018) (“... even if prison officials deviated from BOP regulations in the
administration of Applicant’s mental health evaluation, the Court cannot conclude that he was denied
due process based solely on the failure to follow particular federal regulations and directives.”).1
The Court separately notes that Barnett was not found guilty of Threatening Another with
Bodily Harm, but rather only with Conduct Disruptive of the Orderly Running of the Institution,
something his behavior appears to have accomplished. Barnett attached to his petition documents of
the kind he asserts should have been submitted to the DHO, which include a Skills Development Plan
setting forth some of the mental and physical challenges he faced and his efforts to address them. [R. 12 at 1-2] These documents, as well as the conditions Barnett describes, suggest difficulty in managing
his mood, but they do not indicate that Barnett was entirely dispossessed of both his ability to
understand and to control his actions. It is therefore far from clear that evidence of this sort would
have had any, let alone meaningful, impact on the decision of the DHO to find him guilty of this
offense. Absent a clear demonstration of prejudice, relief is not warranted. Mackey v. Federal Bureau
of Prisons, 440 F. App’x 373, 374-75 (5th Cir. 2011).

In addition, as noted above the DHO did not fail to follow the BOP’s regulations because he considered the evidence provided
at the hearing; Barnett’s assertion to the contrary is not supported by the record. Nor do Barnett’s allegations support the notion
that Dr. Boateng failed or refused to provide any support or assistance to him within the meaning of the broad language found in
the BOP Program Statement. Thus even if such a claim could be made, the facts alleged are insufficient to make out a clear
violation of the BOP regulations at issue.
1

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Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
1.

Petitioner Barnett’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241

[R. 1] is DENIED.
2.

This action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court’s docket.

3.

Judgment shall be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion and

Order.
Dated July 18, 2018.

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