Thomas v. Crawford et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) GRANTING Thomas' 3 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; payment of the filing & administrative fees are WAIVED; (2) DISMISING without prejudice Thomas' complaint; (3) DENIED AS MOOT Thomas' 9 MOTION to Appoint Counsel; (4) court will enter an appropriate judgment; (5) matter is STRICKEN from the docket. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 6/8/18.(KJR)cc: COR, Thomas (US Mail)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON
JONATHAN EDGAR THOMAS,

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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
V.
JACOB CRAWFORD, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 5: 18-224-JMH

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

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***

Plaintiff Jonathan Edgar Thomas is a pre-trial detainee
confined at the Fayette County Detention Center (“FCDC”) located
in Lexington, Kentucky.

Proceeding without an attorney, Thomas

has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
[R. 1]

and

a

motion

administrative fees.

to

waive

payment

of

the

filing

and

[R. 3]

The information contained in Thomas’s fee motion indicates
that he lacks sufficient assets or income to pay the $350.00 filing
fee.

Because Thomas has been granted pauper status in this

proceeding, the $50.00 administrative fee is waived.

District

Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, § 14.
The Court must conduct a preliminary review of Thomas’s
complaint because he has been granted pauper status.
§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A.

28 U.S.C.

A district court must dismiss any claim that

is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.

McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601,

607-08 (6th Cir. 1997).

The Court evaluates Thomas’s complaint

under a more lenient standard because he is not represented by an
attorney.

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Burton v.

Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir. 2003).

At this stage, the Court

accepts the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, and his legal
claims are liberally construed in his favor.

Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
In his complaint, Thomas alleges that he was detained by Jacob
Crawford, a detective with the Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Government (“LFUCG”) Police Department, on May 24, 2017, and taken
to the FCDC.

He states that, upon arrival, he saw his personal

property (wallet, credit cards, cell phone, driver’s license, and
dentures) laid out on a desk in the officer’s room at the jail.
Thomas alleges that he was then interrogated in the next room by
the County Attorney and booked into jail.
these items were later missing.

According to Thomas,

He seeks money damages in the

amount of $949.00 (his estimate of the value of these items) or
replacement of the lost items.
Thomas

filed

this

[R. 1]

complaint

against

Crawford

(in

his

individual capacity) and the LFUCG Police Department (in its
official capacity) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To establish a

§ 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a
constitutional right and that the deprivation occurred at the hands
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of defendant who was a “state actor,” or acted under color of state
law.

See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); Searcy v.

City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994).
However,

as

currently

drafted,

Thomas’s

claims

dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief.

must

be

A complaint

must set forth claims in a clear and concise manner, and must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 (6th
Cir. 2010).

Although the Court has an obligation to liberally

construe a complaint filed by a person proceeding without counsel,
it

has

no

authority

to

plaintiff has not made.

create

arguments

or

claims

that

the

Coleman v. Shoney’s, Inc., 79 F. App’x

155, 157 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Pro se parties must still brief the
issues advanced with some effort at developed argumentation.”).
Vague

allegations

that

one

or

more

of

the

defendants

acted

wrongfully or violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights are
not sufficient.

Laster v. Pramstaller, No. 08-CV-10898, 2008 WL

1901250, at *2 (E.D. Mich. April 25, 2008).
Although Thomas seeks to bring a claim against Crawford in
his individual capacity, the only fact alleged with respect to
Crawford is that Crawford is the detective who “obtained” Thomas
prior to his arrival at the FCDC.

To bring a claim under § 1983,

a plaintiff must “plead that each Government-official defendant,
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through

the

official's

Constitution.”

own

official

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.

actions,

violated

the

Thus, to be held liable

under § 1983, a defendant must have personal involvement in the
alleged unconstitutional conduct.
295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999).
any

facts

here

Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d

However, Thomas has failed to allege

connecting

Crawford

to

any

potential

unconstitutional conduct.
To the extent that Thomas seeks to bring a claim against the
LFUCG Police Department, the police department is not a legal
entity independent of the county that operates it; instead it is
merely an administrative department operated by the county.

Cf.

Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439-40 (6th Cir. 2008); Matthews
v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Since the Police
Department is not an entity which may be sued, Jefferson County is
the

proper

complaint.”).

party

to

address

the

allegations

of

Matthews’s

However, even construing Thomas’s claim as asserted

against the LFUCG, Thomas does not assert that the actions of which
he complains were taken pursuant to an established policy of the
LFUCG.

Because a county government is only responsible under §

1983 when its employees cause injury by carrying out the county’s
formal policies or practices, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), a plaintiff must specify the county
policy or custom which he alleges caused his injury.
Coyner, 614 F.3d 273, 284 (6th Cir. 2010).
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Paige v.

Thomas points to no such policy in his complaint, and these
claims are therefore subject to dismissal for failure to state a
claim.

Id.; Bright v. Gallia County, Ohio, 753 F. 3d 639, 660

(6th Cir. 2014) (“To establish municipal liability pursuant to §
1983, a plaintiff must allege an unconstitutional action that
‘implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation,
or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s
officers’ or a ‘constitutional deprivation [] visited pursuant to
governmental custom even though such a custom has not received
formal

approval

through

the

body’s

official

decision

making

channels.’”); Brown v. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 517 F. App’x 431,
436 (6th Cir. 2013).
Finally, turning to the substance of Thomas’s claim, claims
for deprivation of property are not actionable under § 1983.

A

plaintiff does not allege a viable due process claim based on
either the negligent deprivation of personal property, see Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981), overruled in part by
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986), or the intentional
but unauthorized, deprivation of property, see Zinermon v. Burch,
494

U.S.

113,

127

(1990),

unless

inadequate to redress the wrong.

state

court

remedies

are

See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.

517, 531-33 (1984); Geiger v. Prison Realty Trust, Inc., 13 F.
App’x 313, 315-16 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that the prisoner failed
to allege a due process claim based on the alleged theft of his
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personal property where he did not demonstrate that his state court
remedies were inadequate).

To assert such a claim, the plaintiff

must both plead and prove that state remedies for redressing the
wrong are inadequate.

See Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 708, 716

(6th Cir.1999).
Here,

Thomas

has

failed

to

allege

that

available

state

remedies are inadequate to redress his property deprivation.

In

the absence of such allegations from Thomas, the Court declines to
reach that conclusion.

Thus, his claim will be dismissed.

See

Meadows v. Gibson, 855 F.Supp. 223, 225 (W.D. Tenn. 1994)).
For

all

dismissed.

of

these

reasons,

Thomas’s

complaint

will

be

1.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
Thomas’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

[R. 3] is GRANTED.

Payment of the filing and administrative fees

are WAIVED.
2.

Thomas’s

Complaint

[R.

1]

is

DISMISSED

WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.
3.

Thomas’s motion to appoint counsel [R. 9] is DENIED AS

MOOT.
4.

The Court will enter an appropriate judgment.

5.

This matter is STRICKEN from the Court’s docket.

This 8th day of June, 2018.

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