Lyons v. SSA

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1. B.L.'s Motion for Summary Judgemnt 8 is DENIED; and 2. JUDGMENT in favor of the Commissioner will be entered contemporaneously herewith. Signed by Judge Gregory F. VanTatenhove on 3/7/2025. (KMP) cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
LEXINGTON
B.L.,

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Plaintiff,
v.
LELAND DUDEK, Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.

Case No. 5:24-cv-00080-GFVT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
&
ORDER

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Plaintiff B.L. seeks judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner
of Social Security’s (“Commissioner”) administrative decision denying his application for
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). 1 For the
reasons stated below, the Court will DENY B.L.’s Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 8] and
GRANT that of the Commissioner [R. 10].
I
B.L. filed his application for benefits on August 19, 2021. [R. 8 at 1.] His application
was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. B.L. then submitted a written request for a
hearing. Id. Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Greg Holsclaw conducted a hearing on January
10, 2023. Id. B.L. alleges disability due to a number of impairments. [See R. 5-2 at 30.] He
suffers from psychogenic seizures, diabetes, obesity, depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic
stress disorder with dissociative symptoms. See id.

The claimant’s initials are used in lieu of their name to protect their sensitive medical information contained
throughout the Memorandum Opinion and Order.
1

In evaluating a claim of disability, the ALJ conducts a five-step analysis. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520. 2 First, if a claimant is performing a substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, if a claimant does not have any impairment or combination of
impairments which significantly limit his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,
then he does not have a severe impairment and is not “disabled” as defined by the regulations.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Third, if a claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the
impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, he is “disabled.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(d). Before moving to the fourth step, the ALJ must use all the relevant evidence in the
record to determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC), which assesses an
individual’s ability to perform certain physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis
despite any impairments experienced by the individual. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545. Fourth, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has the RFC to perform the
requirements of his past relevant work, and if a claimant’s impairments do not prevent him from
doing past relevant work, he is not “disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The plaintiff has the
ultimate burden of proving compliance with the first four steps. Kyle v. Comm'r Of Soc. Sec.,
609 F.3d 847, 855 (6th Cir. 2010). Fifth, if a claimant’s impairments (considering his RFC, age,

2

The Sixth Circuit summarized this process in Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 2003):
To determine if a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act, the ALJ employs a five-step
inquiry defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Through step four, the claimant bears the burden of
proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and the fact that she is
precluded from performing her past relevant work, but at step five of the inquiry, which is the focus
of this case, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to identify a significant number of jobs in the
economy that accommodate the claimant’s residual functional capacity (determined at step four)
and vocational profile.

Id. at 474 (internal citations omitted).

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education, and past work) prevent him from doing other work that exists in the national
economy, he is “disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
In this case, the ALJ issued his written decision on February 28, 2023. [R. 5-2 at 39.] At
Step 1, the ALJ found that B.L. has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 2,
2021. [R. 5-2 at 30.] At Step 2, the ALJ found that B.L. had the following severe impairments:
“psychogenic seizures, diabetes, obesity, depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder
with dissociative symptoms.” Id. At Step 3, the ALJ concluded that B.L. did not have an
“impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR §§ 404.1520(d),
404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926),” so his analysis continued to the next
step. Id. At Step 4, the ALJ concluded that B.L. has an RFC to “perform less than light work”
subject to certain non-exertional limitations. Id. at 32. Those limitations are:
no lifting/carrying more than 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently; no
standing/walking more than six hours out of an eight-hour day; no sitting more
than six hours out of an eight-hour day; can do unlimited pushing/pulling up to
the exertional limitations; no more than frequent balancing, no more than
occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling or climbing ramps or stairs,
but no climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds; no work in areas of concentrated
dusts, fumes, gases or other pulmonary irritants; no work in sound environments
that are more than moderately loud (with the term "moderate" used here as
defined in the Selected Characteristics of Occupations); no work in areas of
concentrated full body vibration; no work around dangerous, moving machinery
or unprotected heights; can understand, remember and carry out simple
instructions; no more than occasional interaction with co-workers, supervisors,
and the general public; no more than occasional changes in the workplace setting.
Id. Finally, at Step 5, the ALJ found that after “[c]onsidering the claimant’s age, education,
work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers
in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” Id. at 38. As a result, he concluded that

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B.L. was not disabled. Id. at 39. The Appeals Council found no reason for review. [R. 1-1 at 2.]
B.L. now seeks judicial review in this Court.
II
This Court’s review is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the ALJ’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611,
614 (6th Cir. 2003); Shelman v. Heckler, 821 F.2d 316, 319-20 (6th Cir. 1987). “Substantial
evidence” is “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Cutlip v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). The substantial evidence standard “presupposes that there is a zone
of choice within which [administrative] decisionmakers can go either way, without interference
by the courts.” Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (quoting Baker v.
Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984)).
In determining the existence of substantial evidence, courts must examine the record as a
whole. Cutlip, 25 F.3d at 286 (citing Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535
(6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983)). However, a reviewing court may not
conduct a de novo review, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or make credibility determinations.
Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 709, 713 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); see also
Bradley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 862 F.2d 1224, 1228 (6th Cir. 1988). Rather, if the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed even if the
reviewing court would decide the matter differently and even if substantial evidence also
supports the opposite conclusion. See Ulman, 693 F.3d at 714; Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506,
509 (6th Cir. 2007); Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999).
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A
B.L. first argues that ALJ did not afford appropriate weight to medical opinions in
assigning the RCF. B.L. attended an examination with Dr. Marcella Ramsey. [R. 5-7 at 338.]
Dr. Ramsey, the treating provider, concluded that B.L.’s condition caused difficultly in making
work-related decisions, working around others, performing at a consistent pace, responding to
changes in a work routine, and dealing with stress. Id. at 340. Dr. Ramsey also noted that B.L.
would be off-task at least 25% of the day and take off more than 4 days of work per month. Id.
at 341. Specifically, B.L. argued that the ALJ incorrectly deemed Dr. Ramsey’s opinion to be
unpersuasive. [R. 8 at 13.] The ALJ summarized Dr. Ramsey’s opinion as follows:
Marcella Ramsey, LPCC, a treating provider, opined that the claimant had marked
restrictions making simple work-related decisions, working around others, performing at
a consistent pace, responding to changes in a routine work setting, dealing with normal
stress, and remembering work-like procedures; he would be off-task 25% of the day; and
he would miss more than 4 days of work per month (7F). Ms. Ramsey’s opinion is
inconsistent with her own exam findings. She noted that the claimant was making
moderate or adequate improvement with treatment (9F, 69, 146). The claimant was
cooperative and maintained good eye contact (9F, 23, 68, 92, 99, 157). His thoughts were
goal directed and reality based, or she noted no thought abnormalities such as racing,
illogical, or incoherent thoughts (9F, 23, 68, 92, 99, 157, 227). He was negative for
perceptional and psychotic disturbances (9F, 23, 93, 158, 202). He denied suicidal
ideation and was not at risk to himself (9F, 23, 206, 233). She noted no cognitive
impairments, including no impairment in memory, concentration, judgment, and insight
(9F, 68, 99, 117, 157, 227). He possessed a normal and euthymic mood and affect (9F,
68, 139, 145, 157). He was alert and oriented to person, place, and time (9F, 74, 80, 92,
99). In March 2022, he reported that he had recently gone out with a friend and had been
playing games online (9F, 241). Accordingly, the undersigned finds this opinion
unpersuasive.
[R. 5-2 at 37.] Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2), a medical source’s opinion on the issues of
the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments is given controlling weight only if it is “wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and is “not

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inconsistent with other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).
B.L. argues that the ALJ, in finding Dr. Ramsey’s opinion unpersuasive, relied primarily
on the opinions of Dr. Cornett, another MHCC provider. [R. 8 at 14.] The Court, however, finds
that the ALJ adequately considered Dr. Ramsey’s own examination findings, as well as the
findings of Dr. Cornett in reaching the conclusion that Dr. Ramsey’s opinion was inconsistent
both with her own findings and others’ medical findings. The ALJ explained that the opinion is
not well supported because it is inconsistent with the other evidence. Some examples include
that B.L. was able to “answer questions and follow commands,” as well as demonstrate “normal
fine motor skills.” [R. 5-2 at 30.] Further, the ALJ deemed the state agency determinations,
which rejected B.L.’s severe limitations, to be more persuasive. Id. One determination
described B.L.’s limitations to be “no more than mild mental restrictions.” Id. at 36. Another
initial determination from a mental residual functional capacity assessment found as follows:

Id.

[T]he claimant had moderate limitations in all areas of mental functioning that
restricted him to simple instructions and procedures requiring brief initial learning
periods (usually 30 days or less); sustaining concentration, persistence, or pace for
simple tasks requiring little independent judgment and involving minimal
variations and doing so at requisite schedules of work and breaks, including 2hour time blocks; frequent interaction with supervisors and peers but no more
than occasional contact with the public; and adapting to situational conditions and
changes with reasonable support and structure
In Eckert v. O’Malley, which the Plaintiff relies heavily on, the court remanded the case

back to the SSA. Eckert v. O’Malley, No. 5:22-CV-00316-MAS, 2024 WL 841765, at *5 (E.D.
Ky. Feb. 28, 2024). However, Eckert is distinguishable because the Eckert ALJ’s details
“regarding the objective medical evidence . . . [were] . . . located earlier in the ALJ’s decision
rather than in the ALJ’s analyses of the consistency and supportability factors.” Id. at *5. In this
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case, however, the ALJ includes his factual predicate in his analysis, such that the Court can
adequately assess how he reached his conclusions. [R. 5-2 at 35-36.]
Ultimately, the ALJ’s explanation is sufficiently detailed to enable B.L. to understand
why Dr. Ramsey’s medical opinion was granted little weight. Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544; Hall v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 148 F. App'x 456, 464 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Nelson v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 195 F. App'x 462, 470 (6th Cir. 2006). And the state agency determinations support the
finding that B.L. was capable of light work. This Court’s role is not to resolve the alleged
conflict in the evidence, but to determine if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.
Ulman, 693 F.3d at 713. Though there may have been evidence to the contrary, the state agency
determinations provide substantial evidence that Lyons does not require severe limitations,
precluding this Court from reversing the ALJ. Id.
B
B.L. next argues that the ALJ discredited his testimony and statements regarding his
psychogenic seizures. [R. 8 at 19.] Specifically, he argues that “the ALJ improperly evaluated
them through the lens of physical impairment, rather than a mental impairment.” [R. 8 at 19.]
ALJs cannot reject a claimant’s “statements about the intensity and persistence of [his] pain or
other symptoms . . . solely because the available objective medical evidence does not
substantiate [his] statements.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2); accord Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d
1027, 1039 (6th Cir. 1994). Other than medical evidence, ALJs should consider: (1) the
claimant’s daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency and intensity of her pain; (3)
precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any
medication he takes to alleviate his pain; (5) treatment other than medication; (6) any measures
he uses to relieve his pain; and (7) other factors concerning his functional limitations and
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restrictions due to pain. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)(i)–(vii); Felisky, 35 F.3d at 1039. The
regulations also permit ALJs to consider “observations by our employees and other persons.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.159(c)(3). ALJs do not have to include “a factor-by-factor discussion” of these
considerations in their opinions. Storey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 98-1628, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 8357, at *9 (6th Cir. Apr. 27, 1999).
Moreover, ALJs can make credibility determinations based on facts from a claimant’s
testimony. Id. Reviewing courts defer to an ALJ’s findings regarding the credibility of the
applicant because the ALJ can observe her demeanor and credibility. Walters v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). “Discounting credibility to a certain degree is
appropriate where an ALJ finds contradictions among the medical reports, claimant’s testimony,
and other evidence.” Id.
In addition to the extensive medical evidence that conflicted with B.L.’s characterization
of his pain, the ALJ included various non-medical reasons to discount B.L.’s testimony. First,
the ALJ considered an observation by seizure witnesses who “noted no postictal state.” [R. 5-2
at 34.] Second, the ALJ noted that B.L.’s “[h]obbies included fishing, exercise, and archery” and
“he worked part-time, 15-20 hours at Papa John’s.” Id. at 35. The ALJ did not rely only on the
objective medical evidence to find that B.L.’s account of his pain lacked credibility. C.f. Felisky,
35 F.3d at 1039 (ALJ only considered the medical record). Instead, the ALJ properly exercised
his discretion to discount B.L.’s credibility. The record reflects substantial evidence in support
of the RFC developed by the ALJ.
III
Thus, after reviewing the record, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision finding

8

B.L. is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence. Even if the evidence could also
support another conclusion, the ALJ’s decision must stand because the evidence reasonably
supports his conclusion. See Her, 203 F.3d at 389-90; Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993).
Accordingly, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is hereby ORDERED
as follows:
1. B.L.’s Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 8] is DENIED; and
2. JUDGMENT in favor of the Commissioner will be entered contemporaneously
herewith.
This the 7th day of March, 2025.

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