Snowden v. Schneider Electric USA, Inc.

Filing 50

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) Defendant Schneider Electric USA, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 31 ] is GRANTED; (2) Schneider's Reply [DE 45 ], insofar as it requests that the Court impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, is DENIED; (3) This matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and (4) This is a final and appealable order. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 10/14/20.(JLM)cc: COR

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON
RORY SNOWDEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC USA, INC.,
Defendant.

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Case No.
5:19-cv-192-JMH-MAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

***
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Schneider
Electric USA, Inc.’s (“Schneider”) Motion for Summary Judgment [DE
31]. In his Complaint [DE 1-1], Plaintiff Rory Snowden alleges
Schneider racially discriminated against him in his employment as
both an Assembler and Line Leader at Schneider. Snowden fails to
show several essential elements of the claims raised against
Schneider. Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Rory Snowden was employed by Schneider from February 23, 2011,
until his resignation in 2018. [DE 32, at 4 (citing [DE 32-3, at
19])]. He started as an Assembler on the production line of
Schneider’s Lexington plant, which primarily manufactures vehicle
distribution and transmission equipment. Id. at 3-4; [DE 39, at
1]. Schneider’s employees are represented by the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 220 (the “Union”). [DE

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32, at 4 (citing [DE 32-3, at 27]); DE 39, at 2]. In 2012, Snowden
was promoted to the position of Line Leader, in which he supervised
a small group of line workers. [DE 32, at 4 (citing [DE 32-3, at
19-20]); DE 39, at 1].
In 2013, Snowden had his first incident with Human Resources
(“HR”). [DE 32, at 5]. Specifically, on October 20, 2013, Snowden’s
supervisor became aware of an altercation between Snowden and
fellow Line Leader, Jeremy Atkinson. Id. Snowden’s supervisor at
the

time,

Tom

Rawlins,

reported

to

Pamela

Macy,

an

HR

Representative, that Snowden told Rawlins something along the
lines of, “I’ll kill him,” referring to Atkinson because Snowden
thought Atkinson called him a “nigger.” [DE 32-3, at 39]; see also
[DE 32, at 5; DE 39, at 2]. However, during Snowden’s deposition,
when he was questioned about Atkinson’s alleged use of the racial
slur, Snowden said, “It sounded like it,” but he was unwilling to
“swear on it.” [DE 32-3, at 39]. Later that day, Snowden was
brought in to meet with Macy, Rawlins, and two representatives
from the Union to discuss the incident with Atkinson. [DE 32, at
5 (citing [DE 32-3, at 45-47; DE 32-4, at 106-110; DE 32-5, at 34, 85-89])]. During the meeting, Snowden admitted to saying he
would kill Atkinson and was placed on a 10-day suspension, required
to

attend

mandatory

counseling,

and

given

a

“Last

Chance

Agreement,” but he was not demoted at that time. [DE 32, at 5
(citing [DE 32-3, at 35-39, 48-49, 51-53; DE 32-4, at 106-110; DE
2

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32-5, at 4, 85-89]); DE 39, at 2]. Macy’s subsequent investigation
into the incident led her to believe that Atkinson did not violate
company policy, but he was nonetheless counseled on his behavior.
[DE 32, at 6 (citing [DE 32-4, at 106-110; DE 32-5, at 4-5, 8589])].
On

April

24,

2017,

Schneider

was

harassment allegations against Snowden.

made

aware

of

sexual

[DE 32, at 6 (citing [DE

32-4, at 4, 113-24]. Four (4) days earlier, on April 20, 2017,
Lara Walker was working alone in an enclosed “weld cell” when
Snowden, the Line Leader for her group, entered the cell and began
speaking with her. Id. During this conversation, Snowden allegedly
stated, “‘Have you ever been with a black man? I always wanted to
be with a little white girl. Want to go to Horseshoes and have a
drink? You just pack a bag and I will take care of everything.’”
Id. at 6 (quoting [DE 32-4, at 5]); see also [DE 32-3, at 63-66;
DE 32-4, at 113-124]. Walker asserted that she “nervously ‘laughed
it off’ and ‘told [Snowden] he was crazy.’” [DE 32-4, at 5]. After
Snowden

allegedly

made

these

statements

to

Walker,

George

Cunningham, a mechanic, entered the cell, and Snowden stopped
talking to Walker. Id. When investigating these claims, HR manager
Shannon

Phillips

spoke

with

Theresa

True,

another

Schneider

employee, who informed Phillips that she too had a “run in” with
Snowden. Id. Phillips spoke with Snowden, who admitted that he had
asked Walker to meet him at the bar and that he had told Walker
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about his past “‘experiences,’” including that “‘he had never been
with a white girl.’” Id.; see also [DE 32-3, at 63-66].
At this interview, Snowden complained about how he felt that
Cunningham and Walker’s conduct was inappropriate. [DE 32-4, at
5]. Cunningham and Walker had previously been in a romantic
relationship, and Cunningham told Phillips that “he had ‘put his
hands’ on Walker recently ‘just as friends.’” Id. at 6. Cunningham
further asserted that he “did not kiss or grope [Walker] recently
although he may have done so in the past on a consensual basis.”
Id. Cunningham and Walker were counseled “to act in an appropriate,
respectful manner towards each other and their co-workers while at
work.” Id. at 7.
Despite Snowden’s prior “Last Chance Agreement,” Schneider
did not terminate Snowden’s employment due to the Walker incident.
Instead, Phillips found that Snowden had “violated the Company’s
Policy against Sexual Harassment and Other Workplace Harassment,”
and Snowden was demoted to the Assembler position. Id. at 6-7. The
new Line Leader who replaced Snowden was a Caucasian male. [DE 39,
at 7].
After Snowden’s demotion, on April 28, 2017, HR received
complaints that Snowden was engaging in threatening behavior on
the shop floor. [DE 32-4, at 7]. Snowden had allegedly been staring
threateningly at Walker and an investigation by Phillips revealed
that another woman had allegedly been subjected to Snowden’s
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inappropriate comments. Id. at 7-8. However, no further action was
taken against Snowden. Id. at 8. Instead, Phillips “concluded that
these employee statements were further corroborating evidence of
Snowden’s pattern of sexually harassing behavior, which further
supported the decision to remove him from the Leader position.”
Id.
On April 24, 2018, Snowden went to Phillips to report an
incident which had allegedly taken place five (5) days prior. [DE
39, at 3]. This incident involved Snowden seeing his Leader, Mike
Jones, a white man, wearing a white packaging cone on his head for
approximately one (1) minute. Id.; [DE 32, at 11]. Snowden was
under the impression that the cone was intended to resemble the
attire worn atop the heads of members of the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”),
and

Snowden

believed

Jones’s

action

to

be

one

of

racial

intimidation. [DE 39, at 3]. Snowden thought Jones may have said
something while he had the cone on his head, but during Snowden’s
deposition, he admitted that he did not hear what Jones said. [DE
32-3, at 86-87]. Phillips investigated this allegation and found
that Snowden’s two black coworkers who were present during the
cone incident did not see the act as a racist gesture. Id. at 99;
[DE 32-4, at 9-10]. Jones claimed that he was “just being silly”
and that he thought the cone looked “like a party hat.” [DE 32-4,
at 9]. Phillips concluded that Jones did not intend to act in a
racist or threatening manner, but she still instructed Jones to
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throw the cone away and counseled him to be more careful about how
his actions may be perceived. Id. at 9-10.
On April 27, 2018, Phillips told Snowden that she found
Jones’s actions were not intended to be “racially inflammatory”
and that his coworkers did not interpret them as such. Id. at 10.
Additionally,

Phillips

informed

Snowden

that

during

her

investigation, Phillips discovered that other Schneider employees
in Snowden’s group were uncomfortable with him. Id. Phillips
informed Snowden that his coworkers “deserved respect,” that they
“should feel comfortable working in the group,” and that “bullying
is prohibited and can interfere with other employees’ peace of
mind or ability to work.” Id. Finally, Phillips “reminded Snowden
of Schneider Electric’s Harassment and Workplace Violence Policies
and directed him to comply with those policies and to treat his
fellow employees in a respectful manner.” Id. at 10-11; see also
id.at 125-132.
On April 30, 2018, Schneider received reports that Snowden
made

further

threatening

remarks.

[DE

32-4,

at

136-38].

Specifically, one of Snowden’s coworkers reported that Snowden had
stated that he was a “‘messenger from God’” and that they would
see “‘this place on the news next week.’” Id. at 137. Based on
these comments, Snowden was suspended while HR investigated the
comments and awaited Phillips’s return the following Monday, as
Phillips was out of the office. Id. Snowden claims he made the
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statements regarding his intent to call a local news station to
report the allegedly “racially hostile environment” at Schneider.
[DE 39, at 3]. Following his suspension, Snowden was escorted out
of the building, and approximately an hour later, sent a text
message to his Union representative informing them that he was
resigning. [DE 32, at 15; DE 39, at 3]. On May 7, 2018, Phillips
received Snowden’s letter of resignation from Snowden’s Union
representative. Id.
On April 5, 2019, Snowden filed his Complaint [DE 1-1, at 25] in Fayette Circuit Court claiming Schneider subjected him to
racial discrimination in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights
Act (“KCRA”), specifically KRS § 344.040, and created a racially
hostile

work

environment

that

resulted

in

Snowden

being

constructively discharged from his job. On May 1, 2019, Schneider
removed this matter to this Court. [DE 1]. On January 31, 2020,
Schneider file the present Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 31] and
an accompanying Memorandum in Support [DE 32], which shall be
discussed further herein.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). “A genuine dispute exists on a material fact, and thus
summary judgment is improper, if the evidence shows ‘that a
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reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”
Olinger v. Corporation of the President of the Church, 521 F. Supp.
2d 577, 582 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). Stated another way, “[t]he mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s
position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the
jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 252. “The central issue is ‘whether the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether
it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
law.’" Pennington, 553 F.3d at 450 (citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the
basis for its motion and identifying those parts of the record
that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002).
The movant may satisfy its burden by showing “that there is an
absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the movant
has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the
pleadings and come forward with specific facts demonstrating the
existence of a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Hall
Holding, 285 F.3d at 424 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).
Moreover, “the nonmoving party must do more than show there is
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some metaphysical doubt as to the material fact. It must present
significant probative evidence in support of its opposition to the
motion for summary judgment.”

Hall Holding, 285 F.3d at 424

(internal citations omitted).
The Court “must construe the evidence and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Pennington v. State
Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). However, the Court is under no duty to
“search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a
genuine issue of material fact.” In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 655
(6th Cir. 2001). Rather, “the nonmoving party has an affirmative
duty to direct the court’s attention to those specific portions of
the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue
of material fact.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Schneider moves for summary judgment, asking the Court to
dismiss Snowden’s claims with prejudice. [DE 32, at 31]. Each of
Schneider’s arguments shall be discussed in turn.
A. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
"‘The language of the KCRA generally tracks the language of
Title VII and, thus, should be interpreted consonant with federal
interpretation.’" Meads v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't, No.
15-5310, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23776, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 20, 2016)
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1201

(quoting Morris v. Oldham Cty. Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 793
(6th Cir. 2000)). Although not clearly stated, the Parties appear
to agree that Snowden’s discrimination claim is a single-motive
claim, which means this claim must be “analyzed under the burdenshifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and later
modified by Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 252–53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).” Wright
v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 706 (6th Cir. 2006); see also
[DE 32, at 17-18; DE 39, at 5]. Under a single-motive claim
framework, the plaintiff must first establish by the preponderance
of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Wright, 455
F.3d at 706. If the plaintiff can show a prima facie case, the
burden

then

shifts

to

the

defendant

to

“‘articulate

some

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’” existed for the allegedly
adverse treatment. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (quoting Green, 411 U.S. at 802); see
also Wright, 455 F.3d at 706. Lastly, “should the defendant carry
this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons
offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a
pretext for discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (citing
Green, 411 U.S. at 804); see also Wright, 455 F.3d at 706.

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1. PRIMA FACIE CASE
To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination
under the KCRA, Snowden must show that (1) he was a member of a
protected class; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; (3)
he was qualified for his position; and 4) he was replaced by
someone outside of the protected class or treated differently than
similarly-situated, non-protected employees. Wright, 455 F.3d at
707.
In the present case, Snowden is indisputably a member of a
protected class because he is black. Snowden claims, “Defendant
argues that the Complainant did not suffer an adverse employment
decision.” [DE 39, at 5]. However, that is not what Schneider
argues.1 Instead, Schneider asserts, “To the extent Snowden claims

This is one of many inaccurate statements made in Snowden’s
Response [DE 39] and Affidavit [DE 39-1]. In addition to Snowden
and his counsel’s unfounded assertions, which are too numerous to
include herein, many of the citations found in Schneider’s
Memorandum [DE 32] are in the improper order. By placing citations
in the incorrect order, Schneider’s counsel initially gives the
impression that Schneider’s counsel is misrepresenting the
contents of documents in the record. Only after spending a
considerable amount of time sorting through each of the citations
was the able Court to discover that counsel habitually cites to
documents, and even directly quotes documents, that are not the
first citation after the body of the sentence. Going forward, when
Schneider’s counsel files pleadings with the Court, their
citations should conform with the standards found in the Bluebook.
Regarding Schneider’s request for the Court to impose
sanctions against either Snowden or his counsel, see [DE 45, at 38], the Court will not do so at this time. While many of Snowden’s
assertions that Schneider argues are improper misrepresentations
of fact could, in fact, be deliberate misrepresentations, they
could just as easily be the result of poor factchecking,
1

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1203

that the Written Reprimand . . . is an adverse action, such a claim
fails because the Written Reprimand itself did not change his
hourly wage, benefits, duties or responsibilities.” [DE 39, at 18
(citing Handshoe v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 34 F. App’x 441, 447 (6th
Cir. 2002) (finding a “write-up” to be “insufficient to rise to
the level of a materially adverse employment action”); Allen v.
Michigan Dept. of Corr., 165 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 1999); Marshall v.
Super Serv. LLC, No. 6:14-229-DCR, 2016 WL 1389595, at *8 (E.D.
Ky.

Apr.

6,

2016)).

Additionally,

Schneider

concedes

that

Snowden’s demotion from the Leader position “may constitute an
adverse employment action that is sufficient to support a claim
for race discrimination” but argues, “[H]e was removed from the
Leader

position

for

legitimate,

non-discriminatory

reasons

unrelated to his race,” which the Court will consider further

proofreading, and analysis. Many of the assertions could also just
be Snowden’s opinion. For example, Schneider takes umbrage with
Snowden’s assertion that his altercation with Atkinson was the
cause of his demotion years later. To be sure, the Atkinson
incident did not coincide with Snowden’s demotion. However, it is
at least arguable that the Atkinson incident being part of
Snowden’s disciplinary history with Schneider, coupled with his
later actions, led Schneider to demote Snowden. Snowden’s counsel
would serve himself, opposing counsel, and the Court well to take
more care to ensure that what he presents to the Court is factually
supported and accurate. The Court gives Snowden’s counsel the
benefit of the doubt, but many of Snowden’s supposed factual
assertions and the way his counsel has supported arguments with
said assertions give the Court pause. The Court hopes Snowden’s
counsel takes this second chance to heart because the Court may
not be as forgiving if Snowden’s counsel exhibits similar behavior
in the future.
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herein. [DE 32, at 18-19]. The Court agrees that a warning, such
as the Written Reprimand in this case, does not amount to an
adverse employment action. However, a demotion certainly is, and
Schneider agrees with that determination. See [DE 32, at 18-19; DE
45, at 8-9]. Additionally, a Caucasian male replaced Snowden as
Leader, which establishes the fourth prong of the prima facie case,
so

the

Court

need

not

consider

whether

Snowden

was

treated

differently than similarly situated white employees.
Nevertheless,

to

the

extent

Snowden

attempts

to

argue

Phillips treated Walker and Cunningham, who Snowden claims behaved
similarly to him, more favorably than Phillips treated Snowden
because

Walker

and

Cunningham

were

white,

the

argument

is

unpersuasive. See [DE 39, at 7]. “‘[T]o make a comparison of a
discrimination

plaintiff’s

treatment

to

that

of

non-minority

employees, the plaintiff must show that the ‘comparables’ are
similarly-situated in all respects.’” Lewis-Smith v. W. Kentucky
Univ., 85 F. Supp. 3d 885, 899 (W.D. Ky. 2015), aff’d 15-5146 (6th
Cir. Jan. 12, 2016) (citing Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964 F.2d
577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992)). Neither Walker nor Cunningham were
Leaders,

and

workplace,
Phillips

it

while
was

counseled

their

conduct

was

inappropriate

consensual.

Following

the

Walker

Cunningham

to

and

for

the

investigation,
behave

in

an

appropriate manner when they were at work, so they were given a
warning, which is essentially the same punishment Snowden received
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after

his

first

offense,

the

Atkinson

incident.

Walker

and

Cunningham did not receive a Last Chance Agreement, like Snowden,
but

their

alleged

conduct

was

not

as

severe

and

involved

consensual, albeit inappropriate, acts. There is also no evidence
in the record that Walker and Cunningham had a disciplinary
history, and at the time of his demotion, Snowden did. In fact,
prior to Phillips’s warning, there is no evidence that either
Walker or Cunningham had ever been disciplined while working at
Schneider.
Despite being able to meet his burden to show three out of
four of the elements of the prima facie case, Snowden fails to
demonstrate that he was qualified for the position. To demonstrate
that he was qualified for the position of Leader, Snowden must
show that he was performing his job at a level that met Schneider’s
legitimate expectations at the time of his demotion. Robinson v.
Dixie Consumer Prod., LLC, No. 5:09-242-JMH, 2011 WL 1430276, at
*5 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 14, 2011) (citing Vincent v. Brewer Co, 514 F.3d
489, 495 (6th Cir. 2007)). Arguing that Snowden was failing to
meet Schneider’s legitimate expectations when he was removed from
the

Leader

position,

Schneider

states,

“[T]he

Company

had

a

legitimate expectation that its Leaders . . . would comply with
the Company’s Policy Against Sexual Harassment and Other Workplace
Harassment, and Snowden failed to comply with this and other
policies on multiple occasions.” [DE 32, at 19].
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In

Robinson,

this

Court

found

the

plaintiff

failed

to

demonstrate that she met her employer’s legitimate expectations
where “[t]he Code of Conduct clearly set[] out [the employer’s]
expectations for its employees’ behavior, and [the plaintiff] was
repeatedly warned that her behavior violated the Code of Conduct.”
2011 WL 1430276, at *7. Prior to the plaintiff’s termination, the
plaintiff

had

an

incident

that

could

have

resulted

in

her

termination, but she was instead issue a Last Chance Agreement.
Id. A few months later, the plaintiff was issued an oral warning,
which escalated to another written warning when the problematic
behavior continued. Id. After another incident and a contentious
meeting regarding it, the employer found the plaintiff violated
the Code of Conduct and terminated her employment. Id. This Court
found the plaintiff’s repeated failure to comply with the Code of
Conduct,

even

after

receiving

several

warnings,

showed

the

plaintiff failed to meet the employer’s legitimate expectations at
the

time

of

her

termination,

and

the

plaintiff

failed

to

demonstrate otherwise.
Like the plaintiff in Robinson, Snowden received a warning,
in the form of a Last Chance Agreement, prior to his demotion.
Specifically, after the incident where Snowden threatened to kill
Atkinson, Snowden signed a Last Chance Agreement. The incident
with Atkinson coupled with Snowden’s incident with Walker that
resulted in his demotion and True’s comments to Phillips about a
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similar encounter with Snowden show he was not complying with
Schneider’s policies and was, therefore, not meeting Schneider’s
legitimate
demotion,

expectations
it

was

for

revealed

a

Leader.

that

Furthermore,

another

female

after

the

coworker

was

allegedly subjected to Snowden’s inappropriate comments. However,
even without considering True and the other female coworker’s
allegations, the Atkinson and Walker incidents alone show Snowden
was not meeting Schneider’s legitimate expectations, and Snowden
does not meet his burden to show that he was meeting those
expectations. Thus, Snowden fails to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination.
2. NONDISCRIMINATORY REASONS AND PRETEXT
Even if Snowden could meet his initial burden of establishing
a

prima

facie

case,

he

has

failed

to

show

that

Schneider’s

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for demoting him were a
pretext for unlawful discrimination. Schneider asserts that “[i]t
is

undisputed

that

Phillips

removed

Snowden

from

the

Leader

position based on her belief that he had engaged in inappropriate
and unprofessional behavior and violated the Company’s Policy
Against Sexual Harassment and Other Workplace Harassment, and
considering his history of misbehavior.” [DE 32, at 24 (citations
omitted)]. “If an employer has an honest belief in its proffered
nondiscriminatory reason for discharging an employee, the employee
cannot establish that the reason was pretext by showing the
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employer was ultimately incorrect.” Robinson, 2011 WL 1430276, at
*7 (citing Allen v. Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545 F .3d 387, 398 (6th
Cir. 2008)). “‘[T]he key inquiry is whether the employer made a
reasonably
adverse

informed

employment

and

considered

action.’”

Id.

decision
(quoting

before
Martin

taking
v.

an

Toledo

Cardiology Consultants, Inc., 548 F.3d 405, 414 (6th Cir. 2008)).
“‘The employee then has the opportunity to introduce contrary
evidence, but the decisional process need not be optimal, only
reasonably informed and considered.’” Id. (quoting Russell v.
Univ. of Toledo, 537 F.3d 596, 605 (6th Cir. 2008)).
In the present case, Snowden denies that he sexually harassed
Walker,

but

he

fails

to

show

Schneider’s

decision

was

not

reasonably informed and considered. To the contrary, as previously
shown

herein,

Schneider,

namely

Phillips,

conducted

several

interviews with employees, including Snowden, Walker, Cunningham,
and True, before making her determination to remove Snowden from
the Leader position. Not only was Phillips’s decision reasonably
informed and considered, she showed restraint by opting to demote
Snowden instead of terminating his employment despite his earlier
Last Chance Agreement. Regardless of whether Snowden disagrees
with Phillips’s decision or believes the demotion was excessive,
Snowden has not shown Phillips’s decision to be anything other
than an honest belief that he should have been demoted due to his
alleged sexual harassment. Therefore, Snowden has failed to show
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1209

Schneider’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for demoting him
was a pretext for discrimination, and Schneider must be granted
summary judgment on Snowden’s racial discrimination claim.
B. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
Snowden’s hostile work environment claim also lacks a genuine
dispute of material fact and requires summary judgment. In Hafford
v. Seidner, the Sixth Circuit outlined the elements for a prima
facie case of a hostile work environment based on race as follows:
(1) the person was a member of a protected class; (2) the person
was subjected to unwelcomed racial harassment; (3) the harassment
was based on race; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with
the

person’s

work

performance

by

creating

an

intimidating,

hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) the employer is
liable. 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir. 1999).
As previously stated herein, there is no dispute that Snowden
is a member of a protected class. On the contrary, whether Snowden
was

subjected

occurrences

to

that

any

harassment

could

is

potentially

contested.
be

The

construed

only
as

two

racial

harassment were the paper cone incident and an earlier incident
where Snowden thought Atkinson used a racial slur. Schneider found
the paper cone incident to not be racially motivated, and Snowden’s
black coworkers who were present for the incident did not perceive
it as such. See [DE 32-3, at 99; DE 32-4, at 9-10]. Snowden
initially claimed that Jones may have said something while the
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1210

paper cone was on his head, but Snowden later stated in his
deposition that he did not hear what Jones said. [DE 32-3, at 8687]. Similarly, Snowden originally asserted that he threatened to
kill Atkinson because he called Snowden a “nigger,” but during
Snowden’s deposition, he admitted that he could not swear that
Atkinson said the word. See [DE 32, at 5; DE 32-3, at 39; DE 39,
at 2]. Despite finding Snowden’s claims about Jones and Atkinson
to be exaggerated or not as he perceived them, Schneider counseled
both Jones and Atkinson about their behavior. [DE 32-4, at 9-10;
DE 32, at 6 (citing [DE 32-4, at 106-110; DE 32-5, at 4-5, 8589])].
By construing the facts most favorably to Snowden, the nonmoving party, and ignoring Snowden’s own uncertainty about whether
Jones or Atkinson said anything racist, the two acts could be
considered instances of unwelcomed racial harassment. However, as
Schneider correctly asserts, “Even if Atkinson called Snowden a
‘Nigger’ as he alleges, a single remark by a co-worker nearly seven
years ago is time barred by the 5-year statute of limitations under
the KCRA and cannot establish actionable harassment.” [DE 45, at
17]; see also Scott v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. CV
5:19-412-DCR, 2019 WL 5967950, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 13, 2019)
(quoting Ammerman v. Bd. of Educ., 30 S.W.3d 793, 798 (Ky. 2000)
(“Under the KCRA, ‘[c]ivil rights claims are governed by the fiveyear

statute

of

limitations

provided
19

in

KRS

413.120(2)).”

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Regardless of the claims regarding Atkinson’s alleged use of a
racial slur being time-barred, the hostile work environment claim
fails on the fourth prong, as Snowden has shown no evidence
indicating that the harassment was so severe that it interfered
with his work performance.
To meet the fourth prong, a plaintiff must show that there
was conduct “‘severe or pervasive enough to create an environment
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive and the
victim must subjectively regard the environment as abusive.’”
Handshoe v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 34 F. App’x 441, 448 (6th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 463 (6th
Cir.

2000)).

“[T]he

hostile

work

environment

‘must

be

both

objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in
fact did perceive to be so.’” Lindsey v. Whirlpool Corp. 295 F.
App’x. 758, 766 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998)). In determining whether harassment
was severe and pervasive, the Court, looking at the totality of
the circumstances, must consider the following factors: “‘the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it
is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance;

and

whether

it

unreasonably

employee's

work

performance.’”

Handshoe,

interferes
34

F.

App’x

with

an

at

448

(quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
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Here, Snowden cites Robinson v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc.,
No. 1:06-CV-371, 2007 WL 2948869 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2007) to
support

his

position

that

“[r]epeated,

though

infrequent,

instances of racial slurs and imagery are sufficient to create a
hostile work environment.” [DE 39, at 9]. However, there are stark
differences between Robinson and the present case.
In Robinson, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio found that a reasonable juror could find that
workers at a Coca-Cola plant were subjected to a racially hostile
work environment. Robinson, 2007 WL 2948869, at *14. The Robinson
plaintiffs

alleged

incidents

of

physical

assault

while

being

subjected to the repeated use of racial slurs, supervisors favoring
white

employees

while

scolding

black

employees

for

the

same

behavior, and incidents of racist graffiti being written in the
bathroom. Id. at 1-5. White supervisors allegedly mocked black
workers, used racial slurs, and turned the other way while white
employees harassed the black plaintiffs. Id.
The alleged work environment in Robinson is a world apart
from the one Snowden alleges existed at Schneider, in which a
single employee, Jones, put a white paper cone on his head, Jones
and Atkinson may have said something racist that Snowden could not
confirm he heard and no other employee could corroborate, and both
Jones

and

Atkinson

were

counseled

by

HR

to

behave

more

professionally in the future. Concerning the paper cone incident
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1213

with Jones, Snowden went so far as to admit that he could not hear
what he thought Jones said. [DE 32-3, at 86-87]. At best, Snowden,
considering the paper cone incident to be racially motivated,
appears to assume that if Jones said something, it was racist.
This is an unreasonable inference, unsupported by the testimony of
Snowden and other black employees present at the paper cone
incident, and the Court will not allow Snowden to use it in his
favor.
Without any evidence that Jones actually said anything, the
Court is left with nothing more than Snowden’s belief, which was
not shared by any other black employee present for the incident,
that Jones placing a paper cone on his head was racist and not
just a juvenile, unprofessional act. Snowden may satisfy the
subjective component of the fourth element because he perceived
the paper cone incident to be racist, but he has failed to show
that a reasonable person would find the incident hostile or
abusive. See Lindsey, 295 F. App’x at 766 (quoting Faragher, 524
U.S. at 787. There is no evidence suggesting the paper cone
incident was intended as an act of racial hostility, so the Court
is unable to consider the paper cone incident as severe. See
Lindsey, 295 F. App’x. at 766 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788
(“The harassment ‘must be extreme to amount to a change in the
terms and conditions of employment’. . .‘[S]imple teasing, offhand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will
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1214

not amount to discriminatory changes in terms and conditions of
employment.’”)); see also Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d
502, 517 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco
Corp., 112 F.3d 710, 716 (3d Cir. 1997)
as

squinting

and

shaking

one’s

(“‘[M]ute gestures’ such

fists

‘cannot

itself

be

characterized as particularly severe.’”)).
Even if the paper cone incident and the confrontation with
Atkinson, were assumed to be acts of racial hostility, the fact
that they were two infrequent events separated by several years,
both of which HR intervened in and attempted to remedy, precludes
the

Court

from

finding

that

these

incidents

are

enough

to

constitute severe and pervasive harassment. Moreover, Snowden
fails to show that the incidents involving Jones and Atkinson
negatively affected his work performance. If anything, the record
shows that any disruption following the incidents was caused by
Snowden’s

behavior.

Therefore,

the

Court

will

grant

summary

judgment on Snowden’s hostile work environment claim.
C. CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
“To demonstrate constructive discharge, a plaintiff must
adduce evidence to show that (1) ‘the employer . . . deliberately
create[d]

intolerable

working

conditions,

as

perceived

by

a

reasonable person,’ (2) the employer did so ‘with the intention of
forcing the employee to quit,’ and (3) ‘the employee . . . actually
quit.’” Goldfaden v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 482 F. App'x 44, 48 (6th
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1215

Cir. 2012) (quoting Moore v. KUKA Welding Sys. & Robot Corp., 171
F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999)). “‘To determine if there is a
constructive

discharge,

both

the

employer's

intent

and

the

employee's objective feelings must be examined.’” Id. “Intent can
be

shown

by

demonstrating

that

quitting

was

a

foreseeable

consequence of the employer's actions.” Goldfaden, 482 F. App'x at
48.
In the present case, there is no indication that Schneider
had any intent to force Snowden to quit. In fact, given Snowden’s
disciplinary record, it appears that Schneider was working quite
hard to keep Snowden employed. After the Walker incident, even
though Snowden had a Last Chance Agreement, Schneider demoted him
instead of terminating his employment. Snowden attempts to compare
his case to Scott v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 160 F.3d 1121
(6th Cir. 1998) in which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
found the doctrine of constructive discharge applied because the
plaintiff had “‘no definite prospect of continued employment with
the company.’” [DE 39, at 11 (quoting Scott, 160 F.3d at 1128)].
However, Snowden’s demotion does not indicate that he had no
prospect of continuing to be employed by Schneider. He was no
longer a Line Leader, but there is no indication in the record
that Snowden’s position as an Assembler was threatened or that a
demotion

would

foreseeably

lead

Snowden

to

resign.

Snowden’s

suspension while his remarks regarding Schneider being on the news
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1216

also fails to allude to him having no prospects of continued
employment, especially when the Court considers the fact that his
suspension

after

the

Atkinson

incident

did

not

lead

to

his

termination.
Furthermore, Snowden’s constructive discharge claim, like his
hostile work environment claim, fails because has not shown that
Schneider deliberately created intolerable working conditions, as
perceived by a reasonable person. Snowden may have subjectively
perceived

his

working

conditions

as

such,

but

as

has

been

repeatedly shown herein, his black coworkers did not agree with
his perception, and they certainly did not find the conditions so
appalling that they resigned. Accordingly, the Court will grant
summary judgment on Snowden’s constructive discharge claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, each of Snowden’s claims against
Schneider should be dismissed. Accordingly, having considered the
matter fully, and being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS ORDERED as follows:
(1)

Defendant

Schneider

Electric

USA,

Inc.’s

Motion

for

Summary Judgment [DE 31] is GRANTED;
(2) Schneider’s Reply [DE 45], insofar as it requests that
the Court impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11, is DENIED;
(3) This matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
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1217

(4) This is a final and appealable order.
This 14th day of October, 2020.

26