Guyn v. Wal-Mart Stores East, Limited Partnership et al

Filing 76

OPINION & ORDER: 1. the motions for summary judgment ( 60 , 61 , 62 ) filed by the defendants are GRANTED; and 2. judgment will be entered in favor of the defendants. Signed by Judge Karen K. Caldwell on 3/10/2025. (KMP) cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION LEXINGTON
GE’LAWN RAKEEM GUYN,
Plaintiff,
V.
WALMART STORES EAST, LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 5:22-CV-332-KKC-MAS

OPINION AND ORDER

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This matter is before the Court on the motions for summary judgment filed by all three
defendants (R. 60, 61, 62). For the following reasons, the Court will grant the motions.
I.

Background

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment if, under the undisputed facts and the
plaintiff's version of any material disputed facts, defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Davenport v. Causey, 521 F.3d 544, 546 (6th Cir. 2008); Rimco, Inc. v.
Dual-Tech, Inc., No. 3:21-CV-313, 2022 WL 4545608, at *1, n.1 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2022) (“As
required, this Court accepts undisputed facts as true. In deciding a motion for summary judgment
as to which the parties dispute any material facts, the Court must view the disputed evidence in the
light most favorable to the party responding to the motion—here, Plaintiff—and draw all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor.”)
Accordingly, for purposes of these motions, the Court has considered the material facts
that the parties agree to and has considered the plaintiff's version of any material facts that the
parties dispute.

Plaintiff Ge’Lawn Rakeem Guyn worked for a retail store owned by defendant Walmart
Stores East, Limited Partnership located in Georgetown, Kentucky. (R. 60-1 Walmart Record.) He
worked as a stocker in the grocery department on the third shift (10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.). (R. 1
Complaint ¶ 11.) Guyn asserts that he began working there on September 11, 2021 as a temporary
employee and he was initially paid by the temporary agency that placed him there. (R. 60-4 Guyn
Note.) Walmart has submitted evidence that it hired Guyn on October 7, 2021, and he was
terminated on January 1, 2022. (R. 60-1 Walmart Record.)
Guyn is an African American male and is also Muslim. His direct supervisors at Walmart
were defendants Phillip Spitznagel and Kenneth Newsome. Spitznagel was not transferred to
Guyn’s shift until November 6, 2021. (R. 60 Walmart Mem. 4; R. 60-5 Record.) Guyn alleges that
Spitznagel and Newsome discriminated against him during his employment because of his race
and religion by, for example, making discriminatory comments and jokes and by monitoring him
more closely than other employees.
He testified that Newsome told him he had to stock a certain aisle because it contained a
large quantity of bacon and that Guyn would have to do so by himself because he was black. (DE
69-1 Guyn Dep. 59.) He also testified that Newsome told him multiple times that, “if it was back
in the day, we would take you for a ride . . . for not cooperating and doing as you’re told.” (DE 691 Guyn Dep. 63.) Guyn testified that, after Spitznagle was assigned the same shift as Guyn, he
“joined in” with Newsome. (DE 69-1 Guyn Dep. 59.)
Guyn testified that Newsome terminated him after he complained to store manager Joey
Allen. He then filed this action naming Walmart, Spitznagel, and Newsome as defendants. He
asserts that they retaliated against him for complaining about racial discrimination and that such

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retaliation violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981. He also asserts a retaliation claim under the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act against Walmart only.
All three defendants move for summary judgment in their favor.
II.

Analysis

Section 1981 provides that all persons have the right to “the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a). “To prevail on a section 1981 claim, a litigant must prove intentional
discrimination on the basis of race, which involves a high threshold of proof.” Chapman v. Higbee
Co., 319 F.3d 825, 832–33 (6th Cir.2003). Other types of discrimination, such as discrimination
on the basis of religious affiliation, are not actionable under the statute. Saint Francis Coll. v. Al–
Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976).
Section 1981 also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for opposing
racial discrimination. Herrera v. Churchill McGee, LLC, 545 F. App'x 499, 500–01 (6th Cir. 2013)
(citing CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 454–55 (2008)). To establish a prima facie
case of retaliation, a plaintiff must present evidence that (1) he engaged in protected activity, (2)
the activity was known to the defendant, (3) the plaintiff was subjected to a materially adverse
action, and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.
Harris v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 594 F.3d 476, 485 (6th Cir. 2010).
Upon this showing, the defendant must articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its action.
Id. If the defendant does so, the plaintiff then must show that the proffered reason was a pretext
for retaliation. Id.

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As both parties agree, the Court must analyze the KCRA retaliation claim under the same
burden-shifting framework applicable to § 1981 retaliation claims. See Blount v. Stanley Eng'g
Fastening, 55 F.4th 504, 514 (6th Cir. 2022).
A. Prima Facie Case
“The burden of establishing a prima facie case in a retaliation action is not onerous, but
one easily met.” Taylor v. Geithner, 703 F.3d 328, 336 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
As to evidence that Guyn engaged in “protected activity,” he testified that he verbally
complained to store manager Joey Allen at least twice about Spitznagel and Newsome. He is not
certain when those conversations occurred but thinks they occurred before Black Friday in
November 2021. (DE 69-1 Guyn Dep. 93, 97.) He testified that he told Allen how “they were
harassing me, saying black jokes, discriminatory jokes, comments.” (DE 69-1 Guyn Dep. 94; see
also 100-01, 177.) He also testified that he told Allen that Spitznagel and Newsome, who assigned
staff to stock each aisle, did not staff anyone to help Guyn stock the two aisles he was assigned.
(DE 69-1 Guyn Dep. 94-95.) He testified that he told Allen that all other employees had assistance
stocking their aisles and the reason he was being treated differently was because he was black.
(DE 69-1 Guyn Dep. 94-95.) He testified that he also told Allen about the “racial jokes” by
Newsome. (DE 69-1 Guyn Dep. 178.)
Further, in its response to Plaintiff’s request for admissions, Walmart admits that “Plaintiff
verbally complained to Store Manager Joey Allen of alleged harassment and/or discrimination at
Walmart Store #571 on one or more occasions during his employment at Walmart, though the
specific dates of the alleged verbal complaints are presently unknown.” (R. 69-3 Admissions.)
Walmart made similar admissions in its answer to the complaint. (R. 13 Answer ¶¶ 17, 23, 26.) In
these admissions, Walmart did not identify what kind of discrimination Guyn complained of but,

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given that this is a § 1981 action, it could be inferred that Walmart would have clarified in its
admissions that Guyn’s complaints of discrimination did not include racial discrimination if that
were the case.
Finally, in a December 7, 2021 report, Allen stated, “I have an overnight associate Gelawn
Guyn, he is claiming racial discrimination, sexual comments and aggression against the overnight
coach Phillip Spitznagel.” (R. 65 Ethics Case Management Details; R. 69-2 Allen Dep. 118)
(emphasis added). The defendants point out that Guyn’s complaint that prompted this report did
not mention racial discrimination. Instead, Guyn complained that, on November 26, 2021,
Spitznagel “forcefully smack[ed]” him on the shoulder and told Guyn to come to his office. Guyn
stated he refused and told Spitznagle, that, if he ever hit Guyn again, Guyn would “return the hit.”
He also stated that Spitznagel had “repeatedly made sexual gestures and comments that are very
uncomfortable.” (R. 60-6.)
Nevertheless, Allen’s report specifically stated that Guyn had complained of racial
discrimination. This is sufficient evidence from which a juror could infer that, prior to his
termination, Guyn complained of racial discrimination in the workplace.
As to Walmart’s knowledge of the complaint, Allen reported Guyn’s complaints, including
his complaints of racial discrimination, through Walmart’s Ethics Case Management Service. (R.
65 Ethics Case Management Report.) This is sufficient evidence that Walmart was aware of
Guyn’s complaint of racial discrimination. As to Newsome and Spitznagle, they both denied that
Allen told them about any racial discrimination complaints by Guyn. However, in his December
7, 2021 report, in which Allen asserts that Guyn was “claiming racial discrimination,” Allen also
stated he had taken statements from Spitznagel and Newsome. A juror could infer from this that
Allen told Newsome and Spitznagle about racial discrimination complaints.

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As to whether Guyn suffered an adverse employment action, being fired qualifies. Univ.
Hosps. Cleveland Med. Ctr., 833 F. App'x 605 (6th Cir. 2020). Guyn also asserts after his
complaints of discrimination, the jokes and harassment by Spitznagle and Newsome increased.
(DE 69-1 Guyn Dep. 97.) While disturbing if true, these actions do not qualify as adverse
employment actions. Adverse employment actions are typically marked by a “significant change
in employment status, including hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” O'Donnell v.
Univ. Hosps. Cleveland Med. Ctr., 833 F. App'x 605, 620 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotations and
citation omitted). Guyn has not alleged that any actions by the defendants caused a significant
change in his employment status other than his termination.
There is no evidence, however, that Spitznagle had any role in Guyn’s termination.
Accordingly, the Court must enter judgment in his favor on the § 1981 claim against him.
As to the causal connection between the complaint and termination, “Where an adverse
employment action occurs very close in time after an employer learns of a protected activity, such
temporal proximity alone may satisfy the causal prong of a plaintiff's prima facie retaliation case.”
Herrera, LLC, 545 F. App'x at 501 (internal quotations and citation omitted). In Herrera, the
plaintiff last complained of discrimination in February 2008 and was fired on March 22, 2008. The
court determined this “a sufficiently close temporal proximity to allow us to make an inference of
causation.” Id. at 502. In support of that finding, the court cited other Sixth Circuit cases holding
that a time period as long as three months between the complaint and adverse employment action
was sufficiently close in time to permit an inference of causation.
Here, there is no evidence as to the precise date when Guyn first complained to Allen of
racial discrimination. However, Allen filed the report on December 7, 2021 stating that Guyn had

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complained of racial discrimination and that Allen had taken a statement from Newsome. Guyn
was fired less than a month later. The time period between the two events is sufficiently short that
a jury could infer that the first event caused the second.
Citing Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., Inc., 757 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2014), Newsome
argues that “temporal proximity, standing alone, is not sufficient evidence to meet the causation
requirement.” (R. 73 Reply 9.) In that case, however, the Sixth Circuit explicitly stated, “we have
held that temporal proximity alone can be enough.” Id. at 505. There, the court explained that,
where an employer previously contemplated an adverse action like termination before the
employee makes a discrimination complaint, then courts must “analyze the evidence of how and
when the adverse employment action occurred to determine whether it squares with the action
previously contemplated. If it does, then temporal proximity is not evidence of causality, but if the
adverse employment action is unlike the action previously contemplated or does not occur on the
schedule previously laid out, then the temporal proximity of the adverse action to the protected
conduct is certainly evidence of causation.” Id. at 507. While there is ample evidence as described
below that, in his short tenure at Walmart, Guyn’s supervisors had multiple issues with his work
performance and attitude, neither Walmart nor Newsome cite any evidence that they contemplated
firing him until Newsome did so on January 1, 2022.
Accordingly, Guyn has presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation against Walmart and Newsome. He has not, however, established a prima facie case of
retaliation against Spitznagle.
B. Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason
Walmart and Newsome argue that it had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for firing
Guyn: his poor work performance and attitude at work. They cite the following evidence:

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October 26, 2021 – Travis Hawk, Guyn’s initial supervisor, recorded in a
disciplinary action that he told Guyn what the expected stocking times for his aisle
were. Hawk stated that Guyn argued with and ignored him when Hawk tried to
give him direction (R. 60-2; R. 61-3.)

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November 26, 2021 – Spitznagel approached Guyn to tell him he was taking too
long to stock shelves. (R. 60-17 Spitznagel Dep. 43-44.) He found Guyn on his cell
phone while working in violation of Walmart policy. Guyn “proceeded to berate”
Spitznagel and yell at him when Spitznagle directed Guyn to come to his office.
(R. 60-17 Spitznagel Dep. 45-46.) Employee Eva Mullins, who witnessed the
event, stated in a December 1, 2021 note to Allen that Guyn refused to go to the
office with Spitznagel despite Spitznagel’s repeated requests that he do so. (R. 609 Mullins’ Statement.)

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December 6, 2021 – Spitznagel recorded in a disciplinary action that Guyn’s
performance in recent weeks had “gone down” and that his “attitude towards work
has done major impacts to the team production time and has rubbed off on others.”
Spitznagel stated that Guyn left work on December 5 at 7:00 a.m. without
straightening the aisles or contacting Newsome or Spitznagel. (R. 60-3; 61-7.)

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December 21, 2021 – Newsome completed a statement asserting that Guyn
checked in for work at 10:06 p.m. but Newsome did not see him in his aisle until
11:00 p.m. When Newsome asked Guyn where he had been, he responded that he
was in the restroom and that, “if we wanted to go in and smell his ‘shit’ we could.”
(R. 60-12 Statement.)

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Newsome testified that he brought Guyn into his office multiple times to talk about
his job performance, specifically his “not getting the aisles done . . . in the way
they needed to be done” and not “straightening up” the aisles. He testified that
another issue was Guyn’s “poor attitude.” (R. 60-16 Dep. 44.)

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Store manager Joey Allen testified that he received complaints of Guyn taking
“excessive breaks” and that Guyn would work out on an ab rolling machine in the
store when he was supposed to be stocking his aisle. (R. 60-14 Dep. 132.)

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January 1, 2022 – Newsome called Guyn into his office to talk with him about his
job performance. Newsome testified that Guyn “should have had the aisle done
and he didn’t. . . I don’t even believe it was halfway done.” Guyn refused to talk
to Newsome, who terminated Guyn that night. (DE 60-16 Newsome Dep. 47-48.)

This is sufficient evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Guyn’s
termination.
C. Evidence of Pretext
Thus, to defeat summary judgment, Guyn must point to evidence that Walmart did not
really fire Guyn for poor work performance and attitude but, instead, because he complained of
racial discrimination. On summary judgment, he need only produce enough evidence to rebut the
defendant's proffered reason for his termination. Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584, 593 (6th Cir.
2012). To do this, he must point to evidence “that his employer's proffered reason was false and
that retaliation was the real reason for the adverse action.” Herrera, 545 F. App'x at 503. “A
plaintiff may prove a reason false by showing that it (1) had no basis in fact, (2) did not actually
motivate the employer's action, or (3) was insufficient to motivate the employer's action.” Id.

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“The first type of showing is easily recognizable and consists of evidence that the proffered
bases for the plaintiff's discharge never happened, i.e., that they are ‘factually false.’” Manzer v.
Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994), overruled on other
grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
“The third showing is also easily recognizable and, ordinarily, consists of evidence that
other employees, particularly employees not in the protected class, were not fired even though they
engaged in substantially identical conduct to that which the employer contends motivated its
discharge of the plaintiff.” Id.
“The second showing, however, is of an entirely different ilk.” Id.
There, the plaintiff admits the factual basis underlying the
employer's proffered explanation and further admits that
such conduct could motivate dismissal. The plaintiff's attack
on the credibility of the proffered explanation is, instead, an
indirect one. In such cases, the plaintiff attempts to indict the
credibility of his employer's explanation by showing
circumstances which tend to prove that an illegal motivation
was more likely than that offered by the defendant. In other
words, the plaintiff argues that the sheer weight of the
circumstantial evidence of [retaliation] makes it “more likely
than not” that the employer's explanation is a pretext, or
coverup.
Id. For this type of rebuttal, “the plaintiff may not rely simply upon his prima facie evidence but
must, instead, introduce additional evidence” of retaliation. Id
In his response, Guyn points to four kinds of evidence he relies on to prove pretext.
First, Guyn points to Newsome’s testimony that, the night he terminated Guyn, he told
Guyn, “If you can’t respond to what I’m saying to you, then you’re terminated tonight.” (DE 694 Newsome Dep. 42.) Here, Guyn seems to argue that Newsome’s testimony indicates that his
work performance and attitude did not actually motivate Newsome to fire him. Instead, it indicates
that Newsome fired him because Guyn would not talk to him. Even if this were evidence that
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Newsome fired Guyn for not talking to him, it is not evidence that Newsome fired him in retaliation
for complaints of racial discrimination.
More importantly, however, Newsome made this statement to Guyn only after telling him,
“We’ve had a lot of conversations about your performance. . . as far as stocking speed, getting the
. . . aisle done . . . with no improvements.” (DE 69-4 Newsome Dep. 41.) He also told Guyn,
“You’ve had a very poor attitude with everything going on when I’ve approached you . . . and
talked to you about it.” (DE 69-4 Newsome Dep. 41-42.) It was only after explaining this to Guyn
that Newsome told him if he would not respond to him regarding the issues with his job
performance, then he was terminated. A juror could not infer from this testimony that Guyn’s work
performance did not actually motivate Newsome to fire Guyn.
The second kind of evidence that Guyn relies on to prove pretext is that Walmart has not
produced emails between Allen, Newsome, and Spitznagel documenting any issues with his work
performance and attitude. With this argument, Guyn appears to contest whether any of the
instances of poor work performance and attitude that Walmart relies on occurred. The Court has
outlined above, however, the evidence that Walmart has produced documenting that Guyn’s
supervisors had issues with his work performance and attitude. While this evidence may not consist
of emails, it is nonetheless evidence that Guyn’s supervisors had issues with his work performance
and attitude and that they discussed those issues with Guyn on multiple occasions.
The third kind of evidence Guyn relies on to prove pretext is what he argues was a failure
by Allen and Walmart to investigate his complaints of racial discrimination. The records show,
however, that Allen did conduct an investigation of Guyn’s only written complaint in the record,
which was the December 1, 2021 statement. In his December 7, 2021 report, Allen explained:
I have collected statements from Gelawn, Phillip Spitznagel
the overnight coach, Kenneth Newsome Cap 3 Team Lead
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and Eva Mullins overnight Coach. Gelawn is claiming that
Phillip was yelling his name from the end of the aisle trying
to get his attention in an aggressive tone, the witness
statement that I got from Eva is that Phillip asked him
multiple times to come to the office to have a conversation
about the fact the Gelawn should of been zoning but was
watching TicTok. As Phillip approached Gelawn, Gelawn
got into Phillips face and stated that he would beat him up.
Gelawn in his own statement stated that he did say he would
beat him up. In another instance Gelawn states that Phillip
made a comment after Gelawn said that his jaw hurt that he
needed to zip up his pants. Kenneth was a witness to this
conversation and stated that that was not said.
(R. 65 Report.)
Emails indicate that the investigation continued at the Walmart Global Ethics &
Compliance department at corporate headquarters, but that the staff was unable to obtain more
information because both Spitznagle and Guyn had been terminated and, thus, the case was closed.
(R. 66 Emails.).
It is true that the investigation does not seem to have included complaints of racial
discrimination, but, as discussed, in his only written complaint, Guyn did not complain of racial
discrimination.
Moreover, to the extent that Walmart’s investigation could have been more thorough or
efficient, that is not the issue in this case. The issue is whether Walmart’s investigation provides
evidence that Newsome fired Guyn in retaliation for his complaints of racial discrimination.
Nothing about how the investigation was handled or its findings indicate that.
Finally, for his pretext argument Guyn argues that Walmart did not obtain testimony from
Tyler Newsome (no relation to defendant Newsome), a Walmart employee who was in the office
when Newsome terminated Guyn. Guyn argues that this omission could be construed “as evidence
that Tyler Newsome would not testify in a manner favorable to any Defendant in this matter” and

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“makes Walmart’s proffered reasons seem pretextual.” (R. 69 Response 22.) A juror could not
infer from Walmart’s failure to obtain testimony from Tyler Newsome that Walmart terminated
Guyn for making complaints of racial discrimination. Tyler no longer works for Walmart, and
there is no evidence that he knew anything about the reasons for Guyn’s termination.
III.

Conclusion

For all these reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
1) the motions for summary judgment (R. 60, 61, 62) filed by the defendants are
GRANTED; and
2) judgment will be entered in favor of the defendants.
This 10th day of March, 2025.

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