Johnson v. SSA

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that 7 FIRST MOTION for Summary Judgment by plaintiff is OVERRULED and Dft's 9 MOTION for Summary Judgment is SUSTAINED. Judgment in favor of dft will be entered. Signed by Judge Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr on 7/15/2019.(GLD)cc: COR

Eastern District of Kentucky
UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
at LEXINGTON

F BLED
JUL 15 2019
Al ASHLAND
ROBERT R. CARR
CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Civil Action No. 18-226

DENISE E. JOHNSON,

v.

PLAINTIFF,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

DEFENDANT.

Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g) to challenge a final
decision of the Defendant denying Plaintiffs application for disability insurance benefits.
The Court having reviewed the record in this case and the dispositive motions filed by the
parties, finds that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is supported by substantial
evidence and should be affirmed.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed her current application for disability insurance benefits on May 15, 2015,
alleging disability beginning on October 1, 2014, due to longstanding, diffuse arthritis and
degenerative disc/joint disease. This application was denied initially and on reconsideration.
Thereafter, upon request by Plaintiff, an administrative hearing was conducted by Administrative
Law Judge Greg Holsclaw (hereinafter "ALJ"), wherein Plaintiff, accompanied by counsel,
testified. At the hearing, William Harpool, a vocational expert (hereinafter "VE"), also testified.
At the hearing, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, the ALJ performed the following fivestep sequential analysis in order to determine whether the Plaintiff was disabled:

Step 1: If the claimant is performing substantial gainful work, he is not disabled.
Step 2: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work, his impairment(s)
must be severe before he can be found to be disabled based upon the requirements in 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(b).
Step 3: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work and has a severe
impairment (or impairments) that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period
of at least twelve months, and his impairments (or impairments) meets or medically
equals a listed impairment contained in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4, the
claimant is disabled without further inquiry.
Step 4: If the claimant's impairment (or impairments) does not prevent him from doing
his past relevant work, he is not disabled.
Step 5: Even if the claimant's impairment or impairments prevent him from performing
his past relevant work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national
economy that accommodates his residual functional capacity and vocational factors, he is
not disabled.

The ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. Plaintiff was born in
1963 and was 51 years old at the time she alleges she became disabled. She has a high school
education. Her past relevant work experience consists of work as a construction worker.
At Step 1 of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability.
The ALJ then determined, at Step 2, that Plaintiff suffers from osteoarthritis /
degeneration of the cervical and lumbar spine, as well as the knees; dyslipidemia; hypertension
and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, which he found to be "severe" within the meaning of
the Regulations.
At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiffs impairments did not meet or medically equal any
of the listed impairments.
The ALJ further found that Plaintiff could not return to her past relevant work but
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determined that she has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a reduced range of
light work with no standing/walking for more than 30 minutes at a time and no sitting for more
than 45 minutes at a time, and additional restrictions on stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling,
climbing, reaching, and exposure to environmental elements and hazards (Tr. 42).
The ALJ finally concluded that these jobs exist in significant numbers in the national
and regional economies, as identified by the VE.
Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff not to be disabled at Step 5 of the sequential
evaluation process.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review and adopted the ALJ's decision
as the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff thereafter filed this civil action seeking a
reversal of the Commissioner's decision. Both parties have filed Motions for Summary
Judgment and this matter is ripe for decision.
II. ANALYSIS
The essential issue on appeal to this Court is whether the ALJ's decision is supported by
substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence" is defined as "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;" it is based on the record as a
whole and must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Garner
v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6 th Cir. 1984).

If the Commissioner's decision is supported by

substantial evidence, the reviewing Court must affirm. Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 667 F.2d 524,535 (6 th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). "The court may

not try the case de nova nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility."
Bradley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 862 F.2d 1224, 1228 (6 th Cir. 1988).

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Finally, this Court must defer to the Commissioner's decision "even if there is substantial
evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion, so long as substantial
evidence supports the conclusion reached by the ALT." Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270,273 (6th
Cir.1997).
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly evaluate her credibility.
Specially, she maintains that the ALJ did not consider her symptoms in accordance with SSR 163.
Upon review of an ALJ's decision, this Court is to accord the ALJ's determinations of
credibility great weight and deference as the ALJ has the opportunity of observing a witness'
demeanor while testifying.

Walters v. Commissioner ofSocial Security, 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6 th

Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff concedes that the ALJ's credibility findings are to be accorded great weight but
argues that he is not permitted to simply recite the factors from SSR 16-3. She cites this section
of SSR 16-3 in support:

It is also not enough for our adjudicators simply to recite the
factors described in the regulations for evaluating symptoms. The
determination or decision must contain specific reasons for the
weight given to the individual's symptoms, be consistent with and
supported by the evidence, and be clearly articulated so the
individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess how the
adjudicator evaluated the individual's symptoms.

SSR 16-3.
Yet, the ALJ' s decision cited several examples of Plaintiffs complaints not matching the
medical evidence. For example, he discussed the normal clinical findings, normal imaging
studies and the lack of a prescription for an ambulatory device. The ALJ referred to the most
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recent medical evidence in the record, a treatment note from December 2016, in which Plaintiff
was described as neurovascularly intact and having only mild degeneration that did not require
surgery (Tr. 484).
The ALJ also discussed only medical opinion in the record, rendered by state agency
medical consultant, Jack Reed, M.D., who opined that Plaintiff was capable oflight work with
no restrictions pertaining to sitting or walking. (Tr. 129). Notably, the ALJ added restrictions
beyond those suggested by Dr. Reed in the RFC. Indeed, the ALJ's restrictions for walking and
standing appear to be consistent with Plaintiffs own statements regarding her ability.
Contrary to Plaintiffs assertion, the ALJ did not simply recite the factors described in the
regulations for evaluating symptoms. He compared Plaintiffs statements to the medical evidence
and, citing specific medical records and he explained why he did not find it to be entirely
consistent with her testimony. Subjective claims of disabling impairment must be supported by
objective medical evidence. Duncan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 801 F.2d 84 7,
852-853 (6 th Cir. 1986). In this case, Plaintiffs subjective complaints do not pass Duncan
muster.
To the extent that Plaintiff suggests a different interpretation of the evidence, the task of
this Court is not to reweigh the evidence, but, rather, to determine if there is present here "such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). The
ALJ's decision satisfies this standard.

III.

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the

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record.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary

Judgment be OVERRULED and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be

SUSTAINED.

A judgment in favor of the Defendant will be entered contemporaneously herewith.

This

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Signed By:

Henry R. WIihoit. Jr.
United States District Judge

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