Spaw v. AMCOR Rigid Plastics USA, LLC

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: It is ordered that 10 MOTION to Dismiss for failure to state a claim or in the Alternative, MOTION for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 9/24/2018.(SCD)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON

JEFFREY C. SPAW,
Plaintiff,
v.
AMCOR RIGID PLASTICS USA, LLC,
Defendant.

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Civil Case No.
5:18-cv-230-JMH
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

***
Plaintiff Jeffrey Spaw, a former employee of Amcor Rigid
Plastics

USA,

LLC,

brings

this

action

alleging

that

he

was

terminated due to his age in violation of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act
(“KCRA”).
the

[DE 1].

alternative

Amcor moves for dismissal of the case, or in

for

summary

judgment,

asserting

that

Spaw’s

lawsuit is untimely because it violates a six-month limitations
period for filing a claim or lawsuit contained in his application
for employment and employment contract.

[DE 10].

Spaw has

responded to Amcor’s Motion, arguing that he complied with the
limitations period because he filed a claim when he filed a charge
of

discrimination

with

the

United

States

Equal

Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) before the expiration of the sixmonth limitations period.

[DE 12].

1 

Amcor has replied [DE 13],

making this matter ripe for review.

The Court does not find that

oral argument will assist with resolution of the issues raised by
the

parties

at

this

stage.

For

the

reasons

stated

herein,

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for
Summary Judgment [DE 10] is DENIED.
I.

Factual and Procedural Background

A.
The Limitations Period in the Employment Contract and
Employee Handbooks
Jeffrey Spaw was employed by Amcor at a plant located in
Nicholasville, Kentucky, beginning June 3, 2011.

[DE 1, Complaint

pp. 1-2; DE 12-1, Charge of Discrimination to Kentucky Commission
on Human Rights, p. 1].

Prior to his employment, Spaw completed

an employment application that contained a six-month limitations
period for any claim or lawsuit arising out of his employment with
Amcor.

[DE 10-1, Exh. A, Employment Application, p. 8].

The

contractual limitations period found on the fifth page of the
application states:
In consideration for Amcor Rigid Plastic’s review of my
application, and employment if I am hired, I agree that
any claim or lawsuit arising out of my employment with,
or my application for employment with, Amcor, or any of
its subsidiaries must be filed no more than six (6)
months after the date of the employment action, I agree
to be bound by the six (6) month period of limitations
set forth herein, and I WAIVE ANY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
TO THE CONTRARY.
[Id. (emphasis in original)].

Below the language containing the

limitations period, in a box at the bottom of the same page, the

2 

application states: “I agree to the terms and conditions stated in
the Job Applicant’s Agreement and Certification.”
in original)].

[Id. (emphasis

On the same page, in a separate box directly to

the right of the language concerning agreement to the terms and
conditions, the application says, “I Agree,” which is circled on
Spaw’s application.

[Id.].

Finally, at the top of the next page,

the employment application is signed by “Jeff Spaw” and dated May
24, 2011.

[Id. at 9].

In addition to the employment application, on March 12, 2014,
Spaw signed a “Receipt of Co-Worker Handbook” acknowledgement form
that stated:
Finally, I agree to be bound by the Time Limitation for
Filing Claims policy as described in Section 8.8 of the
Employee Handbook. I acknowledge that I am required to
file a claim or lawsuit against Amcor within six (6)
months after the date of the decision, event, or
employment action that is the subject of my claim or
lawsuit. If a claim or lawsuit is not submitted timely,
my claim or lawsuit will be deemed to have been waived
and forever released.
I understand that the time
limitation for filing claims or lawsuits arising out of
an employment action may be longer than six (6) months
under state or federal law, but I acknowledge that I am
bound by the six (6) month time limitation for filing
claims set forth in the policy and waive any time
limitation for filing claims to the contrary, to the
fullest extent permitted by law.
[DE 10-1, Exh. B, Receipt of Co-Worker Handbook form (Adopted Jan.
2013), p. 12].

Additionally, Spaw signed a different Receipt of

Co-Worker Handbook acknowledgement form on August 22, 2015 that
contained nearly identical language regarding the contractual

3 

limitations period.

[DE 10-1, Exh. B, Receipt of Co-Worker

Handbook form (Adopted Mar. 2015), p. 11].
limitations

policy

Co-Worker Handbook.

is

also

outlined

in

Finally, the time

section

8.8

of

the

[DE 1-10, Co-Worker Handbook, p. 45].

B.
Spaw’s Termination, Filing of Charge of Discrimination
with EEOC, and Lawsuit
After a series of reprimands, Spaw’s employment with Amcor
was terminated on May 8, 2017.

[DE 1, pp. 2-7; see DE 1-2,

Supervisor’s Report; DE 1-3, Supervisor’s Report; DE 1-5, Note to
File; DE 1-6, Note to File; DE 1-7, Supervisor’s Report; DE 1-8,
Supervisor’s Report].
fifty-four years old.

At the time of his termination, Spaw was
[DE 1, p. 2].

Feeling that the reprimands

were frivolous, or at least that they failed to justify his
termination, and believing that he was terminated based on his
age, Spaw filed a charge of age-based discrimination under the
ADEA with the EEOC, which was also sent to the Kentucky Commission
on Human Rights (“KCHR”).
and Notice].1

[DE 12-1; see DE 1-1, EEOC Dismissal

Subsequently, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice

1

It is unclear exactly when Spaw filed his charge with the EEOC.
The Charge of Discrimination [DE 12-1] is neither signed nor dated.
Additionally, the Dismissal and Notice [DE 1-1] is also not dated
although it confirms that a charge was filed with the EEOC. Spaw
claims that he filed with the EEOC on September 12, 2017 but only
cites to the undated Charge of Discrimination.
[DE 12, p. 4].
Amcor claims that Spaw did not file with the EEOC until October
14, 2017. [DE 10, p. 4]. Still, the parties do not dispute that
Spaw filed a charge with the EEOC and even accepting the later
filing date of October 14, 2017, the charge was filed within the
4 

of Rights on January 24, 2018 indicating that the “EEOC [was]
unable to conclude that the information establishe[d] violations
of statutes” and informing Spaw that he had a right to file a
lawsuit within ninety days of receiving the notice.
1].

[DE 1-1, p.

A stamp at the top of the Dismissal and Notice form indicates

it was received on January 26, 2018.

[Id.].

Then, Spaw initiated

this lawsuit on April 4, 2018, alleging violations of the ADEA, 26
U.S.C. § 623 and the KCRA, K.R.S. § 344.040(1).
II.

Standard of Review

As an initial matter, the most appropriate procedural vehicle
to

determine

whether

the

contractual

limitations

period

bars

Spaw’s claim is a Motion for Summary Judgment under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56.

See Engleson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 723 F.3d 611,

616 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The district court dismissed the case
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) . . . that rule, however, is generally
an inappropriate vehicle for dismissing a claim based upon a
statute

of

omitted)).

limitations.”

(internal

citations

and

quotations

According to Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1(c)(1), expiration of

a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense upon which
relief may be granted to a defendant based on a fact of set of
facts other than those alleged by the plaintiff.

See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 7.1(c); see also Campbell v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 238

six-month contractual limitations period which expired on November
8, 2017. [See DE 10; DE 12].
5 

F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2001).

Of course, “the defense of [statute

of] limitations may be raised by a Rule 12 motion to dismiss when
. . . the time alleged in the complaint shows that an action was
not brought within the statutory [limitations] period.”

Rauch v.

Day & Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d 697, 702 (6th Cir. 1978).
Alternatively, “where the defect does not appear on the face of
the

complaint,

the

defendant

can

still

raise

[a

statute

of

limitations defense]” that the court will treat as a motion for
summary

judgment.

Id.

Finally,

Rule

12(d)

is

instructive,

providing that “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under
Rule 56.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see Engleson, 723 F.3d at 616.

Additionally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) provides that a party must
assert a statute of limitations defense in its responsive pleading
or risk waiving the argument.

There is no meaningful distinction

between

of

statutory

limitations

statutes

periods.

Courts

limitations
have

and

routinely

contractual
referred

to

contractual limitations periods as “statutes of limitations.”

See

Ray v. Fedex Corp. Servs., Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066 (W.D.
Tenn. 2009); Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe,
331 U.S. 586, 608 (1947); Thurman v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 397
F.3d 352 (6th Cir. 2004).

6 

Here, there is no mention of the statute of limitations or
contractual limitations period on the face of Spaw’s complaint.
In fact, there is no mention of Spaw’s filing a charge with the
EEOC on the face of the complaint.

Also, there is no discussion

in the pleadings about whether the statute of limitations has run
or if there is an exception to the statute of limitations that
entitles Spaw to relief.

Therefore, determining whether the

contractual limitations period bars Spaw’s claim in this matter
necessarily requires the parties to provide extrinsic evidence and
make legal arguments outside the original pleadings.

Thus, while

the outcome may be the same under either the Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule
56 standard, Amcor’s Motion is more appropriately analyzed as a
motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 than a motion
to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine dispute
exists as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The moving

party has the burden to show that “there is an absence of evidence
to support the nonmoving party’s case.”
477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

“A dispute about a material fact is

genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Smith v. Perkins Bd. of Educ.,

708 F.3d 821, 825 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted).
The Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the
7 

nonmoving party.

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986).
In considering whether summary judgment is appropriate based
on the expiration of a statute of limitations, courts “must
determine whether (1) the statute of limitations has run and (2)
whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to when
the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued.”
775.

Campbell, 238 F.3d at

Initially, “the burden is on the defendant to show that the

statute

of

limitations

has

run.”

Id.

If

the

defendant

demonstrates that the statute of limitations has run, “the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to establish an exception to the statute
of limitations.”

Id.
III. Analysis

Pursuant to the ADEA, a plaintiff must file a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC as a jurisdictional prerequisite to
filing a civil lawsuit.

29 U.S.C. § 626(d); Oscar Mayer & Co. v.

Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979); Vinson v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.2d
686,

688

(6th

Cir.

1986).

Filing

a

charge

with

the

EEOC

“trigger[s] the investigatory and conciliatory procedures of the
EEOC so that the Commission may first attempt to obtain voluntary
compliance with the law.”

Davis v. Sodexho, Cumberland College

Cafeteria, 157 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 1998).

These procedures

“notify potential defendants of the nature of plaintiffs’ claims

8 

and provide them the opportunity to settle the claims before the
EEOC rather than litigate them.”

Id.

Here, Spaw’s filing with the EEOC complied with the statutory
scheme that requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before
commencing a lawsuit.

The parties dispute whether filing a charge

with the EEOC is a “claim” as contemplated by the Amcor Employment
Application

and

Co-Worker

Handbook.

Amcor

argues

that

the

contractual limitations period is a complete defense to Spaw’s
lawsuit

and

moves

for

summary

judgment

contractual limitations period has run.

claiming

[DE 10].

that

the

In response,

Spaw argues that filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
within the six-month limitations period satisfies his obligation
to file a claim within six-months of his termination.

[DE 12].

Spaw does not challenge the validity or reasonableness of
contractual limitations clause, has not argued that he did not
sign

the

employment

application

or

the

receipt

of

co-worker

handbook acknowledgments, has not argued any other contractual
defenses, and has not asserted any exceptions to the statute of
limitations.
case

turns

[See id.].
is

whether

Thus, the sole issue upon which this

Spaw’s

filing

a

charge

with

the

EEOC

constitutes a “claim” under the limitations provision found in the
Amcor Application for Employment and Co-Worker Handbook.
The proper interpretation of a contract, specifically whether
a contract is ambiguous, is a question of law to be decided by the
9 

court.
Ltd.,

Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Orient Overseas Container Line
525

F.3d

409,

421

(6th

Cir.

2008);

accord

Kentucky

Shakespeare Festival, Inc. v. Dunaway, 490 S.W.3d 691, 695 (Ky.
2016).

“Ambiguity exists if the language is susceptible to two or

more reasonable interpretations.”

Royal Ins., 525 F.3d at 421

(internal quotations omitted); accord Dunaway, 490 S.W.3d at 69495.
If a contract is unambiguous, the court should look to the
four corners of the contract to determine and effectuate the intent
of the parties.

Royal Ins., 525 F.3d at 421; accord Dunaway, 490

S.W.3d at 694-95. Where the language in a contract is unambiguous,
the

court

must

read

the

entire

contract

and

interpret

the

contract’s terms by assigning the contractual language its plain
and ordinary meaning. Royal Ins., 525 F.3d at 421; accord Dunaway,
490 S.W.3d at 694.
Contract interpretation is generally an issue for the court,
but “when construction of the contract requires reference to
extrinsic evidence it can become a jury issue.”

Lagrew v. Hooks-

SupRx, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 401, 404 (E.D. Ky. 1995) (citing Cook
United, Inc. v. Waits, 512 S.W.2d 493 (Ky.1974)); see Royal Ins.,
525 F.3d at 422.

“When a contract is ambiguous, it is for the

jury to determine the meaning of its terms, subject to proper
instructions

and

based

upon

‘evidence

of

the

surrounding

circumstances and the practical construction of the parties.’”
10 

Scott v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 496 F.2d 276, 280 (6th Cir.
1974) (quoting Tennessee Consolidated Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers of Am., 416 F.2d 1192, 1198 (6th Cir. 1969)).

Even if

there is ambiguity, “a court may determine that the evidence so
overwhelmingly favors one interpretation of that contract that no
reasonable person could decide to the contrary.”

Royal Ins., 525

F.3d at 422 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Nadherny v.
Roseland Prop. Co., 390 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2004)).
A. Differences in Language Between the Employment Contract
and Co-Worker Handbook
As an initial matter, the limitations period language in the
Amcor employment application varies slightly from the relevant
language in the Co-Worker Handbook.

The employment application

required Spaw “to bring any claim or lawsuit” within six months.
[DE 10-1, p. 8 (emphasis added)].

The Amcor Co-Worker Handbook,

however, required Spaw “to bring a claim or lawsuit” within six
months.
The

[DE 10-1, p. 12 (emphasis added)].
parties

dispute

whether

this

variation

in

language

results in any substantive or material difference in outcome or
effect.

[Compare DE 12, pp. 4-6, with DE 13, pp. 2-3].

The

language in the employment application, requiring Spaw to bring
any claim or lawsuit within six months suggests that Spaw would
have to bring all claims or lawsuits that he had against Amcor
within six months.

Used in this context, the word “any” seems to

11 

encompass or contemplate multiple claims or lawsuits that must be
brought within the six-month period.

On the other hand, the

language in the co-worker handbook, requiring that Spaw bring a
claim or lawsuit within six months, seems to suggest that Spaw
must only bring one claim or lawsuit against Amcor.

The use of

“a” in this context suggests a singular claim or lawsuit that must
be

brought.

The

semantics

are

technical

and

may

seem

inconsequential, but in the law, and particularly in the context
of contract formation and interpretation, the meaning of words
matters.
Here, to the extent that there is a substantive or material
difference between the language in the limitations clause in the
employment application as opposed to the Co-Worker Handbook, the
language in the Co-Worker Handbook must control.
First, there is no indication in the employment application
that the terms in the contract are incorporated as terms of an
employment application if Spaw is hired.
contained

in

the

Co-Worker

Handbook

and

Second, the language
Co-Worker

Handbook

Acknowledgement is more recent than the language in the employment
application.

Spaw

signed

a

“Receipt

of

Co-Worker

Handbook”

acknowledgement in March 2014 and again in August 2015.

Thus,

Spaw acknowledged receipt of the “a claim or lawsuit” language
twice and more recently than the “any claim or lawsuit” language
contained in the employment application.
12 

As a result, to the

extent that there is a material difference between the language
contractual

limitations

language

contained

in

the

employment

application and the Co-Worker Handbook, the language in the CoWorker handbook should govern.
B. Whether Filing a Charge with the EEOC is a Claim
Neither the employment application nor the Co-Worker handbook
defines the meaning of claim.

Thus, the Court must look to the

ordinary and plain meaning of the term in the Co-Worker Handbook
to determine if there is more than one plausible interpretation of
claim as used in the contractual limitations clause.

According to

the Oxford English Dictionary, a claim is “[a] demand for something
as due” or “an assertion of a right to something.”
Dictionary (2d ed. 1989).

Oxford English

In the legal context, a claim is “[a]

statement that something yet to be proved is true” or “[t]he
assertion of an existing right; any right to payment or to an
equitable remedy, even if contingent or provisional” or “[a] demand
for money, property, or a legal remedy to which one asserts a
right.”

Claim, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

The plain meaning of the word claim demonstrates that filing
a charge of discrimination with the EEOC is synonymous with filing
a claim.

Each charge filed with the EEOC requires the complainant

to submit a signed statement of facts and other information that
asserts something that has yet to be proved.

By filing a charge

with the EEOC, Spaw asserted that his employer engaged in age
13 

discrimination in violation of federal law.

The charge then

prompted the EEOC initiate an administrative investigation to
determine if discrimination occurred.
Additionally, filing a charge with the EEOC is also an
assertion by the employee that they have been discriminated against
and that they have a right to be free from such discrimination in
the workplace under federal law.

In fact, filing a charge with

the EEOC is a prerequisite for an aggrieved employee to file a
lawsuit in which he or she may demand a right to money, equitable
relief, or other legal relief arising out of the alleged unlawful
discrimination.
Moreover, courts have routinely referred to the filing of a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC as a claim, at least to the
extent that filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC must
necessarily include an underlying claim of discrimination.

See

id. (“[T]he charge filed did not give the EEOC sufficient notice
of Davis’ age discrimination claim to investigate or facilitate
conciliation with her employer on that ground.”); Howlett v.
Holiday Inns, Inc., 49 F.3d 189, 195 (6th Cir. 1995) (“Thus a
charge will be adequate to support piggybacking under the single
filing

rule

if

it

contains

sufficient

information

to

notify

prospective defendants of their potential liability and permit the
EEOC to attempt informal conciliation of the claims before a
lawsuit [is] filed.” (emphasis added)); Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of
14 

E. Tenn., 302 F.3d 367, 380 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[W]here facts related
with

respect

to

the

charged

claim

would

prompt

the

EEOC

to

investigate a different, uncharged claim, the plaintiff is not
precluded from bringing suit on that claim.” (emphasis added));
McCartt v. Kellogg USA, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 3d 843, 854 (E.D. Ky.
2015) (“[Plaintiff] contends that the narrative attached to his
charge provided the EEOC with the facts necessary to investigate
his retaliation claim.” (emphasis added)); Morton v. ICI Acrylics,
Inc., 69 F. Supp. 1038, 1042 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (“In order to file
suit under the ADEA, a plaintiff must have first filed a claim
with the EEOC. . . . The EEOC claim . . .” (emphasis added)).
Even so, Amcor cites authorities that appear to point in the
other direction and indicate that filing a charge with the EEOC is
not a claim.

First, Amcor relies on Thurman, 397 F.3d 352 (6th

Cir. 2004) to suggest that filing a charge with the EEOC is not a
claim or lawsuit that will satisfy the contractual limitations
period.

[DE 10, p. 10; DE 13, p. 2-3].

Amcor is correct that the

language in Thurman and the language found in the application for
employment here are nearly identical, both requiring the employee
to bring “any claim or lawsuit” within a six-month contractual
limitations period. [DE 13, p. 2]. Still, while the Thurman court
acknowledged that the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Michigan
Department

of

Civil

Rights,

it

did

administrative complaint was not a claim.
15 

not

rule

that

this

See Thurman, 397 F.3d

at 358.

The plaintiff’s action was time barred in Thurman because

her first lawsuit was dismissed, and the second lawsuit was outside
the six-month contractual limitations period.

See id. at 355,

358-59.
In fact, Thurman could be read to support the conclusion that
an administrative complaint or charge is synonymous with a claim.
In

discussing

whether

the

abbreviated

limitations

clause

was

reasonable, the court noted that Ms. Thurman had filed a previous
lawsuit, brought a criminal complaint, and that “Ms. Thurman filed
a complaint with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights.”
358.

Id. at

The court went on to say that “[t]hese facts demonstrate

that she had ample opportunity to investigate her claims and
determine her losses.”

Id. (emphasis added).

Thus, the Thurman

court seemed to interpret the administrative filing with the
Michigan Department of Civil Rights as constituting a claim.
Next, Amcor cites Aytes to support the contention that Spaw’s
EEOC filing is not a claim.

But in Aytes, the contractual

limitation language was quite different than the language employed
in the limitations period found in Amcor’s co-worker handbook.

In

Aytes, the plaintiff was required “to bring a legal action” in six
months.

See Aytes v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 5:10-cv-230, 2012 WL

1831272 at *10 (E.D. Ky. May 18, 2012) (emphasis added). The Aytes
court concluded that the terms “legal action” and “complaint” and
“lawsuit” apply exclusively to a judicial proceeding.
16 

See id.;

see also Adams v. Fedex Express, No. 5:15-cv-376, 2016 WL 6211277
at * 4 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 24, 2016) (concluding that filing a charge
with the EEOC does not constitute a legal action in state court
under Kentucky civil rights statutes). The language in the present
contract required Spaw “to file a claim or lawsuit against Amcor
within six (6) months after the date of the decision, event, or
employment action that is the subject of [his] claim or lawsuit.”
[DE 10-1, p. 12 (emphasis added)].

Aytes and Adams simply stand

for the proposition that filing a charge of discrimination with
the EEOC does not constitute filing a legal action, complaint, or
lawsuit. The authorities that Amcor relies are are distinguishable
from the current case and do not hold that filing an EEOC charge
is not synonymous with a claim.
Again, the controlling inquiry here is whether filing an EEOC
charge constitutes filing a claim under the Co-Worker Handbook.
While other cases and authorities are instructive, the main inquiry
is what was meant by the language that required Spaw to file a
claim or lawsuit against Amcor within six months of the date of
the decision or event that is the subject of his action.
Ultimately, the act of filing an EEOC charge constitutes a
claim that satisfied Spaw’s obligation under limitations period in
the Co-Worker Handbook.

The Co-Worker Handbook is not ambiguous.

The plain meaning of claim demonstrates that filing an EEOC charge
is synonymous with filing a claim. Additionally, many courts refer
17 

to the EEOC charge as a claim and do not appear to interpret the
word claim to apply exclusively to judicial proceedings.

In sum,

Spaw’s EEOC charge was based on an underlying allegation or claim
that Amcor had engaged in unlawful age discrimination.
Of course, Amcor may have intended for an EEOC charge to be
excluded from the meaning of claim in the Co-Worker Handbook.

But

Amcor was the drafter of the contract and was in the best position
to clarify the meaning of claim in the Co-Worker Handbook.

For

instance, Amcor could have simply defined the meaning of claim in
the Co-Worker Handbook.

Similarly, Amcor could have expressly

excluded filing an EEOC charge as a claim in the text of the CoWorker Handbook.

Finally, Amcor could have been more specific and

used language like that in Aytes and Adams requiring that Spaw
file any legal action, lawsuit, or complaint within six months.
Unfortunately, Amcor did not define the word claim and thus the
meaning of claim in the Co-Worker handbook is subject to multiple
reasonable interpretations.
Ultimately, considering the common usage of the word claim
and the fact that courts routinely refer to EEOC charges as claims,
Spaw’s filing with the EEOC satisfied his obligation to file a
claim within six months.
C. Timeliness of Spaw’s Lawsuit
Lastly, Amcor asserts that even if Spaw argues that his EEOC
filing tolled the limitations period, Spaw’s lawsuit still fails
18 

because it was not filed until approximately three months after
the EEOC issued a right to sue notice, making the complaint
untimely.

[DE 10, p. 2 n.3].

Of course, the burden is on Amcor

to show that the statute of limitations has run.

Campbell, 238

F.3d at 775.
Here, Spaw filed a claim within the six-month contractual
limitations period when he filed a charge with the EEOC.

As such,

Amcor has failed to demonstrate that the contractual limitations
period expired and Spaw’s lawsuit is timely.
IV. Conclusion
In this case, Spaw complied with the contractual limitations
period contained in the Amcor Co-Worker Handbook when he filed a
charge

of

discrimination

contractual

limitations

with

the

period

EEOC
for

within
claims

the

six-month

or

lawsuits.

Additionally, Spaw filed his lawsuit within ninety days of the
EEOC right to sue letter. As such, Amcor has failed to demonstrate
that

Spaw’s

lawsuit

is

untimely

and

summary

judgment

is

inappropriate at this stage in the litigation.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that
Amcor’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for
Summary Judgment [DE 10] is DENIED.

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