Goodin et al v. Knox County, Kentucky et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER:(1) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [R. 5 ] is GRANTED with respect to federal claims against individual Defendants in their official capacities and as to Knox County Detention Center; (2) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [R. 5 ] is GRANTED with respect to state claims against Knox County, Knox County Detention Center, and individual Defendants in their official capacities; (3) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [R. 5 ] is GRANTED with respect to Bill Mi lls, in both his official and individual capacities; (4) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [R. 5 ] is DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief against Defendants in their official capacities; (5) Defendants' Moti on to Dismiss [R. 5 ] is GRANTED with respect to a federal claim for punitive damages against Knox County; (6) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [R. 5 ] is DENIED with respect to federal and state claims for punitive damages against individual Defendants in their individual capacities; (7) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [R. 5 ] is DENIED with respect to the argument that an indispensable party has not been joined; and (8) Defendants' Objection [R. 10 ] to Plaintiffs' sur-reply [R. 9 ], construed as a motion to strike, is GRANTED. Signed by Gregory F. VanTatenhove on 5/3/2012.(RBB)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LONDON
THE ESTATE OF ANGELA GOODIN,
Joseph Goodin, Executor,
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JOSEPH GOODIN, and
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TABITHA GOODIN,
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Plaintiffs,
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V.
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KNOX COUNTY, KENTUCKY,
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KNOX COUNTY DETENTION
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CENTER,
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J.M. HALL, Knox County Judge
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Executive, in his Official and Individual
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Capacities,
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MARY HAMMONS, Jailer for Knox
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County Detention Center, in her Official )
and Individual Capacities,
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BILL MILLS, Deputy Knox County
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Jailer, in his Official and Individual
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Capacities, and
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JOHN DOE(S), as Employees/Officers of )
Knox County Detention Center
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Defendants.
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Civil No: 12-18-GFVT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
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ORDER
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This matter is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [R. 5].
Defendants’ request dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, and Rule 12(b)(7), failure to join a party under Rule 19, of
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion
will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I.
Plaintiffs’ filed their Complaint on January 24, 2012. [R. 1.] The Complaint
contains claims based on federal law, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Kentucky state
law. Angela Goodin’s incarceration and eventual death while in the Knox County
Detention Center on January 28, 2011 provide the factual undergirding for this action.
[Id. at 5.] It is alleged that Goodin died from taking excessive medication and not being
provided medical care. [Id. at 7.] Furthermore, Plaintiffs state that Defendants should
have known Goodin needed care, at least in part because she complained to Defendants
that she was suffering. [Id.] Because of Defendants’ inaction, foreseeable harm was
inflicted on Goodin. [Id.]
II.
Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion argues for dismissal of the following claims:
federal claims against particular defendants [R. 5 at 2-3]; state claims against particular
defendants [Id. at 1-3]; all claims against Bill Mills [Id. at 4]; Plaintiffs’ claim for
injunctive relief [Id. at 8; R. 8 at 4]; and Plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages [R. 5 at 58]. Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(7) motion alleges that the Barbourville Police Department is
an indispensable party.
A.
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “construe[s] the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept[s] its allegations as true, and draw[s] all
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” DirecTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir.
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2007) (citation omitted). The Court, however, “need not accept as true legal conclusions
or unwarranted factual inferences.” Id. (quoting Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d
433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000)). Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion seeks dismissal of all
federal claims against Knox County Detention Center, J.M. Hall, Mary Hammons, and
Bill Mills in their official capacities. [R. 5 at 2-3.] Utilizing that same Rule, Defendants
ask the Court to dismiss any state law claims asserted against Knox County, Knox
County Detention Center, and J.M. Hall, Mary Hammons, and Bill Mills in their official
capacities based on state sovereign immunity. [Id. at 1-3.]
Any claims brought pursuant to § 1983 against Hall, Hammons, and/or Mills, in
their official capacities, are functionally equivalent to claims against Knox County:
“individuals sued in their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they
represent.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). This is because a plaintiff seeking to “recover on a
damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the government entity itself.”
Id. Thus, Knox County is the true defendant when the aforementioned parties are sued in
their official capacities, and those parties are dismissed. See Clark v. Kentucky, 229 F.
Supp. 2d 718, 721-22 (E.D. Ky. 2002) (dismissing official capacity claims). Similar
reasoning holds true for § 1983 claims against Knox County Detention Center. Knox
County is the real party in interest and the proper party against which to bring suit.
Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (cited by Gifford v. Bullitt Cnty.
Jail, 2011 WL 1539795, at *1 (W.D. Ky. April 22, 2011)).
The Motion to Dismiss correctly notes that state claims against Knox County
Detention Center and Hall, Hammons, and Mills, in their official capacities, are
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equivalent to claims against Knox County. See Webb v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court,
802 F. Supp. 2d 870, 886-87 (E.D. Ky. 2011). Whatever immunity is enjoyed by
Kentucky counties, therefore, will also protect Knox County Detention Center and the
individual defendants in their official capacities. Id. at 887; see also Crawford v.
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 2007 WL 101862, at *3 (E.D. Ky.
January 10, 2007) (quoting Benning v. Board of Regents, 928 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1991)
(explaining that state rules of immunity apply to claims premised on state law)).
Precedent is clear that “Kentucky counties are cloaked with sovereign immunity under
Kentucky law by virtue of their status as an arm or political subdivision of the
Commonwealth.” Crawford 2007 WL 101862, at *1 (quoting and citing other sources)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, Kentucky counties’ sovereign immunity is
only waived by decision of the Kentucky General Assembly, not by court decree. Id.
(quoting and citing other sources). “[I]mmunity with respect to the care and keeping of
inmates” has not been waived,1 Webb, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 887, and accordingly, such
claims against Knox County are barred by Kentucky law.
B.
Plaintiffs named Bill Mills, Deputy Knox County Jailer, in his official and
individual capacities, in the header of their Complaint. [R. 1.] Mills was not otherwise
mentioned in the Complaint, notably even being excluded when Plaintiffs demanded
judgment against the Defendants being accused of wrongdoing. [Id. at 13 ¶ 5.] Claims
against Mills in his official capacity have already been dismissed for the reasons outlined
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Furthermore, “[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity extends to actions sounding in both tort and contract.”
Wardle v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Government, 2006 WL 2788951, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 29,
2006).
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above. For the reasons that follow, any claims against Mills in his individual capacity
will also be dismissed.
Recently, the Supreme Court explained that in order “[t]o survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). See also
Courier v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Products, 577 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2009). Stated
otherwise, it is not enough for a claim to be merely possible; it must also be “plausible.”
See Courier, 577 F.3d at 630. According to the Sixth Circuit, “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Plausibility” then, is the benchmark the factual allegations
contained in Plaintiffs’ Complaint must meet in order to defeat Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss.
Plausibility is not achieved in this instance because there is no factual content
tying Mills to Goodin’s death. The allegations of general misconduct are arguably
sufficient to clear the plausibility hurdle, but the Complaint is devoid of facts tying Mills
to the misconduct. Plaintiffs do not allege he denied care to Goodin. Plaintiffs do not
allege he made policy for the detention center or supervised its employees. [See R. 1 at 2
(alleging Hammons was a supervisor and policy-maker).] Plaintiffs do not allege that
Mills was present during this incident. The facts provided in the Complaint do not
comply with the requirements for overcoming a motion to dismiss set forth by the
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Supreme Court in Iqbal. For that reason, claims against Mills in his individual capacity
are dismissed.2
C.
To the extent Plaintiffs are seeking injunctive relief against individual Defendants
in their official capacities, in accord with Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), those
claims persist and Defendants’ motion [R. 5 at 8; R. 8 at 4-5] is denied.3 Ex Parte Young
allows claims for prospective injunctive relief based on federal law: relief that “merely
compel[s] the state officer’s compliance with federal law in the future . . . is sufficient to
invoke the Young fiction.” Perez v. Wade, 652 F. Supp. 2d 901, 906-07 (W.D. Tenn.
2009) (quoting Nelson v. Miller, 170 F.3d 641, 646 (6th Cir. 1999)). Plaintiffs’
Complaint seeks an injunction “requiring the training of all personnel in the care and
treatment of all captives and prisoners and establishing guidelines for the treatment of all
prisoners in custody who have medical afflictions.” [R. 1 at 14.] At this stage of the
litigation, and based on the facts that have been pled, this claim is sufficient to defeat
Defendants’ motion. See Dunn v. Spivey, 2009 WL 1322600, at *5 n.4 (M.D. Tenn. May
11, 2009).
D.
Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages under
both state and federal law. [R. 5 at 5-6.] As to punitive damages sought against Knox
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Defendants attached an affidavit from Mills to their Motion to Dismiss. [R. 5, Ex. 1.] For the reasons
identified in the text, the affidavit is not necessary to support this decision, and the Court rejects Mills’s
affidavit and any information in the motion to dismiss that referenced or relied on Mills’s affidavit. See
Max Arnold & Sons, LLC v. W.L. Hailey & Co., 452 F.3d 494, 503-04 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that if
information outside of the pleadings is not rejected a motion to dismiss is automatically converted to a
motion for summary judgment). In this way, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was not converted to a motion
for summary judgment. See id. at 504.
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Official capacity claims against Mills are excepted and are dismissed. See infra II.B.
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County for violations of federal law, the motion to dismiss is granted. Belk v. Hubbard,
2009 WL 3839477, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 16, 2009) (quoting City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267-68 (1981)). In contrast, a punitive damages claim will
not be precluded for federal claims against Defendants in their individual capacities. Id.
(citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54-56 (1983)); see also Webb v. Jessamine Cnty.
Fiscal Ct., 2011 WL 3847454 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 26, 2011). Similarly, it is premature to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim against individual defendants in their individual capacities based
on state law. KRS § 411.184(2) permits punitive damages, and this case is based on an
individual dying while being detained; it is plausible that this case may justify a punitive
damages award.
E.
Rule 12(b)(7) is also utilized by Defendants as a ground for dismissing Plaintiffs’
claims. [R. 5 at 3.] Defendants’ contend that the Barbourville Police Department acted
contrary to a Kentucky statute in bringing Goodin to the detention center while she was
in need of emergency care. [Id. at 3-4.] On that basis, Defendants’ baldly claim that
Barbourville Police Department is an indispensable party. The Court denies Defendants’
motion.
Analyzing joinder under Rule 19 first requires the Court to determine whether an
entity’s presence is required. Rule 19(a)(1) explains:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not
deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if:
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief
among existing parties; or (B) that person claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the
person's absence may: (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the
person's ability to protect that interest; or (ii) leave an existing party
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subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations because of the interest.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). Further analysis of Rule 19 joinder is unnecessary because the
facts do not dictate that Barbourville Police Department is a required party. Two reasons
are especially salient in justifying this conclusion.
First, Defendants support their argument by merely citing a Kentucky statute that
explains the booking process, part of which states that “an arresting officer shall obtain
medical attention for the person prior to delivery to the jail.” Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS)
71.040. Because Goodin died from drugs which were apparently taken prior to entering
the jail, Defendants’ argue she was in need of emergency care and the statute was not
followed. This argument is misplaced. Whether a KRS provision was followed has no
impact on Knox County Detention Center’s responsibility to follow the Constitution. In
other words, regardless of how Goodin arrived at Knox County Detention Center, once
Goodin was lawfully committed to Knox County’s care, it was required to treat her in
accordance with the Constitution. Knox County’s liability is linked exclusively with that
determination.
Second, the only rule-based provision that might support Defendants’ argument is
Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii)—the possibility of inconsistent obligations. But the risk that
Defendants will be unfairly saddled with liability is not present here. Rather, relief will
be granted only insofar as Knox County is found to have violated Goodin’s constitutional
rights while she was under Knox County’s purview. The interaction that occurred
between Barbourville Police and Goodin has no bearing on the interaction Goodin had
with Knox County. Either, both, or neither could have violated her rights and any relief
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would be granted solely based on that individual entity’s actions. Defendants 12(b)(7)
motion, therefore, will be denied.
III.
Accordingly, and the Court being sufficiently advised, it is hereby ORDERED as
follows:
(1)
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [R. 5] is GRANTED with respect to
federal claims against individual Defendants in their official capacities and as to Knox
County Detention Center;
(2)
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [R. 5] is GRANTED with respect to state
claims against Knox County, Knox County Detention Center, and individual Defendants
in their official capacities;
(3)
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [R. 5] is GRANTED with respect to Bill
Mills, in both his official and individual capacities;
(4)
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [R. 5] is DENIED with respect to
Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief against Defendants in their official capacities;
(5)
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [R. 5] is GRANTED with respect to a
federal claim for punitive damages against Knox County;
(6)
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [R. 5] is DENIED with respect to federal
and state claims for punitive damages against individual Defendants in their individual
capacities;
(7)
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [R. 5] is DENIED with respect to the
argument that an indispensable party has not been joined; and
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(8)
Defendants’ Objection [R. 10] to Plaintiffs’ sur-reply [R. 9], construed as
a motion to strike, is GRANTED.
This 3rd day of May, 2012.
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